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 THE INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION AS A CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISM IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
                  Abstract 
This study investigates the contributory power of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) as 
one of the four mechanisms of Corporate Governance. The primary aim of the research 
is to examine the capacity of the IAF to fulfil its contributory role as one of the four 
cornerstones of CG particularly in the financial sector (FS) of a developing country-
Nigeria. Four research questions were put forward. First, what is the level of 
independence of the IAFs in the Nigerian financial sector (NFS), Second, To what 
extent are the IAFs in the NFS performing their roles in conformity with the Institute of 
Internal Auditors (IIA)’s standards?, Third, how objective are the internal auditors in the 
Nigeria Financial Sector (NFS)?, and finally, to what extent are internal auditors in the 
NFS competent in fulfilling their expected roles? To provide some answers to the 
research questions, the study made use of triangulation of both quantitative and 
qualitative primary data gathered from both questionnaire survey on 88 respondents 
(internal auditors) from firms in the NFS, through purposive sampling method. Four 
hypotheses formulated for the study were tested using both binary logistic regression 
analysis (BLRA) and thematic analysis on the collected data, with the aid of a 
conflation of 3 theories (Agency, Transaction Cost Economy and Institutional theory-
‘’ATI’’).  
Overall, the study provided strong evidence to indicate that the IAFs of the NFS 
cannot be said to be totally independent of management. The study also established that 
the auditing methodology of the IAFs of the NFS is not in tune with the new order of 
internal audit practice (i.e. IIA’s standards). Likewise, the internal auditors in the NFS 
were not found to objective and proficient. Areas requiring improvement include the 
manner of appointment and dismissal of CAEs, irregularity of audit committee meeting 
attendance by the CAEs, insufficiency of training for the IAs as well as their low 
membership with the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA). The originality of the study 
and its key contribution to the body of knowledge reside in the evolution of the 
expansive theoretical framework (‘’ATI’’), and the development of four different 
models applied to investigate the IAF’s contributory power in CG.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.0 Chapter Overview  
The main aim of this chapter is to construct a broad background for the study. 
Examination of the capability of the Internal Audit Function (IAF) to fulfill its 
contributory role as one of the four cornerstones of Corporate Governance particularly 
in the financial sector of a developing country is the focus of this thesis.  The rising 
cases of corporate scandals worldwide in the recent time have resulted into many 
negative impacts on the investing public and other stakeholders (see Porter, 2009; 
Malin, 2010; Adeyemi & Adenugba, 2011; Otusanya & Lauwo, 2010). Unceasingly, 
issue relating to corporate governance has always been visited in finding solutions to 
these un-ending concerns.  
 
While other three key mechanisms of Corporate governance, as  indicated by Gramling, 
et al. (2004)  i.e. External auditing, Audit committee, and Management have been under 
intense criticism due to their seeming failures in addressing the negative incidences and 
ensuring good Corporate governance in corporate entities, much attention however 
seems to have been shifted to Internal auditing as corporate stakeholders seek solutions 
to the perceived breakdown  in the systems of business reporting, internal control and 
ethical behavior apparent in some of these scandals (Boyle, Wilkins & Hermanson , 
2012; Adeyemi & Adenugba, 2011; Hass, Abdolmohammadi & Burnaby, 2006; Sarens 
& Abdolmohammadi, 2011).  
 
This study starts with an acknowledgment of the perspective of four cornerstones of 
corporate governance representing the primary representatives of organisation’s 
stakeholders (i.e. Management, audit committee, external auditor and IAF (see 
Gramling et al.,2004). Also, the many contentions about the relevance of internal 
auditing in maintaining corporate order are also acknowledged and brought to fore. 
 
The continuous push for appreciation of IAF as one of the key mechanisms of sound 
corporate governance, in spite of the many unresolved controversies surrounding its 
relevance and value addition to corporate governance in the literature, suggests the need 
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for an empirical verification of the ability of the IAF for its assumed role of 
strengthening corporate governance, and therefore, the crux of this study.  
 
The chapter is organized as follows. While the next section discusses the motivation and 
scope of the study, sections 1.2 and 1.3 center on the study’s problem definition and the 
research objectives respectively. Section 1.4 itemizes the study’s research questions, 
and section 1.5 gives an overview of the research methods. Section 1.6 highlights the 
significance of the study, and finally, Section 1.7 gives a snapshot of the contents of the 
rest of the chapters covered in the thesis. 
 
1.1      The Motivation and Scope of the study 
The thrust for this research stems from the scant studies and limited literature on the 
issue of IAF’s enhanced roles in corporate governance’s domain. While studies on the 
internal auditing’s theoretical framework, IAF’s changing roles, improved status, and 
how it can be strengthened in response to its rising and challenging roles within the 
corporate governance’s ambit are numerous and multidimensional (Harmanson, 2002; 
Adams, 1994; Dominic & Nonna, 2011; Boyle, Wilkins, & Harmanson, 2012; Pape, 
2007; Swinkels, 2012), little has,  however,  been reported on variables that are 
associated with IAF’s ability to play active role in promoting corporate governance 
(Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & Lenz, 2012; Abiola, 2012).   
 
Whereas, IAF has been argued to be one of the cornerstones of corporate governance, 
startlingly, none of the extant studies on corporate governance, within the knowledge of 
the researcher has specifically attempted to establish empirically, how capable the IAF 
is as a cornerstone of corporate governance in financial sectors, and particularly in 
developing economies.  Incidentally, the Nigerian financial sector (NFS), particularly its 
banking industry, is overwhelmed with issues of poor corporate governance, bothering 
on corporate accountability, risk management, and governance process. Going by 
Gramling et.al (2004)’s position on IAF and their perspective of same as resource to 
each of the other three cornerstones (i.e. external auditor, audit committee and 
management), and the advocacy on the enhanced roles of IAF by the Institute of 
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Internal Auditor (IIA), one may want to say that the respite is here at last. However, the 
un-abated cases of corporate governance’s failure worldwide is a big challenge and 
open up an area of curiosity into capability of the function (IAF) for its enhanced roles 
in ensuring sound corporate governance.  
 
Aside from the limitation of studies on IAF’s capability to deliver enhanced roles in 
corporate governance’s domain, most especially in developing economies, and its 
changing roles within corporate governance’s domain, no study, at least within the 
knowledge of the researcher has specific sectorial focus either from developing or 
developed countries. Likewise, an ideal theoretical paradigm appears yet to be agreed 
despite the numerous studies on IAF’s theorisation specifically devoted to internal 
auditing (see Paape, 2007, 238; Swinkels, 2012; Boyle, 1993; Gendron and Bedard, 
2006). Therefore, efforts geared towards broadening the horizon of theoretical lenses 
currently employed in internal auditing’s research are considered worthwhile. 
Therefore, a thorough reflection on the scant theoretical lenses of internal auditing 
forms part of this research’s outlines. 
  
Of the extant scant studies on internal auditing, and corporate governance, such as 
Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep (2003); Gramling et al. (2004); Munro, & Stewart (2011); 
Burnaby & Hass (2011), Adel, & Maissa (2013); Karagiorgos, et al.(2010), Saren, 
Beedle & Everaert (2009); Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & Lenz (2012); Ebaid (2011);  
Paape (2007); and Swinkels (2012); only Karagiorgos, et al.(2010); Paape, Scheffe, & 
Snoep (2003); Ebaid (2011); Cohen & Sayag (2010) and Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & 
Lenz (2012) studies seem similar to this research based on their focus on IAF and 
corporate governance, and thus provided useful guidance and direction particularly in 
the area of conceptual framework. The other referenced studies appear fragmented in 
approach. For instance, instead of looking at IAF’s role in corporate governance 
through a wider perspective of its interactions with the other three key cornerstones, as 
argued by Gramling et al. (2004), most of the studies applied one to one relationship, 
thus producing mixed and divergent results.  
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Of the ones considered similar to this study based on the contextual focus (Karagiorgos, 
Drogalas, Gotzamanis & Tampakoudis, 2010; Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep, 2003; Ebaid, 
2011; Cohen & Sayag, 2010; and Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & Lenz, 2012), none is 
found to have a specific sectorial focus, therefore, creating a gap which this study aims 
at filling, by focusing an important sector as financial, whose beneficial roles in any 
economy cannot be overemphasized. The recent corporate challenges that ravaged 
economies worldwide further amplify the relevance of this sector across climes (Gras-
Gil, Marin-Hernandez, & Garcial-Perez de Lema, 2012).  The significance of financial 
sector in any economy cannot be overemphasized. The sector is known to serve as the 
lubricant which facilitates the smooth running of any economy (Yaqub & Omobitan, 
2012 ).  
 
Whereas, the linkage between financial sector and economic growth has been a subject 
of discussion over time (Garba, 2014), it is however established that the sector is 
expected to galvanize economies by mobilizing funds from surplus to deficit ends, 
manage the payment systems and facilitate the effectiveness of monetary policies  
(Yaqub & Omobitan, 2012). Ndebbio (2004) relying on his findings from a study 
focusing sub-Saharan African countries establishes that a developed financial sector 
triggers sustainable economic growth. Hicks (1969) using England economy also 
affirms that a well-developed financial sector engenders sustainable economic growth. 
The referenced study emphasizes the interrelationship of nations’ financial sector with 
economic growth by maintaining that the industrialization of England (United kingdom) 
was facilitated by the nation’s developed financial sector which  among other roles 
makes funds available to people and government. Thereby, facilitating production, trade 
and capital formation that resulted in sustainable job creation, and economic 
development in England. The argument is that well-developed financial sector provokes 
sustainable economic growth (Bensivenga, 1995). Other studies that corroborate this 
position include Amara & Quintin (2007), Thornton (1995), Rousseau & Sylla (2001), 
Calderon & Lieu (2002) and Agarwal (2001). 
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The massive bail-out that followed the 1999 global financial meltdown across countries 
is a confirmation of the acknowledgment of the importance of financial sector in any 
economy. Garba (2014) disclosed that the belief of the affected countries is that once 
the financial sector is revived the whole economy shall be revitalized.  
 
The Nigerian financial sector no doubt presents an ideal model of financial sector of a 
developing economy. This is so given that the country’s financial sector like any other 
developing economy’s financial sector has a less-developed capital market which 
indicates the nation’s inability to tap fully into the huge opportunities of capital 
accretion internally, and huge potentials of foreign direct investments that a developed 
capital market offers. The limitation of most developing economies in this regards is 
mainly responsible for their low capital formation, unemployment, poor Gross domestic 
product, low per capital income, and ultimately poor standard of living generally. 
Studies focusing on factors that could further strengthen financial sectors of these 
climes will expectedly provide insights on what to do to address some of the economic 
plagues confronting these economies, and therefore a worthwhile endeavour. 
 
While Karagiorgos, et al. (2010) focuses no specific organization, industry, sector, or  
country, (in addition to the fact that it offers no empirical evidence on the impact of IAF 
on corporate governance), Paape, Scheffe, & Snoep (2003) focus only top listed 
companies in 15 European union (EU) member countries, with no particular sector or 
industry in focus.  Ebaid (2011) no doubt offers a divergent platform on IAF and 
corporate governance studies by focusing an emerging market (Egypt). The study 
however fails to be specific on a particular sector or industry but rather on the countries’ 
listed firms with deliberate exclusion of banks and other financial institutions. The 
author adduces the reason of peculiarity of financial sector’s regulatory framework in 
terms of effectiveness of internal control and compliance with regulations capable of 
ensuring good corporate governance practices. This further indicates continuous neglect 
of this very important sector in academic research on IAF and corporate governance, 
and consequently calls for attention that this study avails. The study’s overall 
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conclusion of doubts about the significance of the IAF as a corporate governance’s 
mechanism in Egyptian firms also stimulates the current study from a similar domain. 
  
In the case of Cohen & Sayag (2010), the focus is on both private and public 
organizations in Israel. Differences in the objectives of private and public organizations 
however may not allow any meaningful inference to be drawn from such study. While 
private organization is profit oriented, public organization is usually service inclined. 
The study of Sarens, Abdolmohammadi & Lenz (2012), no doubts provides very useful 
empirical insights into the subject of the research. The study nonetheless makes 
professional internal auditors of the status of Chief Audit Executive (CAE), and who are 
members of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), its focus. This is a sharp departure 
from the other studies earlier mentioned. As much as the study has its own rationale for 
this, and makes the ampleness of large membership of the IIA in United States of 
America (due to its pioneering status in the field of internal auditing) a justification, the 
referenced research may be said to be ingrained with limitation of generalization of 
result, more so that there is no industry or sectorial focus.  In addition, the results may 
have limitation of professional bias as inclusion of only professional internal auditors 
suggests abinitio that an informed and patterned result may emerge, as opinion of other 
practicing internal auditors, who are not members of the IIA, is not incorporated. This 
study consequently aims at improving on this weakness by incorporating all internal 
auditors (whether or not members of the IIA) in the NFS.  
 
The gaps identified above provide the first motivation for the research. Incidentally, the 
relationship between IAF and corporate governance issues in developing countries 
attracts little attention and focus in academic literatures (Abiola, 2012). To the best of 
the researcher’s knowledge, the few studies identified in this regards are Barac and Van 
Staden (2009), Akinteye, York and Qudrat-Ullah (2015) and Abiola (2012). However, 
the various gaps identified in these studies further motivate this research.  
 
For instance, Abiola (2012), a study of corporate governance in the Nigerian banking 
sector and relevance of internal auditors aside from focusing only the Nigerian banking 
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industry, relies on feedbacks (through semi-structured interview) from 23 internal 
auditors. The significance of sample size in generalization of research findings certainly 
cannot be overemphasized. Wider coverage could have been achieved if the study’s 
focus is extended to cover all firms in a particular sector (for instance, financial sector) 
in the country. In addition, a mixed method approach capable of generating 
corroborative evidences would have yielded a stronger and more reliable result. Sparse 
feedback based on a limited scope on a crucial matter like corporate governance might 
be refuted easily. This study therefore aims at more robust sample size and mixed 
methods (involving both qualitative and quantitative data). 
 
For Akinteye et.al (2015), a study that investigates IAF’s quality in Nigerian listed 
firms, though found evidence that the IAF of Nigerian listed firms is fully integrated 
into the business and as such puts the IAF in good position to function as an effective 
corporate governance’s mechanism, however also fails to concentrate on a particular 
sector of the listed companies. In addition, the study also does not explore the 
corroborative advantage associated with mixed method in behavioural research. Only 
qualitative research approach (interview method) involving descriptive statistical 
analysis was employed. Furthermore, only 8 heads of IAFs were involved in the study’s 
interview. Generalising results emanating from interactions with only 8 heads of IAFs 
for Nigerian listed companies appears too wishful and such outcome is vulnerable to 
criticism particularly that there are more than 8 sectors on the Nigerian Stock Exchange 
(NSE) listing.    
 
Lastly, the finding of Barac and Van Staden (2009) that no correlation was established 
between the defined soundness of the corporate governance’s structures and the 
perceived internal audit quality of participating 30 large companies in South Africa is 
puzzling and further gives credence to the rationale of the current study. A study from 
developing nation (such as South Africa), indicating no correlation between IAF and 
corporate governance contradicts the general position in the literature and certainly is 
expected to trigger further research in this direction particularly from another major 
developing nation in sub-saharan Africa . 
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Worth of note is the concern on the issue of corporate governance in the NFS. Poor 
corporate governance has become a common lexicon in the NFS (Adegbite, 2012; 
Babalola & Adesoji; 2011; Aileman & Ojeka, 2013). Aileman and Ojeka (2013) further 
maintain that boards and management of some major banks in Nigeria were not 
equipped to run their institutions. Internal auditing is a dynamic and evolving profession 
and no longer a branch of accounting profession or a branch of information technology 
(Bou-Raad; 2000). Whereas with a view to promoting the significance of IAF in 
corporate accountability and governance, the IIA was established over seventy years 
ago in the USA, the internal audit profession in Nigeria is however still seeking identity, 
following the full institute status of the IIA Nigeria chapter in 2013.  In the same vein, it 
was discovered that most of the internal audit practitioners in the country currently do 
not associate with the IIA, whose core objective is capacity building through knowledge 
sharing. This type of environment no doubt, presents another divergent platform for a 
study on IAF and corporate governance. 
 
Finally, the position of Nigeria in the Sub Saharan Africa in terms of her population and 
Gross domestic product justifies the focus on the country’s financial sector among the 
other developing economies in the continent. Nigeria is the largest economy in Africa 
(Suberu, et al.; 2015). 
 
1.2 Problem Definition 
The aim of this study is to assess the effectiveness of IAF as a mechanism of corporate 
governance in a developing country, Nigeria, plagued with corporate governance issues 
such as falsification of companies’ financial statements, executive recklessness, and 
abuse of corporate office (Otusanya & Lauwo, 2010), and with budding internal 
auditing profession. 
 
The argument of this study is that if indeed IAF is a key mechanism of corporate 
governance (Gramling et al.; 2004), and a resource to the remaining three key 
components of corporate governance – management, audit committee, and external 
audit, in line with its enhanced role post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, how far 
                                                                                                                                                                             
    
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector 9 
 
has it impacted corporate governance and helped in restoration of public trust 
particularly in the NFS?.  Going by the position of the IIA, an IAF that will add value is 
however expected to be the one that is independent, conduct its activities in conformity 
with established standards, and the one comprising of a team of objective internal 
auditors with high level of proficiency. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The study’s specific objectives which the researcher planned to accomplish were to: 
i. investigate the level of independence of the IAF from management in the 
Nigerian financial sector. 
ii. establish the level of adoption of the IIA’s international standards by the 
IAFs for its engagements in the Nigerian financial sector 
iii. establish the level of objectivity of the individual internal auditors in the 
Nigerian financial sector. 
iv. establish if the internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector possess 
the required level of proficiency to fulfill their expected roles. 
 
The above objectives were converted into research questions (shown in section 1.4 
below). As indicated in chapter 4 of the thesis, 4 different testable hypotheses, and 15 
propositions were formulated to provide empirical answers to the research questions.  
 
1.4 Research Questions   
The following research questions were formulated from the above listed objectives: 
(i) What is the level of independence of the internal audit functions in the 
Nigerian financial sector?. 
(ii) To what extent are the internal audit functions in the Nigerian Financial 
sector performing their roles in conformity with the Institute of internal 
auditors’ standards? 
(iii) How objective are the internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector?.  
(iv) To what extent are internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector 
competent in fulfilling their expected roles?.  
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1.5 Overview of Research Method 
This study adopted triangulation of theories and data with an overall pragmatic 
philosophy, a conflation of both positivism and constructivism philosophical paradigms. 
In line with previous studies in this area of research, primary data (comprising both 
quantitative and qualitative) were applied for this study through a questionnaire survey 
and semi-structured face-to-face interviews. While Binary logistic regression analysis 
(BLRA) was performed on the quantitative date for the test of the hypotheses, thematic 
analysis was performed on the qualitative data. The results of the thematic analysis were 
then applied for necessary corroborations of the findings from the BLRA. In all, 4 
hypotheses were tested.  
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
First, this study has reasonably demonstrated the inadequacy of a singular theoretical 
lens to evaluate the relevance of IAF in the corporate governance’s mosaic, and its 
capability to function as a mechanism of corporate governance. This study forges ahead 
the use of a conflation of three different theories (namely Agency, Transaction Cost 
Economy, and Institutional theory (‘’ATI’’) in the study of IAF’s contributory roles to 
corporate governance.  The tripodal theoretical model (‘’ATI’’) evolving from the study 
has provided a paradigm through which some of the gaps identified in the extant studies 
(reviewed in chapter 4) associated with limitation of theoretical openness, can be 
appropriately addressed. The development of the tripod theoretical model (ATI) 
espoused in the study is a new approach in internal auditing research. This is expected 
to provoke further research endeavours, and broaden the frontier of knowledge 
accordingly.   
 
Second, this research work is the first study to concentrate exclusively only on the 
financial sector which hitherto suffered neglects from researchers in the field of internal 
auditing and corporate governance. Whereas, the study’s outcome could presently be 
limited in generalization to only developing economies, it is however capable of 
stimulating interests of researchers in the financial sectors of developed nations. This is 
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considered a way of gaining insights about the characteristics of IAF in the sector that is 
being shielded from the prevalent scrutiny the IAFs of other sectors face at the moment. 
 
Finally, the four models that evolved conceptually under the study,  aside from being a 
modest response to passionate calls for paradigm shifts in internal auditing and 
corporate governance’s studies (Sarens,2009), and applied to test the study’s hypotheses 
empirically, open a new path for future studies in internal auditing. 
 
1.7 Thesis Organisation 
Following the Introduction of the study covered in this chapter, the rest of the thesis is 
organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background of the study environment and 
sheds light on the status of corporate governance and internal auditing in Nigeria. The 
next two chapters (Chapter 3 and 4) of the thesis deal with the review of literature 
establishing the study’s theoretical underpinnings and empirical review of extant studies 
on internal auditing and corporate governance. The study’s propositions and hypotheses 
are consequently synthesized in chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 5 presents the research design. This gives an account of the research 
methodology adopted for the study, while analyses of the research data are presented in    
both chapters 6 and 7. The summary of the findings of the study, their discussions, 
conclusion, limitations and potential future research opportunities uncovered in the 
course of the study and the study’s major contributions to the body of knowledge are 
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Chapter 2 :  Internal auditing and Corporate governance 
2.0  Chapter Overview  
The objective of this chapter is to discuss the concept of corporate governance 
generally, establish the key mechanisms of corporate governance in organisations and at 
the end, expatiating internal auditing as one of the key mechanisms of corporate 
governance particularly as suggested by existing studies. In doing this, some seminal 
and contemporary studies on corporate governance generally are reviewed, establishing 
there from, some concerns on corporate governance from both developed and 
developing economies. Thereby, identifying the major unresolved issues regarding 
corporate governance particularly from sub-saharan Africa.   
In addition, the history of evolution of internal auditing as a component of accounting 
function is traced, and developments that made it a profession distinct from accounting 
practice are also brought to fore. Also, the nexus between internal auditing and 
corporate governance is discussed and the study’s conceptual framework is 
consequently espoused. Finally, an overview of the Nigerian financial sector and recent 
developments therein (making it a focus of this study) are discussed. 
Overall, this chapter is structured into four main sections. The first section focuses 
discussions on corporate governance generally, highlighting the many unresolved issues 
regarding corporate governance as espoused in extant studies, focusing particularly 
developments on corporate governance in developing economies. 
The second section focuses discussions on auditing generally, concerns about audit 
crunch and efforts made to sustain the relevance of auditing globally, while establishing 
various developments that have led to emergence of internal auditing as a profession 
globally. The third section is on discussion of the relationship between internal auditing 
and corporate governance, and consequently establishes the study’s conceptual 
framework. An overview of the Nigerian financial sector and various recent 
developments in the sector are discussed in the last section.  
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2.1.0  Corporate Governance 
Businesses around the world need to be able to attract funding from investors in order to 
expand and grow (Mallin, 2010). Investors however require certain level of assurances 
on the safety of their funds as well as on the expected returns thereon. These assurances 
are usually and traditionally derived from disclosures made about business status in 
companies’ annual financial statements, duly attested by an independent person 
(auditor). Surprises of the recent years in form of sudden business collapses without any 
premonition particularly as could be gleaned from various disclosures in audited 
financial statements suggest the limitation of audited financial statements in terms of 
completely meeting investors’ information requirements. Therefore, it has become 
evident that additional non-financial information (about operation and management of 
business organizations) are also vital to enable investors have detailed and full 
knowledge about how well their investments are being managed by managers of these 
corporate entities.  
Whereas annual reports may give a reasonably accurate picture of business activities, 
information on many other critical areas of business are not included in companies’ 
annual reports (Mallin, 2010). These critical areas relate to how businesses are being 
run by the management, the processes and structures designed by organizations towards 
achieving its objectives, the manner of business decisions that are taken in running 
corporate entities, the soundness of business decisions taken by those in charge, 
adequacy of various structures put in place by business to carry out their day to day 
activities, the effectiveness of board supervision of the management towards 
achievement of business objectives etc. All these details are woven around governance 
of business organization.  
It is reasoned that further assurances can be provided when investors are abreast of 
governance issues relating to their business. The need for sound corporate practices in 
managing firms’ affairs cannot be overemphasized particularly in retaining the 
confidence and continuous supports of various concerned parties of corporate entities 
(such as investors, shareholders, creditors, suppliers of inputs, employees, governments, 
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host communities etc). Continuous business catastrophes worldwide in recent times and 
the need to put these unpleasant events in control to avoid uncontrolled business 
tragedies globally are the main thrusts for the heightened interests and discussions of 
corporate governance worldwide. Mallin (2010) identifies the phenomenal collapse of 
Enron in 2001 and the subsequent financial quagmires that consumed other numerous 
and big companies in various countries as other landmark disasters that led to the 
increased attention in corporate governance particularly over the last couple of decades.    
Whereas there are varying and very wide viewpoints on the term ‘’Corporate 
governance’’, the term is however generally construed to mean practices, mechanisms, 
structures, rules or processes put in place for administration of corporate entities with an 
overaching motives of ensuring and maintaining fairness to all stakeholders while 
pursuing their objectives. Different legal, economic, political, historical and cultural 
environments across countries however have impacts on the level of good corporate 
practices across nations (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003).  
Unlike developed countries with sophisticated capital markets, sound legal framework 
and low level of corrupt practices, developing countries (such as Nigeria) are endemic 
with high-level of corruption, weak legal and regulatory frameworks, and the 
consequential underdeveloped capital market. These factors hinder ability to attract 
foreign investments that are capable of stimulating rapid economic developments in 
these environments. Therefore, studies that could contribute meaningfully to 
enhancement of corporate governance in these domains are expected to serve as eye-
openers and consequently help in advocacy for best corporate practices. The impacts of 
foreign investments in developing countries cannot be overemphasized, and foreign 
investors continuously look for an environment where good corporate practices exist 
before their commitments.   
2.2.0 Evolution and transition of internal auditing 
Society facilitates initiation and growth of economic entities by providing them with 
resources, and put their control and management in the hands of some “agents” known 
as “the management”. As their command over resources increases, these entities gain 
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significant economic, social and political power and thus accountability is demanded of 
their managers to forestall possible abuse of this power (Porter, 2009). Millichamp & 
Taylor (2008) maintain that the evolution of corporate entities with limited liabilities 
(limited liability company) in 1856, following the liberalization of incorporation of 
companies (with limited liability, through the enactment of the Companies Act of 
1856),  was the greatest gain of industrial revolution.  
This development is however not without some challenges associated with the split 
between ownership and control and the associated contracting costs. One of such major 
issues is the likelihood of opportunistic or selfishness tendencies on the part of the 
management at the expense of the owners.  Millichamp &Taylor (2008), while quoting 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW, 2006), also 
amplify this fear by stating that “no agents are trustworthy, and that if the management 
can make themselves richer at the expense of the principal, of course they will”. Porter 
(2009) re-emphasises that managers are perceived to be in a position to use corporate 
resources for their own, rather than for the shareholders’ benefit.  Also, human frailties 
are such that when the manager is reporting about his stewardship, he may conceal 
some vital facts which are necessary to determine the true state of affairs of the business 
(Olusanya, 2008). Aside from covering up their misdeeds, Sikka, Filling, & Liew 
(2009) add that  directors can maximize their  personal welfare (such as end of year  
bonus) at the expense of shareholders by presenting optimistic or even misleading 
financial statements. 
 
In a bid to thwart these noted tendencies, Olusanya (2008) and Power (1999) in 
Otusanya and Lauwo (2010) explains that auditing and auditors are promoted as trust 
engendering mechanism and watchdog with the capacity to promote a particular kind of 
social order.  An auditor is an independent person, whose duties, among others, include 
investigating and examining the business transactions with a view to reporting whether 
the financial statements prepared by the business managers (agents) to indicate periodic 
performances represent a “true and fair view” of the state of affairs of the business.  
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Auditing thus lends credibility to financial statements of companies (Hayes et al.2005; 
Carpenter et al. 2004).  
 
Adeniyi (2010) hinted that roles analogous to audit dates back to many hundreds of 
years. This he elucidates, began in the ancient Egypt and Rome, where people were 
employed to assess endeavours of tax collectors and estate managers, with a view to 
ascertaining whether returns made by them are accurate and devoid of irregularities. 
Audit profession however can be said to commence in the 20th century, following the 
enactment of the Companies Act 1900, which specifically made it obligatory for 
directors of companies to produce annual accounts (Millichamp & Taylor 2008). 
 
The owners of business (hereafter referred to as “shareholders”), who had vested their 
power of oversight on managers of their investments in the hands of few among them 
(the board of directors-‘’BoDs’’), need to be assured that their business is being well 
managed and will continue to be profitable (Mallin, 2010), after all, it is generally 
assumed that shareholders have resolved to delegate wealth to directors to have their 
(shareholders’) wealth maximized (Sikka, Filling & Liew, 2009). The annual reports 
(ARs) or accounts presented to them in annual general meetings (AGMs) serve this 
assurance purpose. This assurance is however further enhanced when it is reported upon 
by an independent person (also engaged by the shareholders), that such is in accordance 
with accepted accounting standards and gives a “true and fair view” of the business 
activities (i.e assurances of full disclosure and conformity to generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP)). What connotes “true and fair” view in financial 
statement’s audit though contentious and debatable, is however not the focus of this 
study. 
 
Today, a much wider range of people are interested in the annual reports and accounts 
of companies.  Millichamp & Taylor (2008) indicate that aside from the owners of the 
business, other group of people that may be interested in this assurance include:  
i.  employees of the company, 
ii. customers, 
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vii. the public, including those who are interested in issues such as consumer 
protection, environmental protection, and political, as well as other 
pressure groups, 
viii. the government, including tax authorities and regulatory agencies, and 
ix. people who act in the advisory capacity to all the parties aforementioned. 
These include accountants, stockbrokers, credit rating agencies, financial 
journalists, and financial analysts. 
From the above, it may therefore be contested that the society in general wants to be 
assured that companies’ annual reports (also called financial statements) can be relied 
upon. This position aligns with Porter (2009)’s argument that managers of large public 
companies today are considered to be accountable to society as a whole for a wide range 
of corporate activities. 
 
Reflecting on the above exposition therefore, it can be seen that auditing of financial 
reports of companies, prepared by the management adds assurances of full and accurate 
disclosures, conformity to GAAPs, or applicable financial reporting framework, before 
users of such reports, particularly the owners. These assurances are however, given after 
a systematic process of objectively obtaining and evaluating evidences regarding 
management’s assertions about economic activities of an entity. The degree of 
alignment between the various assertions and established criteria (such as control 
systems, the GAAPs, financial reporting framework) are then ascertained and 
communicated to the interested users, by an independent person, called auditor. It is the 
process of arriving at such opinion that is referred to as “auditing”.  
 
2.2.1  Internal and External Audit 
Given that the company’s directors are saddled with the responsibility of producing 
‘’true and fair’’ accounts (Millichamp & Taylor, 2008), they are therefore expected to 
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maintain all reasonable level of controls in the business that will ensure correctness, and 
completeness of recording of all financial transactions in the business, It will be 
depressing for the directors of organisations , while carrying out their stewardship role 
to rely on the external auditor for the effectiveness of their organisation’s internal 
control system as the external auditor is considered not privy to the contract of agency 
that exists between the owners and them. The external auditors only concern themselves 
with testing of the efficiency and reliability of the internal control systems put in place 
by the directors, with a view to gauging the degree of the risk involved in case of failure 
of such, and also to know the highest risk area where greater audit effort should be 
directed (Millichamp & Taylor, 2008). 
 
It is with the intention of ensuring effectiveness of an organisation’s internal control 
systems that directors initiate an ‘’internal watchdog’’. Who is expected to keep an eye 
over the various control systems initiated by the management to ensure that their 
instructions and guidelines are adhered to in the course of running the organisation’s 
affairs on behalf of their principals, the shareholders. This management’s internal 
mechanism is referred to both in literature and practice as ‘’internal audit’’. In practice 
however, it is allowed and equally found that the roles of this internal mechanism are 
handled by external auditor, acting however as subcontractors (Millichamp & Taylor, 
2008). This audit exercise whether provided by an in-house staff or outsourced, the 
concern is ‘’independence’’. The rising controversy over ‘’make or buy’’ decision of 
IAF is examined in details in chapter 4, 7 and 8 of the thesis. In summary, the concept 
of auditing is better appreciated when it is looked at being classified into two (internal 
and external audit). Omoteso (2006) reaffirms that audit can be categorised into external 
and internal, according to the primary beneficiaries. The major differences between the 
two functions are as shown below: 
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Table 2.1: Differences between Internal and External Audit 
 
2.2.2  Auditor’s Esteem 
The privilege hitherto enjoyed by external auditor is utterly disappearing due to 
numerous cases of audit failure.  Reliance on corporate auditing and auditor’s claims of 
being able to objectively ascertain the  state of the financial affairs of business entities 
are routinely weakened and being challenged by unexpected corporate collapses, frauds, 
financial scandals and general crisis of capitalism (Sikka, Filling, & Liew, 2009). 
Incidences of audit failure associated with falsification of annual reports is nauseatingly 
 Internal audit External audit 
Objectives evaluation of organisation’s risk 
management  processes and systems control 
and to make recommendations for the 
achievements of organisational objectives 
expression of an opinion on 
whether the financial statements 
show a true and fair view, and 
whether proper accounting records 
have been maintained 
Scope all aspects of the organisation’s activities, 
including operational considerations and 
compliance issues 
financial records and processes, 
risk management processes 
Responsibility  Management Shareholders 
Approach i. risk based 
ii. evaluation of internal control 
systems 
 
iii. testing of systems 
iv. evaluation of operational efficiencies 
i.    risk based 
ii.    testing of basis on which 
financial accounts are 
produced and reliability of 
systems 
iii.    verification of assets and 
liabilities. 
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becoming more and more rampant across economies – US: Enron, Worldcom, Global 
Crossing, Cendent, Sunbeam and Waste Management; UK: BCCI, Independent 
Insurance, Equitable Life, Maxwell and Polly Peck; Germany: Metallgesellscheft 
among others (Okaro and Okafor, 2009).  
 
While in Nigeria, external auditors of companies such as Lever Brothers (now Unilever 
Nigeria Plc), African Petroleum Plc (now Forte Oil Plc), and Cadbury Nigeria Plc had 
been fingered for cases of audit failures (see Okaro and Okafor, 2009; Uadiale, 2010; 
Otusanya and Lauwo, 2010; Adeyemi and Fagbemi, 2011), unfortunately, financial 
institutions are not left out of this window dressing and audit failure issue. The Central 
Bank of Nigeria (CBN)’s directive in 1999 to banks to restate their financial statements 
to fully recognize huge stock of “toxic assets” warehoused in billions of Naira further 
attests this allegation. Restatement of corporate accounts at least may be taking as an 
evidence of account falsification. 
 
The resulting effect of the scandals on the investing public (Porter, 2009) were the main 
reason for drawing attention towards the quality of financial statements and invariably 
questioning the relevance of external auditors as trust engendering mechanism and 
watchdog, in ensuring that “true and fair” financial statements are produced at least 
(Otusanya and Lauwo, 2010).  External auditors are no doubts in a unique position in 
monitoring the fairness of financial statements and other information produced by 
corporate managers (porter, 2009). They alone have the statutory rights and privileges to 
request for organisations’ records in search of the required evidences on management’s 
assertions on economic activities of entity under their care, as indicated by Porter 
(2009).  
However, business failures characterised by deficient financial reporting and fraudulent 
corporate disclosures have figured prominently, and indeed no longer a new 
phenomenon both in developed and developing economies (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 
2011).  For over three decades or so, the extent and brutality of the impact of 
unexpected corporate failures and revelations of cases of transgression and reckless 
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management by senior company officials have demonstrated that the two fold approach 
(management on one side, and external auditor on the other side) to securing corporate 
accountability and ensuring social order may have become inadequate (Porter, 2009, 
Otusanya & Lauwo, 2010, Sikka, Filling, & Liew 2009). This has had a negative and 
cumulative impact on the way informed opinion views financial reporting and the 
auditing profession in particular (Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2011; Porter, 2009, Otusanya & 
Lauwo, 2010; Sikka, Filling, & Liew 2009).  
The auditor’s connection with failing or distressed companies has created a firestorm of 
controversy (Carpenter et al. 2004), thus smearing the esteem of external auditors. In 
the last decade, studies have shown that the auditing profession has had to deal with a 
lot of challenges than it has done in its lengthy history which spans over one hundred 
years (Mactosh, Francis, & Ongocho, 2010; in Adeyemi & Fagbemi, 2011).  
While there has been serious defence made to exonerate accountants and of course 
auditing professionals by some scholars such as Defond, Francis, and Carcelo (2005), 
accounting and auditing profession continues to receive blows due to the alleged and 
established cases of their professionals’ involvement in some of the scandals. These 
professions are being questioned about the ethical standards of their members that were 
said to be involved.  Members of the society do expect these watch dogs to at least 
sound early warning signals whenever fraud and other irregularities are observed 
(Otusanya, & Lauwo, 2010). An emerging body of literature however argues that 
accounting professionals have increasingly applied their expertise to facilitate, conceal 
and promote anti-social practices (Sikka, 2008a; Us Senate Permanent Sub-committee 
on Investigations, 2005; Bakre 2007; in Otusanya, and Lauwo, 2010).  Bakre (2007)  
while looking at the unethical practices of accountants and auditors and the 
compromising stance of professional bodies in the corporate world, cited Nigeria (a 
developing country) to affirm that accountants and auditors were partly responsible for 
cases of  distress and closure of companies and banking institutions in Nigeria.  
Adeyemi (2004), while lending his voice on this great concern, states that there is a 
general opinion that modern day Nigerian accountants are mere tools in the hands of 
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perpetrators of fraud. If external auditors are being alleged of collaborating with 
company’s management to perpetrate their con, the question therefore is how 
independent of the management are the external auditors, and how reliable are the 
audited financial statements?. Is this suggestive of non-sufficiency of principal’s 
monitoring cost?. 
The involvement and culpability of accountants and auditors in unethical practices and 
conflicts of interest have long been documented by critical accounting scholars in 
developed and developing countries (Garcia-Benau and Humphrey, 1992; Sikka and 
Willmot, 1995; Cousins et al., 2000; Bakre, 2007; Sikka, 2008; Sikka et al. 2009; 
Gue’nin-Paracini and Gendron, 2010). The major reference point in the annals of 
auditor’s misdeeds is the case of Enron, the Texas (USA)-based energy trading 
company which shook up the auditing profession worldwide due to the case of fraud 
facilitation and unethical behaviour of the company’s auditor – Messrs Arthur 
Andersen.  Enron debacle caused a crisis in respect of the confidence placed on auditors 
and raised questions on the reliability (and relevance) of financial reporting (Otusanya, 
and Lauwo, 2010).  
Arthur Anderson was accused of issue of conflict of interest which led to it (Arthur 
Anderson) being accused of professional misconduct and other unethical accounting 
practices (Michell and Sikka, 2002).   
As indicated by Otusanya and Lauwo (2010), the quality of the audit and the 
independence of the auditors were questionable because Arthur Andersen was also 
rendering non-audit professional services for Enron and earned substantially high fees 
in respect of same. For instance, the audit firm earned $55million for regular exchanges 
of employees within Enron from Arthur Andersen, causing conflict of interest and 
thereby affecting the auditor’s independence (Otusanya and Lauwo, 2010).  Auditors 
cannot give unbiased opinions unless they are independent of all parties involved 
(Millichamp & Taylor, 2008). The lack of independence on the part of the external 
auditors may be considered to be the source of the malaise that is plaguing the corporate 
world across the globe.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
    
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector 23 
 
The unceasing criticism of the auditing profession essentially boils down to issues of 
audit quality (Defond, Francis, and Carcelo, 2005), associated with enfeebled auditor’s 
independence. While Defond, Francis, and Carcelo, (2005) do not seem to appreciate 
the familiarity threat associated with Arthur Andersen’s earning of about same amount 
from non-audit services as from audit services in the referenced case, they however hint 
that the issue of objectivity and independence are part of the thrusts for SOX 2002.  
“The engagement characteristic addressed in SOX that garnered  
           the most attention  is the auditor’s provision of non-audit services  
          and the potential for these services to compromise the auditor’s  
          objectivity and independence’’ 
 
Auditors are not only required to be independent in fact and in attitude of mind, but 
must be seen to be so (Millichamp & Taylor, 2008). If Arthur Andersen is seen to have 
compromised its independence in the referenced case, then of what substance is the 
acclaimed independence?. Similarly, the investigations into the collapse of Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), one of the largest bank failures that have 
taken place worldwide, implicated the external auditor, Pricewaterhouse Coopers 
(PWC), who acted as both private consultant and tax advisor to the bank’s management 
in order to enhance its own private profits (Arnold and Sikka, 2001, Mitchell et al, 
2001).  A case of compromised independence was proven against the external auditor 
who was said to have accepted loans and financial benefits from the BCCI’s 
management (Arnold and Sikka, 2001).   
 
The issue of due diligence expected of auditors is another matter that came up in Arthur 
Andersen and WoldCom Saga, where the audit firm was found to have failed to take 
proper steps to detect accounting irregularities (Wong, 2004 in Otusanya and Lauwo, 
2010).  The Enron case earlier mentioned also highlights the overriding need for the 
external auditor to be able to ask searching questions without holding back for fear of 
offending a lucrative client (Mallin, 2010). One therefore wonders if an external auditor 
whose hand is already soiled can have enough courage to question a company’s 
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management team when it matters. Does this suggest vote of no confidence on external 
auditor? 
 
Going by the saying, “he who pays the piper dictates the tune’’; one can also predict the 
likely impact of the persistent flaw in the manner of engagement and retention of 
external auditor on their independence. This phenomenon, according to Ronen & 
Cherny (2003) implicitly makes the auditor beholden to his client and its management. 
While conventional wisdom, according to the writers sees nothing wrong in the 
situation, it may however make the auditor to end up seeing things through the eyes of 
management without even realising it.  
 
Looking at the issue of diminishing esteem accorded the external audit, and what could 
have triggered it aside from auditor’s alleged unethical roles in corporate collapse,  
Okike (2004);  DeFond, Francis & Carcello (2005); Sikka (2009); and Ronen & Cherny 
(2003); in their different studies identify: developments within information technology, 
ever dynamic business world with its various challenges, relaxed legal framework, 
anachronistic audit standards, non-suitability of the extant curriculum and professional 
accounting education to produce the required skill set for modern day auditors faced 
with the issue of assurance in this modern business time. These changes and challenges 
have had (and will continue to have) significant impact on the auditing profession 
(Okike, 2004).  
 
It is beyond dispute that the movement from an industrial economy to an information 
economy has wrought massive changes on the nature of business, accounting and 
auditing (Ronen & Cherny, 2003). During the era of industrial economy, client’s books 
and records were maintained manually for all intents and purposes, and there were 
major gaps in data. The auditor’s primary focus then was validation of data. Auditors 
thus expended major efforts to verify records through such activities as extensive 
counting of inventory and confirming accounts receivables and payables with external 
parties. Other than long term assets and debt, by the time the auditor’s field work was 
completed, the rest of the balance sheet had usually completed its cycle, with most of 
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the inventory turned over, most of the receivables collected, and most of the payables 
settled. This thus enabled the auditor to look back and further validate his assessment of 
the data and valuations as at the statement date.  Stressing the above point further, 
Ronen & Cherny (2003) indicate that long term projects were accounted for on a 
percentage–of-completion basis, but auditors had methods and techniques such that they 
were confident in the carrying of the projects. 
 
With the advent of information technology (IT), and the continuous eruption in IT 
world however, business data are produced electronically with ease, and in volumes 
thus posing the challenge of data overload, and putting the auditor at the mercy of the 
data processing systems: the ‘’black box syndrome’’ (Ronen & Cherny 2003). Closely 
related to this challenge is the impact on auditing profession, of the very dynamic 
business environment with bouquet of ‘’financial derivatives’’, the movement from 
tangible to intangible assets with very long lives, and from liabilities whose principle 
and terms are known and specified to liabilities whose principle and terms are legally 
related to and dependent on other factors. Evidently, even Nobel prize winners in 
economics had difficulty in gauging market turbulence and arrive at an objective 
valuation of complex financial instruments (Sikka, Filling, and Liew, 2009).  It is 
therefore doubtful if auditors are more knowledgeable, or can make better assessment of 
market volatility to verify valuation of complex financial instruments (Sikka, Filling, 
and Liew,2009).  Sikka, Ronen & Cherny (2003) note that the above scenario thus puts 
the auditor at the mercy of the client, and that auditors are therefore naturally tempted to 
adopt the client’s position. These concerns on inadequacy of external auditors’ 
competence in the modern day business world further raise the pessimism on the 
relevance of external auditors and reliability of audited accounts carrying their 
attestation.   
One point that is clear from the above exposition is that the relevance of audited 
financial statements is continually becoming doubtful, as the various accounting 
scandals in the corporate world have called into question the value of the financial 
statements audit, and increases the societal awareness on corporate accountability. 
Incidentally, external auditors, being the easiest target, according to Ronen & Cherny 
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(2003) are always singled out as the culprits.  Issues bothering on auditor’s 
independence, competence and due diligence usually characterise the basis of public 
aspersion on external auditors.   
 
While the concerned professionals and some accounting scholars may not subscribe to 
the notion that audit cord is broken, with a view to minimising societal fury against the 
auditing profession, ensuring sanctity of financial reporting, and promoting good 
corporate accountability probably, some measures identified by accounting scholars 
who are also worried about the rising negative public view on auditing as a tool of 
corporate accountability include: 
i. modification of the anachronistic audit standards (Ronen & Cherny, 
2003; ). 
ii. adoption of audit trinity approach, encompassing external audit, internal 
audit and audit committee (Porter, 2009), this recommendation may not 
be unconnected with Sikka, Filling and Liew (2009)’s contention that the 
current audit model is flawed and cannot be rectified.  
iii. fortification of the legal framework as it relates to auditors’ ingenious 
caveat on liability on failed audit (Sikka, Filling and Liew, 2009). 
iv. adoption of financial statement insurance (FSI), that will involve an 
intermediary, an insurance company (as recommended by the proponent) 
between company’s management and auditors. The FSI (as 
recommended by Ronen & Cherny, 2003;), will play the role of an 
underwriter of audit service, and will thus be the one that will be in 
charge of  appointment and dismissal of external auditors and will also 
take all liability arising from the audit services. This according to them 
will engender external auditors’ independence, and further shield them 
from the public continuous disparagement.    
 
2.2.3  Stature of Internal Auditing 
Historically, internal audit has been considered as a monitoring function, the 
‘’organizational policeman and watchdog’’, tolerated as a necessary component of 
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organizational control but deemed subservient to the achievement of major corporate 
objectives (Karagiorgos et al, 2010). However, internal audit has evolved considerably 
since the IIA was established in the United States in 1941 (Bota-Avram, 2011). The 
institute is dedicated to the furtherance of the state of the arts (both in philosophy and 
practice) of internal auditing (Dittenhofer, 2001). Dittenhofer (2001) and Swinkels 
(2012) further emphasize that since its inception that spanned over seventy (70) years, 
the institute has pre-occupied itself with the practice of quality internal audit, its edicts, 
its statements of responsibilities and body of ethics. The growing stature of internal 
auditing across climes might not be unconnected with the increasing “vote of no 
confidence’’ on external audit as a means of fortifying corporate accountability, arising 
from their smeared image in connection with various corporate scandals, and the need to 
retain public confidence in corporate sustainability (Sarens et al., 2011).  Burnaby & 
Hass (2011), and Sarens et al. (2011) disclose that the significance of the internal 
auditing profession has grown dramatically over the last decade as the numerous frauds 
and whimsical practices of financial management has escalated. 
Traditionally, the internal audit focus is on company’s internal control. Putting this 
succinctly, Ebaid (2011) indicates that it is designed to safeguard firm’s assets, and 
assist in the production of reliable accounting information for decision making 
purposes. If truly the IAF is meant to assist in the production of reliable accounting 
information, then one wonders the level of interaction between this mechanism and 
external audit in pursuance of their role of attestation on management’s assertions on 
financial transactions.   
Moreover, according to Martin & Lavine (2000), understanding of both the financial 
and operational aspects of the firm is one of the core competencies of internal auditors.  
Accordingly, if this competency can be leveraged for increased external audit’s 
efficiency and effectiveness, significant overall cost savings is anticipated (Gras-Gil, 
Marin-Hernandez, & Perez de Lema, 2012).  One therefore expects high level of 
collaboration between the external auditor and internal auditor in improving the quality 
of external audit. The question is whether the need for this level of relationship is 
appreciated by the concerned. The findings of Gras-Gil, Marin-Hernandez, & Perez de 
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Lema (2012) which indicates that greater collaboration of external auditor with internal 
auditor promotes quality financial reporting in Spanish banks provides an head start in 
this direction.   
While external auditor’s reliance on the work of internal audit has been researched for 
almost three decades (Clark et al., 1980; Margheim, 1986; Schneider, 1985; 
Whittington & Margheim, 1993), the focus of many studies has been on the objectivity, 
work performance and competence of the internal auditors (Brown, 1983; Messier & 
Schneider, 1988; Schneider, 1985).  Considering the fact that there is now a closer 
alignment between external audit role and internal audit focus in this changed audit 
environment, triggered by the eruption in business world, further examination of this 
relationship (i.e. between internal and external audit ) is thus warranted (Munro & 
Stewart, 2011). 
 
Going by the definition of the IIA (IIA, 1999, 2004), internal audit is defined as ‘’an 
independent, objective assurance and consulting activity designed to add value and 
improve an organisation’s operations. It helps an organization accomplish its objective 
by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness 
of risk management, control and governance process’’.  
 
Internal audit is conceptualized in theory as both an assurance and consulting activity 
concerned with evaluating and improving the effectiveness of risk management, control 
and governance process (Munro and Stewart, 2011).  Obviously, this is an expanded 
vista over the initial restrictive focus of keeping an eye over the various control systems 
initiated by the director to ensure that their instructions and guidelines are adhered to in 
the course of running the organisation’s affairs on behalf of their principals, the 
shareholders.  This new definition shifts the focus of the IAF from one of assurance to 
that of value added through consulting (Nagy, & Cenker 2002; Porter, 2009; 
Karagiorgos, et al., 2010; Ebaid, 2011; Burnaby, & Hass, 2011).  The objectives of 
internal audit are therefore generally more inclusive. Its scope may include operational 
audits, reviews of projects and programs, management audits, and other related 
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assignments (Buenger, & zamir, 1991). As a matter of fact, some voices were 
suggesting that the 21st century internal auditor must be prepared to audit virtually 
everything.  
 
The increased roles assumed by the IAF has no doubt, necessitated an expansion of the 
skill set and attributes that internal auditors need to perform their work as efficiently as 
possible (Bota-Avram, 2011). Martin (2013) argues that transforming the IAF requires 
sufficient resource, expertise and capabilities. Capabilities around industry specific 
knowledge, insight skills to address financial reporting, information technology 
security, data analysis, understanding of operational challenges, compliance 
requirement, business analysis,  critical thinking, communication science, Enterprise 
Risk Management (ERM), risk valuation, etc,.  Appreciating the need for a wide 
departure in auditors approach, and the need for up to date and multifarious skills, 
Allison (1994) argues that an internal auditor who operates by yesterday’s rules, and 
approaches the future by looking in the rear view mirror runs the risk of failing to do his 
job properly.  Quoting an excerpt of the PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC), on its findings 
on 2014 state of the internal audit profession study in May 2014, 
‘’ this year’s research once again confirms that today’s increasingly complex and risky 
business landscape has resulted in many internal audit functions struggling to be 
viewed as valuable. Further, internal audit’s ability to build the right capabilities and 
deliver on expectations continues to be challenged’’. 
 
It is with this great challenge that the IIA while bracing up for the enhanced role makes 
the issue of capacity building through collegiality a priority. In this modern and rapidly 
changing business world, characterized by continuous revolution in information 
technology and very stiff business competition, it is nevertheless, doubtful if the 
recommended skill sets are available in most IAFs, particularly in a developing 
economy, such as Nigeria, where internal auditing profession is just evolving with scant 
membership (currently around four hundred).  Thus, the researcher’s keenness in 
establishing if the internal auditors in the NFS possess adequate level of competence to 
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fulfill their enhanced roles, as included in the research objectives. Outcome of this 
exploration will assist to address the issue of ‘’make or buy decision’’ of IAF.  
 
Reflecting once again on the IIA definition, it can be seen that internal audit is not only 
characterized as an independent, but also as an objective activity (Swinkels, 2012).  The 
issue of independence and objectivity affects both the external audit and internal audit. 
This according to Power (2003), affirms that all audits irrespective of categorization 
possess the same general characteristics. Interestingly, the IIA standards require internal 
audit to assist the organization in maintaining effective controls by evaluating their 
effectiveness and efficiency and by promoting continuous improvement (Schneider, 
2009).  How objective the internal auditors are and to what extent are all these standards 
being adopted in IAF’s activities, also form areas of concern under this study, and are 
thus included in the study’s objectives.  
 
The emergence of audit committee of the board in the domain of corporate 
accountability is with a view to ensuring the independence of the auditor.   Literature 
suggests that a valuable audit committee should play an important role in strengthening 
the financial controls of a business entity.  A number of studies have found that 
companies with an audit committee, particularly when that committee is active and 
independent are less likely to experience fraud (Beasely, et al., 2000; Abbott, et al., 
2000; McMullen, 1996) and other reporting irregularities (McMullen, 1996; McMullen 
& Raghunandan, 1996). Independence and objectivity appear the watchword in 
promoting the effectiveness of the trinity audit function of external auditor, internal 
auditor and even audit committee.  Of interest therefore is examination of the level of 
interaction that exists between IAF and audit committee.  According to Raghunandan, 
Read, & Rama (2001), empirical research related to audit committee’s processes such as 
the interaction between audit committees and internal auditors is in development stage, 
previous researchers such as McMullen (1996), and Scarbrough et al (1998) contend 
that further studies are needed to provide increased understanding of audit committee’s 
processes and activities.     
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The internal auditor by virtue of his engagement as an employee of an organization has 
his reporting line directed  to the management, and by virtue of his assurance and 
consulting roles is a powerful tool not only on the issue of internal control effectiveness 
but also in the area of calibrating business risks, and recommending appropriate 
mitigants for their management. 
 
In the course of discharging his responsibilities to both the management and audit 
committee, the internal auditor faces a lot of dilemma, arising from the divergence of 
goals between the two masters. For example, while the audit committee sees the IAF as 
capable of giving them the necessary hints on effectiveness and adequacy of firm’s 
internal control, management may not see the value-added aspect of controls-related 
activities and divert IAF’s focus away from such activities and more towards activities 
that produce immediate, contemporaneous cost savings (Gray,2004; Anderson, 2003). 
This is so, given management’s perception of IAF as a powerful business tool that can 
enhance the firm’s economic performance (Abbot, Parkers, & Peters, 2010). This 
challenge of serving two masters underlies inclusion of the relationship of the IAF with 
both the management and the audit committee under the study’s focus.  
 
2.2.4   Reflections on Internal auditing profession and its legitimisation 
Whereas, internal auditing as a profession can be said to have benefitted greatly from 
the unparalleled and concerted efforts of the IIA (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010; Bota-
Avram and Popa, 2011; Gacon, 2013), which is acknowledged as a reputable, global 
professional body driving the practice of, and laundering the image of internal auditing 
across climes (O’Regan, 2001, Bota-Avram and Popa, 2011), yet the issue of 
legitimization of the internal auditing profession can be said to remain contentious 
(Gacon, 2013). The major contention on the legitimization of the internal auditing 
profession is the lack of exclusivity of the profession on matters of IAF (O’Regan, 
2001; Gacon, 2013).  
Clarity of mapping of jurisdiction of activities places value of elitism and prestige on 
profession (Gacon, 2013). Of concern therefore, is the fact that other non-internal 
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auditing professionals also fight fiercely to encroach the territory ordinarily expected to 
be within the exclusive jurisdiction of internal audit professionals. This is being made 
possible through outsourcing of IAF  in organisations (discussed fully in chapter 4). 
Since the mid-1990s, internal audit has increasingly been outsourced to public 
accounting firms, and this trend has led to a competitive relation between the internal 
and external auditors (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010). The issue of outsourcing of IAF has 
become a serious matter of competition between internal auditor and external auditors 
(Rittenberg and Covaleski, 2001). Gacon (2013) maintains that the ‘’big four’’ audit 
firms are in a superior position in this competition due to the fact that businesses often 
desire to outsource their IAF to them given their extensive knowledge and experience 
(considered appropriate for internal audit activity) acquired through auditing financial 
reports and consulting projects. Thus motivating what Abbot (1988) refers to as 
intellectual jurisdiction. Intellectual jurisdiction, according to Abbot (1988) refers to a 
situation where the superior profession controls the knowledge base, but allows other 
occupations to practice more or less unrestricted.  
Contrary to their claim of expertise, the members of external audit profession appear 
very skeptical about internal auditor’s competence. A study carried out by Arena and 
Jeppesen (2010) to analyse the process of professionalisation of internal auditing in 
Denmark, applying Abbot (1988)’s perception, indicates that external auditor ordinarily 
desires to keep internal auditors in a subordinate position (Arena and Jeppesen, 2010). 
The author went further by stating that internal auditors in Denmark actually derive 
their legitimacy mainly from the public perception of them as assistants to the external 
auditors, their legitimacy is derived from the society’s perception of them as the ‘’right-
hand men’’ of the external auditors.  
While discussing the need for further legitimization of the profession, O’Regan (2001, 
p.217 ) in his article titled ‘’Genesis of a profession: towards professional status for 
internal auditing’’, synthesized the definition of a profession as: 
  ‘’an occupation based on advanced, complex, or esoteric knowledge, 
   backed by a social legitimacy deriving from both an institutional 
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   framework and a credible ethical basis (however disputed the latter 
   may be)’’ 
The above definition of a profession, the author indicates is inspired by reflections on 
both the functionalist and interactionist’s perspectives of profession as captured in 
sociological literature. Whereas the functionalist perspective according to the author 
sees ethical legitimacy as crucial to the definition of a profession, the interactionist’s 
paradigm is a complete shift from this mindset, seeing emergence of a profession as 
expressions of institutional self-interest. Rather than altruistic groups of citizens serving 
society, professionals are perceived by the interactionists as greedy and suspicious 
groups of men and women craving economic advantage and social prestige in a ruthless 
manner.     
Macdonald (1995, p. xii), while describing this paradigm shift between the 
functionalists and interactionists, states as follows: ‘’The sociological question change 
from what part do professions play in the established order of society’’, to ‘’How do 
such occupations manage to persuade society to grant them a privileged position’’?. 
Chambers and Odar (2015) also agree with this paradigm by maintaining that ‘’society 
cedes professional status to an occupational group when it is in society’s best interest to 
do so”. 
While analysing the internal auditing as a profession along his conceptualized definition 
of profession, O’Regan (2001), concurred that the IIA has truly created the trappings of 
a formal proto-professional framework, with a defined body of knowledge, and an 
institutional framework that delivers certifications (Bota-Avram and Popa, 2011), a 
sophisticated literature (including serials), research activities, written standards and a 
public service ethos embodied in a code of ethics.  Going by this submission, and 
complemented by endorsements of internal auditing evidenced by its increased visibility 
in the corporate governance landscape, one may want to say that internal auditing 
profession has achieved remarkable level of legitimization (Bota-Avram and Popa, 
2011).  
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Questions are however being raised about the legitimization of internal auditing as a 
profession (see O’Regan, 2001; Gacon, 2013; and Chambers & Odar, 2015) . For 
instance, O’Regan (2001) raises doubts about the full legitimization of the profession by 
raising the following critical issues against the profession: 
i. ill-defined symbolism and mythology, 
ii. short term tenor of internal audit professionals in organisations 
iii. increased doubts and concern over an appropriate professional title for the 
internal auditing professionals 
iv. ethical compromise; and 
v. absence of monopolistic privilege or clearly defined jurisdiction of internal audit 
activity. 
Ruminating on the above, Gacon (2013) and Chambers and Odar (2015) support 
O’Regan (2001)’s position by maintaining that presently, internal auditing cannot be 
regarded as an independent profession.  Putting this mildly, Lenz and Sarens (2011) 
indicates that internal auditing has not generally been seen as part of the solution to the 
recent global financial turmoil.   
On the issue of symbolism or mythology, Gacon (2013) hints that observation of 
traditional professions, such as doctors, lawyers and architects reveals certain 
characteristics that distinguish these professions from other occupations. On the part of 
internal auditing as a profession however, there is no obvious image that identifies the 
internal auditor as a professional, no symbolic image in internal auditing to compare 
with, to give one example, the social significance of the barrister’s wig (O’Regan, 2001 
p. 221).  Reflecting on these revelations, it truly seems that more needs to be done 
towards creating a uniform means of professional identity for the internal auditing 
professionals.  
Another issue considered to be affecting internal auditing as a profession is the practice 
of perceiving and using internal audit departments in organisations as a training ground, 
and mere stepping stone to other function in the organization (O’Regan,2001’). The 
feeling that internal audit staff needs to interacts with all departments in an organization 
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and, the feeling that internal auditors have deep knowledge of an organization business, 
makes management to always see the IAF in most organization as an appropriate 
training grounds. After one or two years in internal audit, the candidate is expected to 
move on to other, and presumably greater function. The impact of this practice is the 
creation of an impression of ‘’non-professional’’ function of the IAF. O’Regan, (2001) 
hints that such practice may erode the professional status of internal auditing, by 
downgrading the intrinsic value of the discipline as a rewarding and credible career. 
This contentious issue of using IAF as management’s training ground is extensively 
discussed in chapter 4.  
Also, of severe impact on the professionalization of internal auditing is the fact that 
current internal audit activities (i.e. assurance and consulting) necessitate a blend of 
employees with diverse backgrounds and trainings. Thus raising questions on 
identification of internal auditors as true professionals. Though internal audit 
professionals till date are still referred to as ‘’Internal auditors’’, concerns are 
continuously being raised on appropriateness of this professional title in these days of 
enhanced roles of the function. The general argument is whether professionals in the 
field still need to be addressed as ‘’Internal auditors’’, firstly given the enhanced focus 
of the IAF to include both assurance and consulting instead of the antiquated and 
narrow focus of compliance only.  
The internal auditing literature includes considerable debate over the appropriate title 
for the internal auditor (O’Regan, 2001). Suggested titles to replace the existing one 
include ‘’performance evaluator (Sawyer, 1998), ‘’control assurance consultant’’, 
‘’business process consultant’’ and corporate governance officer (Ennis, 1998).  To be 
addressed as ‘’internal auditor’’ truly may look less rewarding, and inappropriate 
particularly when looking at the practice of outsourcing IAF to external audit firm. So 
where is the ‘’internal’’ in IAF outsourced?, one may want to ask. Driving this name 
change agenda, Sawyer (1998, 9.112), the so-called ‘’father of modern internal 
auditing’’ (Bota-Avram and Popa 2011) insists: 
 ‘’changing our name will have the salutary effect of boosting the  
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profession from the common place aspect of mathematical  
verification to the managerial concept of organization-wide 
 evaluations. To declare that one is an evaluator rather than  
 an auditor might be uplifting’’  
While the agenda of the anticipated name change is clear, the position of O’Regan 
(1998) appealing to the IIA to retain the existing appellation is considered appropriate 
firstly on the basis of consistency and also to avoid unnecessary confusion before the 
public. Possibly, retention of the existing professional designation may likely garner 
overwhelming support from the internal auditing practitioners if such is to be put to vote 
or opinion survey.  The new role of consulting assigned internal auditors, in a way 
portrays the function as a partner to the management, such that any decisions reached by 
management in the course of their pursuance of the organisation objectives may also be 
perceived as having substantial input of the internal auditors. Therefore, on the issue of 
ethical concern, a reminiscence of various catastrophic incidences that ravaged the 
corporate landscapes across globe recently may portend an unfavourable outlook for 
internal auditors playing a partner of the management through its expanded role of 
consulting. The fact that internal auditors are usually seen as proponents of the need for 
economy, efficiency and effectiveness in relation to organisationals’ affairs may be a 
potential source of concern when it comes to the way the public generally perceive 
internal auditors (O’Regan, 2010). Putting this concern succinctly, O’Regan (2010) 
alerts that: 
‘’The use of internal auditing in the late twentieth century to support  
The ruthless cost cutting measures associated with the so-called 
 new public management (NPM) paradigms (Power, 1997) could 
be a potential weakness in the discipline’s ethical standing. 
On the various efforts made by the IIA towards professionalization of the internal 
auditing profession, O’Regan (2010), Bota-Avram and Popa (2011), and Arena and 
Jeppesen (2010) admitted that the following initiatives of the global professional body 
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have really gone a long way in pursuing the legitimization of the internal auditing 
profession: 
i.     formation of the IIA in 1941 with the main aim of pursuing legitimization of 
the internal auditing as a profession,  
ii.      the formation of auditing standards (popularly known as  Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing, first version of which was issued 
in 1978 (Gacon, 2013, Chambers and Odar, 2015) 
iii.       establishment of the institute’s (IIA) Research foundation in 1968, which 
finances scientific research in the field of internal auditing, 
iv.       establishment of a professional magazine ‘’Internal auditor’’, which 
constitutes a medium of knowledge sharing in the field of internal auditing, 
v.       development of the Code of ethics of internal auditors in 1968 (Gacon, 
2013); 
vi.      IIA’s certification through professional examinations 
As skeptical as Gacon (2013) is about the professional status of internal auditing, the 
author in unison with O’Regan (2010), Bota-Avram and Popa (2011), and Arena and 
Jeppesen (2010) also acknowledges all the above initiatives of the IIA towards ensuring 
that internal auditing is positioned as a legitimate profession before the public. This 
notwithstanding, the concerns raised on the internal auditing’s ill-defined symbolism 
and mythology, short term tenor tendency of the internal auditors in organisations, 
contentions on the appropriate professional title for the internal auditing practitioners, 
concern on the ethical compromise of the internal auditors, and most significantly, the 
obvious unclear mapping of jurisdiction and the seeming encroachment of the internal 
auditing’s domain by external audit firm (using the ‘’outsourcing’’ leniency), suggest 
that the issue of legitimization of internal auditing as a profession is yet to be resolved.  
It is as a result of the concern above that the following have been put forward as 
necessary steps to actualize the dream of making a profession of internal auditing: 
i. pursuance of a clearly defined scope of activities and expertise of 
internal auditing, distinguishing internal auditing from other professions 
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(Gacon, 2013). To professionalise, internal auditing will need to 
demonstrate that it is different from external auditing (Arena and 
Jeppesen, 2010,p. 126). 
ii. determining the necessary qualifications for performing the work of an 
internal auditor and collaboration with universities in order to develop 
educational programs exclusively meant for breeding internal auditing 
professionals (Gacon, 2013; Richard and Kimberly, 2000). Improving 
the relationship between the internal auditing professionals and the 
academia is considered a good step, given that each has a great deal to 
offer the other, and working together, Richard and Kimberly (2000) 
maintain they can open yet another door of opportunity for today’s 
students and tomorrow’s professionals. 
iii. seeking ‘’regulative bargain’’ with state with a view to obtaining a 
jurisdiction within which it can set its terms of reference (O’Regan, 
2001). 
iv. creation of a professional image of internal auditing among both internal 
and external clients (Gacon’, 2013).    
Development of internal auditing profession is certainly evolving and the effort of the 
IIA on the evolution across nations cannot be overemphasised. 
 
2.2.5  Internal Auditing Profession in Nigeria 
Seventy seven (77) years after the official establishment of the IIA in the United States 
of America (USA), internal auditing as a profession is just evolving in Nigeria. It is 
doubtful if any notable line of separation exists between the auditing and accounting 
professions in Nigeria. This is so given that auditing is perceived as an adjunct of 
accounting. Accounting profession in Nigeria is currently regulated by two professional 
accounting bodies- the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria (ICAN) and the 
Association of National Accountants of Nigeria (ANAN).   
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While the ICAN focuses professionalism of private sector’s accountants, ANAN 
regulates the practice of public sector’s accountants. However, the profession of internal 
auditing which has gained remarkable advocacy in most developed countries 
particularly in USA and united kingdom, just started to be seen as a full fledge 
profession quite distinct from external audit in Nigeria.  The IIA Nigeria was 
established in 2002 as an affiliate of the IIA Global and became a full chapter of the 
global body (the IIA) in 2013. Following its full institute status in 2013, the IIA Nigeria 
has become a very fast growing body of risk, governance and control professionals in 
Nigeria. Even with the existence of two notable professional bodies that regulate the 
practice of accountancy in the country, external and IAFs of both the private and public 
sectors are still subsumed under the accounting profession.  
 
With the advent of the Nigeria chapter of the IIA however and following its full chapter 
status in 2013, the internal auditing profession in Nigeria is gradually gaining publicity 
through knowledge sharing focus of the institute via conferences, and seminars. 
According to the Secretariat of the local chapter of the institute, current membership is 
around four hundred.  This confirms the infancy status of the IIA in the country.  Sarens 
and Abdolmohammadi (2010) confirm that there is a great variability in the maturity of 
the internal auditing profession when comparing countries worldwide. They maintain 
that variability at country level can partially be explained by cultural differences. 
Nigerian case however, is perceived as a combination of culture and orientation. The 
implication of the level of maturity of the internal auditing profession in the country on 
the overall performance of IAFs generally, and specifically in the country’s financial 
sector is expected to be established at the end of this research effort.  
 
2.3.0 Internal auditing as a mechanism of Corporate governance 
Generally, it is established that developed countries remain in the forefront of agitation 
for good corporate governances and had consequently codified good corporate 
practices. With a view to imitating these good corporate practices, developing countries 
replicate corporate governance codes from developed economies by domesticating the 
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established best practices for their corporate entities. These codes first establish 
mechanisms of instituting good corporate governance practices, and second, put in place 
necessary framework for monitoring adherence to the espoused good practices. In 
literature, the various mechanisms are classified as either internal or external.  For 
instance, Munisi and Randoy (2013) identify internal mechanisms as comprising Boards 
of directors, debt financing, ownership concentration, executive compensation, and 
executive director shareholdings; and external mechanisms as including market for 
corporate control, product market competition, and the executive labour market.  
In most internal auditing literature however, key corporate governance mechanisms are 
identified and discussed as the Board of directors, Management, Internal auditing and 
external auditing (see Gramling et.al, 2004). Since the redefinition of internal auditing 
by the IIA in 2009, particularly indicating internal auditing as an enabler of corporate 
governance, studies investigating how the aforementioned mechanisms interplay and 
the relationship between their connections and corporate governance continue to gain 
prominence.  
While studies investigating the relationship of these various mechanisms on the 
soundness of corporate governance are diverse and tenuous, a recent dimension 
introduced into the discussion of the significance of corporate governance practices in 
firms particularly within the Accounting and Internal auditing community relates to the 
relationship between internal auditing and corporate governance. The intensified 
academic interests in this area is borne out of the increased advocacy for internal 
auditing mostly by the global regulatory body of internal auditing (the IIA), and the 
internal auditing professionals’ desire to push for their relevance and therefore promote 
internal auditing as a pillar of corporate governance. The intense interests in this area by 
internal auditing scholars perhaps, can be argued to be triggered by the IIA’s self-
acclaimed remit as ‘’governance process’’ accompaniment (see IIA (1999)), and the 
uncertainties surrounding the value addition of internal auditing in firms (see Chambers, 
2014).                                                                                                                                
In assessing the capability and relevance of internal auditing as one of the cornerstones 
of corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004; Gras-Gil et al., 2012), the contributions 
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made to corporate governance by the IAF usually come to mind. Whereas, it has been 
established that quality IAF influences corporate governance positively (see D’ Silva 
and Ridley, 2007), it has however become a big challenge for the IAF and internal 
auditors to show their value addition both inside and outside an organization (Sarens, 
2009; Lenz and Sarens,2011; Chambers, 2014) in assessable forms.  Possibly, one 
conceivable way to prove the relevance of the IAF to corporate governance is to find 
evidence to demonstrate that IAF, as one of the building blocks of corporate governance 
has positive impact on the quality of corporate governance.  
Proving the value addition of internal audit however seems a daunting task (Lenz and 
Sarens, 2011). This is so given that evaluation of such values could be subjective 
particularly in the absence of generally adopted metrics or parameters. Nevertheless, it 
is considered insufficient to be emphasizing the value–addition of the internal auditing 
without tracking and measuring such values. Chambers (2014, p.64) contends that once 
an IAF is no longer adding value, it has on itself become a cost centre and a drain on 
company’s resources. 
 
Given that IAF’s impact cannot easily be traced and mapped against the organisational 
bottom line, it therefore becomes crucial that the value addition of the IAF is 
established. ‘’…it is important for internal auditors to be able to clearly articulate to 
management and other stakeholders how the internal audit function adds value (Reding  
et al. 2013, p. 2-5). ‘’An examination of the pressures on internal audit in recent years 
reveals the struggle to demonstrate that the function can add value’’ (Spira and Page, 
2003, p. 653). Lenz and Hann (2015) insist that proving the value addition of IAF 
remains the only way internal auditing generally can be seen as a legitimate function 
before its major stakeholders.  
 
Internal auditing’s major or primary stakeholders according to Chambers (2014) include 
the following: 
i. organisation’s audit committee; 
ii. the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or overall head of enterprise; 
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iii. the Chief financial officer (CFO) or the individual to whom the CAE 
reports administratively; 
iv. the other chief officers of the enterprise (in some cases). 
Business-unit executives, usually called ‘’auditees’’ are classified as secondary 
stakeholders. The same author classifies organisation’s employees, investments 
analysts, shareholders, external auditors and regulators and the general public as tertiary 
stakeholders (see Chambers, 2014, p. 50). 
IAF that contributes to corporate governance is ordinarily said to be effective (Gras-Gil 
et al.,2012). For an IAF to be referred as effective however, such function must have 
possessed some qualities. Incidentally, Internal audit quality is an issue of great concern 
to both the internal and external audit profession (Gramling and Vandervelde,2006). 
According to Sarens (2009), effectiveness of IAF is discussed in terms of the positive 
impact it has on corporate governance. This position therefore might be interpreted to 
mean that an IAF that desires to be effective will be the one that has positive impacts on 
corporate governance. Only effective IAF can perform its tasks properly (Savc’kuk, 
2007). Whereas, the internal auditing literature has established that an effective IAF is 
critical to the success of a company (Carcello et al., 2005; Savc’kuk, 2007; Barac et 
al.,2009; Gras-Gil et al.,2012); little empirical evidence on the correlates of IAF’s 
effectiveness is however found in literature (Lenz and Sarens,2011, Arena and 
Azzone,2009). Expressing this succinctly, Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2011) maintain 
that performance evaluation mechanisms of internal auditing have not evolved 
contemporaneously. This further affirms the need for acceptable metric of assessing 
IAF’s effectiveness. 
 
Sarens (2009) nevertheless maintains that only IAF that has positive impact on the 
quality of corporate governance can be said to be effective.  For Ernst and Young 
(2007) as reported in Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2011) the top two metrics used in the 
measurement of IAF’s effectiveness are:  
(i) completion of audits in comparison to an IAF plan, and  
(ii) the length of time for issuing IAF’s reports.  
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How these two yardsticks translate to values of internal auditing in firms is however 
unclear particularly relying on Ernst and Young (2007)’s earlier counsel that cost 
savings or revenue enhancement should be the benchmark of IAF’s value assessment. 
The referenced survey indicates that in order to demonstrate the value and relevance of 
the IAF to business, value tracking (in terms of cost savings and/or revenue 
enhancements) should be used as a mechanism (Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011). 
Surprisingly however, the same survey showed that 51% of the respondents do not 
conduct any value tracking of the IAF, while only 13% assess the contribution of the 
function from actual cost savings perspectives. The study further amplifies the 
complications surrounding the perspectives on assessment of IAF’s effectiveness. Yet 
studies continue to postulate that an IAF by being identified as a constituent part of the 
corporate governance can add value (Gramling et al., 2004; D’Silva and Ridley, 2007). 
It has also been particularly argued by studies such as Sav’cuk (2007, p. 277), a study 
that attempts to design appropriate principles for evaluating internal audit’s evaluation,  
that IAF as a corporate governance mechanisms can add value to an organisation once it 
is effective. Stakeholders of IAF however, seem not convinced with this value addition 
claims (such as number of reports issued, number of individuals auditors with relevant 
certifications, number of recommendations in audit reports, etc.) of internal auditors 
(Chambers, 2104). Failure to design an appropriate way of justifying the value addition 
of IAF indicates knowledge gap on acceptable metrics of value addition of IAF (i.e. 
IAF’s effectiveness) and therefore indicates the need for a model to be conceptualized. 
This is a very important additional motivation for this research endeavor. Evolution of 
an acceptable framework or indicators of a value-laden IAF will certainly help in 
addressing this quagmire the internal auditing profession currently faces and expectedly 
help in shaping the direction of studies relating to the relevance of internal auditing, 
while also broadening the burgeoning academic endeavours in the field.  
Coram et al., (2008) acknowledge that there have been limited studies on the 
effectiveness of IAFs. Worried by the scant studies on appropriate benchmarks to be 
adopted for assessing internal auditing effectiveness, Arena and Azone (2009) while  
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identifying organisational drivers of internal audit effectiveness on the basis of 
questionnaire data from 153 CAEs from Italian companies summarized the three 
approaches of measuring IAF’s effectiveness as found in extant literature as: process 
measures, output measures, and outcome measures. These are as clarified below: 
ι. Process measure, i.e. evaluating IAF compliance with Statements for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing –SPPIA (see Al-Twaijry et al. 
2003); 
ιι. Output measures: i.e. focus on auditee and their feedback on IAF (Arena 
and Azzone, 2009); and 
ιιι. Outcome measures: i.e. level of implementation of internal audit 
recommendations (see Mihret and Woldeyohannis, 2008; Arena and 
Azzone, 2009). 
Mihret et al.(2010) while rationalizing the first approach as the most appropriate, 
observe (through an explorative study on antecedents and organisational performance 
implications of internal audit effectiveness) that non-implementation of internal audit’s 
recommendations arising from prior internal audit on the part of management may not 
necessarily suggest an ineffective IAF as it could be that some of the recommendations 
are unpopular, costly or impracticable to implement and thus jettisoned. This argument 
can therefore be leveraged to question the acceptability of using the level of 
implementation of recommendations of internal audit in measuring IAF’s effectiveness.  
 
Likewise, using feedback from internal audit’s customers for measuring effectiveness of 
IAF is also criticized by the same authors based on challenges of operationalization 
associated. The authors argued that varied backgrounds and experiences of the internal 
audit’s customers become a concern in this regard. Each internal audit’s customers 
certainly have their own peculiar and divergent expectations. Each of these customers 
will ultimately define the value of its IAF based on how well their specific expectations 
are met (Chambers, 2014, pg 68). To further strengthen this line of argument, Lenz and 
Sarens (2011) indicate that issues around who the internal audit’s customer (s) is (or 
are) has been a subject of debate for some time, maintaining that customers of internal 
audit seem numerous. ‘’internal audit currently has multiple of customers to serve’’. For 
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Chambers (2014, p.50), internal audit’s customers (stakeholders), and their expectations 
can vary dramatically from one organisation to the next.   
 
Arguing along these lines of opinion therefore, one might be wondering whether there 
can be congruence of performance indicators of internal auditing by these multiple 
customers and indeed if there can be any point of convergence in assessing internal 
audit’s effectiveness along this paradigm. Precisely expressed, Chambers (2014, p. 51) 
indicates that internal auditors will from time to time encounter conflicts between the 
expectations of different stakeholders. Thus, indicating that leaving evaluation of IAF’s 
effectiveness to its multiple customers with diverse expectations might be challenging 
and perhaps disputable. 
 
To balance his argument, Mihret et al. (2010) indicates that application of compliance 
with the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing 
(ISPPIA) presents a multi-dimensional approach in evaluating internal audit’s 
effectiveness and as such is viewed the best approach. Corroborating this stance, the 
position paper of IIA-UK and Ireland (2002) clearly indicates that the IIA’s 
International standards are the benchmarks against which effective internal audit 
activities can be measured.  Apparently, this standpoint might attract less criticism due 
to the anticipated universality of adoption of the ISPPIA. The IIA mandates compliance 
with the standards for every individual who provides internal audit services (Burnaby, et 
al., 2009). Aside offering a multi-dimensional approach as hinted by Mihret et al. 
(2010), the ISPPIA offers a general platform on which the practice of internal auditing 
is expected to operate globally and therefore signals a model for development of any 
meaningful approach for assessment of internal audit’s value.  
 
While discussing the purpose of the ISPPIA, Reding et al. (2013) further argue that the 
standards, in addition to offering a framework for performing and promoting a broad 
range of value-added internal audit, also establish the basis for the evaluation of IAF’s 
performance. The standards are ‘’principles-focused, mandatory requirements 
consisting of statements of basic requirements for the professional practice of internal 
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auditing and for evaluating the effectiveness of performance, which are internationally 
applicable at organisational and individual levels… (Reding, et al. 2013, p.2-9-2-10)’’. 
Burnaby et al. (2009) identify the adoption of the IIA standards for evaluation of 
internal audit’s performance, as one of its three cores. Studies that relates to evaluation 
of IAF or the value-addition of IAF usually leverage on this direction (see for instance 
Barac and van Standen, 2009; Barac et al., 2009). 
 
Adopted from Savc’kuk (2007), table 2.2 below details out the relevant sections of the 
IIA standards that are considered relevant to the effectiveness of the IAF. 
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S/n Standards Focus Details 
1 1000 Purpose, Authority, and 
Responsibility 
Internal Audit charter approved by the board is obligatory. Charter must include the purpose, authority, 
and responsibility of the internal audit. 
2 1100 Independence and 
objectivity 
The internal audit activity must be independent, and internal auditors must be objective to perform their 
work. The function must be subordinated to the appropriate management to ensure independence of the 
function and objectivity of the internal auditors 
3 1200 Proficiency and Due 
professional care 
Engagements must be performed with proficiency and due professional care. Continuous professional 
development must be present to ensure efficiency. 
4 1300 Quality Assurance and 
Improvement Program 
(QAIP) 
It is obligatory for the CAE to develop and maintain a QAIP that covers all aspects of the internal audit 
activity and continuously monitors its effectiveness. This program includes periodic internal and external 
quality assessments and ongoing internal monitoring. The standards however do not provide efficiency 
estimation factors. 
5 2000 Managing the IA 
activity 
The CAE should effectively manage the internal audit activity to ensure it adds value to the organizations. 
6 2100 Nature of work The internal audit activity must evaluate and contribute to the improvement of governance, risk 
management, and control processes using a systematic and disciplined approach.  
7 2200 Engagement planning Internal auditors must develop and document a plan for each engagement, including the engagement’s 
objectives scope, timing, and resource allocation. 
8 2300 Performing the 
Engagement 
Internal auditors must identify, analyze, evaluate, and document sufficient information to achieve the 
engagement’s objectives. 
9 2400 Communicating Results Internal auditors must communicate the results of the engagements. 
10 2500 Monitoring Progress It is obligatory for the CAE to establish and maintain a system to monitor the disposition of results 
communicated to management 
Table 2.2: IIA standards on IAF effectiveness (adapted from Savc’kuk, 2007). 
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Savc’kuk (2007) based on the above as a guide, identifies four (4) different platforms or 
metrics that can be adopted for assessing IAF’s effectiveness. These are: 
i) internal audit level of subordination, 
ii) internal auditors’ qualifications,  
iii) internal audit’s strategy; and  
iv) internal audit’s efficiency estimation. 
The referenced study adopts the metrics and creates internal audit’s efficiency scores 
(IAES) to aid its analysis. This is seen as a head-starter in evolution of ideal framework 
for measuring the value addition of any IAF. 
For Arena and Azzone (2009), IAF’s effectiveness is linkable to the resources and 
competencies of the internal audit team, activities and processes performed, as well as 
the function’s organisational role. The approach adopted by Barac et al. (2009) in their 
study of perceptions of the value added by South African IAFs mirrors Arena and 
Azzone (2009). Specifically, organisational status, staffing and work environment, 
implementation of IAF’s recommendations, IAF’s involvement in risk, services 
rendered by the function , and performance measure are the metrics adopted in Barac et 
al. (2009). This is also seen as a further push on Savc’kuk (2007), and Arena and 
Azzone (2009). 
Gramling and Vandervelde (2006), while contributing to the debate surrounding the 
need for a universally-accepted metrics for evaluating IAF’s effectiveness, provide 
useful hints on how IAF’s quality can be assessed. According to the authors, IAF’s 
quality can be assessed using current guidance on IAF’s quality as inspired by both the 
professional internal and external auditing standards. This position is not quite different 
from Mihret et al. (2010)’s submission on ideal metric for IAF’s effectiveness. 
For instance, Statement of Auditing Standards (SAS) 65 describes the internal audit’s 
quality characteristics as consisting: 
i.    Competence (e.g. educational level and professional experience, 
professional certification and continuing education, Audit policies, 
programs and procedures, practices regarding assignment of internal 
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auditors, supervision and review of internal auditors’ activities, 
quality of working paper documentation, reports, and 
recommendations, evaluation of internal auditors’ performance). 
ii.    Objectivity (e.g. Organisational status of the function, reporting 
relationship, party responsible for internal audit engagement 
decision); and 
iii.    Quality of work performance (e.g. adequacy of audit programs, scope 
of work performed). 




iii. Proficiency, and  
iv. Due care 
Addressing the same concern of how best to assess IAF’s quality, perhaps following the 
lines of argument of Gramling and Vandervelde (2006), Sarens (2009) indicates that 
effectiveness of IAF can be assessed along the line of IAF’s quality, the quality of the 
individual internal auditors in the IAF, and the quality of the two important aspects of 
corporate governance-internal control and risk management. This view (which is in 
tandem with Mihret et al.; 2010) implies that to have an adequate understanding of 
IAF’s quality, one needs to understand the factors determining IAF’s capacity to 
monitor and improve internal control and risk management process. The line of 
argument advocated  by Sarens (2009) definitely can be accommodated within the focus 
of the IIA’s redefinition of internal auditing (i.e. IIA,1999),  ‘’…it helps an 
organisation accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to 
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance 
processes’’ 
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2.3.1  Internal Audit and Corporate Governance Literature 
In internal audit literature, the central themes of discussions in recent time, specifically 
since the re-definition of internal auditing in 1999, had been on the contributory roles of 
internal audit in the improvement of the effectiveness of risk management, control and 
governance process; and how the internal auditing assurance and consulting activities 
do contribute to organisations’ ability to accomplish their set objectives. The 
discussions along this area usually focus Governance, control and risk management 
(GCR). 
While internal control and risk management appear two different concepts, internal 
control has been argued to be a subset and an integral part of risk management (see 
Spira and Page, 2003; Reding et al. 2013). To drive down this argument, Reding et al. 
(2013, p. 3-2 to 3-3) maintain that internal control is part of risk treatments designed to 
execute the risk management strategies.  
For the IIA, Governance is seen as “the combination of processes and structures 
implemented by the board to inform, direct, manage, and monitor the activities of the 
organization towards achievement of its objectives’’. 
Given that the shareholders are represented by the board, the responsibilities of setting 
organisational objectives, and pursuance of same is that of the board and the 
management. The board sets the objectives of organizations on behalf of the 
shareholders, communicates the set objectives to the management to develop 
appropriate strategies of achieving the set objectives under their oversight. In pursuing 
the objectives, the management ordinarily is faced with series of risks capable of 
preventing accomplishment of such objectives.  Risk management according to 
Bahrman (2011, p. 23) is ‘’ the set of processes through which management identifies, 
analyses, and responds appropriately to risks that might adversely affect achieving the 
organisation’s objectives’’ 
To demonstrate the significance of IAF in corporate governance, Paape, Scheffe and 
Snoep (2003) maintain that company’s BoD has significant oversight to play most 
especially in the area of ensuring implementation of appropriate policies by the 
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management. ‘’This board must seek the right advice and find the right solutions for its 
organisation’s particular circumstances and ensure that policy is implemented and the 
expected result achieved. Part of that advice may come from the board’s own Audit 
Committee which in turn could be advised by its internal auditors’’ (Paape et al, 2003, 
p. 251). 
In responding to risk, it is argued that management can avoid, accept, share or transfer 
the risks to the third party (see Redding et al., 2013). Internal control is however seen as 
activities employed by the management to manage the risks retained in the organization. 
Sarens (2009)’s inkling about the significance of internal control and risk management 
in assessing IAF’s quality is derived from the IIA’s new orientation of internal auditing 
on control, risk management and governance.      
Bearing the IIA standards in mind, Sarens (2009) while presenting an Editorial for 
International Journal of Auditing on ‘’Internal Auditing Research: Where are we 
going?’’, focuses the IAF’s characteristics and the characteristics of the individual 
internal auditors which are within the professional standards of both the internal and 
external auditing, and which enhance the capability of the function (IAF) to achieve its 
expected roles of monitoring and improving internal control  and risk management in 
organisation. These two studies (i.e. Gramling and Vandervelde , 2006; and Sarens, 
2009) though seem different in their approach, can be argued to have same ultimate 
focus on IAF’s characteristics and the characteristics of the individuals engaged in the 
function within the framework provided by standards guiding both external audit,  and 
the internal audit professional standards (i.e. ISPPIA). Consequently, with a view to 
having a coordinated approach for the review of related literature that are diverse in 
focus and orientation, the guidelines offered by the referenced studies are adopted as a 
guide for this study, and therefore also applied to shape the focus of the study’s 
empirical literature review. 
Special consideration is however given to the insights drawn from Sarens (2009) as all 
factors adopted in the previous and numerous studies on IAF’s effectiveness can be 
subsumed in the general perspective advocated by the author. From all the referenced 
studies (such as Barac et al., 2009; Arena and Azzone, 2009; Gramling and 
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Vandervelde, 2006; Sav’cuk,2007; Mihret and Woldeyohannis, 2008), the central focus 
remains the IIA standards. The IIA standards and the definitional focus of internal 
auditing by the IIA (2009) remain the basis of Sarens (2009). The linkage of internal 
auditing’s new focus specifically to enhancement of corporate governance further lends 
weight to Sarens (2009)’s exposition and thus considered an endearing schema for the 
literature review focus in chapter 4 of the thesis.  
To begin with, Sarens (2009) indicates that only IAF that adds value to an organisation 
can be said to be effective.  Leveraging on Gramling (2004) to answer himself on the 
question, ‘’when can we talk about an effective IAF”?, the author indicates that only 
when an IAF’s quality impacts positively the quality of corporate governance. 
According to Sarens (2009), the characteristics of the IAF itself, and the characteristics 
of the individual auditors constituting the function (i.e. IAF’s characteristics and 
internal auditors’ characteristics) are the two main factors that determine the IAF’s 
capacity to monitor and improve risk management and internal control (the two main 
focus of corporate governance).  The need for identifying a focus-driven and established 
approach for the review here is borne out of the fact that no studies has ever attempted 
to integrate the various concepts this study attempts to explore (i.e. IAF’s independence, 
conformity of IAF’s engagements with the relevant IIA’s standards, internal auditors’ 
objectivity and competence). Sarens (2009) incidentally stands out from those various 
extant studies that have linkages with the study’s broad themes due to its 
comprehensiveness in terms of various perspectives on effectiveness of IAF.   
  
2.3.2   Internal audit function’s quality 
IAF’s quality is an extensively studied area of the internal audit literature (Gramling et 
al., 2004). The rationale for researchers’ interests in this area can be argued to be 
inspired by the continuous enhanced roles of strengthening corporate governance in 
companies expected from the function (IAF). IAF as one of the acclaimed cornerstones 
of corporate governance (Gramling et al., 2004) is seen theoretically to occupy a vital 
position in the mechanisms required to ensure corporate social order (Gras-Gil,et 
al.,2012; Cohen, et al.,2011; Schneider,2009; Savc’uk,2007). Each of the remaining 
parties saddled with corporate governance responsibility in firm (i.e. External auditor, 
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Audit committee and Management) perceive internal audit as a valuable partner. Given 
this beneficial relationship, Gramling et al. (2004) argue that each of the parties 
accountable for firm’s corporate governance therefore has some responsibilities for 
ensuring or at least evaluating the quality of the IAF.  
For instance, board and management of corporation who are desirous of confirming that 
their firm’s internal controls are effective and reliable, ordinarily may want to be 
concerned with the effectiveness of their firm’s IAF (Gramling and Vandervelde,2006; 
Omoteso and Obalola,2014). The external auditor who is also desirous of leveraging on 
the deep knowledge of the IAF about the firm’s business and environment may 
ordinarily have the tendency to rely substantially on the work already performed by 
internal auditors for the essence of timely and quality audit. Omoteso and Obalola 
(2014, p. 138) agree that adequate knowledge of the firm’s business is required for 
effective auditing of an entity, and they concur that external auditor has limited 
knowledge of the organisation and its staff. For the external auditor to leverage 
maximally on the internal auditor’s deep familiarity with the firm in this regard, and in 
line with the guidance from auditing standards (see SAS 65) the external auditor would 
be interested in ascertaining the quality of such IAF. As a matter of fact, the external 
auditor in accordance with the referenced standard is required to make inquiries about 
appropriateness and management of internal audit personnel on matters such as: 
i. organizational status within the entity 
ii. application of professional standards (particularly as it relates to objectivity 
and competence of the internal audit’s personnel) 
iii. audit plan, including the nature, timing , and extent of audit work 
iv. access to records and whether there are limitations on the scope of their 
activities. 
Paragraph 24 of SAS 65 specifically advises the external auditor to perform procedures 
to evaluate the quality and effectiveness of the internal auditor’s work. Apart from 
making use of the internal auditor’s work in performing his assignment (i.e. annual 
external audit), the external auditor may also require direct assistance of the internal 
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auditor in performing some aspects of his work. In doing this, objectivity and 
competence of the internal auditor shall be subjected to thorough assessment. 
  ‘’when direct assistance is provided, the auditor should assess 
 the internal auditors’ competence and objectivity…’’ (SAS 65, para 27). 
In the same vein, the audit committee who is saddled with the responsibility of ensuring 
quality financial reporting, effective internal control and risk management, also 
ordinarily would be interested in monitoring and ensuring quality IAF so as to assure 
itself of the reliability of assurances it obtains from such function. A close working 
relationship between the audit committee and internal audit is anticipated, as such is 
recognized a fundamental principle of corporate governance (Munro and Stewart, 
2011:467; Chambers, 2008). Turley and Zaman (2007) argue that audit committee sets 
the appropriate tone that allows the IAF have a certain degree of influence in the 
organization. Thus it can be argued that IAF derives its status, independence and 
relevance from the manner of its coordination with the audit committee.  
The more highly competent and objective staffs of an IAF is, and the more detailed their 
testing, the more likely the external auditor would want to make use of their work.  
PCAOB (2004) contends that companies should ordinarily be motivated to develop 
high-quality IAFs given the considerable flexibility that external auditors have in 
making use of the work of IAF. Whereas it is expected that external auditor would 
ordinarily want to leverage on IAF of an organisation to avoid duplication of efforts and 
repetition of work, the independent auditor (external auditor) is however at liberty to 
determine the extent of such reliance he is willing to put on IAF’s services. Avoidance 
of duplication of efforts and work on the part of the external auditor connotes some cost 
saving benefits in times of cost of audit, timely execution of annual audit and reliability 
of same to organisation. In determining the appropriateness and extent of such reliance 
however, Reinstein, Lander and Gavin (1994:30) recommend that at a minimum, the 
external auditor should: 
i. consider the results of prior years’ audit 
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ii. review how internal auditors allocate their audit resource in response to 
their risk assessment procedures (e.g. between operating and financial 
activities) 
iii. review their internal audit reports to ascertain their scope of work 
Appropriateness of using the IAF to complement their own efforts relates to relevance, 
reliability and potential cost saving benefits of the function to the external auditor and 
ultimately to the organisation as well. Reinstein et al.(1994) affirm that once it is 
ascertained that IAF fails any of these tests of appropriateness (i.e. relevance, reliability, 
and cost saving potential), the external auditor would not make use of the function, 
except as a supporting staff on the audit. This aligns with the findings of the Ernst and 
Young (2007), that upholds the significance of cost benefits (in terms of cost savings 
and/or revenue enhancements) when it comes to reckoning with  the value and 
relevance of the IAF.  
An external auditor desirous of relying on internal auditors activities focuses on the 
IAF’s independence, internal auditors’ level of objectivity and competence. To 
determine competence, it is argued by Reinstein et al.(1994) that ‘’the external auditor 
needs to know the internal auditor’s educational level and professional experience, 
their professional certification and continuing education, the audit policies, 
programmes and procedures they operate under; how they are assigned and how they 
are supervised and reviewed. They should assess the quality of internal auditors’ audit 
programmes, working paper documentation, reports and recommendations’’. 
The authors also go on by saying that “to determine objectivity, the external auditor 
needs to know the organisational status of the officer to whom the internal auditors 
report; if the internal auditors have access to audit committee or its equivalent; who 
hires and fires the auditors; if policies prevent auditors from auditing areas where 
relatives are employed or where they may themselves be assigned’’.  
In addition, Gramling et al.(2004) indicate that the IIA standards require the IAF’s head 
(i.e. the CAE) to develop and maintain a QAIP that includes periodic internal quality 
assessments of the IAF and ongoing internal monitoring. Attributes standard 1310 of the 
IIA standards specifically requires IAF to put in place: 
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quality assurance and improvement program capable of both  
internal and external assessment of the function. The standards 
require that IAF must maintain a program that will enable it  
carry out on-going monitoring of the performance of the internal  
audit activity, and periodic self- assessments or assessments by 
other persons within the organization with sufficient knowledge of 
internal audit practices. 
 
According to the standard (IIA 2009), external assessment of the function is also 
required to be carried out once every five years by a qualified, independent assessor or 
assessment team from outside the organization.  
From the above discussion on the roles played by the IAF to the three other corporate 
governance mechanisms, one may want to argue that IAF is a resource center and a 
valuable nexus to the remaining cornerstones. Gramling et al.(2004) however contend 
that for the function to be deemed as a valuable resource, it must be seen as having an 
appropriate level of quality, and that the level of such quality determines the level of 
coordination IAF will have with the other three mechanisms, and consequently predicts 
the quality of corporate governance.  
The above clue notwithstanding, little attention is paid to evaluation of the value-
addition of IAF (Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011). Academic research also seems not to 
be highly disposed to this. ‘’Despite increasing attention to the IAF’s role within 
corporate governance, only limited research has examined the effectiveness of its 
function’’ (Soh and Martinov-Bennie, 2011, p.608). This concern further validates the 
focus of this study.  
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2.3.3  IAF’s Independence and internal auditors’ Objectivity 
‘’Independence’’ can be said to be the foundation upon which internal audit rests. 
Mousa (2013) indicates that the importance of the attribute is apparent in the definition 
of internal auditing provided by the IIA (1999).  
Internal auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations. It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic and disciplined 
approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control 
and governance processes. 
While Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) observe that independence and objectivity are 
closely related, authors such as Paape (2007) and Mutchler (2003) maintain the two 
concepts are not well distinguishly defined. According to the IIA standards, 
independence is defined as ‘’the freedom from conditions that threaten the ability of the 
internal audit activity (or function) to carry out internal audit responsibilities in an 
unbiased manner’’.  In order to create a more comprehensive meaning, Mutchler (2003) 
defines independence as ‘’a desired characteristics of the environment in which the 
assurance services are performed by the individual or team’’. 
The Glossary to the IIA standards however presents a distinguishing distinction between 
the two concepts in the following way: 
• Independence – the freedom from conditions that threaten 
objectivity or the appearance of objectivity. Such threats to 
objectivity must be managed at the individual auditor, engagement, 
functional and organizational levels. 
• Objectivity – An unbiased mental attitude that allows internal 
auditors to perform engagements in such a manner that they have an 
honest belief in their work product and that no significant quality 
compromises are made. Objectivity requires internal auditors not to 
subordinate their judgment on audit matters to that of others. 
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Stewart and Subramanian (2010) reflecting on the above definitions further contends 
that independence can be seen as a ‘’state of affairs’’ while objectivity can be perceived 
as ‘’state of mind’’.  While this position is adopted to direct the literature review made 
in this study, a more definite and exact description of the two connected concepts is 
anticipated as it is argued in literature that the line of distinction between the two key 
concepts is obscured (see Mutchler, 2003; Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).    
The issue of independence of IAF has been a long-standing challenge to internal 
auditors and the internal auditing profession (Ahmad and Taylor, 2009) particularly 
within the expanded framework of IAF’s roles to organisations. Aside the issue of 
organisational positioning of the IAF, the challenge of conflict of interest, the dual and 
seeming incompatible roles (‘’assurance’’ and ‘’consulting’’) of internal auditing under 
the enhanced corporate governance framework is posing, same is also inspiring more 
and more attention on the IAF’s independence (see Sarens, 2009; Lenz and Sarens, 
2011; Chambers and Odah, 2015).The traditional role of internal audit is expanding 
from a watchdog of controls to a value-added business advisor (Ahlawat and Lowe; 
2004; Savc’uk, 2007). Providing a guide for research agenda on the issue, areas 
considered germane by Mutchler (2003) include: 
i. understanding the relation between the organizational positioning of the 
IAF and the overall independence and effectiveness of the organizational 
governance system  
ii. knowing the appropriate control (firewalls) for those internal audit units 
that provide both consulting and assurance services; 
iii. assessing the relation between the organizational positioning of the 
internal audit unit and the occurrence and detection of fraudulent 
company’s activities; 
iv. evaluating how external auditors make assessment of the work of 
internal auditors. 
Drexler (2003) argues that corporate governance can be impaired by a lack of IAF’s 
independence. 
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Another dimension to the evaluation of independence of IAF is by investigating the 
source of the IAF, whether in house or outsourced, i.e. whether maintained as a 
department in the organisation or farmed out. James (2003) contends that IAF’s 
sourcing arrangement is another key factor that distinguishes IAFs. Whereas the issue of 
outsourcing of internal auditor continues to attract intense criticism by the internal audit 
profession and practitioners, it is argued that contention for exclusivity of jurisdiction 
might not be a sound basis for internal audit profession to cast aspersion on outsourcing 
of the function. TCE theory (extensively discussed in chapter 3 and reflected upon in 
chapters 6 and 8 of the thesis) may be adopted as a guide to direct decision on internal 
audit sourcing. Cost benefit analysis is the key tenets of the theory. However, studies 
have shown that external auditor usually tend to place stronger reliance on the work of 
IAF when such function is outsourced on the ground that they believe the management 
may not be able to easily sway the function to their side, and thus an indication of 
guaranteed independence (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  
Another relevant issue on IAF’s independence that has been contentiously discussed in 
literature is the use of IAF as a training ground in organizations (see Messier et.al, 
2011; Christopher et.al, 2008; and Godwin, 2004).  However most internal auditing 
literatures do use this as one of the indicators of internal auditors’ objectivity. The 
manner most authors do anchor discussions on IAF’s independence and internal 
auditors’ objectivity as a singular concept is responsible for this interwovenness and 
seeming haphazard manner of discussing indicators of IAF independence and internal 
auditors’ objectivity.  
2.3.4  IAF’s Characteristics 
The ISPPIA or ‘’Standards’’ clearly set out the various characteristics expected of an 
effective IAF. The standards provide a framework for performing and promoting a 
broad range of value-added internal audit.  The standards are grouped into two- 
‘’Attribute’’ and ‘’Performance’’ standards. While the attribute standards address the 
features of organisations and individuals performing internal audit, the performance 
standards describe the nature of internal audit and provide quality criteria against which 
the performance of IAF can be measured (the IIA, 2012). The standards thus apply to 
both the IAF and individual internal auditors. Specifically, the IAF is expected to ensure 
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independent organisations to which the function is made, and the individual auditors are 
expected to conform to the standards related to individual objectivity, proficiency and 
due professional care. 
In addition to the requirement of independence on the part of IAF is the issue of 
adopting appropriate auditing technology or techniques capable of delivering internal 
audit services that adds value to the organization. IAF adds value to the organisation 
(and its stakeholders) when it provides objective and relevant assurance, and contributes 
to the effectiveness and efficiency of governance, risk management and control 
processes (IIA, 2012).  
Concerning the characteristics of individual internal auditors that make up the IAF, 
Sarens (2009), complimentary to the usual focus of extant studies (such as Ahlawat and 
Lowe, 2004; Brody and Lowe, 2000; Scheneider,2003) mainly on internal auditors’ 
objectivity, argues that other attributes of the internal auditors such as the following also 
contribute to the internal auditors’ capacity to monitor and improve risk management 
and internal control: 
a. educational background, 
b. previous work experience, 
c. professional certification (s), 
d. training and development programme, 
e. behavioural skills, 
f. technical skills; and 
g. competencies 
Whereas all the above attributes are perceived by auditors as representing different 
traits, the IIA standards 1200 (Proficiency and due professional care) recognize them as 
competencies and are classified under the interpretation of the standard as 
‘’proficiency’’. Specifically, standard 1200 of ISPPIA requires that ‘’internal auditors 
must possess the knowledge, skills, and other competencies needed to perform their 
individual responsibilities …’’. So, as suggested in the referenced study, the above 
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presents a platform to assess the adequacy of the individual internal auditors’ 
characteristics. 
On the issue of internal control and ERM’s quality, Sarens (2009) indicates that as 
established in previous studies, ‘’internal control deficiency disclosures’’ can be used to 
assess the quality of organisations’ internal control. The author however expresses his 
uncertainty on the operationalisation of risk management’s quality, maintaining that no 
clear definition of risk management’s quality is provided in literature. Nevertheless, the 
referenced study suggests that the eight interrelated components of ERM framework as 
indicated by COSO (2004) can be adopted in the alternative. According to the author, 
these are (i) internal environment, (ii) objective setting, (iii) event identification, (iv)risk 
assessment, (v)risk response, (vi)control activities, (vii)information and communication; 
and (viii)monitoring. 
In extant literature, independence of IAF is studied from the perspective of the 
organizational position of IAF. This is dominantly studied in terms of the IAF’s 
reporting relationship. Areas extensively considered here include the recommended dual 
reporting lines of IAF i.e. functional reporting relationship with the BoD or Audit 
committee and administrative reporting relationship with the management (Sarens, 
2009) and the agitations thereon (see Chambers and Odar, 2015; and Lenz and Sarens, 
2011).  
Whereas a strand of studies focuses how such recommended dual reporting relationship 
can be further optimized, others are looking at strategic adjustment of the reporting 
relationship in favour of the board or its audit committee, perceived as the key 
stakeholder of internal audit (Chambers and Odar, 2015; and Lenz and Sarens, 2011).  
For instance, Sarens (2009), and  Lenz and Sarens (2011) though believe the dual 
reporting relationship of internal audit and the Board, and internal audit and 
management, seems problematic, are of the view that such can be enhanced for full 
potentials of IAF to firms. Contrarily, Paape et al. (2003), and Chambers and Odar 
(2015) bluntly indicate that the dual reporting model of internal audit is defective and 
advised that internal audit needs to cut the umbilical cord that joins it with management.  
Both strands of perspectives are discussed in details in chapter 4. Charting a new 
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research focus around this contentious area however, Sarens (2009) incites further 
research on the intensity of functional and administrative relationship maintained by the 
IAF with the BoD or Audit committee on one hand and with the senior management on 
the other hand.  
Areas such as what proportion of meeting time, of Audit committee or BoD, spent on 
internal audit topics, to what extent do the BoD, the audit committee and senior 
management provide input for the internal audit’s planning?, how intensively do they 
(BoD, Audit committee, and Senior management) follow up on internal audit’s findings 
and recommendations?, according to the author need to be looked into critically. Extant 
studies (Christopher, Sarens and Leung, 2008) in this area though scant (Stewart and 
Subramaniam, 2010) seem to be adopting this focal direction. In recognition of the 
above clues, this study attempts to investigate among others, areas such as the level of 
relationship between IAF and management, and between IAF and audit committee in 
the NFS. 
The indicated focus is with the aim of establishing the level of independence enjoyed by 
the IAFs in the NFS, and shall be done by examining the organizational status of IAF in 
the NFS through investigation of the manner of reporting relationships maintained by 
IAF in the country’s financial sector. Establishing this will expectedly reveal the level 
of IAF’s quality in the sector and consequently inform of its capability as a cornerstone 
of corporate governance in the NFS. The curiosity that prompted this investigation 
cannot be timelier given continuous neglect of financial sector in most studies that 
bother on internal auditing and corporate governance, obviously due to the peculiarity 
of the sector in form of regulatory framework. Incidentally, the recent global financial 
turmoil has reemphasized the significance of this sector and calls for serious attention 
on matters that relate to IAF and corporate governance in the sector (Gras-Gil et al., 
2012). 
In line with the IIA’s guidance on IAF’s independence and internal auditors’ 
objectivity, Ebaid (2011) argues that IAF should be given the appropriate status in the 
organization so as to enable the function to exercise organizational independence. In 
order to have a clearer appreciation of ‘’organisational independence’’ of the function, 
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Chapman (2001) provides a guidance by defining it as ‘’the placement of the IAF in the 
reporting structure that will make it free to determine the audit scope and perform audit 
work without interference’’.  
IAF’s organizational status is therefore epitomized through the manner of relationship 
maintained by the function with corporate governance’s other internal mechanisms 
(particularly both Management and Audit committee).  
Whilst the IAF is expected to maintain healthy relationships with the two named 
internal mechanisms, such level of relationship existing between the function and the 
duo, is a strong determinant of how independent the function is, and will also be 
perceived to be. In order to strengthen the function’s independence, the IIA standards 
(Attribute Standard 1110 of the International Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing-IIA, 2004) prescribes for IAF, a reporting line capable of making the 
function accomplish its activities (Christopher et al., 2009). 
IAF’s ability to accomplish its activities of value addition to the organization through its 
dual roles of assurance and consulting, while also remaining independent is seen as a 
dilemma (See Lenz Sarens, 2011; Chamber and Odar, 2015), and an area of serious 
threat to IAF’s independence. This dilemma and the arguments thereon are not 
unconnected with the uncertainties associated with the dual roles of the IAF as both an 
assurer and a consultant to the organization. While audit committee relies heavily on the 
assurance role of the IAF, management also relies extensively on the extended role of 
consulting from the function. Thus IAF is conducting assessments of the management 
(for its assurance) as well as assessments for them in the capacity of consultant 
(Peursem, 2005).  
Whereas Omoteso and Obalola (2014.p. 144) further assert the significance of the 
supporting role IAF plays for management particularly in terms of preventing and 
curbing corporate fraud (among others) through establishment and operation of physical 
security and monitoring processes, fraud reporting hotlines (including whistle blowing 
activities, training and education for staff member), Drent (2002) indicates that 
management ordinarily in utilizing the IAF for the extended (dual) roles do not always 
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appreciate the need for IAF’s independence and objectivity of the individual internal 
auditors. 
The issue of the optimal level of relationship between IAF and the audit committee, and 
management has been of controversy particularly going by the argument of Christopher 
et al. (2009), that too much involvement of, for example senior management in the 
internal audit’s planning could have a negative impact on the IAF’s independence. So 
one can then argue that too little a level of coordination between management and IAF 
is as undesirable as may be too much a level of coordination between them.  
The second issue to be looked into in the area of IAF’s characteristics is the 
appropriateness of the auditing technology and techniques used by IAF. Albeit, the IIA 
standards on best practice for internal audit, in line with the revised focus of internal 
auditing globally on internal control, risk management and governance make case for 
risk-based audit approach, studies on compliance with the standards are however scant 
(Sarens, 2009),  and therefore warrant attention. Accordingly, the author suggests the 
following areas for such academic endeavours: 
i. existence of internal audit operating manual, 
ii. whether IAF uses a Risk-based audit plan (RBAP), 
iii. how frequently does the IAF update the internal audit planning?, 
iv. whether IAF facilitate risk and control self-assessment (CSA), 
v. whether IAF conducts  auditee satisfaction surveys, 
vi. whether IAF uses computer-assisted audit technique, 
vii. whether IAF is familiar and does comply with the IIA ISPPIA, 
viii. whether IAF have a quality assessment and improvement program 
(QAIP) in place, and 
ix. whether IAF uses external quality assessment 
 
Till date, the provisions laid down in the IIA standards remain the best guidelines for 
conduct of internal audit engagements and any IAF that would add value to 
organisations is expected to conduct its engagements in full compliance with the 
standards.  
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The IIA standards and the various inputs from extant studies such as above shall be 
applied in addressing the second research question – ‘’To what extent are IAFs in the 
NFS performing their roles in conformity with the IIA standards’’. The research 
questions shall be explored specifically by looking at the conformity of the IAF’s 
activities with the IIA’s standards.   
 
2.3.5  Internal auditors’ Characteristics 
Mousa (2013) maintains that whereas appropriate organizational status ensures IAF’s 
independence, the level of objectivity of each internal auditor is the basis of evaluating 
independence of IAF. Sarens (2009), though agreed with Mousa (2013)’s position, 
however suggested that other numerous personal attributes such as educational 
background or qualification of internal auditors, work experience, professional 
certification, behavioural skills etc, are areas that can also be looked into when 
exploring internal auditors’ characteristics. The issue of multidiscipline skills required 
for the enhanced roles of IAF, and the challenges associated with finding internal 
auditors with the required skill sets has being identified as a very crucial issue when it 
comes to IAF responding to its ever dynamic roles particularly within the concern of 
enhanced corporate governance domain. Sarens (2009) argues that the capacity of IAF 
to monitor and improve risk management and internal control processes is determined 
by an internal auditor’s personal characteristics relating to possession of appropriate 
level of competence.  
 
Discussions of internal auditor’s competence, and the study’s research question on 
internal auditor’s characteristics (i.e. whether internal auditors in the NFS have adequate 
level of competence to fulfill their expected roles) is informed by the above arguments. 
This is thoroughly addressed within the domain of the literature review in chapter 4 of 
the thesis. For the purpose of exactness and defined focus, the empirical literature 
review in chapter 4 of the thesis shall be shaped within the perspectives explained 
above, and consequently, the conceptual framework of the study is synthesized as 
illustrated below. 
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Figure 2.1: Study’s Conceptual framework   
 
 
2.4.0   Structure of the Nigerian financial sector  
Nigeria, officially known as the Federal republic of Nigeria is a multi-ethnic and 
culturally diverse country located on the Western coast of Africa covering a total 
surface area of  923,768square kilometers, with an estimated population of about 
197million (Nigerian Bureau of Statistics). Nigeria gained her independence from the 
United Kingdom on October 1, 1960 and is presently divided into 36 federating units 
known as States, and its Federal capital territory known as Abuja. The country, usually 
referred to as the ‘’giant of Africa’’ is widely known for her monolithic economy. 
Nigeria is the largest oil producing and exporting country in Africa (Suberu et.al; 2015). 
Petroleum accounts for about 95% of the country’s foreign exchange income and 70% 
of government revenue.  
 
Nigerian financial sector is generally classified into formal and informal groups. The 
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institutions. The banks, based on the different functions they are meant to perform, are 
classified into different categories. These include Deposit money banks (DMBs) also 
known as commercial banks, Development banks (such as Bank of Agriculture, 
Development bank of Nigeria, Bank of industry, The infrastructure bank, Nigerian 
Export-Import bank (NEXIM), Mortgage banks, and Micro-finance banks. The non-
bank financial institutions include insurance companies, finance houses, discount 
houses, Bureau De change, Pension fund administrators, pension fund custodians, 
insurance brokers, issuing houses, stock broking firms, registrars. Both the bank and 
non-banking financial institutions are regarded as the formal financial sector.  
 
Whereas the DMBs (popularly referred to as commercial banks), which constitute about 
80% of the Nigerian financial sector are primarily involved in deposit mobilisation from 
the surplus units, and granting of such as credit facilities to the deficit ends, 
development banks (such as Bank of agriculture, bank of industry etc) are specifically 
set up to cater for specific sectors of the country’s economy. This is with a view to 
stimulating economic development across the country. It is generally agreed that 
financial sector plays a catalytic role in the process of economic development (Onwe, 
2013). 
 
The informal financial sector in Nigeria includes local money lenders, money changers, 
pawn brokers and thrifts and savings associations. Whereas, the formal sector has 
defined operating structure with specific regulatory framework, the informal sector 
operates outside the regulatory purview of the government. The informal sector engages 
in activities which are not easily measured and it cuts across a wide range of areas of 
informality (such as environmental, spatial, economic, and social), covering business 
activities, employment, markets, settlements, and neighbourhoods. 
  
The regulatory bodies of Nigeria formal financial sector include the Federal ministry of 
finance (FMoF), Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Nigeria Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC), Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Nigerian Stock 
Exchange (NSE), the National insurance commission (NAICOM), and the Federal 
Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN). 
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2.4.1  Financial sector reforms and Corporate governance issues in Nigeria 
Nigerian financial sector has been through lots of remarkable changes over time 
(Odeleye, 2014; Yaqub and Omobitan, 2012). The adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) by the Nigerian government in July 1986 however 
remains the landmark incident in the reformation of the country’s financial sector. The 
referenced economic reform policy was a conditionality of the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank’s intervention aimed at addressing the severe 
economic conditions prevalent in most African countries inclusive Nigeria.  SAPs were 
intended to restructure and diversify the nation’s economy. Liberalisation of the various 
sectors of the economy was one of the key thrusts of the economic reform programs.  
Prior to the adoption of SAP by the Nigerian government under the administration of 
President Ibrahim Babangida, Nigerian economy was highly regulated and largely 
crude-oil dependent.  
 
According to Ogun & Akinlo (2011), the economic reform program was orchestrated to 
address the macroeconomic imbalances in Nigeria (in form of severe balance of 
payments, increased debt burden, high inflation and high rate of unemployment).  The 
economic hardship of the time was brought about by the global oil glut of 1980 and its 
severe impact on the Nigerian mono-product economy. The government’s liberalization 
policy then was aimed at commercialization and privatization of some of the 
government’s investments in corporate entities across sectors. As envisaged, aside from 
the fact that some private investors were given the opportunities to have equities in 
some public corporations, the liberalization policy also paved way for influx of foreign 
investors into the country particularly into the country’s financial sector.  Between 1988 
to 1999, over 55 public enterprises were privatized (Danladi & Naankiel, 2016). This re-
affirms the shift in economic regulation to deregulation in Nigeria (Ogun and Akinlo, 
2011). 
 
The financial sector in Nigeria no doubts recorded significant growth and expansion as 
a result of the liberalization policy. The phenomenal growth in the sector however 
generated mixed effects on the economy (Edo, 2012).  The positive impacts of such 
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unprecedented expansion include increased job opportunities, remarkable growth in 
banks deposits, and boost in the other sectors in Nigeria. In the same vein, the need for 
increased monitoring and regulation on the part of the sector’s regulators became so 
evident. As at that time, the Companies and Allied Matters Decree (CAMD) of 1990, 
remained the principal statute regulating companies in Nigeria (Marshall, 2015). This 
legislation (formerly known as the Companies Act 1968) was modeled after the United 
Kingdom companies Act of 1948. The statute (CAMD) has however been repealed and 
replaced with the Companies and allied matters Act (CAMA) 2004. The legislation 
made provisions regulating issues such as accounting and auditing standards, equity 
ownership disclosure, shareholders rights among other issues. As at this time, the 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC) and other regulators are expected to regulate 
companies’ operations. As activities in the country’s financial sector increased with the 
associated challenges of unethical issues among companies, the inadequacies of the 
various provisions of the CAMA became evident.  
 
In order to strengthen the sector particularly following its liberalisation, efforts made by 
the CBN and NAICOM include continuous upward review of the required level of 
capitalization for companies in the sectors, and unceasing monitoring of activities of 
companies in the sector by the various operators. The incessant recapitalization of 
companies in the sector had resulted into series of mergers and acquisition in banks and 
non-bank financial institutions. For instance, the last recapitalization exercise of 2005, 
(stipulating =N=25billion as the new minimum capital base for deposit money banks in 
Nigeria) led to significant reduction in the number of commercial banks in the country 
from 89 to only 25 (Ogunsakin, 2014; Muritala et.al.; 2017).   
 
Similar to what led to the phenomenal collapse of Enron and some other major 
corporations in United States of America and UK in early 2000s, Nigerian corporate 
world (inclusive of financial sector) was noted to be plagued with bad corporate 
governance practices. The unending systemic rot in the nation’s financial sector (leading 
to huge non-performing loans) led to CBN’s sack of the Chief executive officers and 
directors of eight Nigerian commercial banks in 2009. According to the CBN, the 
decision was taken to prevent the Nigerian financial sector from complete collapse and 
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also to restore investors’ confidence in the sector. According to the then CBN 
Governor- Mallam Lamido Sanusi, the officials were removed due to high level of non-
performing loans attributable to poor corporate governance practices, lax credit 
administration processes and the absence or non-adherence to the bank’s credit risk 
management practices, Further to the sack of the managing directors and the takeover of 
the concerned bank, Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria (AMCON) was 
established in July 2010 to pursue the recovery of the non-performing loans (estimated 
at over N2trillion) in the troubled banks.  
 
Whereas, corporate governance still remains a topical issue in Nigeria particularly in the 
academic and corporate environment, the country’s efforts in stemming the issue of 
corporate mis-governance officially started in 2003 with the issuance of code of 
corporate governance for Banks and other financial institutions in Nigeria.  Code of 
corporate governance sets out standards of good practice in relation to management of 
corporate organizations. The code was issued by the Bankers committee in August 
2003. This was followed by the SEC code of 2003, the CBN code of 2006 (for banks), 
PENCOM code 2008 (for pension fund administrators and custodians) and NAICOM 
code of 2009 (for insurance companies). These codes were issued by the various 
regulators in the financial sector as their response to the post bank consolidation 
challenges. Multiplicity of codes of corporate governance has however become a great 
challenge facing companies in the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
Concerned with the rising corporate governance challenges in the country and with a 
view to assuring the investing public that corporate reporting and governance 
frameworks in Nigeria were robust, the Nigerian government, through the Financial 
Reporting Council of Nigeria (FRCN) issued the first code of corporate governance for 
the country on January 15, 2019. The code (Nigerian Code of Corporate Governance – 
“NCCG 2018”) highlights key principles that seek to institutionalize corporate 
governance best practices in Nigerian companies. The FRCN established by the 
Financial reporting council of Nigeria Act No. 6, 2011 is a Federal government 
parastatal under the supervision of the Federal ministry of Industry, Trade and 
Investment.  
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The code which is principle-based consists of seven parts (focusing issues relating to 
Board of directors and officers of the board, Assurance, relationship with shareholders, 
business conduct and ethics, Sustainability and transparency).  As a way of ensuring 
compliance, companies shall be required to report in their annual financial statement 
(starting in financial years ending on or before January 1, 2020) their level of 
compliance with the governance code. It is envisaged that the emergence of the 
harmonized code of corporate governance based on the principle of ‘’apply and 
explain’’ in the country will further ease the challenge of compliance among corporate 
entities in Nigeria 
 
2.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reflected upon various developments that brought internal auditing into 
the corporate governance discussion globally. In doing this, the concern on audit crunch 
and auditing profession’s diminishing esteem were thoroughly discussed. In a bid to 
establish the study’s conceptual framework, issues relating to the emergence of internal 
auditing as a corporate governance mechanism, and its rising stature are discussed. In 
the same vein, the various concepts surrounding IAF’s effectiveness are discussed.  
 
The overarching argument here is whether IAF in its current revered status is truly 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework 
3.0  Chapter overview 
This chapter aims at establishing an appropriate theoretical framework for the study. 
Based on evidence obtained in the literature, three different theories are considered 
relevant to the study’s focus. These are Agency theory, Transaction Cost Economics 
(TCE) theory, and Institutional theory. With a view to establishing their relevance to the 
study, the theories are reviewed and their various standpoints are reflected upon in 
relation to the study’s objectives and research questions. 
As part of the focus of this chapter, the limitations posed by scant theories of internal 
auditing is brought to fore and justifications are made for the study’s theoretical 
underpinnings. 
 
3.1.0  Theoretical Framework 
If there is any issue confronting the practitioners of internal auditing, either in 
academics or in practice, the issue of scant and seeming incomplete theories to shape 
studies on internal auditing definitely is. Theories and research specifically devoted to 
internal auditing is extremely limited (Paape, 2007, 238; Swinkels, 2012; Boyle, 1993; 
Gendron and Bedard, 2006).  
 
Lack of enough theories to shape researchers’ direction is argued the bane of academic 
activities in the field of internal auditing. A limited number of academic studies use 
theory to position their research focus (Swinkels, 2012).  Incidentally, most thrusts 
always initiated by the IIA do not usually seem to be theory-motivated but mostly 
circumstantial, reactional and opportunistic (Swinkels, 2012, 68).  While the infancy 
stage of the internal auditing profession was in the past, being used as a justification for 
scant theorization in the field of internal auditing (Vutren, 1996), major transformation 
and achievement is however expected to have been recorded particularly over seventy 
years of existence of a global body pushing for legitimacy of internal auditing 
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profession. So, internal audit professionals (whether in practice or in academics) cannot 
continue to shirk their responsibilities in strengthening the profession considering its 
improved visibility and bequeathed stature particularly associated with reforms in the 
corporate governance’s domain (Carcello et al; Sarens et al., 2012). Therefore, efforts 
geared towards broadening the horizon of theoretical lenses currently employed in 
internal auditing research are considered worthwhile.  
 
Calls for theoretical refinement in internal auditing theories abound (see Spraakman, 
1997; Paape, 2007; Swinkels 2012; and Mihret, 2014), and an effort in this direction, 
serves to further motivate internal auditing research particularly in these days of 
growing stature of internal auditing across climes. This may engender significant 
contribution to the body of knowledge in the field and an attempt capable of stimulating 
renewed interests in studies focusing internal auditing. Contrary to the positions 
maintained by some authors (e.g. Boyle, 1993) that internal auditing has no theoretical 
background at all, three different theories-Agency theory, TCE theory, and Institutional 
theory, have been identified relevant to the study. These theories are employed to give 
insights on studies that bother most especially on the essence of internal audit, role 
played by internal audit in business organisations, and decisions relating to sourcing 
(i.e. internalisation or outsourcing) of IAF of firms.  
 
Agency theory, TCE theory, and Institutional theory promoted by Adams (1994), 
Spraakman (1997) and DiMaggio and Powell (1983), respectively, have history of 
application in internal audit research. The three theories are frequently applied by 
researchers in the field (Paape, 2007. p. 104).  
 
The next section presents detailed discussion of the referenced theories with a view to 
establishing their areas of relevance in the field of internal auditing, highlighting the 
criticisms against their universality on issues that bother on internal auditing as a 
corporate governance mechanism, and justifying the adoption of the conflation of the 
three theories as a suitable theoretical framework for the study. 
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3.1.1  Agency Theory Literature 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) titled ‘’Theory of the firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency 
costs and ownership structure’’ remains a very useful background to literature on 
Agency theory. The authors define an agency relationship as ‘’a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf by delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent’’. In this definition, it can be seen that agency contract involves not only 
engagement of the agent by the principal for performance of services, but also involves 
delegation of authority by the principal to the agent. This is necessary to facilitate the 
agent’s performance of the assigned function. 
 
While presenting a review of Agency theory, Paape (2007) in tune with the above 
indicates that the theory is based on two essential actors: a principal and his agent and 
the relationship between them. An Agency relationship exists whenever a principal 
engages someone to make decisions on his or her behalf (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 p. 
5; Armstrong, 1989.  p.312). Agency theory is employed to explain contractual 
obligations between the owner of a business (usually called the principal) and the 
managers (usually referred to as agent). A contract of agency exists between owner of a 
firm who produces resources required for the firm’s establishment and operation on one 
hand, and the managers who controls, runs and manages the business affairs on behalf 
of the owners on the other hand. Whereas, the rewards to the principal (owner) is the 
return on his investments in form of profits and increase in market value of his 
investment, the agent (manager) is compensated through salary and other fringe benefits 
implied in his contract of engagement. It is assumed that each of the parties will 
continuously pursue optimization of his reward or compensation. It is based on this 
assumption that both parties are referred to by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as utility 
maximizers.  
In the course of pursuing this utility maximization objective, divergence of interests 
between the principals and the agents is inherent, and consequently the principal is said 
to always feel skeptical of the agent acting in the best interest of the firm. Davis, et al. 
(1997) lament that agents leverage on the principals’ authority to act on their behalves 
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(delegation) to build their own utility at the expense of the principal’s utility (wealth). 
They argue further that chance that agents do not share the same interest and utility 
choices as their principal is substantial. This feeling had earlier been echoed by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976 p. 1): 
 ‘’The directors of such (joint stock) companies, however,  
being the managers rather of other people’s money than  
of their own, it cannot well be expected that they should  
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
 the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch  
over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are  
apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their  
master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a  
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion,  
therefore must always prevail, more or less, in the management  
of such a company’’  
 
The above cynicism is enshrined in the notion that managers of the business knows 
more than the owners, and may capitalize on this information unevenness (popularly 
known as information asymmetry) to gain undue advantage at the expense of the owners 
(Sarens and Abdolmohammadi, 2011; Paape, 2007).  In addition to this information 
asymmetry cynicism is the fear that the managers might not even be making the best 
business decisions at any point in time after all, the owners do not have full information 
about the business. This is what Adams (1994) interprets as ‘’adverse selection’’.  This 
adverse selection, Culpan and Trussel (2005) argue might also be associated with 
different levels of risk appetite of the principal and the agent. 
 
While positioning this theory as a basis for internal audit, Scapens (1985) as indicated in 
Adams (1994), argues that each party will continue to optimize his wealth at the 
expense of the other until an optimal level, state of efficiency (also called “pareto 
optimality”) is reached where neither party can enhance his wealth at the expense of 
other.  Adams (1994) argues further that in order to ensure pareto-optimality in the 
agency contracting process, both principals and agents will incur contracting costs. This 
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contracting cost is well captured as bidirectional, on the part of both parties in the 
contract, and such is required to align interests (Culpan and Trussel, 2005). Adams 
(1994)’s position on contracting costs on the part of the two parties perfectly aligns with 
the Jensen and Meckling (1976)’s view that the principal can put the aberrant activities 
of the agent under control by establishing appropriate incentives capable of limiting 
divergences of intentions and actions on the part of the agent. Similarly, the authors 
state that it will be in the best interest of the agent to continue to retain the principals’ 
confidence by signaling to them that divergent actions shall not be taken by them or that 
the principals shall be compensated for any harmful actions or decision taken on their 
behalf. 
 
Whereas principal’s portion of the contracting cost is in form of monitoring 
expenditures, such as the cost of subjecting management’s annual financial reports to 
external audit, the expenditures on Audit committee and non-executive directors (Watts, 
1988),  the agent on the other hand and according to Adams (1994),  incurs bonding 
cost which includes the cost of internal audit, engaged at least to signal to the 
owners/principal that they are acting responsibly and in a manner congruent to the 
contract of their employment. Such action, it is further argued by Adams (1994), is 
expected to help the managers to secure their agent’s position and guarantees their 
salary and other fringe benefits.  
 
While, the monitoring expenditure incurred by the principal is seen by Davis et al. 
(1997) as cost of holding the opportunistic tendencies of the agent in check, it can be 
contended from the argument above that it will be in the best interest of the managers to 
demand monitoring services like internal audit so as to mitigate the risk of the principal 
coming up with adverse adjustments on their compensation.  
 
Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) reemphasize IAF as a bonding cost borne by 
managers of company to satisfy the owners’ quest for accountability by signaling to 
them that their investment is under control. Interestingly, that might sound superflux but 
in reality it is just a theoretical conjecture; after all in reality, bonding costs are like any 
other operational cost of business, which are treated as first line charge before arriving 
 The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector                       Page 77 
 
at the residue to be passed to the principal. Cost classification and its accounting 
treatment is however not a focus here and as such the cost of internal audit is taken 
theoretically as it is (i.e. bonding cost). Additional to both monitoring and bonding costs 
borne by the principals and the agent respectively, is the cost attributable to the 
divergence between principal’s and agent’s interests that results to diminution in the 
principal’s welfare. This is referred to as ‘’residual loss’’ (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Culpan and Trussel, 2005).  
 
The totality of these expenditures (i.e. monitoring expenditures by the principal, 
bonding expenditure by the agent, and residual loss) is what is referred to as the agency 
cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The important idea in the agency relationship is the 
selection of appropriate governance mechanisms between principal and agent that will 
ensure an efficient alignment of principals and agent interests (culpan and Trussel, 
2005).   
 
The rationale of both monitoring cost and the need for bonding cost on the part of the 
principal and his agent is best appreciated within the context of diffused ownership, 
where ownership and control of business entities are unavoidably distinct. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that since the relationship between the stockholders and the 
managers of a corporation fits the definition of a pure agency relationship, then the 
issues associated with ‘’separation of ownership and control’’ in the modern corporation 
with diffused ownership are closely associated with the general problem of agency.  
 
In this type of business setting, information asymmetry becomes a major concern for the 
principal who is completely ignored on critical and regular business decisions (if not 
completely all). Paape (2007) appropriately captures this concerns as bothering on 
‘’hidden information’’ and ‘’hidden action’’ of the agent. Inherent in this laxity and 
opportunity of hidden information and hidden actions are behavioural issues that 
translated to moral hazard ex-post. 
An alternative approach to incurring monitoring cost is for the principal to take his 
destiny in his hands by adopting a ‘’do it yourself’’ psyche. This certainly might not be 
feasible particularly within the context of firms with diffused ownership, due to issue of 
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uneven endowments in terms of dexterity and acumen, time constraints, and 
impracticability. Even where owners would prefer to self-manage their own companies 
and reap the maximum utility for themselves, this may evidently seems impossible in 
modern corporations where capital requirements might be an impediment (Davis, et 
al.1997). The advent of the modern corporation with diffused ownership inevitably 
heightened separation between ownership and control of wealth (Bearle &Means, 
1932). 
 
While the first two constrains were also indicated in Paape (2007), it is extremely 
inconceivable for numbers of equity holders to constitute themselves into such 
monitoring mechanism. Thus the inevitability of monitoring cost.  Sarens and 
Abdolmohammadi (2011) argue that the more diffused the ownership of a company, the 
higher the likelihood of the divergence in owners’ and managers’ preferences. This 
implies that as the diffusion of ownership increases, so does the demand for monitoring. 
 
Paape (2007)’s poser on who monitors the monitor as contemptible as it is, remains a 
concern for both the professionals and professional bodies in auditing to give serious 
attention, as the monitor (internal auditors) themselves are economic agents whose 
activities cannot be said to pass the test of altruism due to the inevitability of 
opportunistic tendencies.  
 
Another issue arising from the above exposition has to do with the possibility of seeing 
internal audit as monitoring cost on the part of the management when viewed as having 
a contractual relationship (akin to agency relationship) with the employees under their 
management, as well as facing similar challenges of unevenness of information on 
operational issues within the firm. It is based on this feeling that it is worth of 
emphasizing that the principal-agent relationship, underlying Agency theory is actually 
between the owner and manager of economic resources. Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
also give credence to this line of thoughts by emphasizing the contractual agreements 
between the owners and top management of corporations.  
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Looking at internal auditing within the mindset above, Agency theory can then be said 
to offer acceptable explanation or platform for the raison d’être of internal audit, the 
“license to practice’’ of internal audit according to Paape (2007). Considering internal 
audit from another perspective under the theory, particularly reflecting on its role as a 
monitor, the theory also offers a good rationalization for evaluation of the unceasing 
agitation about IAF’s independence and its organisational status within the company on 
the need for auditor’s independence. Studies focusing who the internal audit boss should 
be extensively leverage on this paradigm.  
 
Adams (1994) concludes his study by arguing that agency theory can help to give 
explanation on the existence of internal audit, the nature of IAF and the approach 
adopted by internal auditors to their work.  From 1994 to date however, internal 
auditing studies found in literature to have employed Agency theory include Adams 
(1994), Paape (2007), Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011), Al-Hroot (2012); and 
Endaya and Hanefah (2013). These are as indicated in table 3.1 (page 105). Paape 
(2007) in her PhD thesis focusing on the changes brought about in internal audit due to 
corporate governance regulations that have been coming into effect for more than a 
decade, submits  that Internal auditing theorization is at infancy stage perhaps because 
of the usual perception that internal audit is subservient to external audit.  The author 
indicates the inadequacies of both agency theory and Transaction Cost Economics, and 
consequently agitates for further theoretical exploration.  
 
Paape  (2007. P.129) however forewarned that ‘’positioning internal audit under those it 
is supposed to monitor is a recipe for failure’’. The position maintained on this has an 
implication for the perceived independence and reputation of the IAF not only by the 
external auditor who makes a decision of reliance on internal auditor’s work, but also on 
other stakeholders of firm who need assurance on the effectiveness and reliability of the 
monitoring mechanism. The argument is though IAF is perceived to be within the orbit 
of “employer–employee’’ in a firm, with the management naturally and technically its 
boss, the necessity of independence of a monitor from the ‘’monitored’’ amplifies the 
concern on management bossing IAF.    
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Independence is a critical attribute to be possessed by the IAF so as to strengthen such 
assurances from it and consequently enrich the reliability of the function. The 
significance of this characteristic forms the foundation and cornerstone of internal 
auditing profession, and is further emphasized by the IIA definition of internal auditing 
as: 
‘’an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity 
 designed to add value and improve an organisation’s  
operations. It helps and organisation accomplish its  
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach  
to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management, 
control and governance processes’’  
Millichamp and Taylor (2008) argue that an independent IAF is a significant part of the 
overall internal control environment. The issue of IAF’s independence is extensively 
discussed in chapter 4 and 6 of the thesis. 
 
Culpan and Trussel (2005) while reviewing the Enron debacle of 2002 identified among 
other factors, the issue of IAF’s independence that was utterly undermined in the 
company. The agency costs became more complicated in the referenced case as 
managers were involved in a complex network of long term business deals, which 
involves the usage of financial derivatives such as options and forward contracts as well 
as creation of Special purpose entities (SPEs) for managing the company’s balance 
sheets. According to Healy and Palepu (2003), Enron entered into long-term fixed price 
transactions and adopted financial derivatives, including swaps, forward and future 
contracts, the company also started using off-balance sheet financing vehicles known as 
SPEs to finance many of the transactions. These are transaction that subjected the extant 
accounting standards to twisting given that such transaction model adopted ‘’mark-to-
market’’ accounting. Mark to market accounting according to Healy and Palepu (2003) 
implies that once a long-term contract was signed, the present value of the stream of 
future inflows under the contract was recognized as revenues and the present value of 
the expected costs of fulfilling the contract were expensed. Unrealised gains or losses in 
the market value of the long-term contracts (that were not hedged) were then required to 
be reported later as part of annual earnings whenever they occurred. SPEs are shell 
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firms created by a sponsor, but funded by independent equity investors and debt 
financing. Healy and Palepu (2003) disclosed that by 2001, Enron had used hundreds of 
SPEs. Reinstein and Weirich (2002) approximate this to be five hundred (500) in 
number. Therefore, Enron was able to borrow substantial sums without carrying such 
liabilities on its balance sheets, and as a result maintaining its high credit rating status 
(Doost, 2003). 
 
According to Healy and Palepu (2003), Enron’s primary challenge in using the mark-to-
market accounting was estimating the market value of the contracts, which in most 
cases ran as long as twenty (20) years. This accounting flexibility was further 
complicated by the flexibility associated with treatments of SPEs transactions which 
Enron was able to leverage on to manipulate its balance sheets by not disclosing debts 
raised by it through the various SPEs.  
 
The company’s auditor Messrs Arthur Andersen, serving as both external and internal 
auditor to Enron, appeared to compromise his independence and Enron management 
capitalizing fully on this flaw was able to sway the firm at the time to their side. 
Therefore, given them a shield over their shady deals of creative accounting with their 
selfish interests. For instance, Arthur Andersen was accused of applying lax standards 
in their audits because of a conflict of interest (Healy and Palepu, 2003). Conflict of 
interest is established as part of the major threats to either external or internal auditor’s 
objectivity.  
 
Looking at it from another perspective, Enron case can be said to be that of an 
uncontrolled appetite for risk on the part of the company’s management without 
adequate risk-based internal audit approach. While the company keeps pursuing 
business growth model aggressively through diversification, the risk analysis and 
management issue were neglected (Healy and Palepu, 2003). Rather than instituting an 
in-house IAF, Enron management outsourced same to Arthur Andersen. Aside from 
trading off their independence as internal audit firm, as argued by Smith (2002) 
provider of outsourced IAF cannot be fully committed to their client same way 
employees of an in-house IAF will do. The author also maintains that outsourced 
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auditors providing internal audit services to a firm often do not achieve the same 
understanding of the business as the in-house auditors who are perceived to have 
tremendous knowledge of the business that can only be gained through years of daily 
interactions with management and staff. Drexler (2003) contends that in-house internal 
auditor’s familiarity with operations and insider knowledge can enable more informed, 
insightful audits than an outsourced IAF may be able to provide. 
 
On the issue of commitment and allegiance, ‘’External auditors go from client to client. 
Their allegiance is to their firm and the partners of the firm, not to the client. Internal 
auditors are employees of the company with an independent reporting structure to the 
audit committee. Their status as employees ensures that they are interested in the long-
term good of the organisation’’ (Smith, 2002. P. 13). 
  
Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) in their study, adopted agency theory to assess the 
monitoring effects of the IAF in Belgian companies, and discovered that the explanatory 
power of traditional agency variables is relatively weak in a Belgian setting. 
 
As explained earlier, this study shall also leverage on Agency theory to assess the level 
of independence of the IAF in the Nigerian financial sector. Various indicators or 
determinants of IAF’s independence (such as sourcing arrangement, reporting line of 
the IAF in the sector etc) shall be evaluated using the various insights provided by 
agency theory. 
 
3.1.2.  Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory 
TCE theory according to Huascar (2006), studies the uncertain world of incomplete 
contracts, inhabited by ‘contractual men’ – people with bounded rationality and 
potential opportunists. TCE theory is a variation of agency theory (Spraakman, 1997), 
which was developed for exploration into the field of internal auditing. The theory has 
its footing in the new Institutional Economics research tradition and leverages on the 
theory of the firm expounded by Coase (1937). The main focus of TCE is the definition 
of the determinants of coordination of the transactions through markets or hierarchies 
(Joskow, 1988).  Bounded rationality, opportunism, the primacy of markets and the 
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action of economising are building blocks of TCE theory as formulated in the 
pioneering work of Oliver Williamson (Huascar, 2006). The main appeal of the theory 
lies in the fact that in resolving the principal-agent unavoidable rifts, internal audit apart 
from being one of the bonding cost incurred by management mechanism to signal 
conformity with the principal’s intents and the organizational goals, also offers itself to 
the organization as a controlling device to prevent shirking and opportunistic 
tendencies, which certainly reduces the cost associated with information asymmetry (to 
be specific) inherent in the contract of agency. This expectedly increases organizational 
efficiency, or economizes costs, and indicating the focus on efficiency.  
 
TCE theory applies cost of transaction in studying economic organisations. Here, 
transaction is regarded as the basic unit of analysis and an understanding of transaction 
cost economizing is central to the study of organization (Williamson, 1981). According 
to the author, the requirements underlying this approach are: 
i. that transactions be dimensionalised,  
ii. governance structure be described, and 
iii. that economizing is accomplished by assigning transaction to governance 
structures in a discriminating way.  
While discussing the fundamentals of the theory, Williamson (1981) indicates that the 
proposition of transaction as the basic unit of economic analysis was advanced by John 
R. Commons in 1934 (Williamson, 1981. P.550). A transaction is said to take place 
when a good or service is transferred across a technologically separable interface. While 
some transactions are simple and easy to mediate, others according to Williamson 
(1981) are difficult and require special care, so the concern on how to identify factors to 
be used for differentiating easy and difficult transaction, identification of differing 
governance structures within which transactions can be organized and actualized in a 
transaction-cost–economising manner are the essence for which TCE theory was 
propounded. 
 
When transaction occurs within an organisation, the transaction costs aside from the 
cost of input (raw materials and capital expenditure) can include managing and 
monitoring personnel, negotiating, cost of drafting agreements, as well as cost of 
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safeguarding any exchange or transaction that are friction-encumbered. The transaction 
costs of buying same good or service from an external source, within the framework of 
TCE includes cost of source selection, contract management, performance evaluation 
and arbitration (i.e. dispute resolution). From this, one might establish that organisation 
setting or governance structure is a factor on the determination of transaction costs. The 
transaction costs generally can be seen as ex-ante and ex-post. While cost of sourcing, 
negotiation, agreement drafting, and exchange safeguarding are ex-ante, costs of input 
evaluation, output measurement, monitoring cost and dispute resolution constitute ex-
post transaction cost. Industrial firms worldwide continue to rationalize their operations 
by ‘’right-sizing’’ and shedding non-core business and functions (Widener and Selto, 
1999). The essence of such rationalization is to help firm focus its area of core 
competence so as to remain competitive. Rationalisation improves organizational 
operations. In this era of highly competitive business environment globally therefore, 
such right sizing, or rationalization of operations becomes inevitable. Widener and Selto 
(1999) argue further that increased competitive pressures are actually forcing business 
organisations to look closely at the services they maintain internally. This they do to 
make sure they add value and do not duplicate other services. The decision to either 
maintain IAF internally in organisations or outsource it can be resolved along this line 
of argument. Many firms are now facing the decision dilemma of whether to develop 
and maintain these broader internal audit capabilities internally or farm out same to 
external providers. 
 
A strand of argument is that if the enhanced role of IAF (i.e. (assurance and consulting) 
requires diverse of skills that seem to be posing greater challenge to organisations, skills 
sets such as IT, interpersonal skills, communication, etc which will cost firms additional 
cost to acquire and maintain become inescapable, the question here is will such 
expenditure be in the best interest of the firm in terms of its ‘’bottom line’’ and 
viability?.  According to TCE, high market transaction costs are incentives to internalize 
economic activity, conversely, activities with low market transaction costs may be more 
economically mediated through markets, (Widener & Selto, 1999), ceteris paribus (i.e. 
all other considerations held equal). TCE theory argues that activities of the firm will 
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either be internalized or market–mediated, depending on relative transaction costs of 
conducting the activities (Wiiliamson, 1979).        
 
To have a better appreciation of the theory, Williamson (1981) made two behavioural 
assumptions which are assumptions of recognition of human agents as being subject to 
bounded rationality, and that at least some agents are given to opportunism. Simon 
(1978)’s explanation of the differences between bonded rationality on one hand and 
hyper-rationality and irrationality on the other hand, offers a better appreciation of the 
first assumption of TCE theory. According to his explanation, Simon (1978) captured 
bounded rationality as the limited endowment of an ‘organization man’ in terms of 
capability as applicable to analytical and data processing apparatus. This he nonetheless 
cautions should not be taken as hyper-rationality that is often attributed to ‘economic 
man’. Opportunism within the concept of the theory is in the same vein, interpreted not 
as selfishness but rather ‘’self-interest seeking with guile’’, that is an effort to realize 
individual gains through lack of candor. 
 
The relationship between Agency theory and TCE theory might not be unconnected 
with these two assumptions of bounded reality and opportunism, which can be likened 
to the same problems of information asymmetry and selfishness tendencies of agents 
under the contract of agency. Considering the bounded rationality and opportunism 
assumptions of TCE within the frame work of Agency theory, the opportunism 
tendency of an economic agent (either principals or agents), complicates the process. 
Williamson (1981) while emphasizing the complicating impact of opportunism argues 
that although it might be incomplete, universal contracting would still have been 
achievable but for the human agent’s crafty self-interest (i.e. opportunism). This means 
that if agents though bounded rationally, were fully trustworthy, comprehensive 
contracting would still be possible, and presumably observable. Reciprocation of 
promises of being ‘’a good boy’’ would have been a caveat at most (i.e. principals 
would simply exchange with the agent, promises of behaving in good faith, with his 
(agent) well-mannered and steward-manship upon unanticipated events).   
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Such well-mannered and cooperative behavior of agents towards managements are the 
focus of ‘’Stewardship theory’’. The theory, which provides a contrary argument to 
Agency theory paradigm, assumes a pro-organisational and collectivistic behavior for 
management in a steward (agent) versus principal relationship. Davis et al. (1997) 
elucidates further by stating that stewardship theorists assume that given a choice 
between self-serving behavior and pro-organisational behavior, a steward’s behavior 
will not be divergent from his or her organization (i.e. pro-organisational). Given that 
the steward perceives greater utility in cooperative behavior, a steward will not 
substitute or trade self-serving behaviours for cooperative behaviours. Even when faced 
with situation where the interests of the steward and the principal are not in alignment, 
the steward places higher premium on cooperative behavior than defection (Davis, et 
al.1997. p. 24). Attainment of the organizational objectives is the focus and the driving 
force of the steward’s action. 
 
In the case of loosely coupled, heterogeneous organisations, or put directly, an 
organization with diffused ownership, stewards are assumed to keep their eyes on the 
ball, that is attainment of organizational goals remains the focus. Cooperative behavior 
of the stewards however does not indicate that stewards are self-sustaining or without 
‘’survival’’ needs, the driving force remains the paradigm that the tradeoff between 
personal needs and organizational objectives facilitates achievement of organizational 
greater utility, through which varied personal objectives can be met altruistically.  
 
Impliedly, enhancing stewards’ autonomy seems desirable, as doing that will result in 
maximization of benefits accruing from the stewards’ cooperative behaviour. In such 
situations, it is assumed that because stewards can be trusted, therefore monitoring 
incentives and or bonding costs are unnecessary. It is argued that control measures can 
indeed be potentially counterproductive, as such undermine the pious behaviour of the 
stewards (Davis, et al. 1997). Thus stewardship theorist focuses on structures that 
facilitate and empower rather than those that monitor and control. 
 
Going by the above, and given that internal audit is understood as a control mechanism, 
one may therefore want to argue the limitation of stewardship viewpoint in studies 
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concerning internal auditing. Commenting on opportunistic tendencies of agents, Paape 
(2007) argues that opportunism is truly worse than self-interest in that its 
(opportunism’s) embryonic and dignified form is lying and cheating for the benefit of 
one’s own interests. Spraakman (1997) indicates that the assumption of opportunism 
may be taken as incomplete or distorted disclosure of information by agents, especially 
aimed at misleading, distorting, disguising, obfuscating, or otherwise confusing. Thus 
information asymmetry issue highlighted under agency theory earlier discussed might 
be taken to be a case of agent’s opportunism when viewed under TCE’s paradigm.   In 
explaining TCE further, Morrill and Morrill (2003) identifies three dimensions for 
characterising transaction that give rise to transaction cost. These are: 
i. uncertainty; 
ii. the degree to which durable, transaction specific investments are required 
to realize least cost supply (assets specificity) 
iii. the frequency with which transactions recur (frequency); 
The above three dimensions are as shown below: 
 
Figure 3.1: TCE Dimension (according to Morrill and Morill, 2003) 
 
i. Uncertainty  
Without the existence of bounded rationality and opportunism, Williamson (1985) 
argues that uncertainty would be much less of a problem because general rules would 
usually prevail. However with the challenges of bounded rationality and opportunism 
earlier discussed, contracts are difficult to write as it is very difficult to ascertain ex-ante 
who will indulge in pursuing self-interest ingeniously (cunningly).  Fundamentally, an 
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inability to predict eventualities (contingencies) creates problems in writing contracts 
and therefore agreements are incomplete in some important respects (George and 
Barton, 1988 pg 341) 
 
Uncertainty is an assumption of imperfect knowledge about a transaction. This certainly 
contrasts with neoclassical view assumption of existence of perfect information.  
Information about past, current and future assets are not known perfectly and as a result 
contracting becomes more complex.  Williamson (1985) identifies two forms of 
uncertainty that have implications on transaction cost. These are environmental and 
behavioural uncertainties. Environmental uncertainty refers to the inability to predict all 
eventualities that might affect a transaction and given that economic agents are naturally 
beleaguered with limited cognitive aptitudes, they are constrained to write incomplete 
contracts. Market contracts are certainly cumbersome in the face of unforeseen 
contingencies as opportunistically inclined agents can try to interpret unspecified 
clauses of the agreements to their benefits (Morrill and Morrill, 2003).  
 
The existence of environmental inexactness obfuscates the process of writing and 
enforcing contracts since the environment shifts in unpredictable manners. The 
fundamental challenge under the market model is that even contracts adjudged ‘best’ are 
incomplete (Spraakman 1997). So, the conclusion is that in-house production is better 
able to cope with because internally, organisation can cope without revisiting formal 
agreements. TCE theorists accordingly argue that an appropriate response to increased 
environmental uncertainty is to internalize transactions, given that stable, long-term 
administration and communication mechanisms can be developed to enhance 
information flow between the parties, and thus ‘on line, real time’ resolution of conflicts 
is also predicted (Morrill and Morrill, 2003).   
 
Significant environmental uncertainty exists in the context of external audit 
characterized by high levels of complexity or risk, as either could impose unanticipated 
costs onto the external auditor either through litigation or additional audit work.  If TCE 
theorists are correct, Morrill and Morrill (2003) infers that a complex and risky audit is 
associated with high transaction costs in a pure market based contractual arrangement. 
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The only option left therefore, is to renegotiate with the clients for increased audit fee or 
sub-standard audit through sordid audit (associated with controlled audit budget) in 
situation where the audit fee cannot be renegotiated with the auditee.  
 
The second option certainly is not desirable given higher costs associated with poor 
audit particularly if certain contingencies materialize. This obviously will not be in the 
best interest of the two parties. In contrast, internal audit participating in the financial 
statement audit, faced with these same contingencies, Morrill and Morrill (2003) further 
argues can more easily adapt through internal administration and communication 
mechanisms. Transaction cost analysis posits that an appropriate response to increased 
environmental uncertainty is to internalize the transaction (George and Barton, 1988).   
Thus, internal audit’s participation in financial statement audit might be offered as a 
recipe for controlling the transaction costs associated with a risky or complex financial 
statement audit.  
 
The second form of uncertainty- behavioural uncertainty discussed by Williamson 
(1985) has to do with the level of difficulty involved in evaluating performance on 
contractual agreement and safeguarding adherence to contractual obligations. 
Behavioural uncertainty is associated with strategic non-disclosure, manipulation of 
information, and more generally-moral hazard and information asymmetry (Speckle’ et 
al.,2007). Unlike environmental uncertainty which is exogenous, behavioural 
uncertainty is endogenous, inherent within the context of the exchange itself. Morrill 
and Morrill (2003) argue that in transactions ingrained with a high level of behavioural 
uncertainty, one or more opportunistically inclined parties might be motivated to shirk 
or consume excessive levels of privileges.  
 
TCE theory is suggestive of internalization as the best strategy to deal with transactions 
characterized by high levels of behavioural uncertainties. This is thought so because 
within a hierarchical arrangement, monitoring mechanisms and performance history can 
be simulated. This thus aids accurate measurement of performance, consequently 
encouraging better performance on the part of parties to an agreement while also 
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facilitating easy identification of inefficient or opportunistic individuals (Morrill and 
Morrill, 2003).  
 
Applying this line of argument to this study, an auditee might have bounded capability 
with which to evaluate the efficiency of audit, and or the quality of same, this limitation 
can be costly particularly if the audit transaction is carried out inefficiently or 
ineffectively. Therefore, leveraging on the above clarifications, one may want to 
advocate that internal auditor might be in the best position to handle those aspects of 
audit whose performance is not easy to monitor in order to take advantage of monitor 
mechanisms that are absent within a market setting. Consequently, discussion of 
internal auditor’s coordination with external auditor in financial sector can be made 
within the framework of TCE theory. 
 
ii. Assets specificity 
Asset specificity according to Williamson (1981) is the most important dimension for 
describing transaction, and it occurs in organisations where assets have been customized 
(Spraakman, 1991); such that the assets have little or no alternative uses (Paape, 2007). 
Customisation of assets restricts assets to limited usage. This thus makes redeployment 
of assets extremely uneasy. Morrill and Morrill (2003) explain that assets specificity is 
achieved when investment in transaction-specific assets is made. He further gives 
examples of transaction-specific investments that have been studied within the TCE 
literature to include investments in equipment dedicated to the manufacture of some 
specific product and which have no alternative applications, specialized communication 
hardware and software in the insurance industry, and specialized knowledge required of 
sales personnel in order to handle particular products. Succinctly expressed, Speckle’, 
Elten and Kruis (2007) indicate that asset specificity suggests the presence of 
opportunity losses that arise if the investments made to support a transaction are put to 
other alternative uses or users.     
 
Williamson (1981) maintains that decision regarding asset specificity is critical because 
once an investment has been made, buyer and seller are effectively operating in a 
bilateral (or at least quasi-bilateral) exchange relation for a considerable period 
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thereafter, and the supplier is ‘’locked in’’ on the transaction to a significant extent, 
particularly if the alternative uses of the specific assets is much smaller than the 
specialised use for which the customization was prompted. In the same vein, the buyer 
is as well committed to the transaction (boxed into a corner) as he cannot turn to 
alternative sources of supply and obtain the item on more favourable terms, since the 
cost of supply from un-customised capital is presumably excessive. Agents are usually   
unwilling to undertake transaction-specific investments if there is no guaranteed long-
term return on the investment in view. Invariably, where assets specificity is great, both 
parties (buyers and sellers) will make special efforts to design an exchange that has 
good continuity properties (Williamson, 1981).  This certainly shall be for the mutual 
benefits of the suppliers and buyers and is necessary because according to Morrill and 
Morrill (2003), each party is dependent upon the other, and therefore susceptible to 
opportunistic tendencies. Paape (2007) affirms the vulnerability of the parties to ‘self- 
interest-seeking with guile’ by stating that a cooperative attitude cannot be assumed. 
TCE theory, Morrill and Morrill (2003) argue further, suggests that transactions 
characterized by high levels of transaction-specific investments are cumbersome in a 
market setting.  
 
Williams (1981) identifies three forms of assets specificity. These are: 
a) Site specificity – e.g. successive stations located in a cheek-by-jowl relation to 
each other so as to economise on inventory and transportation expenses. Once in 
place, the assets involved are difficult to move (Morrill and Morrill, 2003). 
b) Physical asset specificity – one or both parties to the transaction make 
investments in equipment that has design characteristics specific to the 
transaction and little alternative use (Morrill and Morrill, 2003). For example, 
specialized dies that is required to produce a component (Spraakman, 1997). 
c) Human assets specificity – This refers to transaction-specific human capital that 
often arises through a learning-by-doing process 
 
In addition to the above categorization, Morrill and Morrill (2003) included the fourth 
form of asset specificity as dedicated assets. This they referred to as general investments 
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made by a supplier that ordinarily would not have been caused but for the prospect of 
selling a significant number of products to a particular customer.    
 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that TCE has offered itself a good platform 
upon which decision relating to internalization or outsourcing of internal audit can be 
made. Given the need for considerable knowledge of client’s business, Transaction-
specific investment in form of human asset specificity is often argued the fundamental 
basis of good internal audit. Firms operating in high risky domain require specialized 
knowledge particularly to appreciate the various inherent risks and peculiarities of 
vulnerabilities. Although the argument on sourcing in favour of external audit firms on 
the ground that most external audit firms operate a bouquet of services that are designed 
for diverse of industries or domains of firms’ operations sound logical, where highly 
specialized knowledge, skills or dexterity is required however, and the industry or 
sector contains relatively few firms, internalizing the IAF may be cost economical. This 
is so considering that investment in the required skill acquisition may be less likely to 
be readily transferable to other clients in the sector due to fierce competition that may 
abound. Given that it seems there is no consensus yet on the issue of ‘’make or buy’’ of 
IAF, the theory is considered a good platform to investigate the determinants of IAF’s 
sourcing in the NFS, as well as how such sourcing decision affects IAF’s ability to 
enhance quality corporate governance. 
 
  
iii. frequency with which transactions recur 
This is the last dimension put forward by Williamson (1981). Spraakman argues that the 
dimension could as well be called ‘’Large scale production’’. Frequency refers to the 
volume and value of a particular transaction over time, and affects economic rationality 
of investment in assets specificity (Speckle’ et al, 2007). TCE theorists opined that an 
investment on specialized assets becomes worthwhile only when there is large potential 
demand for the transaction. Small markets or demand demotivates assets’ specificity. 
Thus in-house production and internal audit will be associated with large scale 
production (Spraakman, 1997).  
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The above dimensionalising factors expatiated below are what Williamson (1981) refers 
to as the critical dimension for describing transactions. It can therefore be argued that all 
the three dimensions discussed above are intertwined and have relationship with the 
decision on IAF’s sourcing (in-sourcing or outsourcing) in organization, In summary, 
Paape (2007) maintains that ‘Make or buy’ decision of IAF are the classic problem for 
which TCE theory is used. . 
 
Following Spraakman (1997)’s indication of the general applicability of TCE theory 
particularly to the issue of make or buy of IAF, and its adaptability even to both private 
and public sectors (in spite of the differing operational motives), application of the 
theory in internal auditing studies have started to gain wider horizon. Studies in internal 
auditing that have adopted the theory since then include Widener and Selto (1999), 
Morrill and Morrill (2003), Paape (2007), and Speckle et al., (2007). See table 3.1 on 
page 105.  All the studies identified asset’s specificity and frequency as dimensional 
factors that are taken into consideration whenever the decision of ‘buy or make’ of IAF 
is to be made in firms.   
 
Specifically, both Widener and Selto (1999) and its replicating study of Speckle et al. 
(2007) suggest that concerns for the transaction costs caused by dimensions of assets’ 
specificity and frequency, both as main effects and interactions, influence the decision 
to outsource IAF. This implies that organisations are more likely to internalize IAF if 
the function require firm-specific knowledge and becomes more integrated with the 
management and operations of the firm. 
 
The relevance of the frequency impacting firms decision on make or buy decision of 
IAF implies that larger firms and firms that are relatively heavy consumers of IAF tend 
to rely more on internalization of this services, whereas smaller firms that are less audit 
intensive are according to Speckle et al. (2007), more likely to farm out their IAF. The 
population of this study with its peculiarity in terms of size and internal audit’s intensity 
presents an appropriate setting to verify the findings of Speckle et al. (2007). In terms of 
size, Nigerian economy is a developing one with considerably higher number of smaller 
firms with mild drivers of IAA. As earlier discussed in chapter 2, internal auditing as a 
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profession is just evolving in Nigeria. It is doubtful if any notable line of separation 
exists between the auditing and accounting profession in Nigeria. This is so given that 
auditing is perceived as an adjunct of accounting in the country. This might be 
responsible for the low intensity of IAA in the country. 
 
On the impact of uncertainty on IAF’s sourcing arrangements, no evidence of 
uncertainty (either behavioural or environmental) influence on IAF’s sourcing decision 
is consistently found in the referenced studies.   
 
Considering the peculiar characteristics of this study’s focus, and the specificity of the 
knowledge required by internal auditors of Financial sectors, TCE theory shall be 
adopted to examine the relevance of outsourcing of IAF in the sector as it relates to 
adequacy of skills and expertise. Whereas the study of Widener and Selto (1999) 
indicate that financial institutions (banks) in United States such as Great Western Bank 
(Hodgson and Purchaver, 1995), First American Corporation, First Bank-Minneapolis 
(Verschoor, 1992), and Bank of America Illinois (Cox, 1993) are part of the country’s 
firms whose IAFs are already being outsourced. The authors hinted that this outsourcing 
practice is expected to continue and that virtually all firms might outsource their IAFs in 
not-too-distant future. It is however doubtful if financial sector in Nigeria has embraced 
this development. Firms in this sector seem to have the peculiarity of high inherent 
operational risks and also do operate through expansive branch networks. This is an 
indication of transaction’s high frequency and human assets specificity (in terms of 
specialised knowledge to discern risks while also leveraging on thorough understanding 
of firms’ idiosyncrasies). Therefore, the likelihood of internalization of IAFs in the 
sector. This uncertainty shall be unraveled under the study by testing the relevant 
hypotheses with the guidance of TCE theory. 
 
Looking at it from another perspective, and going by the exposition made on TCE 
theory above, it may be argued that the impact of outsourcing on the operational 
capability, competitive advantage and the bottom line of firms might be argued as 
enough incentives for farming out firms’ IAF. The issue of dearth of the required skill 
sets necessary for the modern day IAF to meet its value-addition expectation of its 
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various stakeholders (the management, audit committee, and ultimately the 
shareholders) might be the motivation for outsourcing in the NFS. Outsourcing 
anticipatedly, might offer some respites in the sector, plagued with poor corporate 
governance. Poor corporate governance has become a common lexicon in the NFS 
(Adegbite, 2012; Babalola & Adesoji; 2011; Aileman & Ojeka, 2013). To aggravate 
issues, board members and management of some companies in the country’s financial 
sector are said to be incapable of running their institutions (Aileman and Ojeka, 2013). 
 
One of the objectives of the study is to evaluate the adequacy of the resources and 
expertise of the internal auditors in the sector. The essence of tailing this path of enquiry 
is informed by the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 610, guidance on the level 
of coordination between internal auditor and external auditor as captured in Millichamp 
and Taylor (2008, p.264): 
‘’How competent is internal audit function?, Does the department 
 contain sufficient numbers of trained, competent professional  
accountants to carry out the role effectively. Is it well enough resourced?. 
Do they have professional qualifications and training programmes 
both for trainees and for continuing professional development?” 
 
The impact of the endeavor cannot be overemphasized given series of financial scandals 
and corporate governance failures that swept through the sector in recent time, causing 
the Federal government of Nigeria colossal sum in the name of ‘bail out’ to prevent 
collapse of the nation’s financial system. Skills gap is one of the challenges associated 
with the sector’s endemic poor risk management as identified by the nation’s apex bank 
(the CBN).  
 
3.1.3.  Institutional theory 
Institutional theory provides insights into understanding of how regulatory 
requirements, diffusion of practices among organisations and the impact of professions 
generate isomorphic pressures on organisations (Mihret et al., 2012). It is a theory that 
emphasizes the survival value of conformity with the institutional environment. Such 
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conformity leads, for instance, to increased stability, legitimacy, and access to resources 
(Ball and Craig, 2010).  
 
That internal auditing has witnessed some radical changes in the recent time, 
particularly sequel to the catastrophic incidences of corporate failures since 1990 that 
cuts across climes (O’Regan, 2001), is not an exaggeration. The inadequacy of the 
external audit firms to sufficiently mitigate phenomenal financial scandals of 1990’s on 
one hand, and the paradigm shift in internal audit from internal control only to 
incorporate risk management and corporate governance processes on another, contribute 
tremendously to the growing stature of internal auditing worldwide. Burnaby & Hass 
(2011), Arena et al. (2006), and Sarens et al. (2011) disclose that the significance of the 
internal auditing profession has grown dramatically over the last decade as the 
numerous frauds and whimsical practices of financial management has escalated. These 
shocking situations led governments in some countries to revise their regulations, 
particularly the financial regulatory frameworks. The most evident instance is the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002), famously referred to as SOX 2002. 
 
Various regulations post-ante SOX 2002, as well as the concerted efforts of the IIA, 
aimed at regulation of the internal auditing professional practice are the critical factors 
shaping the profession of internal auditing worldwide. The IIA is dedicated to the 
furtherance of the state of the arts both in philosophy and practice of internal auditing 
(Dittenhofer, 2001).  Since its inception, the institute has pre-occupied itself with the 
practice of quality auditing, its edicts, its statements of responsibilities and body of 
ethics (Dittenhofer, 2001; Swinkel, 2012).   
 
Transformation of internal audit from mere control instrument to risk management and 
governance mechanism can be argued a case of deinstitutionalization of old practices 
and institutionalization of new ones. This institutional change perspective can provide a 
useful analytical framework to explain how internal audit practices develop over time as 
a consequence of institutional change dynamics.  
While Institutional theory might be said to have been embraced limitedly in accounting 
and internal audit research (Dillar et al., 2004; Mihret et al, 2012), the theory is 
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gradually receiving prominence among researchers in the field of internal auditing (see 
Al Twajiry et al., 2003; Arena et al., 2006; Arena and Azzone, 2007; Mihret et al., 
2010; and Mihret et al., 2012).  These studies however focus mainly on explaining 
internal audit adoption and characteristics (Mihret et al., 2012). Similar to other 
organizational activities widely accepted internal Audit practices exist as institutional 
norms and are moderated by the principles of institutionalization (Mihret et al., 2012).  
An institution is defined by Dillar et al. (2004.  p.508) as ‘an established order 
comprising rule-bounded and standardization social practices; and institutionalization as 
‘’the process whereby the practices expected in various social settings are developed 
and learned’’.  The idea that organizations are deeply and essentially embedded in their 
wider institutional environment rose to prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Prior to 1970s, most organisations’ analysis involved a focus on the internal workings 
of organisations (Mizruchi and Fein, 1999).  
The ground breaking work of DiMaggio and Powell (1983) which investigated the 
isomorphic behavior of organisations facing similar conditions remains the reference 
point under Institutional theory. Isomorphism according to Perdana and Umar (2011) 
means similarity in form. Mihret et al. (2012) describe this as the process that engenders 
similarity. Noting the remarkable similarity of organisations in contemporary 
industrialised societies, DiMaggio and Powell (1983) question the basis of 
organisations’ similarity. They argued that this similarity has arisen not because of 
competition or an objective requirement of efficiency but rather as a result of 
organisations ’quest to attain legitimacy within their larger environments.  
This legitimacy-seeking tendency ultimately generates isomorphism (Mihret et al., 
2012).  DiMaggio and Powell (1983) proposed three mechanisms through which 
institutional isomorphism occur. These are as shown below: 
i. Coercive isomorphism 
ii. Mimetic isomorphism; and 
iii. Normative isomorphism 
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Fig. 3.2: Different forms of isomorphism 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), by indicating that coercive isomorphism is driven by two 
forces: pressures from other organisations on which a focal organisation is dependent 
and organization’s pressure to conform to the cultural expectations of the larger society 
argue further that coercive isomorphism may result from formal and informal pressure 
exerted on organisations, including government’s mandate. In developed economies 
such as USA, UK and Canada, the relevance of coercive isomorphism in the field of 
internal auditing cannot be overemphasised. Swinkels (2012) submits that regulatory 
and legislative changes are an important reason why IAFs even exist within some firms.  
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003. p.512) added that coercion takes place through mechanisms of 
authority, legitimisation and the power to compel organisations to establish internal 
audit departments which not only review the adequacy of the internal control system but 
engage in a wider review of the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the 
organisation’s activities and their effect on organizational performance. Institutional 
theory endorses conformance to external rules and norms (Ball and Craig, 2010). A 
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quick guess here might be the view that coercive isomorphism paradigm offers a 
justification for rationalising possibly the essence of internal audit as well as 
transformation in IAA over time due to the need to respond to regulators’ shifts from 
time to time. 
The second form of isomorphism is mimicry. According to DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983), companies strive to model themselves on the practices of similar organisations 
in the same field, which they perceive to be more legitimate, or successful (Arena and 
Azzone, 2007), particularly as a response to uncertainty (Mihret et al., 2012). This 
implies that mimetic isomorphism is a change process driven internally within an 
organisation. Prior studies have established evidence of mimetic isomorphism in 
companies particularly in the areas such as strategies, organizational structures, 
organizational processes, and technological preferences (see Haveman, 1993; Burns and 
Wholey, 1993). Less legitimate or successful companies imitate organisations perceived 
as legitimate (Arena and Azzone, 2007). Legitimacy, according to the proponents of 
institutional theory can be attributable to firm characteristics such as size and success. In 
the same vein, one may want to argue that market share, customer base, branch network, 
customer satisfaction, and reputation can be considered as traits of legitimacy, 
particularly in financial sector.  
Normative isomorphism arises from an increase in professionalization within 
organisations (Al-Twaijry et al, 2003). This might be in form of influence from 
professional bodies and consultants (Arena and Azzone, 2007). In the field of internal 
auditing for instance, the IIA has greatly influenced internal auditing profession 
worldwide through diffusion of guidance and professional standards among its 
members, operating through national chapters. The institute’s certification (notably 
CIA) obtained after passing the profession’s qualifying examinations, regular 
workshops and conferences are designed with a view to increasing the legitimization of 
the profession. Similar to Al-Twaijry et al. (2003)’s confirmation about the positive 
contribution of the normative isomorphic pressure of the IIA in Saudi Arabia, the 
practice of internal auditing in Nigeria is gradually gaining publicity through knowledge 
sharing focus of the institute’s chapter via conferences, and seminars.  Bota-Avran and 
Popa (2011) further emphasized the isomorphic roles of the IIA by stating that the 
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professional organisation of internal auditing has played a significant role not only in its 
evolution, but also in the process of ensuring its legitimacy. The issue of legitimization 
certainly plays vital roles in strengthening a profession. Looking at the internal auditing 
profession most especially in developing countries however, it appears the IIA still 
needs to do more in the area of normative isomorphism. Focusing Nigeria for instance, 
one might want to argue that more needs to be done in the area of advocacy in order to 
take maximum benefits of legitimization role of the IIA.  
While expecting more proactiveness and increased activities in this direction, it is 
expected that this particular study will contribute in no small measure in generating 
insights for the IIA. Such insights are particularly anticipated in the area of advocacy. 
This is an area where the institute requires further normative isomorphic directives. 
Incidentally, the study attempts to be the first endeavor to evaluate the contribution of 
IAF to the country’s most sensitive sector (financial sector).    
Generally, from the above expositions, it can be inferred that the changes in the practice 
of internal auditing globally has firstly, been shaped by combination of possibly all the 
three isomorphic pressures (i.e. coercive, mimetic, and normative isomorphism). 
Coercive isomorphism is apparent in the increased visibility accorded internal auditing 
by the radical shift in the various regulatory frameworks- government laws, regulations, 
and guidelines (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, SEC rules, etc). Mimetic, through the IIA’s 
imitation of other notable professional bodies, particularly accounting professional 
bodies (such as ACCA, and ICAEW). This is in the institute’s efforts to brace up to the 
rising challenges and opportunities thrown at it by the corporate governance’s 
revolution in the current era. The growing chapters of the IIA membership across 
countries with the permeability of the institute’s culture, international best practices, 
regular training for the member countries,  is certainly a case of normative 
isomorphism. All the three isomorphic dimensions co-exist in each context, being 
deeply intertwined with each other (Arena and Azzone, 2007). Intertwining of 
isomorphic pressures can be interpreted as complementary and metamorphic or 
changeability. 
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The above notwithstanding, the issue of non-exclusivity of the IIA in the field of 
internal auditing globally is a serious concern being raised on the issue of legitimization 
of internal auditing profession (see Regan, 2001). That internal auditing is not a licensed 
profession where membership and compliance with standards is currently, purely a 
matter of choice, contrary to the external audit profession is a big concern. This implies 
that normative isomorphic pressures are not enough in lifting and legitimizing internal 
auditing across globe. It is considered that legal recognition and endorsement will be 
helpful. Other countries (most especially developing nations) might want to follow the 
path of California, which happened to be the first sovereign to enact a law requiring 
state and local government’s strict adherence to the IIA standards. In clear terms, the 
IIA has not yet achieve a ‘regulative bargain’ (Macdonald, 1995, p187) with the state to 
obtain a jurisdiction within which it can set its terms of reference. 
There is no doubt that institutional theory seems to continue to receive increased 
application in internal auditing studies particularly in recent time. Studies that employed 
institutional theories in this direction include: Al-Twaijry et al. (2003), Arena et al. 
(2006), Arena and Azzone (2007), Al-Hroot (2012), Mihret et al. (2012), Endaya and 
Hanefah (2013), Baker and Bedard (2014), and Elbardan et al. (2014).   Al-Twaijry et 
al. (2003) using institutional theory provide useful insights into the development of 
internal audit in Saudi Arabia and discover that internal audit  is yet to be fully 
appreciated in the country despite its numerous advantages stemming from its enhanced 
roles in risk management, control and governance. The study indicates that the coercive 
and normative pressures expected to influence the profession in Saudi Arabia is yet to 
reach appreciable level thus responsible for the infancy stage of the profession in the 
country. According to the studies, while most directors and staffs of the internal audit 
departments in the country are well educated, few had professional qualifications. This 
deficiency is attributed by the authors to the low level of affiliation to the IIA.  The 
study therefore anticipates more coercive influence in form of government regulation as 
well as more normative pressure in form of aggressive advocacy particularly from the 
IIA. Also suggested as one of the ways forward is the need to have an Arabic version of 
the IIA professional practice standards, considering the language barrier observed in the 
country. These are considered useful hints to the IIA global. 
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Arena et al.(2006) in their case applied the theory to analyse the adoption and 
characteristics of internal audit departments in Italian companies. In the study, the 
authors found out that institutional pressures played a vital role in the growth of internal 
auditing in Italian companies. Industry, listing, size and membership of the IIA national 
affiliate are significant elements influencing the adoption and characteristics of internal 
audit departments in the country. This further confirms the intertwining influence of the 
institutional pressures on internal auditing. 
Concerned further with the development in internal audit practice among Italian 
companies, Arena and Azzone (2007) conducted a study to examine factors driving the 
adoption and characteristics of internal audit departments in Italy and revealed through a 
survey data from 364 Italian companies (with a response rate of 63%) that institutional 
pressures plays significant role in the development of the profession in the country. It 
indicates that industry, listing (coercive forces), size (mimetic pressure) and 
membership of the IIA national affiliate (normative) appear significant elements in 
influencing the adoption and characteristics of internal audit departments. In addition to 
anticipating increasing activity of the IIA in Italy, the study also recommends greater 
attention to internal audit issues in the country’s universities’ curriculum. This is with a 
view to stepping up the required normative pressure meant to shape the characteristics 
of the internal audit departments in the country. The outcomes of this study is similar to 
the findings of Mihret et al. (2012) who uses same theory to examine the extent to 
which institutional norms determine attributes of internal audit practices and how 
institutional changes explain the development of these practices in Ethiopia. The 
tremendous impact of the coercive pressure (in form of government legislations) on the 
rapid development of internal audit practice in Ethiopia is however upheld by the 
authors. 
The study of Baker et al. (2014) that examines the factors regulating statutory auditing 
in the USA, France and Canada, post Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 also identified a 
combination of external pressures from global capital market for standardized 
regulatory practices, and decoupling effect of the professional regulations, as 
responsible for the increasing apparent similarity in the regulatory structures for 
statutory auditing in the three countries. 
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The referenced studies therefore portend valuable implications for enhancing the 
understanding of the adoption and development of internal audit departments at national 
and international levels (Arena and Azzone, 2007), and thus motivate the adoption of 
institutional theory for the current study. The issue of whether or not IAFs conduct their 
engagements in line with the IIA standards, and evaluation of internal auditors’ level of 
proficiency, two of the objectives of the study can be explored meaningfully using 
institutional theory. 
 
3.2.0  Theoretical diagnosis 
From the above theoretical discourse, the following inferences can be drawn: 
i.      Agency theory with its assumption of existence of contractual relationship 
between the owner (principal) and manager (agent) of business entity lends 
itself to the exploration of the reason for existence (raison d’être) of IAF in 
organisation. This theory has received tremendous application in internal 
auditing literature upon its adaptation by Adams (1994) for theorization 
particularly to offer explanations for the essence of internal auditing.  
ii.      TCE, which is regarded as a variation of agency theory (Spraakman, 1997)’s 
attempt to resolve the self-interest tendencies that surround the principal-
agent relationship within the fundamental assumption of bonded rationality 
and opportunism, offers a veritable paradigm for the ‘’make or buy’’(i.e. 
decision on choice of in-house or farming out) sourcing decision of IAF in 
organisations. 
iii.      Institutional theory on its premise emphasizes the survival value of IAF’s 
conformity with the institutional environment. Such conformity which leads, 
for instance, to increased stability, legitimacy, and access to resources is 
adopted to offer justification for the increased and enhanced role of IAF 
attributable to the abstraction of internal audit from external audit on one 
hand and the eventual professionalization of internal auditing worldwide 
through the establishment of the IIA in USA on November 10, 1941 on the 
other hand. This is in addition to the impact of the isomorphic pressure on 
the internal auditing profession worldwide, induced by the institutional 
environment mostly brought about by legislation (coercive isomorphism) 
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and a combination of both endogenous and exogenous imitation of 
international best and acceptable practices (i.e. mimetic and normative 
isomorphisms). The increased need for internal audit has both international 
and national implications as witnessed by the growth of multinational 
corporations and joint ventures operating under different governmental and 
cultural influences (Foster and Greenawalt, 1995). The various 
transformational developments in the field of IAF can therefore be explained 
using this theoretical lens.  
 
Going from the above synopsis, it can be inferred that the existing theories in the field 
of internal auditing, though considered scant and still at infancy stage are not 
contradictory in any way but rather complementary. Considering the objectives and 
propositions to be tested under this study, the three theories: Agency, TCE and 
Institutional (‘’ATI’’) theories are considered relevant and suitable, and a conflation of 
the tripod theoretical lenses shall therefore be explored concomitantly for this study.  
 
With this development, this study consequently enjoys the privilege of being the first on   
internal auditing to adopt an expansive theoretical paradigm (offered by ‘’ATI’’). 
Successful exploration of this tripod and complimentary theoretical framework to 
provide verifiable solutions to the study’s research questions shall be a major 
contribution to knowledge.  
  
3.2.1  Extant internal auditing studies with clear theoretical framework 
As scant as they are, and as mentioned earlier, presented below is a schedule of extant 
studies in internal auditing with clear theoretical framework: 
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Table 3.1: Internal auditing studies with clear theoretical framework 
S/N Study Focus Theory(ies) 
adopted 
1 Adams (1994) Agency theory and the internal audit Agency 
2 Spraakman (1997) Transaction Cost economics: a theory for internal audit? TCE 
3 Widener and Selto (1999) Management Control Systems and Boundaries of the Firm: Why do firms outsource Internal Auditing 
Activities? 
TCE 
4 Al-Twaijry, Brierley and Gwilliam (2003) The Development of Internal audit in Saudi Arabia: An Institutional Theory perspective Institutional  
5 Morrill and Morrrill (2003) Internal auditor and the external auditor: a transaction cost perspective TCE 
6 Arena, Arnaboldi, and Azzone (2006) Internal audit in Italian organisations: A multiple case study Institutional 
7 Paape (2007) Corporate Governance: The Impact on the Role, Position, and Scope of Services of the Internal Audit 
Function 
Agency and TCE 
8 Arena and Azzone (2007) Analysis of adoption and characteristics of internal audit departments in Italian companies Institutional  
9  Spekle’, van Elten and Kruis (2007) Sourcing of Internal auditing: An empirical study  TCE 
10 Sarens and Abdolmohammadi (2011) Monitoring effects of the Internal Audit Function: Agency Theory versus Explanatory Variables Agency 
11 Al-Hroot (2012) The relationship between the internal audit function and corporate governance: Evidence from Jordan Agency and Institutional  
12 Mihret, Mula and James (2012) The development of internal auditing in Ethiopia: the role of institutional norms Institutional 
13 Endaya and Hanefah (2013) Internal audit effectiveness: An approach proposition to develop the Theoretical Framework Agency, Institutional and 
Communication  
14 Baker and Bedard (2014) The regulation of statutory auditing: an institutional theory approach Institutional 
15 Elbardan, Ali and Ghoneim (2014) The Dilemma of internal audit function adaptation: The impact of ERP and Corporate governance 
pressure 
Institutional  
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The schedule further affirms the extent of researchers’ exploration of theoretical lenses 
for studies on internal auditing. Definitely, the espoused tripodal theoretical framework 
–‘’ATI’’ for this study (shown in figure 3.3 below) anticipates to offer a further push in 



















Figure: 3.3 : ‘’ATI’’ - Tripodal internal audit theoretical framework  
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3.2.2  Research objectives, the Study’s conceptual and theoretical framework 
The table below shows how the study’s objectives (stated in chapter 1), conceptual 
framework (established in chapter 2) and the theoretical underpinnings (discussed in 
this chapter) are integrated.   
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3.3   Chapter Summary 
This chapter through extensive discussions, and evaluation of the relevance of the 
existing theories that had enjoyed the embrace of researchers of internal auditing, has 
identified a combination of three complementary theories (Agency, TCE and 
Institutional), which upon integration is acronymed ‘’ATI’’ (a tripodal framework) as a 
suitable theoretical paradigm for the study. The next chapter reviews existing studies 
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            Chapter 4:       Research propositions and Hypotheses development 
4.1  Chapter overview  
Having discussed in Chapter 3 of the thesis, the three theories underpinning the study, 
this chapter aims at developing from the extant studies (both in academics and practice), 
the propositions to be verified and hypotheses to be tested so that answers can be 
provided to the study’s research questions. Formulation of the hypotheses shall be based 
on convergence of evidences and views on the various concepts related to the subject 
matter of the study. This shall be achieved through critical review of the various prior 
studies on the area of focus (the significance of IAF as a corporate governance 
mechanism), addressing specifically the various propositions and missing links 
particularly in connection with realities from developing nations.  
 
4.2.0 IAF’s Independence 
In order to have a broader view of the issue of independence of IAF, the study of 
Christopher et al., (2009) provides a good head start. The referenced study that 
conducted a critical analysis of the independence of the IAF based on empirical 
evidence from Australia used most of the following criteria espoused in literature (see 
Cohen and Sayag, 2010; Lenz and Hahn, 2015; Munro and Stewart, 2011; Sarens et. al; 
2009, Abbot, Parker and Peters; 2010; Zain, Subramaniam and Stewart, 2006; Adel and 
Maissa, 2013; Zaman and Sarens, 2013) to investigate IAF’s independence: 
a) Organisational status of IAF (i.e. IAF’s reporting line) 
b) IAF’s sourcing arrangement 
c) CAE’s Hierarchy 
d) Frequency of attendance of  Audit committee’s meeting by the CAE 
e) Appointment and dismissal of CAE 
f) Existence of internal audit charter 
g) Existence of Audit committee 
h) EAC’s membership adequacy 
i) Audit committee’s meeting frequency 
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Therefore, from the above exposition, it can be seen that meaningful and detailed 
discussion of IAF’s independence can be achieved by looking at the above perspectives 










   
 
 







Fig. 4.1 :  Schema of literature review on IAF’s independence 
 
Previous studies suggest that lack of independence is an obstacle to satisfactory internal 
audit performance in a number of developing countries (Alzeban and Gwilliam, 2014). 
This concern has been raised in developing countries such as Malaysia, Ethiopia, Sudan 
(see: Ahmad et al., 2009; Mulugeta, 2008; and Brierley et al., 2003). It is therefore 
doubtful if the story can be anything different in Nigeria, a terrain where internal 
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audit field has also been established in the country (Abiola, 2010), a push in this 
direction forms part of the motivation for this study. 
 
4.2.1      Organisational status of IAF (IAF’s reporting line) 
Given that independence of IAF is taken as the function’s bedrock, appropriate 
organisational position and status is anticipated for the function to be independent and 
have its work and opinion free from undue influence, particularly from the management 
on whose activities and responsibilities IAF gives its assurance to the audit committee, 
and for which the function also acts as a partner through consulting or advisory 
activities.  
 
Sarens and De Beelde (2006) indicate that the fact that internal auditors are the 
employees of the organization puts them in a serious dilemma when carrying out their 
expected dual roles of assurer and consultant (or advisor), and except the IAF is 
positioned appropriately in the organization with certain level of authority and 
influence, internal auditors can face considerable familiarity and social pressure threat 
(Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  In order to ensure an appropriate organisational 
status for IAF, the IIA stresses that IAF should be accorded the appropriate status in the 
organization (Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010). It is further argued that unless the IAF 
is appropriately positioned, organization may not achieve the optimum benefits of the 
function (Reding et al., 2013). Similarly, the external auditors desirous of leveraging on 
the work of the internal audit also do evaluate how the IAF is positioned before putting 
reasonable level of reliance on their work in performance of their independent audit. 
 
Most studies on organisational positioning of IAF usually approach the concept by 
looking at reporting line of the function, i.e. whether the function is reporting to the 
audit committee or the management.  The dual reporting relationship recommended by 
the IIA as enshrined in its standards for the head of the IAF (i.e. CAE) is aimed at 
achieving the degree of independence required for an effective IAF. Specifically, the 
CAE is expected to have a functional reporting relationship with the board on one hand, 
and an administrative reporting rapport with senior management on the other hand.  
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Commenting on this enhanced reporting relationship, Chambers and Odar (2015) 
maintain that IAF’s independence from management is in jeopardy if such enhanced 
reporting relationship is not adhered to. While emphasizing the importance of IAF’s 
reporting line to their independence, Denise and Denise (2009) define independent IAF 
as one who reports directly to the audit committee. Whereas it appears that there is not 
yet a full consensus on the ideal reporting line for the IAF, it seems there is a general 
consent on the notion that an enhanced working relationship between the IAF and audit 
committee is an enabler of IAF’s effectiveness (Lenz and Hahn, 2015, p. 10). 
Notwithstanding this emphasis, it is claimed in literature that IAF’s reporting line or 
relationship with the management serves as an important means of strengthening the 
function (Beassely et al., 2009; Gendron and Bedard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007), 
by way of placement in the organisation such that employees of the organisation see the 
function as a critical department. Thus, facilitating cooperative attitudes between line 
managers and their staff and the IAF, particularly in form of unrestricted access to 
records and information (Sarens and De Beelde, 2006).  
 
Other areas of management’s supports to IAF are through appropriate resource 
(particularly budget approval), and contribution of necessary inputs towards the 
function’s audit planning. Therefore, the relationship between the IAF and the 
management is anticipated to be symbiotic, such as the one envisaged by Sarens and De 
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Figure: 4.2: Symbiotic relationship between IAF and Senior management (adapted 
from Sarens and De Beelde, 2006, p. 224) 
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IAF fulfills the management’s assurance need in the area of various internal controls as 
well as proactive consulting activities covering risks assessment and mitigation. Cooper 
et al. (1993) states that internal audit can also act as a support for management in terms 
of reviewing operational efficiency, investigating outcomes of financial initiatives, and 
providing knowledge of business activities. Sometimes, the function can also be 
engaged to work with the management in various temporary (ad-hoc) activities such as 
acquisition, mergers and system development and implementation (Brody and Lowe, 
2000). 
 
However, whenever issue of independence of IAF comes up for discussion, the above 
relationship model does attract continuous skepticism. For instance, Drent (2002) 
contends that most management team still see IAF as management’s instrument, 
perceiving IAF’s functional reporting relationship with the board as mere formality, to 
satisfy corporate governance’s formal requirements. These are some of the criticisms 
raised by Chambers and Odar (2015) who maintain that this dual reporting model is 
flawed. The issue of IAF ‘’serving two masters’’ through their recommended reporting 
model (earlier explained) has become a serious issue or perhaps a dilemma for the 
internal auditing practice. 
 
Aside from this complication of where to direct its allegiance, IAF and organisation also 
face the issue of perception of being valueless and irrelevant once the function is seen 
not to possess enough degree of independence. Studies have established that external 
auditors place high premium and reliance on the work of an IAF that has remarkable 
organisational status. This enhanced status could be through either unflinching supports 
from management in form of appropriateness of the function’s budget or through 
unfettered access to the audit committee. Munro and Stewart (2011) while re-
emphasising the essence of IAF’s unimpeded access to the audit committee,  however 
indicate  that IAF’s functional reporting relationship with audit committee, is not as 
essential as its regular meetings (both formal and informal (or private) with the 
committee. Studies such as Turley and Zaman (2007), and Zaman and Sarens (2013) 
underscore the impact of informal interactions of IAF with the audit committee on both 
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the IAF and corporate governance. Research has also indicated that regular meetings of 
the head of IAF with the audit committee assist greatly in improving the effectiveness 
of the function (see Scarbrough et al., 1998; Treadway Commission, 1987).   
 
Chambers (2008) in emphasizing the need for a functional reporting relationship of the 
CAE with the board argues that it is logical that internal audit’s strongest relationship 
has to be with the top body that relies on its assurance services. He goes further by 
stating that if the board is to place reliance upon internal audit, then internal audit’s 
strongest relationship must be with the board. The author however indicates that 
presently, IAF’s strongest relationship is with management. Also, Goodwin (2004) 
study, where 36% of Chief internal auditors (CIAs) drawn from both Australia and New 
Zealand confirmed that they actually report to the CFO, affirm that most IAFs seem to 
have their strongest reporting relationship with management instead of with the audit 
committee of the board. These hints are suggestive of internal audit’s subservience to 
the management, by subordinating its judgment to that of management. 
 
Unsatisfied with the current situation, Chambers and Odar (2015) went further to 
criticise the existing reporting relationship, where IAF reports functionally to the audit 
committee, and administratively to the management by arguing that the reporting model 
is flawed and therefore envisage situation where the IAF’s umbilical cord with the 
management is totally detached. The authors maintain that until this happens, the IAF’s 
independence from management is in jeopardy.  
 
‘’We take the view that to be a reliable provider of assurance to the 
board, internal audit needs to report for all purposes, including 
 ‘’pay and rations’’, to the board or to a chairman of the board,  
He who pays the piper calls the tune’’ (Chambers and Odar, 2015, p.43).  
 
It is argued in literature that IAF may not have the audacity to report management’s 
irregularities to the board (James, 2003), even with the functional reporting right it 
enjoys with the board due to the fear of intimidations and harassment that may ensue. 
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This is exactly what Van Peursem (2004) in Sarens and De Beelde (2006) has in mind 
when he  submits  that “Essentially, a key issue is that internal audit would assume 
whatever position is in the best interests of their employer and would be reluctant to 
counter management, irrespective of the consequences’’(Sarens and De Beelde, 2006, p. 
225). James (2003) also shares in this sentiment by stating that ‘’If the Chief Audit 
Executive says anything serious to the Chairman which he or she hasn’t already said to 
the CEO, the Chief Audit Executive should not expect to be around for long’’. James 
(2003, p. 317). 
 
It is therefore based on these contentious positions that the objective of this study is 
inclusive of investigating the level of relationship between IAF and management on one 
hand, and between the function (IAF) and audit committee on the other hand, in the 
financial sector in Nigeria. Understanding the level of relationships that exist between 
the parties is aimed at gaining valuable insights on the level of independence of IAF in 
the nation’s financial sector, and consequently the level of value-addition of IAF to 
corporate governance in the sector. 
 
To start with, Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003) in their study on ‘’The relationship 
between the IAF and corporate governance in the EU’’ using questionnaire survey to 
gather data from the CAEs across countries within the European Union (EU) also gave 
insights on the manner of IAF’s reporting line across countries in the EU.  Using 
responses from 105 CAEs, the study revealed that almost half of the respondents report 
to the audit committee. According to the outcome of the survey, the percentages of 
CAEs that report to their audit committees in Belgium, Greece, Ireland, the UK and 
Spain range from 80% and 100%. In the other countries however, the percentage is far 
less, and ranges between 25% and 67%. The authors indicated that in Austria and 
Denmark, all respondents report to the Board of management (i.e. the senior 
management). The survey indicates an exceptional pattern of reporting for the 
Netherlands, where almost 90% of the CAEs report to the CFOs. Overall, further insight 
from the study indicates that relatively few (30%) CAEs report to the CFOs in the EU. 
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Also, Goodwin (2004)’s study earlier mentioned (a questionnaire survey of 120 CIAs 
drawn from Australia and New Zealand, aimed at exploring the similarities and 
differences between private and public sectors’ internal audit) suggests that the issue of 
CAE or IAF’s report line is not in line with the international best practice as 
championed by the IIA. As revealed by the study, out of the 120 CIAs (who are also IIA 
members) drawn from both Australia and New Zealand for the survey, none actually 
indicated that they have any reporting line to their audit committees. Instead, the author 
indicates that from the 72 CAEs from public sector, 57%, 7%, and 36% report to their 
CEOs, CFOs and other senior management respectively while for the 48 CAEs drawn 
from the private sector, 38%, 35% and 27% indicate they report to their CEOs, CFOs 
and other senior management respectively. This is quite puzzling as the mention of 
audit committee was not made at all in the survey. One is therefore wondering whether 
the responding CAEs are conversant with the IIA standards at all or formation of board 
audit committee is not fashionable in the two countries. 
 
The referenced study of Christopher et al. (2009), a study that used empirical evidence 
obtained from an electronically-administered questionnaire survey of 34 CAEs from the 
Malaysia corporate sector, established the significance of IAF’s reporting line, CAE’s 
hierarchy, the use of IAF as a training ground, invitation of the CAE to the audit 
committee’s meetings, and private contacts between CAEs and the audit committee’s 
chair on IAF’s independence. The study found that it was only in 38% of cases in the 
sample that their IAFs report functionally to the audit committee (in line with the IIA’s 
standard) while 47% indicate that their IAFs report functionally to senior managers 
(such as CEO and CFO). The authors argued that this is a deviation from the best 
practices and contend that such reporting relationship constitutes serious threat to IAF’s 
independence. 
 
Contrarily, Abbott, Parker and Peters (2010) in their questionnaire study of 134 CAEs, 
selected from Fortune 1000 non-bank companies, regarding their interactions with ACs 
and their budget allocations for the fiscal year 2005, established that IAF appears to be 
reporting to both the audit committee and senior management (CFO or CEO). The 
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authors concluded that such dual reporting line indicates a ‘’solid line’’ or functional 
relationship with the audit committee and a ‘’dotted line’’ or administrative relationship 
with the CFO or CEO. Functional reporting line of IAF to the audit committee, and its 
administrative reporting line to management is the ideal reporting framework according 
to the international best practice of internal auditing as espoused by the IIA. 
 
Similar to the outcome of Abbott, Parker and Peters (2010) on adequacy of IAF’s 
reporting line, Sarens, De Beelde, and Everaert (2009) in their study (titled ‘’Internal 
audit: A comforter to the audit committee’’) involving 4 Belgian companies, found out 
that the IAFs at all the four selected companies had direct reporting lines to their audit 
committees.  Also, Allegrini and D’onza (2003), a study aimed at verifying the main 
features of internal audit activities in large Italian listed companies through 
questionnaire survey of 52 companies found that 92% of the CAEs (in their case CIAs) 
periodically report to the audit committee and to the board of auditors.  
 
Evidence coming from Australia as documented in Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2011), a 
semi-structured interview study conducted to provide insights into the current roles and 
responsibilities of the IAF and the factors perceived to be necessary to ensure its 
effectiveness drawing evidences from Australia context also indicate that majority of 
the IAFs in the country report functionally to their audit committee. The authors found 
out that out of the 7 CAEs interviewed, 6 confirmed that they report to their audit 
committees while only one of them indicate that he reports directly to both the CEO and 
the audit committee for all functional matters. 
 
The general notions that can be formed from the various results from the highlighted 
studies on the reporting line of the IAFs are that first, IAF’s reporting line is considered 
one of the critical measures of IAF’s independence.  Second, majority of the IAFs of 
developed countries do enjoy functional reporting relationship with their audit 
committees in line with the international best practice in internal auditing, championed 
by the IIA. Other inference that can be drawn from the above is that IAF’s functional 
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reporting line to the audit committee is positively related to the IAF’s independence, 
and the ability of the function to enhance corporate governance. 
 
Extending the discussion to developing economies however, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) 
through a study of the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia, taking insights 
from directors of internal audit departments (i.e. CAEs), and external auditors, 
discovered that their IAFs report to General managers instead of their BoDs. In 
addition, the study of Ebaid (2011) provides evidence from Egypt. The referenced study 
which explores the nature and characteristics of IAFs in Egyptian listed firms using 
mixed methods of interview and questionnaire survey of managers of IAF (CAEs) of 
Egyptian listed companies (exclusive of banks and financial institutions), revealed that 
48% of the CAEs indicate that they report functionally to the BoDs or audit committees 
while 52% indicate that they report functionally to senior management (i.e. CFO or 
CEO). 
 
Also, Al-Hroot (2012) provides perspectives on this matter from Jordan. From 
responses to a questionnaire survey from 121 respondents, the study indicates that in 
only 53.7% of the cases, the IAF reports functionally to the audit committee. 28.1% of 
the respondents indicate an administrative reporting relationship with the CEO only. 
Also, about 33.9% of the respondents indicated that they report administratively to the 
audit committee and CFO.  
 
Looking at evidence from the domain of the current study (Nigeria), Akinteye, et al. 
(2015) through a questionnaire survey involving 5 heads of internal audit, and semi-
structured interviews of 3 heads of IAF of listed companies in Nigeria, established that 
80% of the CAEs reports to their audit committees while the remaining 20% reports to 
their BoDs. This implies that almost all the IAFs involved in the study indicated that 
they report to their audit committees. This finding aligns with the results of Sarens, et 
al. (2009), where CAEs from four Belgian companies that were included in the study 
indicate that they all report to their audit committees.  
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The study (Akinteye, et al. (2015))’s finding on IAF’s reporting model is however 
divergent from Christopher et al. (2009) on Malaysia, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) on Saudi 
Arabia, Ebaid (2011) from Egypt, and Al-Hroot (2012) from Jordan where the practice 
of IAF’s reporting functionally to audit committees appears yet to fully diffuse into the 
developing countries. 
 
Also, in line with the findings of Akinteye et.al (2015) about IAF’s reporting 
relationship in Nigeria, Barac et al. (2009), a study from another developing economy 
(South Africa) involving the Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), or the Chief Operating 
Officers (COOs), audit committee chairpersons (ACCs), as well as the CAEs of 30 large 
South African companies show that more than 50% of the companies followed the 
acceptable practice of having IAF with a functional reporting relationship with the 
company’s audit committee.  
 
The findings from Akinteye, et al. (2015) and Barac et al. (2009) notwithstanding, the 
overwhelming evidences on the reporting line of IAFs from developing countries seem 
to suggest that the international best practice on IAF’s ideal reporting line is yet to 
diffuse fully into the developing climes. Consequently, it is doubtful if IAFs of 
developing countries (e.g. Nigeria) is independent based on their reporting lines (or 
their organisational status).  
 
Based on the position above, the researcher is curious to investigate same issue among 
firms in the NFS. Therefore, the study’s first proposition is stated as below: 
 
P 1:  Internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector reporting to audit 
committee is positively associated with the internal audit function’s independence 
and ability to impact positively on corporate governance. 
   
4.2.2  IAF/CAE’s Hierarchy 
The issue of organisational positioning of IAF can also be discussed by looking at how 
the function is considered generally within the organisational organogram. Opinions 
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actually seem to differ on where IAF can and should be positioned so as to align with 
the IIA standards. One strand of this argument is that IAF should be positioned at par 
with the senior management so as to secure for it the necessary visibility, authority and 
responsibility to independently evaluate management’s assessment of the organisation’s 
internal controls, and its ability to achieve business objectives while also managing the 
risks that can inhibit such accomplishments (Reding et al., 2013). Another extreme 
strand on this issue as observed by Reding et al., (2013) are organizations that do not 
have IAF at all or positioned the function in a much lower level within the 
organisational hierarchy, and assigning the function non-audit daily activities (such as 
compliance, quality assurance).  
 
It is argued by Reding et al. (2013), that in response to the IIA’s new focus of assurance 
and consulting, many organizations have positioned their IAF as a senior management’s 
activity that report directly to the board (through its audit committee). The authors 
contend that organisations that continue to position their IAF at a lower level and assign 
the function operational and non-audit activity render such function unable to contribute 
to value addition and invariably do not contribute to corporate governance’s 
improvement. Whereas a report from PricewaterhouseCoopers (2002) discloses that 
inappropriate positioning of the IAF within an organisation can raise serious concerns 
about the overall independence of the function, it seems we still know little about the 
most appropriate positioning of internal audit function (Lenz and Hahn, 2015, p. 6).  
 
Going by the IIA standards, CAE’s functional reporting to the board is a way of 
ensuring organizational independence. From this functional reporting relationship, the 
audit committee or its equivalent according to Practice Advisory 1110-2 of the IIA 
(2004), is expected to see to the following for instance: 
i. approval of the internal audit charter 
ii. approval of the risk based internal audit plan 
iii. approval of the internal audit budget and resource plan 
iv. receiving communications from the CAE on the IAA’s performance 
relative to its plan and other matters 
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v. approval of the hiring and firing of the CAE 
vi. approval of the remuneration of the CAE; and 
vii. oversight functions on the appropriateness of scope, and adequacy of 
resource of the function. 
Based on the above discussion therefore, the first clue that can be drawn which is 
relevant to the research question of the study is that organisation that has its IAF 
positioned at senior management’s level is expected to have its independence 
strengthened, and thus expected to be effective as a mechanism of corporate 
governance. 
 
The benefits associated with appropriate positioning of IAF within an organization is 
the essence of the IIA’s recommendation of dual reporting lines for the function (i.e. a 
functional reporting line with the audit committee, and administrative reporting line 
with the management). The administrative reporting line recommended for the IAF is to 
balance IAF’s relationship within an organization. This is necessary given that internal 
auditors are still employees in the organization. Pursuant to that status, IAF is expected 
to maintain a healthy relationship with the management. After all, for an effective IAF, 
management input is required in the IAF’s audit plan. Furthermore, a healthy 
relationship between IAF and management is envisaged by virtue of the function’s 
engagement by management for consultative role.   
 
Christopher et al. (2009), while discussing the issue of IAF’s hierarchy in organisation 
using Malaysian corporate sector as an evidence, found that all 32 CAEs that 
participated in their online questionnaire survey confirmed that their IAFs were placed 
at the corporate level (i.e. at par with the senior management) as opposed to being 
placed at the intermediate or below senior management.  
 
In agreement with the above Malaysian perspectives, Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003) 
a survey of internal audit practices in the European Union, also indicates that more than 
two thirds of the 105 CAEs that participated in the survey (i.e. over 67%) reported that 
their IAF is positioned at the corporate level. 
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Similarly, the analysis of the descriptive statistics gathered under the extensive survey 
of 364 Italian companies in Arena and Azzone (2007), investigating the adoption and 
characteristics of Italian internal audit departments revealed that half of the companies 
that participated in the survey have their IAFs positioned at corporate group level. 
According to the referenced study, in Italy, the structure which is quite common is the 
creation of several internal audit departments in different companies within the group, 
coordinated and monitored by a centralized structured, located in the parent company. 
This accounts for 34.57% of the whole participating companies. 
 
Allegrini and D’onza (2003) also report that 44% of the CIAs in Italian listed 
companies are generally placed under the CEO, and 23% indicated as being placed 
under Chairperson, thus ensuring organisational independence of the IAFs.   
 
In tandem with the above studies, Al-Hroot (2012), a questionnaire survey study also 
discovered that all the 121 respondents to the survey indicated that their IAF was placed 
at the corporate/group level, as opposed to being placed at the intermediate or local 
level. It was concluded that such placement, aside from being in line with the best 
practice guideline, is also appropriate and capable of securing for the IAFs the required 
level of independence.  
 
Studies that specifically addressed IAF/CAE’s hierarchical position in organisation are 
very limited, this is so given that researchers do apply the manner of reporting of the 
IAF to represent how the IAF or its head is positioned in the organisation’s organogram 
(hierarchy). Following the pattern of Christopher et. al (2019) however, this study 
attempts to investigate how CAEs in the NFS are positioned in relation to their 
organisation’s senior management’s level. It is envisaged that response on this would 
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P2: Maintaining the hierarchy of the Chief audit executive of internal audit 
function of the Nigerian financial sector at par with management is positively 




4.2.3 IAF’s sourcing arrangement 
Similar to what obtains on organizations’ non-core activities such as taxation, legal 
services, facility maintenance, etc, outsourcing of IAF is becoming a common practice 
worldwide (Carey et al., 2006; Bradon, 2010; Desai, Gerard, and Tripathy, 2011; 
Papageorgiou, Yasseen and Padia, 2012; Petravick 1997; Rittenburg, 1999; Ahlawat 
and Lowe , 2004), particularly  in the USA, Canada, and Australia(see Carey et al., 
2006; Mathews et al., 1995; Rittenberg and Covaleski, 1997; Birkett et al., 1999).  
 
This dramatic development is not limited to private sector alone but is also applicable to 
public sector as indicated by Subramaniam, Ng and Carey (2004). The referenced study 
indicates that over 80% of the Queensland public sector entities surveyed engages in 
either full outsourcing or co-sourcing. This position is also supported by Goodwin 
(2004). 
 
Whereas theoretically, TCE offers cost benefits consideration as the basis for the 
practice of outsourcing of IAF by organizations (see Williamson, 1979; Widener and 
Selto, 1999; Sprakman, 1997; Paape, 2007; Morrill and Morrill, 2003; Carey et al., 
2006; Brandon, 2010) as extensively discussed in chapter 3, however, consideration for 
the need for IAF’s independence and the technical competence (see Carey et al., 2006; 
Shapoff, 1999), perceived to be opulent with the external providers of IAF,  appear to 
be other factors driving outsourcing or co-sourcing of IAF. This implies that non-
financial factors as well, play significant roles in IAF’s sourcing decisions. This 
position is also argued by Subramaniam et al. (2004,p.93).   
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According to Desai et al. (2011), In-house IAF is a situation where a company 
maintains its own IAF function, while outsourced IAF is one where an independent firm 
(usually an external audit firm) conducts the internal audit. Co-sourcing, also referred to 
as strategic sourcing by Reding et al. (2013) is a situation where an IAF or an 
organisation with a view to complementing its in-house IAF, hires from outside, experts 
with diverse skill sets. According to Subramaniam et al. (2004), the main motivation for 
co-sourcing is transfer of knowledge. Co-sourcing allows the CAE to optimize both the 
skill base and IAF’s budget (Reding et al., 2013), while retaining the benefits of direct 
control over internal audit activities (Subramaniam et al; 2004).  Salamasick (2012, p. 
19)’s view that ‘’cost should not be the only factor involved when discussing what is 
best for the company…’’ may also be used to justify this development.  
 
It is been argued that outsourcing of IAF may offer a solution to the problem of 
independence of IAF since it is difficult for an employee to be truly independent of 
management (James, 2003; Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004). The nature of in-house IAF with 
the usual employer-employee psyche is indicative of limited liability of the internal 
auditors de facto, signifying an environment of limited liability in case of an audit 
failure. Further, it has been argued that an outsourced IAF provider may be more 
independent of management than an in-house function and relatively reduces the 
probability of giving in to management’s pressure (Del Vecchio and Clinton, 2003; 
Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004).  Though sequel to promulgation of SOX (2002) external 
audit firms are no longer allowed to provide internal audit services to their independent 
audit client (see Brandon, 2010), outsourced IAF services are however available from 
public accounting and specialist firms (Ernst and Young, 2006).   
 
SOX and related standards mandate that external auditor cannot provide internal audit 
or certain consulting services for their financial statement audit clients. This prohibition 
aims at enhancing objectivity (Desai et al., 2011). Despite the prohibition of external 
auditor from rendering both independent audit (external audit) and internal audit (see 
James, 2003), it appears some countries are yet to appreciate the rationale (drawn from 
the Enron versus Arthur Andersen fiasco of 2001) behind Sox (2002) as revealed by 
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Carey et al., (2006). The study based on Australia perspectives, reveal that external 
auditors are still allowed in Australia to offer both external and internal audit services to 
their client ‘’as long as any threats to independence have been reduced to an acceptable 
level’’ (Carey et al., 2006, p. 21). How such an acceptable level of threat to 
independence is ascertained remains a puzzle. The question arising from such 
revelations is Can the Sox (2002)’s prohibition of such practice be a case of “once 
beaten twice shy’’?. 
 
Dickings and O’Relly (2009), a post SOX questionnaire survey of 99 CAEs (typically 
the directors of internal audit, of publicly traded, middle-market companies), with 14 
questions relating to company’s characteristics, CAEs’ qualifications, factors 
influencing IAF’s independence and internal auditors’ objectivity, among others, 
indicate that 77% of the respondents outsource some portion of their internal audit 
work. 
 
According to Caplan and Kirschenheiter (2000), Ernst and Young (2006), Brandon 
(2010), Desai, Gerard, and Tripathy (2011), the practice of outsourcing and co-sourcing 
of the IAF is gaining momentum in recent time.  For instance, Carey et al. (2006) 
survey in Australia to investigate the determinants of internal audit outsourcing using 
survey data on 99 companies listed on the American Stock Exchange (ASX) shows that 
45.5% of the 99 respondent firms surveyed, using internal audit, outsourced some or all 
of their IAAs.  This is in tandem with an earlier survey conducted by Sharma and 
Subramaniam (2005).  
 
In their own survey of Australian publicly listed firms, 50 out of the 87 companies 
surveyed indicated that they use internal audit, and out of this 50, 30 representing 60% 
affirmed that they had either fully outsourced or co-sourced their IAF.  The most 
curious finding from Carey et al. (2006) survey is that more than 50% of companies that 
outsource internal audit have not operated an in-house internal audit department before 
their decision to outsource the function. While the authors attributed this to the 
possibility of increased awareness about IAF’s outsourcing, one may wonder what 
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could have informed this paradigm. The worry on the referenced findings might 
possibly be linked to the issue of legitimization of internal auditing profession, broadly 
discussed in chapter 2, and may further weaken the feeling of supremacy of professional 
internal auditors on IAAs. 
 
Though, outsourcing and or co-sourcing is gaining momentum as earlier indicated, in 
the academic literature however, studies addressing the factors pushing decisions 
thereon is said to be scant (Speckle’ et al. (2007). Carey et al.(2006) however 
synthesised four different factors debatable in literature as the main determinants of 
decision on sourcing arrangement. These are: 
i. cost savings  
ii. company’s size, 
iii.  technical competence of would-be provider of internal Audit services 
(whether in-sourcing or out-sourcing),and 
iv. board strategy particularly on services perceived to be non-core to the 
main activities of the organisation.  
 
Whereas, the findings of the survey suggest that out of the four mentioned factors, 
internal audit’s outsourcing is associated with perceived cost savings and the technical 
competence of the external provider.  
 
James (2003) findings from a study however suggest that though increase in perceived 
audit expertise may occur with outsourcing, such increases may not significantly 
enhance user’s confidence in the IAF because outsourced teams are still perceived as 
having less in-depth knowledge of the company than in-house IAF. On the issue of size, 
the referenced survey’s findings suggest that the larger an organisation, the greater the 
propensity to outsource its IAF. This hindsight appears somehow contradictory to the 
conclusion in Spekle’ et al. (2007), where the authors based on their survey predict that 
larger firms and firms that are relatively heavy consumers of internal audit services tend 
to rely more on in-sourcing, whereas smaller firms that are less audit-intensive are more 
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likely to farm-out their IAFs. These divergent findings are strong indication that further 
studies are warranted on the concept of IAF sourcing decision.  
 
Desai et al. (2011), a study conducted primarily to investigate the effect of sourcing 
arrangement on external audit’s assessed quality and reliance on the IAF suggest that 
external auditors place more reliance on both outsourced and co-sourced IAFs 
compared to in-house IAFs. The study also predicts that external auditors’ reliance on 
co-sourced and outsourced IAFs decreases when tax services are also provided by the 
internal audit service provider. 
 
Goodwin (2004) provides further insights on the type of IAF’s activities that are mostly 
outsourced in public sector as his study on Comparison of IAF in the private and public 
sectors of both Australia and New Zealand reveals. Using feedback from 120 heads of 
internal audit (who are also members of the IIA) drawn from both Australia and New 
Zealand, the study indicates that the level of outsourcing IAF in the public sector 
outweighs that of the private sector in Australia and New Zealand. Specifically, the 
study indicates that a total of 49 (i.e.68%) public sector entities and (65%) private sector 
entities indicated that they engage in some outsourcing of internal audit activities. 
According to the study, information technology and systems are the commonly 
outsourced activities in the two countries’ public and private sectors.   
 
Going from the revelation about the commonest outsourced activities, it might be 
interesting to find out how these two areas of the organisational activities (which are 
considered very key to the financial sector due to the rapidity of pervasiveness of e-
business, e- products in the NFS, in consonance with financial sectors of developed 
nations) are being handled via outsourcing, in case such practice has permeated the 
sector.  
 
One valid conclusion that might be drawn from the above discussions is that 
outsourcing is here to stay!. Arel (2010) re-affirms that even the IIA recognizes that 
companies may outsource the IAF, given its (IIA, 2005) assertion that: ‘’The IIA 
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believes that a fully resourced and professionally competent staff that is an integral part 
of the organisation, whether in-sourced or outsourced, best performs the internal audit 
activity (IIA, 2005)’’.  
 
However, despite the various IAF’s sourcing arrangements, it seems there is no 
consensus yet on the ideal and optimal sourcing arrangement of IAF, and various 
guidance from the IIA do not recommend a particular sourcing arrangement as being 
preferable to the others (Desai et al., 2011).  Though in line with the changing focus of 
internal auditing, there is increased concern on effectiveness of the function as well as 
who is to provide the services (Ahlawat and Lowe, 2004). The principal interest of the 
global professional body however remains how to promote IAAs capable of ensuring 
effectiveness and achievement of organisational objectives in an efficient manner 
(Papageorgiu et al., 2012). From the IIA’s perspectives, internal audit regardless of who 
provides the service should be performed in conformity with the standards. Discussion 
on auditing methodology and techniques discussed fully in subsequent section (section 
4.3), extensively examines the current achievement of this aspiration of conformity with 
the IIA standards.   
 
Given that sourcing arrangement to large extent determines the quality of internal audit 
services, decision on sourcing arrangement is considered a critical area that needs 
serious consideration. After all, the manner in which organizations manage the quality 
and costs of IAAs is critical to fulfillment of its responsibility towards a sound 
governance system (Carey et al., 2006, p. 12).  
 
In addition, IAF’s sourcing arrangement has been established as one of the critical 
determinants of external auditors’ reliance decision on the work of internal auditors 
(Arel, 2010). Given that it has been argued in literature that coordination of external and 
internal audit stand to enhance good financial reporting and ultimately improve 
organisations’ corporate governance, the internal auditors thus have a great need to 
strive to ‘’up the ante’’ in terms of increased collaboration with the external auditors, in 
addition to improving continuously their competence, work performance, and 
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objectivity.  In literature, the mentioned factors remain the key characteristics of internal 
audit usually put into consideration by external auditors whenever decision relating to 
their reliance on the work of internal auditors is to be made (Gramling et al., 2004). 
Enhanced collaboration between the external and internal audit has also been suggested 
as a recipe for organisation to reduce cost of external audit, and in a way a value 
addition accruing from IAF to corporate governance.  
 
Extant studies on IAF’s sourcing arrangement and its impacts on IAF’s independence 
include Carey et al. (2006) a study focusing internal audit in Australia, using a cross 
sectional, mailed questionnaire administered on the managing directors and or Finance 
directors (FDs) of 1030 active Australian companies listed on the country’s (i.e. ASX). 
The outcome of the study with a response rate of 30% (i.e. 304), indicates those 
companies with IAF as 99, and those that do not have IAF as 205.  Of those 99 
companies that have IAF, 45 (representing 45.5%) outsource, while the remaining 54 
companies (i.e. 54.5%) maintained their IAFs in-house. Of the 45 companies that 
outsource their IAFs, the study indicates that 20 companies (44.4%) do full outsourcing 
while the remaining (i.e. 25 companies, representing 55.5%) are into co-sourcing. In 
addition, the study revealed that almost 60% of those that outsource never operated an 
in-house IAF before their decision to outsource. This is suggestive of the fact that 
decision on outsourcing has no relationship with the maturity of the IAF. 
 
While investigating the motivation for outsourcing IAF using Logit cross sectional 
regression analysis, the referenced study discovered that cost saving and need for 
technical competence are the two key motivators on outsourcing. For instance, 61% of 
those Australian companies that outsource did so because using external provider of 
IAF provides a cheaper alternative to maintaining the function in-house.  Also, a greater 
proportion of respondents who outsource their IAFs indicate that external providers of 
internal audit services have ‘’specialised industry-wide knowledge’’, expertise in 
evaluating and testing the system of internal controls, better experience and 
qualifications. The study also discovered that the impact of size on IAF’s sourcing 
decision is mixed. Firms who are first time adopter of IAF through outsourcing are 
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smaller in size, confusingly, for firms that have previously undertaken IAF in-house 
before outsourcing, it was found that the larger the organisations the greater the 
propensity to outsource. 
 
The study of Soh and Martinov-Bennie (2011), also from Australia involving both 
CAEs and ACC using semi-structured interview however showed a different result. Out 
of the seven organisations that participated in the study, only 2 companies (i.e. 28.6%) 
maintain their IAF in house. Only one company (14.3%) practiced full outsource and 4 
companies (57.1%) co-source their IAFs. In summary therefore, the result of the study 
indicates more preference for out-sourcing (either full or partial). This might be 
interpreted to mean further awareness and popularity about outsourcing of IAF in the 
country when compared with the previous study of Carey et al. (2006). 
 
To those ACCs that have preference for in-house IAF, the main reason adduced is the 
intimate knowledge of organisation by the in-house IAF, while ACCs that favoured co-
sourcing indicated that such an arrangement allows IAF to achieve effectiveness in its 
performance through opportunity of access to wide range of expertise and geographical 
reach that was not feasible under full in-house IAF’s arrangement. 
 
Arena and Azzone (2007) examining the internal audit departments adoption and 
characteristics in Italian companies, used both in-depth case studies (as preliminary) and 
questionnaire survey on 230 respondents (mostly CAEs), drawn from 364 Italian 
companies to gain insights on the key issues of the study’s concern. Three main types of 
data analysis were carried out on the study’s data. These are descriptive (which provides 
a picture of the adoption of the internal audit departments and their main characteristics 
among Italian companies), correlation analysis exploring the relations among the 
variables addressed in the research, and finally, cluster analysis meant to overcome the 
limitations of the univariate analysis. From the analysis of the descriptive statistics of 
the survey, it was gleaned that none of the companies involved in the survey has a fully 
outsourced internal audit department; and only few firms outsource a limited set of 
activities, partially or fully. Specifically, 69.41% firms which answered the 
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questionnaire do not outsource any internal audit activity; 18.82% outsource a partial 
coverage of a limited set of activities; and 11.77% of the companies outsource few 
activities completely (in particular technical audits, information technology audits or 
environmental audits). 
 
Lenz, Sarens and D’Silva (2014), a study carried out in Germany to identify, examine 
and evaluate characteristics of an IAF that distinguish between two groups of IAFs with 
sharply contrasting levels of perceived effectiveness also reveals the level of diffusion 
of the practice of IAF’s sourcing in Germany. Drawing evidence from responses to a 
survey questionnaire, from 46 CAEs in Germany (who are also all members of German 
chapter of the IIA, also referred to as Deutsches Institut fur Interne Revision e.v.-DIIR), 
clustered into 4, based on their quartile ranging (QU1-QU4) but with cluster analysis 
emphatically on the two extremes quartiles (i.e. QU1 and QU4), revealed that in 46% of 
cases in QU1, the IAF does not benefit from any co-sourcing or complete outsourcing. 
However all cases in QU4 have a share of co-sourcing ranging from1 to 40%. 
 
On the suitability of one sourcing arrangement on the other, and with a view to 
comparing how independent IAF, and how objective internal auditors can be when 
maintained in-house or outsourced, Ahlawat and Lowe (2004) through a case study 
involving 35 in-house internal auditors and 31 outsourced internal auditors (all members 
of the IIA), discovered that significant advocacy existed in the judgments of both in-
house and outsource IAF, however the level of the advocacy was less severe in the case 
of outsourced IAF. The referenced study found evidence to support the fact that 
outsourced internal auditors advocated less for their client’s position in a corporate 
acquisition scenario than in-house internal auditors. This suggests that outsourced IAF 
seems to be more independent than in-house IAF, and that internal auditors of outsource 
IAFs are more objective than internal auditors of in-house IAF. 
 
Reflecting on the above findings, Arel (2010) indicates that truly, an in-house IAF may 
face different incentives or other compensations dependent on the company’s 
performance which may impact their ability to report internal audit results. The study, 
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an experimental study involving 89 practicing Big 4 auditors under the supervision of 
research protocols at a training session for one Big 4 accounting firm, confirmed that 
when auditors perceive lower litigation risk, they tend to rely more on outsourced IAF 
than in-house IAF. 
 
Another study on the extent of, and motivation for outsourcing in public sector is 
Subramaniam, NG and Carey (2004). The study concentrates only on the public sector 
of Queensland (an Australian state) using a combination of interview and questionnaire 
survey on key people (Internal audit managers or financial controllers) in charge of 
internal audit in 6 Queensland public sector entities. Out of the 52 useable 
questionnaires obtained from the survey of 120 respondents, the authors indicate that 
only 41 (i.e. 79%) used internal audit services. From these 41 respondents however, 
only 5 departments rely completely on in-house. 21 and 15 departments indicate that 
they rely on co-sourcing and full outsourced IAFs respectively. On the motivation for 
outsourcing the IAF, the study revealed that the need for technical competencies is the 
greatest factor while other factors include the perception that outsourced IAFs are 
usually more independent than in-house IAFs. 
 
Goodwin (2004), an exploratory study comparing the practice of internal audit of public 
and private sectors, drawing evidences from 120 CIAs from Australia and New Zealand 
revealed that a total of 49 respondents out of 72 (i.e. 68%) public sector entities, and 31 
respondents out of 48(65%) private sector entities indicate that they engage in some 
outsourcing of IAAs.  
 
On the perception of external auditors on the independence of IAF under different 
sourcing arrangements, Desai, Gerard and Tripathy (2011), using five different cases 
synthesised for 105 experienced Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) from one Big 4 
and a number of regional accounting firms, established that there is no significant 
difference in external audits’ assessments of objectivity, competence and reliance for 
the outsourced and co-sourced IAF in the high inherent risk areas. It was also 
discovered that greater reliance on the co-sourced and outsourced IAFs is correlated 
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with significantly lower external audit efforts relative to the in-house IAF. Contrarily, it 
was observed that there is no significant difference in external audit effort for the co-
sourced and out-sourced IAFs. 
 
Coming to developing economies, the study of Ebaid (2011), an exploratory study of 
IAF of Egyptian listed firms using a conflation of interview and questionnaire survey 
indicate that all the CAEs (100%) of the firms that participated in the questionnaire 
survey maintained their IAFs completely in-house. This result might be an indication 
that the practice of IAF outsourcing is yet to gain prominence in Egypt, an emerging 
economy. In addition to the insight of non-popularity of IAF sourcing in the country as 
indicated by the participants in the survey, the referenced study also revealed that 
17respondents out of the 21respondents that took part in the study (i.e. 81%) indicated 
that their IAAs are performed by formal departments specifically set up for IAFs. The 
remaining 4 respondents (representing 19%) indicated that such formal IAFs are yet to 
be put in place in their companies, and that everything related to IAAs are still 
subsumed in their accounting departments. This further supports the general skepticism 
about legitimisation of internal auditing as a profession particularly in most emerging 
economies.  
 
Papageorgiou et al. (2012), a study exploring similarities and differences between 
public and private sector IAFs in South Africa, using both questionnaire survey and 
interview is another relevant study identified. The study, focusing mainly the CAEs and 
the internal audit managers revealed that majority of the respondents (52.8%) indicated 
that they use in-house IAF while 40.3% rely on outsourced IAF during the past year. 
The study however failed to establish empirically, the implication of this sourcing 
pattern with the IAF’s independence. In addition, aside from the fact that the study 
compares the above findings with the results of Selim and Yiannakas (2000), a similar 
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From all the studies reviewed in this section, it can be inferred that no particular method 
of IAF sourcing seems to be prevalent both in developed and developing nations. It is 
however observed that the practice of outsourcing and co-sourcing permeates 
boundaries. In addition, other non-financial factors (such as the need for technical 
competencies, the need to ensure IAF’s independence) are the most common 
motivations for outsourcing in addition to cost saving benefits. This suggests that the 
TCE theory discussed in chapter 3 might not be sufficient to explain the rationale for 
IAF’s sourcing decisions. In addition, it appears external party, particularly the external 
auditors and other users of financial statements seem to attribute more independence to 
outsourced or co-sourced IAFs than the IAFs maintained in-house. 
 
Deriving from the above expositions, and the gaps identified in Papageorgiou et al. 
(2012), a study of IAF’s sourcing from a developing economy, this study attempts to 
investigate the level of diffusion of the practice of outsourcing in the NFS. In addition, 
the semi-structured interview to be used for this study shall attempt to gain further 
insights (at least from a developing economy) on the motivation of outsourcing or co-
sourcing of IAFs (if such practice exists in IAFs of the NFS). Consequently, the third 
proposition is stated as: 
P3:      Outsourcing of Internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector is 
            positively associated with Internal audit function’s independence and its 
            ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
4.2.4 CAE’s regular attendance of Audit committee’s meetings 
The IIA’s Attribute standard stipulates that the CAE must communicate and interact 
directly with the board. The board’s audit committee meets periodically to deliberate on 
audit issues. Code of corporate governance of most countries as well as sectorial 
regulatory codes made it mandatory for the audit committee of the board to meet not 
less than 4 times in a year. As earlier indicated, the IIA indicates that the CAE is 
required to maintain direct communication with the board (i.e. the audit committee). 
One of the ways in which the CAE communicates directly with the audit committee is 
through his audit report that is usually presented formally at the audit committee’s 
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meetings. CAE’s regular interactions with the board promote independence of the IAF. 
In addition, regular interaction between CAEs and board audit committee facilitates an 
open, two way dialogue on matters of mutual interest. Direct communication is 
primarily achieved by the CAE when he attends regularly the audit committee’s 
meetings and participates fully on discussions raised on auditing, financial reporting, 
organisational governance and control issues. 
 
Paape,Scheffe, and Snoep (2003), internal audit study from developed economies (EU 
countries) provides a good perspective with which findings from developing nations on 
the matter of regularity of attendance of audit committee’s meetings by the CAEs can be 
compared. The study indicates that an overwhelming majority of the cases (90%) 
indicate that their CAEs attend all the meetings of the audit committee. The only 
exception to that feedback is from France and Greece where about 70% of the cases 
indicate that their CAEs attend all the audit committee’s meetings.  
 
Corroborating this impressive development among developed nations, drawing further 
evidences from Australia, Christopher, Sarens and Leung (2008) indicate that but for 
only one case, all CAEs in Australia who participated in their survey on independence 
of the IAF are regularly invited to audit committee’s meetings. The authors indicate that 
such meetings create avenue for the CAEs to present and discuss the internal audit 
plans, results and recommendations, as well as prompting necessary follow-up actions 
on any matter. 
 
Al-Twaijry (2003) while evaluating the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia (a 
developing economy) using questionnaire survey and interview involving 78 
respondents revealed that in almost half of the companies (39), members of the internal 
audit department have never attended board’s meetings, and that it was in only 2 
companies that they do attend regularly. 
 
For Jordanian experience, Al-Hroot (2012) using a questionnaire survey of 121 
respondents, revealed that all the CAEs (except in only one case) indicate that they are 
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regularly invited to audit committee’s meetings, and that such formal contacts enable 
them to present and discuss among other things, the internal audit plan, their audit 
reports as well as their recommendations. They also indicate that their attendance of 
such periodic meetings gives them the opportunity to follow-up on the audit committee 
and the senior management on agreed actions plans. 
 
As critical as the need for regularity of CAE’s presence at board’s meetings is, studies 
that evaluate the regularity of such presence, likely hindrances against his attendance of 
such meetings and the impact of his attendance in such meetings on the function’s 
independence seem very few. As can be seen from above, the two studies from 
developing economies Al-Twaijry (2003) from Saudi Arabia, and Al-Hroot (2012) from 
Jordan give mixed results about the issue of regularity of attendance of audit 
committee’s meetings by the CAEs (in developing economies), unlike the seeming 
established pattern of impressive regular attendance in developed climes. This heightens 
the need for further investigation. Consequently, this study attempts to investigate how 
often the CAEs of the IAFs of the NFS attend the audit committee’s meetings and 
whether or not such regular attendance of audit committee’s meetings has any linkage 
with the function’s independence, and the capability of the function to strengthen 
corporate governance. This is the basis of the 4th proposition formulated as indicated 
below:  
 
P4:  Chief audit executive’s regular attendance of audit committee’s meeting in 
the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with internal audit function’s 
independence and ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
 
4.2.5  CAE’s appointment and Dismissal 
As established in the literature, a CAE whose career can be determined at will by 
company’s executives definitely will not lead an IAF that will be courageous to raise 
unfavourable audit reports against the management. Till date, it seems the issues of 
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whether or not audit committee should be involved in CAE’s appointment and dismissal 
is yet to be laid to rest in academics.  
 
Paape,Scheffe, and Snoep (2003), in Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany and Denmark, 
indicate that audit committee is always involved in appointment and dismissal of the 
CAE. As a matter of fact, the referenced study shows that all (i.e.100%) of the cases 
indicate so. However in only about 88% of Spanish case, audit committees do get 
involved in CAEs’ appointment and dismissal decision, and 75% in Sweeden, Greece 
and Belgium. In Italy however, findings from the referenced study indicate that in most 
cases (90%) of companies with audit committee, such committee do not get involved in 
appointment and dismissal of CAE at all. Likewise in France, where about 75% cases 
indicate that their audit committees do not get involved at all. However, 59% of the 
CAEs express their preference for audit committee’s involvement in their appointment 
and dismissal. The CAEs representing Austria and France in the survey were however 
strongly not in favour of this position as indicated by 60% and 50% level of those in 
disagreement.  
 
For Christopher, Sarens and Leung (2008), a study on the independence of IAF in 
Australia using feedback from 34 CAEs indicate that in half of the cases, the audit 
committee is mandated to appoint, dismiss and evaluate the head of the IAF. However, 
a further 21% of the respondents indicate that their audit committee carries out such 
appointment, dismissal and evaluation of the CAEs in conjunction with the CEO, CFO 
or BoDs. This implies that overall in almost three-quarter (75%) of companies, the audit 
committee is involved in appointing, dismissing and evaluating the head of the IAF. 
Nevertheless, in 21% of companies the responsibility lies with the CEO and/or CFO. 
This practice according to the author signals a significant threat against the 
independence of the IAF. 
 
Al-Twaijry (2003) a study that employs both questionnaire survey and interview to 
examine the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia discovered that out of the 78 
responses obtained from the survey, it was noticeable in 47 respondents (i.e. 60%), that 
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the responsibility with regards to appointment and dismissal of the CAEs is vested in 
the hands of the officers below senior management.  
 
From Jordan, Al-Hroot (2012) indicates that in over half of the cases (66.1% and 
53.7%) respectively, the audit committee is mandated to appoint, dismiss and evaluate 
the CAEs, while in 33.8% and 46.3% cases, the responsibilities lie with the CEO and/or 
CFO. The author contends that the result is an indication of threat against the 
independence of the IAF. 
 
Getting insights from Egypt, Ebaid (2011) found out from a questionnaire survey that 
the CFO and the CEO (senior management) have significant roles in appointing, 
dismissing and evaluating managers of internal audit department. Leaving the fate of a 
CAE determined by senior management without the ratification or involvement of audit 
committee is an indication of impaired independence of IAF.  
 
The only study identified by the researcher in literature so far on the issue of 
appointment and dismissal of CAEs in Nigeria is that of Akinteye, York and Qudrat-
Ullah (2015). The study, using insights from semi-structured interview conducted for 8 
heads of IAFs indicates that 20% of the respondents indicated that the power to hire and 
fire their CAEs is vested in their BoDs. 20% and 60% indicate that such power is vested 
in the audit committee only, and in both audit committee and the BoDs. This seems 
appropriate. Given that the referenced study focuses all listed firms in Nigeria however, 
there is a need to further study this phenomenon using specific sector in the country 
before such a generalization can be substantiated. Thus, the curiosity of the researcher 
to seek further evidence on the matter from the NFS, and consequently the formulation 
of the 5th propositions as below: 
 
P5:  Chief audit executive’s appointment and dismissal by the audit committee in 
the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the function’s 
independence and ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
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4.2.6 Existence of Internal Audit Charter (IAC) 
The IIA’s attribute standards 1000 indicates that the purpose, authority, and 
responsibility of the IAF must be formally defined in an ‘’Internal audit charter’’, which 
must be duly approved by the board, and reviewed periodically.  Also expected to be 
included in the charter is the nature of the audit and advisory services provided by the 
IAF. The standards define IAC as ‘’a formal document that defines the internal audit 
activity’s purpose, authority, and responsibility’’. The IAC therefore establishes the 
IAF’s position within the organization.  
 
According to Barhman (2011), the IAC is one of the most important documents for an 
IAF, as it indicates board and executive management’s support for the roles and 
responsibilities internal audit will assume. The charter is prepared by the CAE, agreed 
with the senior manangement, approved by the board and communicated to the 
organisation’s employees. The document codifies the power and status of the IAF 
within an organization..  
 
While the IIA standard is not specific about the frequency of the review of the 
document, Barhman (2011) suggests that the IAC should be reviewed annually and re-
ratified by the board. The IIA may need to address this seeming lacuna. In addition, the 
fact that the charter has to be agreed with the management indicates that the CAE needs 
to be consultative with all the key stakeholders on the vision of the function with a view 
to obtaining their inputs on same. Thus one may want to argue that existence of an IAC 
and its completeness on matters such as positioning of IAF among others may be the 
starting point of evaluating the function’s organisational status and in corollary how 
independent the function is.  
 
Al-Twaijry, Brierley and Gwilliam (2003), a study on the development of internal audit 
in Saudi Arabia, indicated that 60 respondents (representing 77% of the total 
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respondents) confirmed their IAFs have IAC, defining the purpose, authority and 
responsibility of the functions. 93% of those that indicated the existence of IAC for their 
department also indicated that the IAC contained the terms of reference already agreed 
with their senior management. However, there was an indication from the study that 
where such document exists, 45% of the respondents considered the document as 
partially consistent with the SPPIA. Also, in more than one-third of the department 
surveyed, either no such document existed (23%), or the respondent was not aware 
whether or not the document complied with the SPPIA (13%). 
 
Lenz, Sarens and D’Silva (2014), earlier described also revealed that it is only in 54% 
case in QU1 that IAC exists while the remaining 46% cases in QU1 may not have an 
IAC at all, or have one that is not fully endorsed. In QU4 however, all the IAFs claimed 
they do have IAC. 
 
For this study therefore, verification of existence of audit charter, and its review for 
completeness shall be carried out through the semi-structured interview. 
 
Overall, going by Propositions 1-5 stated above and agency theory discussed in chapter 
3, the overaching hypothesis on the independence of the IAF shall be: 
 
H1:  Internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector are not independent  
 of their organisations’ management 
  
4.3.0         IAF and auditing methodologies /techniques 
The methodology or techniques adopted by IAF becomes another critical area where the 
IIA standard is also emphatical. The increasing emphasis on IAF‘s methodology might 
not be unconnected with the paradigmatic shift in the focus of internal auditing 
worldwide, as envisioned by the IIA. The departure of internal audit’s role from the 
usual compliance and internal control to assurance and consulting with great emphasis 
on ERM can be argued to be the driving force behind the need for risk-based internal 
audit methodology.  The IIA standards 2010 (planning) stipulates that the CAE must 
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establish a risk-based plan to determine if the priorities of the IAA are consistent with 
the organisation’s goals. This further underscores the importance of risk-based internal 
audit methodology and techniques. Reding et al. (2013) further amplifies the need for 
organisation’s IAF not only to have a better understanding of business risks facing their 
organizations but also to be able to give reasonable assurance on the adequacy of the 
organisation’s preparedness to mitigate such. ’’The ability of the CAE and internal audit 
management to get a thorough understanding of the organisation’s business risk will 
determine the extent to which the IAF will be able to fulfill its mission and adds value to 
the organisation’’ (Reding et al., 2013.p. 5-8). 
 
In literature, studies examining the association of IAF’s auditing methodology and 
effectiveness, and impact on corporate governance appear scant. This concern is also 
acknowledged by Sarens (2009) who indicates that the few extant studies are descriptive 
without investigating the impact these techniques have on the IAF’s capacity to monitor 
and improve risk management and internal control. For instance, Arena and Azzone 
(2009) consider adoption of Control risk self-assessment (CRSA) techniques as one of 
the risk-based audit techniques. The authors, quoting Jordan (2005), and Melville 
(1999) defines control self-assessment (CSA) techniques as ‘’processes where auditors 
and management work cooperatively to set and evaluate standards for control through 
workshop and discussion’’.  Whereas the authors indicate that adoption of the 
techniques signify the level of collaboration of the management and the IAF in 
embracing the paradigmatic shift of internal audit from compliance to risk-based, it 
appears empirical studies in this direction are just evolving. Notwithstanding, the 
mindset gleaned here can be a foundation for further studies on the matter.  For the 
current study however, only issues relating to adoption of IIA standards by IAF is the 
focus, this is so given that techniques or audit methodology ideal for any engagements 
by IAF is expected to be in compliance with the various provisions enshrined in the 
IIA’s standards. Therefore, the review of extant literatures herein centers on adoption of 
IIA standards and conduct of Quality Assurance and Improvement Program (QAIP) by 
IAF as indicated below. 
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Fig. 4.3 : IAF’S Auditing methodology 
 
4.3.1 Adoption of IIA standards for internal audit activities and Conduct of 
QAIP by IAF 
Studies that had investigated IAF’s compliance with the IIA standards include Paape, 
Scheffe and Snoep (2003). From 105 CAEs that participated in the survey of EU IAFs 
with a view to ascertaining their contributions to corporate governance, 72% of them 
indicated that they are required to adhere to the IIA standards. However, while in 
Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Austria and Sweeden, the response on the matter was 
almost 100%, in the other countries it swung widely from 83% in Italy to 25% in 
Denmark.  
 
Contrarily, in total, 28% of the respondents stated that they do not require adherence to 
the IIA standards. Probing the CAEs further, the study revealed that on compliance with 
other standards which could be national accountancy rules, 39% indicated that they are 
truly required to adhere to those domestic standards, and a massive 61% indicated that 
such adherence was not necessary.  
 
Burnaby and Hass (2011), a study that investigated the differences in the demographics 
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regions of the USA, Canada, and many Latin American countries revealed useful 
insights on this matter. The study provided evidences on the application of the IIA’s 
standards in USA, Canada and Latin America.   The referenced study (which made use 
of the data from the Institute’s Common body of knowledge (CBOK) 2006 database, 
developed in 2006-2007 by the IIA research foundation)  indicate the average usage of 
the IIA standards in whole or in part in the USA as 84.4%, in Canada as 85% and in 
Latin America as 81%. 
 
Abdolmohammadi (2009), investigating the factors associated with the use of and 
compliance with  the IIA standards specifically by taking insights from the Anglo-
culture CAEs using CBOK (2006) database, analysed using binary logistic regression 
established a positive relationship between length of membership with the IIA, and 
internal audit certification with the use of  the IIA standards. The study disclosed that 
13.5% of the 1,029 CAEs in Anglo-culture countries (who participated in the 
questionnaire survey) do not use the standards, and that of those who use the standards, 
a significant number fail to comply totally with the standards. 
 
The referenced study of Burnaby and Hass (2011) shows a total 61.5% of the USAs, 
59% of Canadians and 52% of Latin America respondents indicated their IAAs were or 
intended to be in full compliance on conduct of QAIP by their IAFs. In Latin America, 
a significantly larger number of the respondents’ organisation, 27.6% compared to 
16.7% in the USA and 22.2% in Canada, did not intend to comply with Standard 1300 
(i.e. the IIA standard on QAIP). The authors adduced the infancy of the internal auditing 
of Latin America as one of the possible causes of this indifference. This is suggestive of 
the impact of the age of internal audit function on the level of compliance with the IIA 
standards. 
 
Burnaby et.al. (2009), a study conducted to investigate the differences in the degree of 
usage and compliance with the IIA standards among IAFs in USA and IAFs of a sample 
of European countries using 4080 responses (from IIA CBOK 2006 database) to a 
questionnaire survey, discovered that many of the respondents disclosed that their IAFs 
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are not in conformance with the standards. CAEs’ responses for the countries indicate a 
range of usage from a high of 90.5% in Belgium to a low of 81.7% in Italy.  Among the 
respondents that confirmed that their IAFs are not in compliance with the standards, 
Italy has the highest percentage of respondents (72.9%), while the UK and Ireland 
respondents (31.5%) had the lowest number of IAFs that have not had an external 
assessment or one done but not in compliance with the IIA standards 1312. 
 
Going by the referenced study, the reasons given by the respondents for not adopting 
the IIA standards in whole or in part include the following: 
a. IIA standards are not perceived by the management or board as adding value 
b. Inadequate staff in the IAF 
c. Standards are time consuming 
d. Compliance with the standards is not supported by the management/board 
e. IIA standards are not appropriate for small organisations. 
 
On the issue of performance of external review, Burnaby and Hass (2011) indicate that 
Latin America respondents had a significantly larger percentage of respondents’ 
departments noting that they never had an external review, 48% compared to 30.2% of 
the Canadian respondents’ departments. Definitely, as the authors indicated, this is an 
area requiring all the three groups’ improvement. 
 
Sarens, Abdolmohammadi and Lenz (2012), a study that investigates the various factors 
influencing the activeness of IAF in its roles in corporate governance, using feedbacks 
from 782 US CAEs indicate that 29.3% of the IAFs have a QAIP currently in place. In 
addition, the study, by analysing the CAEs’ responses to a questionnaire survey using 
binary logistic regression establishes that IAF having an active role in corporate 
governance is significantly more likely when the IAF has a QAIP in place.    
 
The few studies on adoption of standards for internal audit engagements suggest that the 
maturity of internal audit has great roles to play on IAF’s respect for the IIA standards 
in all ramifications. Take for instance, Zaman and Sarens (2013) a questionnaire survey 
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of 187 CAEs in UK reveals that 63.6% of the IAFs have been subjected to an external 
quality assessment.    
 
In summary, compliance with the IIA standards by the IAFs on their engagements 
seems to be prevalent in the developed countries while studies that focus this matter 
from developing countries are just evolving. Thus the postulation of the 6th proposition 
as below: 
 
P6: Internal audit function’s adoption of the IIA standards for its engagements 
and performance of Quality assessment and improvement program (QAIP) is 
positively associated with the function’s compliance with the IIA international 
standards and ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
Emanating from the above and in consideration of the institutional theory (discussed in 
chapter 3 of the thesis), the second hypothesis stated as below: 
H2: Internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector do not perform their 
roles in full conformity with the institute of internal auditors’ standards.  
 
4.4.0        Internal Auditors’ Objectivity 
As earlier discussed, internal auditors’ objectivity is one of the characteristics of 
individuals involved in the conduct of internal audit. In order to shape discussion here, 
the following areas (depicted in figure 4.4) shall be looked into:  
• The use of IAF as a training ground (TG) 
• IAF dual role of assurance and consulting 
• CAE’s regular private contact with the AC’s chairperson 
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                                          Figure 4.4: Internal auditors’ objectivity 
 
 
4.4.1  IAF as a Training Ground (TG) 
Given the general notion that the IAF has the opportunities of having deeper insights of 
an organisation, the common practice is for management of organisation to second 
personnel from other functional areas of the organisation to IAF for a tenured period, 
particularly with the objective of assuming higher responsibility afterwards. In some 
situations, new hires (or experienced recruits meant for senior management’s cadre) are 
posted directly into the IAF with the aim of grooming them before their final posting 
(Messier et.al, 2011). This simply means using IAF as a stepping ground or ‘’tour of 
duty’’ (Goodwin, 2004) to position of higher responsibilities.  
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This practice has existed for some time (Messier et al, 2011; Stewart and Subramaniam, 
2010).  Oxner and Oxner (2006) indicate that a survey conducted as far back as 1990 
indicates that 50% of the companies surveyed actually used their IAF as management 
training ground (MTG).  Most organizations are fond of doing this based on the general 
perception of the IAF as ‘’ocean of talents full of potentials’’. Survey evidences 
affirming the popularity of this practice in United states, Singapore, Australia, Belgium, 
and Italy abound (see Rose et. al, 2013; Goodwin and Yeo, 2011; Selim et. Al;2003; 
Oxner and Oxner, 2006; Abbot et al, 2010; Arena et. al, 2006; Sarens and De Beelde, 
2006). 
Christopher, Sarens, and Leung (2008) state that internal auditors often are well-trained 
people, having a profound understanding of the different functional domain within the 
company. While this practice of using IAF as a training ground might be argued to be 
part of the value addition of the IAF (Christopher, Sarens, and Leung, 2008), by been 
perceived as training ground, in literature however, studies have established various 
concerns of same on the independence of the function. 
Messier et al. (2011) indicate the benefits and disadvantages of the practice as follows: 
Advantages 
i. affords the organisation an opportunity to train versatile, well-rounded 
senior managers in-house. This is also seen as a plus, a valued addition 
on the part of the organisation’s IAF. 
ii. exposes the managers to all areas of the organisation and thus avail them 
greater insights on the organisation’s business. 
iii. increases management understanding of the organisation’s internal 
control (see Koonce, 2013).  
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Disadvantages 
i. dampens IAF’s motivation to enhance its quality on the feeling that their 
good hands will eventually be lost to other departments 
ii. staffs of the IAF has less time to develop their audit skills. This certainly 
will not be in the best interest of fostering the internal audit profession. 
iii. leads to familiarity threat where staffs seconded from another department 
within the organisation may be biased in their judgment and opinion on 
audit issue concerning a department that may likely be their next desired 
point of duty.  
In some instances, staffs of IAF do see themselves as potential candidates for 
management positions. This may not be in the best interest of the internal auditing 
profession as such practice and perception may contribute to erosion of IAF’s 
independence and affect auditor’s objectivity (Christopher et.al. 2008; Chadwick, 1995; 
Goodwin, 2004).  
 
Messier et.al (2011) states that over half of all companies that have an IAF specifically 
hire internal auditors with the purpose of rotating them into management positions (or 
cycle current employees into the IAF for a short stint before elevating them into 
management cadres). In their survey of CAEs in Australia corporate sector, Christopher, 
Sarens, and Leung (2008) found that 56 per cent of the respondents indicated that their 
IAF is used as MTG for management position. In addition, it was found that in 60 per 
cent of the surveyed companies, internal auditors stay less than four years in the 
function. This is a confirmation that IAF is often used as training ground for future 
managers to advance their careers. The authors contend that long term commitment was 
rare in this situation. The concern is whether internal auditors in such situation can have 
the audacity of raising audit reports against management, knowing fully that their future 
career aspiration may be jeopardized because existing senior management is typically 
responsible for evaluations of IAF and promotion of IAF’s staff to management 
position. So, ‘’internal auditors who expect or hope to move into senior management’s 
positions would never want to ruin their relationships with their future peers’’ (Rose 
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et.al, 2013, p. 1008). This certainly raises serious concern on internal auditors’ 
objectivity and IAF’s independence.  
 
Messier et al. (2011),  in a study they carried out using archival data to examine the 
effect of using the IAF as a MTG on the external auditor’s reliance decision observe 
that the practice has a negative impact on external audit fees. External auditors perceive 
internal auditors employed in an IAF used as a MTG, as less objective than those in an 
IAF where such is not practiced, and consequently charge higher audit fees. The results 
of Rose, Rose and Norman (2013) indicating that internal auditors are less objective 
when they work in an IAF that is used as MTG, relative to when the IAF is not used as 
MTG, agrees with Messier et al. (2011)  on the same subject. The authors through a 
laboratory experiment study that investigates the impact of using IAF as MTG on 
internal auditors’ objectivity specifically within the context of revenue recognition 
practices discover that internal auditors are more willing to succumb to aggressive 
revenue recognition practices when they expect to move into senior management 
positions in the future. The authors state that: 
‘’it appears that internal auditors who will become senior managers  
face strong incentives to please existing senior managers and  
support management’s financial decisions, even when there is  
evidence that such decisions may not be appropriate’’ (Rose et. al , 2013, p. 
1017). 
 
Pondering on these findings, one may want to believe that the practice of using IAF as 
MTG may truly undermine IAF’s independence and put individual auditors’ objectivity 
in serious jeopardy. Whereas the negative impacts of using IAF as MTG has prompted 
the global professional body (IIA) to forbid employees transferred to internal audit to 
audit activities they previously performed until expiration of at least one year (Stewart 
and Subramaniam, 2010), the professional body is however yet to issue a guidance to 
apply to a scenario of employees transferred to a department or activity that they are 
currently auditing. Therefore, the IIA’s guidance on the concern appears one-sided 
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(Stewart and Subramaniam, 2010).  It is anticipated that further research activities may 
trigger additional guidance in this direction. 
 
It is in line with this anticipation that the NFS shall also be examined critically to 
ascertain the general disposition of the sector to the practice of using IAF as MTG. 
Areas to be looked into will include assessing whether the position of the CAE in the 
sector is on a rotational basis, i.e. whether CAE do move from IAF to assume a higher 
responsibility at management cadre. 
 
The study of Christopher, Sarens and Leung (2008) revealed that 56% of the responding 
34CAEs stated that there is a culture within their organisation for internal auditors to 
move to other management functions within their organisation. This revelation was 
corroborated further by 47% of the respondents who indicated that, on average, internal 
auditors stay between two and four years in the IAF, with 13% indicating that internal 
auditors stay for less than two years. From the results of the study, a long-term 
commitment is doubtful. It was reported that in 60% of the companies, internal auditors 
stay less than four years in internal audit. In 71% of the cases where it is common to 
move to other functions, internal auditors remain within the IAF, on average, for less 
than four years. It therefore seems that only a small minority aspire to a career in 
internal auditing. The inference that can be drawn here is that in Australia, evidence 
abounds to suggest that IAF is used as a stepping stone, and a training ground for 
potential managers.  
 
Goodwin (2004), another study on the internal audit practice of Australia and New 
Zealand, comparing the practice of the use of IAF as a ‘’tour of duty’’ between private 
and public sector indicates that overall, 91% of the 120 participating Chief internal 
auditors (CIAs) indicate that their appointments as the head of IAFs is permanent, while 
only 9% signals that they are susceptible to the practice of ‘’tour of duty’’ (i.e. MTG). 
When looking at the other employees of the function, 83% of the employees’ 
appointments seem to be permanent while 17% of the employees seem to be high flyers 
using IAF as a mere stepping stone. From those High fliers CIAs, majority of them are 
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from the private sector. The study further revealed that where CIAs are not stable, the 
average length of stay of CIAs are 39months, and 31 months; for the CIAs in the public 
and private sectors respectively. Also for the highfliers internal auditors, average stints 
in their IAFs are 42months and 27months; for public sector internal auditors and private 
sectors internal auditors respectively. The study went further to establish that the 
commonest departments internal auditors are usually transferred to are finance and 
accounting, operations and corporate services. What the results imply generally is that 
internal auditors in the public sector of Australia and New Zealand seem more stable 
than their counterparts from private sector (i.e. Public sector’s IAFs tend to be staffed 
by more permanent employees compared to their private sector counterparts). The 
reason behind this difference however cannot be inferred from the referenced study. 
Investigating the factors responsible for instability of internal auditors of private sector 
than their colleagues in public sector therefore seems a potential research agenda. 
 
Another study on the impact of the use of IAF as a training ground for potential 
managers is Rose, Rose and Norman (2013) who through a 2x2 experiment with 74 
internal auditors examined the effects of using the IAF as a training ground for future 
senior managers. Though the domain of the study is not indicated for geographical 
reflections, the authors, using the experiment involving a synthesis of a manipulated 
case (controlled laboratory experiment) where a case of a company (using a percentage 
of completion method for its revenue recognition) was synthesised. The key issue tested 
in the manipulated case relates to whether or not internal auditors will be more likely to 
support management’s attempt to aggressively report revenue when the IAF is being 
used as a MTG using ANCOVA methods. Two scenarios created are first where IAF is 
used as MTG and second where IAF is not used as MTG. Based on the analysis of the 
results and the authors’ debriefing that ensued, the overall results of the experiment 
indicate that using IAF as MTG for future senior managers can impair the objectivity of 
internal auditors. If faced with a decision of evaluating a firm’s revenue recognition 
practices, internal auditors would be more willing to align with aggressive revenue 
recognition practices when they expect to move into senior management’s positions in 
the future. The authors further added that it seems internal auditors who are nursing the 
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ambition of becoming senior managers face strong incentives to please existing senior 
managers and concur with management’s financial decisions whether or not such 
decisions are appropriate. The finding further revealed the negative implication of the 
use of IAF as a training ground despite the contrary opinion that such practice signals to 
the organisation the value addition potential of IAF in terms of its resourcefulness. If 
indeed the IAF can exhibit its level of resourcefulness by supporting advocacy for its 
use as MTG, then it places on the internal auditing community the challenge of 
identifying the necessary mitigating measures to down play on the negative implications 
such practice will bring on the internal auditors’ objectivity.  
 
Looking at this issue from the perspectives of the external auditors, it has been argued 
in literature that external auditors usually perceive internal auditors of IAF used as 
MTG as less objective relative to the one not used as MTG. In addition, it is contended 
in literature that audit fees charged by external auditors where IAF is used as MTG is 
usually higher than where IAF is not used as MTG.  
 
Investigating these two positions empirically, Messier, et.al (2011), used archival 
analysis and an experiment on 43 external auditors (35 senior associates, and 8 
managers) from the various Big 4 accounting firms in Norway. According to the study, 
the experiment task consists of participants reading a case scenario of a hypothetical 
company and answering questions about the company. The authors indicated that the 
archival analysis of the study revealed that external audit fees are significantly higher 
for companies that use the IAF as a MTG, and that firms pay the highest external audit 
fees when they use only the CAE’s position as a MTG followed by using all internal 
audit positions as a MTG. The study also indicated that using just staff position as a 
MTG is not associated with internal audit fees. Likewise, the study’s experimental 
results indicate that external auditors judge internal auditors to have lower objectivity 
when the client uses the IAF as a MTG. 
 
The nexus between the results of the archival analysis and the experimental results is 
that while the archival results established that using IAF as a MTG impacts external 
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audit fees, the experimental results provide evidence to suggest that one of the factors 
for the higher fee could be the external auditors’ perception of internal auditors’ low 
objectivity where IAF is used as a MTG. Overall, it appears as useful as the practice of 
using IAF as MTG is, there lies in it the negative implication such practice can have on 
the internal auditors’ objectivity and the resulting impacts of such implications (such as 
higher external audit fees). 
 
In NFS, no study has ever attempted to investigate whether IAF is seen as a tour of 
duty, and MTG. Thus the inclusion of this issue under the study’s concern and the 
formulation of proposition 7 as: 
 
P7: Using Internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector as a training 
ground is negatively associated with the internal auditors’ objectivity and with the 
function’s ability to strengthen corporate governance 
 
4.4.2  IAF’s dual role of assurance and consulting 
Whereas shareholders and other stakeholders look forward to internal auditors as being 
in the position and possessing the capability of making an independent assessments, 
judgments and decisions (Mutchler, 2003), scholars such as Peursem (2005), and 
Ahmad and Taylor (2009) contend that the contemporary role of the internal auditor has 
become progressively affected by conflict and ambiguity.  Specifically, Ahmad and 
Taylor (2009) argue further that given the increased role of internal auditors under the 
corporate governance mosaic, internal auditors face issue of inherent conflict of interest. 
This they linked with role ambiguity associated with potential contradictions or 
incompatibility between their audit oversight function (assurance) for the company and 
management consultancy or consultative services role to the management. 
 
‘’in their audit role, internal auditors must remain independent of 
management by not subordinating their judgment to management 
in audit matters. But in their consultative role, they must collaborate 
with and support management, including accepting the judgment  
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of the audit committee of the board of directors. Given the need  
for a close working relationship with the board’s audit committee, the  
potential for the internal auditor to face this kind of role conflict may  
have been heightened’’ (Ahmad and Taylor, 2009 p. 900).  
 
In his view on the impact of the seeming incompatible roles of financial audit and 
consulting role of the internal auditors on independence of IAF, Mutchler (2003, p. 236) 
corroborates the above concern by raising his skepticism as follows: 
 ‘’Management employs internal auditors, yet these same internal 
  auditors are also often asked to review the performance of management 
  and others. In addition, management often relies on internal auditors for  
consulting services and incorporates audit recommendations into the re- 
engineering of business processes. Auditors, in their role as assurance 
providers, evaluate these processes’’. 
 
Two issues that can be inferred from the above emphases remain conflict of interest 
arising from the dual and seeming incompatible roles of assurance and consulting 
assigned to IAF (based on the expanded vista) on one hand, and the issue of 
subordination of the function by way of line of reporting of IAF to both the 
management and audit committee on the other hand. 
 
To start with, the assurance focus of internal audit presupposes and expects IAF’s 
independence from management, whereas the consulting paradigm anticipates shared 
mission and partnership with management (Mihret, James and Mula, 2010). Also, in the 
minds of many executives and managers, internal auditors work for them (Drent, 2002). 
These contentions indicate serious concerns of whether an internal auditor can truly be 
objective once he is engaged for the dual roles of assurance and consulting. 
 
Studies such as Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) and Cooper, Leung and Wong (2006) 
had earlier raised concerns on the challenges the dual roles of assurance and consulting 
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of IAF may have on internal auditors’ objectivity, maintaining that internal auditors are 
uncertain as to how to balance their relationship with senior management in both roles.  
It is based on the above exposition and concern that the 8th proposition is formulated as 
below: 
P8:  Consulting role of internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector is 
negatively associated with internal auditors’ objectivity and the function’s ability 
to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
4.4.3 CAE’s regular private contacts with the audit committee’s chairperson 
When IAF has opportunity of having private meetings with the audit committee, the 
IAF feels secured, protected and independent (Munro and Stewart, 2011), thus, 
improving corporate governance (Braiotta, 2004; Zaman and Sarens, 2013).  
 
To start with, evidence of the regularity of CAE’s private contacts with the audit 
committee’s chairperson is sought from developed environments. One of the studies 
that had documented such evidences is Zaman and Sarens (2013). In their study that 
aimed at providing exploratory evidence on factors associated with informal interactions 
between audit committee and IAFs, using 187 responses of UK CAEs (drawn from 
listed and non-listed, financial and non-financial companies) to a questionnaire survey, 
the authors reported that a large majority of the CAEs (88.1%) indicate that they have 
informal (private) interactions with the audit committee chair and/or audit committee  
members outside the regular pre-scheduled meetings. 
 
Christopher, Sarens and Leung (2009), a study meant to gather evidence from Australia 
on IAF’s independence using feedbacks from 34 Australian CAEs also gathered 
evidence on the issue of regularity of private contacts with the auditee committee’s 
chairperson or individual members. The authors indicated that 68% of the responding 
CAEs had regular private contacts with the auditee committee’s chair or individual 
members. The CAEs utilize the opportunity of their private contacts with the audit 
committee to raise critical matters affecting management without their presence. This is 
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one of the ways internal auditors’ objectivity can be achieved on their opinion on issues 
affecting the business generally. 
 
Therefore, it can be contended that private contact of the internal auditors with the 
auditee committee or its chairperson by the CAEs has positive impacts on the level of 
internal auditors’ objectivity. This gives them opportunity to discuss critical issues 
objectively with the CAEs. The researcher through this research work also intends to 
find out how frequent such private contacts are made by the internal auditors on the 
auditee committee’s chair in the NFS. Thus the formulation of the 9th proposition 
below: 
 
P9: Chief audit executive’s regular private contact with the audit committee 
chairperson is positively associated with internal auditors’ objectivity and the IAF 
of the NFS’s ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
4.4.4  IAF’s unrestricted access to records and information 
Unrestricted access to people, record and information by internal auditors has been 
argued one of the key factors contributing to the objectivity of internal auditors. An 
internal auditor that has an unfettered access to records and information is expected to 
form an opinion on any issue without any trepidation.  
 
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) in their study investigating the development of internal audit in 
Saudi Arabia through a combination of survey questionnaire and interview methods, 
and based on 111 responses from the survey questionnaire and feedback from 92 
interviewees, investigated whether there is unrestricted access to records and 
information on the part of the participants of the study.  The result of the study indicates 
that 44% of the internal audit directors considered that they did not have full access to 
all necessary information. This is an indication of threat to the internal auditors’ 
objectivity, and one of the reasons the authors concluded that the IAF in Saudi Arabia is 
ineffective and consequently adds no value. 
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Using Mousa (2013), a study that evaluates the independence of the IAF using 
reflections on Al-Bariga oil marketing company (AOMC) in Libya applying interview 
method on 13 interviewees (comprising directors of internal audit, financial controllers, 
and internal auditors). The internal auditors indicated that they are been given the right 
of access to the company’s accounts, records, archives, systems and to all its areas at all 
times. However, the feedback from the financial controller on the same matter suggests 
that the right of access to records and information given to the internal uditors is with 
some level of control because the internal auditors’ areas of activities seem limited. 
According to the finance controller, he does not think the internal auditors can audit any 
subject which directly concerns the actions of the BoDs or their close circle. Certainly, 
this is not an unfettered access to records and information. 
 
Therefore, the inferences that can be drawn from the two studies is that evidences from 
developing countries on the issue of internal auditors’ free access to records and 
information is indicative of censored access, and therefore constitute a big challenge on 
the objectivity of the internal auditors. This leads to postulation of the tenth proposition 
as: 
 
P10: Unrestricted access to records and information by the internal audit function 
in the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with internal auditors’ 
objectivity and the function’s ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
 
In order to verify all the above propositions (i.e. P7-10) using Agency theory, the third 
hypothesis is formulated thus: 
H3: Internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector are less objective 
 
4.5.0       Internal Auditor’s Competence and IAF’s effectiveness 
The continuous changing and widening focus of IAF certainly constitutes great concern 
on the appropriateness of internal auditors’ skills and competencies. The modern-day 
requirements and enlarged horizon of internal audit landscape, as well as increased 
customers of IAF, with diverse expectations necessitate a varied and adequate skill set 
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on the part of the staff of the function. Availability of a sufficiently large number of 
skilled professionals is being considered a preliminary requirement for internal auditors 
to be able to perform their tasks (Arena and Azzone, 2009). Incidentally, bouquets of 
internal auditors’ skills set and level of competence on matters that has to do with 
business risk assessment are part of the factors usually put into consideration by 
external auditors before determining the level of relevance of internal audit work by 
them (Gibbs and Schroeder, 1979; Clarks et al. 1981; Messier and Scneider, 1988; 
Maletta, 1993; Gramling and Myers, 1997; Felix et al., 2001; Al-Twaijry et al., 2004).     
 
In addition, the recognition, respect and status, management and employees of 
organisation will accord the CAE and his entire team, and the value they will place on 
their roles in the organisation to greater extent depend on the level of competence of the 
internal auditors. According to Arena and Azzone (2009) the perception of management 
and employees of organisation on the dexterity of their internal auditors can also 
increase the effectiveness of the internal audit’s team. Internal audit team that is not 
seen to be competent will have no respect from the management and consequently 
insights, advice and or recommendations from such internal audit is usually not taken 
serious (Van Peursem, 2004, 2005, Reding et al., 2013). The assurance and consulting 
services rendered by internal auditors without sufficient requisite knowledge, Skills and 
other competencies will be of little value, if any (Reding et al., 2013, p. 2-16). 
Therefore, the IIA standards 1210 require internal auditors to possess the knowledge, 
skills, and other competencies needed to perform their individual responsibilities. 
Gramling and Hermanson (2009) maintain that skilled and qualified internal audit staffs 
are indicative of internal audit quality. This notion had earlier been maintained by 
Fadzil (2005, p. 861) who indicate that professional certification and training lead to a 
lower need for monitoring of the internal control system by an IAF, since they are 
considered as able to perform audits effectively.  
 
Although no specific arrays of skills and knowledge are specified in the IIA standards, 
as fundamentals skills expected to be possessed by internal auditors, some attributes are 
however given prominence in literature as features that can enhance the profile of 
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internal auditors. These to Sarens (2009) include: educational background, previous 
work experience, professional certifications, training and development programme, 
behavioural skills, technical skills; and competencies. Whereas it is usually claimed in 
literature that finding internal auditors with adequate profile is a challenge (Hass, 
Abdolmohammadi and Burnaby, 2006), yet Sarens (2009) maintains that coming up 
with specific competency framework for modern day internal auditors is a dilemma. 
 
The above challenge notwithstanding, researchers do operationalize competence of 
internal auditors with characteristics such as professional certification, formal 
educational background, relevant graduate qualifications, membership of IIA, level of 
experience (see Arena and Azzone, 2009; Barac et al., 2009). While findings from 
extant studies on the influence of internal auditors’ competence on IAF’s quality is 
mixed, a general inference that can be made remains that internal auditors with good 
and relevant educational background, and professional certification perform better than 
those without. While it has also been argued that majority of the internal auditors have 
other professional affiliation aside the IIA, it is also argued that the IIA certifications 
(such as CIA - certification in Internal auditing, CCSA - certification in Control Self-
assessment, CRMA- certification in risk management) are indicative of internal 
auditors’ awareness of the internal audit standards guiding the practice of internal 
auditing worldwide, and possession of the knowledge and competencies required to 
perform internal audits (Burnaby et al., 2009, p. 844). This is so given the ‘’knowledge 
sharing’’ focus of the IIA that drive the certification of internal auditing professionals 
through some professional examinations.   
 
The rising stature of the IIA in this regard is giving increased awareness about all these 
professional certifications.  Burnaby et al. (2009) indicate that in Belgium, certifications 
such as CIA are more often becoming a requirement to enter, or at least to remain in the 
internal audit department.  It is however doubtful if this can be said of Nigeria, where 
only a small number of internal auditors have CIA certification. Thus, the study’s 
curiosity to establish if internal auditors in the NFS have sufficient resources and 
adequate level of expertise to fulfill their enhanced roles. 
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According to the IIA’s CIA learning system, Competencies are more than basic 
knowledge, skill and capabilities about a job. Competencies are transferable behaviours 
that are usually developed over time and represent the compilation of multiple abilities, 
traits, and knowledge required for success. Though competencies are personal to 
individual employee, however, they can be taken from one audit engagement to another, 
from one position to another and from one employer to another as well. 
 
In order to have a defined focus, extant literature on internal auditors’ competence shall 
be reviewed through the following five areas: 
a)  internal auditors’ educational qualifications 
b) internal auditors’ professional qualifications 
c) internal auditors length of years of experience 
d) internal auditors’ regular training 
e)Membership of internal auditors  with the IIA 
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Figure 4.5: Internal auditors’ competence 
 
 
4.5.1     Internal auditors’ educational qualification 
Possession of appropriate educational qualification that would enable anybody assigned 
any role in internal audit to perform creditably and professionally is anticipated (see IIA 
standards 1210). Therefore Ebaid (2011)’s contention in his exploratory study of 
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Egyptian listed firms’ IAF that no qualification (even though it is desirable) is normally 
required for internal auditors sounds confounding. The IIA standards though do not 
specify a particular knowledge, skills or competence, IIA standards 1210 nevertheless 
stipulates that internal auditors must have sufficient knowledge to evaluate the risk of 
fraud and the manner in which it is managed by the organisation. In the same vein, the 
standard also anticipates sufficient knowledge of key information technology, risks and 
controls, technology-based audit techniques. Consequently, it is reasoned that for an 
internal auditor to have sufficient knowledge in risk evaluation, and possess necessary 
acumen in information technology-laden audit methods, definitely, certain level of 
learning (education) is anticipated. 
 
Burnaby et al. (2009), a comprehensive study on the usage of internal auditing 
standards by companies in the US and select European countries using 4,080 usable 
responses from internal auditors whose details and responses were used to create a 
common body of knowledge (CBOK) database between 2006 and 2007 by the IIA 
Research Foundation (IIARF) provides comprehensive insights on the cross-country 
educational qualifications of internal auditors. Going by the study, 20.6% of Italian and 
23.4% of the respondents from the UK and Ireland have secondary/higher education. 
The USA and Italy have the highest number of respondents with a bachelors/diploma in 
business with 49.9% and 42.8% respectively. The Netherland have the largest number 
of respondents with a masters degree (76.8%). According to the findings from the study, 
it seems a masters degree is the minimum requirement to enter the internal auditing 
profession in Belgium and the Netherlands. The study also revealed that among the 
countries selected for the survey, Italian respondents have the lowest number of 
respondents with a masters or doctoral degree and the highest number of auditors with a 
bachelors degree/higher school education. 
 
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003), a study of the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia, 
using a mixed method of questionnaire survey (of 78 heads of Internal audit, and 33 
partners and audit managers in external audit firms) and structured interviews 
(conducted for 92 respondents from firms without internal audit) revealed that 72 out of 
  
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 164 
 
the 78 directors of internal audit departments (i.e. 92%) had a university degree and a 
significant proportion (23%) had a higher degree. This shows that most of the directors 
of internal audit of Saudi Arabia corporate sector are holders of first degree. 
 
Certainly there is a positive nexus between internal auditors’ educational qualification 
and their level of proficiency and therefore the formulation of the eleventh proposition. 
 
P11: Educational qualification of internal auditors of the Nigerian financial 
sector is positively associated with the individual internal auditors’ competence 
and the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen corporate governance in 
the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
4.5.2     Internal auditors’ professional qualifications 
Sarens, Abdolmohammadi and Lenz (2012) in their study that investigates several 
variables that are theoretically associated with the IAF having an active role in 
corporate governance, using responses from 782 US CAEs in the CBOK (2006) 
database analysed with the use of binary logistic regression, establishes the positive 
relationship between CAE’s professional certification and IAF’s active role in corporate 
governance. 
 
According to the authors, 56% of the CAEs whose insights were used to make 
inferences from the study possess at least one professional certification in internal 
auditing (e.g. CIA). Possession of one professional certification in internal auditing by 
the referenced CAEs in the US is indicative of the appreciable level of development of 
internal auditing as a profession in US. Unlike in other economies (particularly the 
developing countries) where majority of the CAEs are unaware of existence of the IIA 
(see Al-Twaijry et. al (2003), let alone its various globally accredited certifications. 
 
Dickings and O’Relly (2009), earlier mentioned in previous section revealed that more 
CAEs hold the CPA designation than those who hold the CIA designation, and that 13% 
of the respondents reported holding both designations. However, 21% of the 
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respondents hold neither designation. Interestingly, the referenced study reported 
finding evidence to suggest that internal auditors in the financial services sector are less 
likely to hold CIA designations than are internal auditors in other industry. What might 
be responsible for the possibility of less CIA holders in financial sectors are however 
not discussed or suggested in the study. Ordinarily, due to the critical roles financial 
services sector plays in any economy, and the high regulatory framework of the sector 
in all economies, one would have thought that the sector would be flooded with CAEs 
with high profile of internal auditing endorsements (certifications). More so, that 
positive association between internal auditing certification and the use of IIA standards 
by the IAFs (and ultimately internal auditors’ competence), is being proven.     
 
Burnaby et. al (2009) in their study of the differences in the degree of usage and 
compliance with the IIA standards by organisations’ IAFs located in the USA and a 
sample of European countries which have affiliates with the IIA also argue that 
professional certifications (such as CIA, MIIA, or the PIIA), is an indication that 
internal auditors have an understanding of the IIA standards and possess the knowledge 
required to perform internal audits. According to the result of the study, The Uk and 
Ireland, Belgium, and the Netherlands have the most respondents with internal auditing 
certification with 62.4%, 55.9% and 48.2% respondents respectively, confirming their 
one certification or the other in internal auditing. Aside from internal auditing 
certifications, the respondents also indicate certification in public accounting as another 
certification held by most respondents with the Netherlands (47.3%) and the USA 
(36.3%). Other relevant certifications indicated by the respondents to the surveys 
include certifications in Information system auditing, Control assessment, and fraud 
examination. These are certifications held by 8% or more of the respondents, as 
reported by the authors. 
 
Contrary to the adequacy of the level of education of the Saudi Arabian directors of 
internal audit in corporate sector observed in Al-Twaijry et. al (2003), there is low level 
of professional qualification amongst the practitioners of internal auditing in the 
country. Only 29 out of the 78 heads of internal audit in the country (i.e. 37%) had 
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relevant professional qualifications. Surprisingly only 4 out of these professionals holds 
CIA while those holding Saudi CPA are 16.  The study also indicates that 18 directors 
of internal audit (i.e. 23%) are not aware of the existence of the IIA. This revelation of 
non-awareness of existence of the IIA on the part of some directors of internal audit 
certainly speaks volume on the general awareness of the IIA on the internal auditing 
community of Saudi Arabia. On the individual internal auditors’ level of education, the 
referenced study further revealed that of the 489 staff (excluding directors) employed in 
total in the departments surveyed, 393 (80%) were educated to degree level. In addition, 
only 134(27%) of the internal audit staff held professional qualifications, of which 29% 
are CIA holders and 53(40%) held a US or Saudi’s CPA qualification. 
 
Out of the 21respondents that participated in a questionnaire survey of the IAFs of 
Egyptian listed firms, Ebaid (2011) observed that 16 (i.e. 76%) indicated that none of 
their internal audit staff are professionally qualified. The remaining five respondents 
(24%) however claimed that less than 25% of their internal audit staff is professionally 
qualified. The author linked the low level of professional qualification to the infancy 
stage of internal auditing in Egypt.    
 
Insights from Italy as indicated in Arena and Azzone (2007) indicates that nearly 40% 
have CIA, while about 20% are certified accountants. 
 
Akinteye, York and Qudrat-Ullah (2015) revealed that 40% of the respondents to their 
survey on IAF quality in Nigerian listed firms are associate members (i.e. ACA) of the 
ICAN, 40% are fellow of the institute (i.e. FCA) while the remaining 20% are associate 
members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants in India (ACAI). In summary, the 
study indicated that all (i.e. 100%) of the heads of the IAFs that participated in the 
survey hold professional qualifications in accounting; but none with CIA.  
 
As presented, the result suggests the preference of the internal auditors in Nigeria to 
associate with the ICAN instead of with the IIA. Two reasons might be adduced for this. 
First it could be that there is very low awareness about the IIA and its purpose among 
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the internal auditing community in the country or, the internal auditors are generally not 
too inclined to associate with the institute given the skepticism about the 
professionalisation of internal auditing. Till date, particularly in most developing 
countries, most people (including the internal auditors) still perceive internal auditing as 
a mere offshoot of accounting profession. 
   
Comparing Egyptian internal auditors’ profile in terms of professional qualification of 
internal auditors (as indicated by Ebaid, 2011) with the profile of their Nigerian 
counterparts as indicated by Akinteye, York and Qudrat-Ullah (2015), one may want to 
argue that internal auditors in Nigerian listed firms  generally are more professionally 
qualified than those internal auditors in Egyptian listed companies.  Overall, possession 
of relevant professional qualifications by internal auditors have positive effect on their 
level of competence and consequently on their IAF’s ability to enhance corporate 
governance. Therefore the formulation of the 12th proposition as:  
 
P12: Possession of relevant professional qualifications by the internal auditors in 
the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the individual internal 
auditors’ competence and the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen 
corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
4.5.3     Internal auditors’ length of years of experience 
Badara and Saidin (2014), a questionnaire survey (of 350 respondents covering the 
internal auditors, audit committee and the Chairmen of the various local governments) 
of internal audit effectiveness across the local governments authorities in Nigeria, 
discovered that with respect to working experience, 32% of the respondents have 
working experience from 15years and above. This is followed by the respondents that 
have working experience of 6-10years which is 25.1%. Similarly, 21.7% of the 
respondents have the working experience of 1-5years, while 19.7% of the respondents 
have the working experience of the range of 11-15years, and finally, 1.4% of the 
respondents have the working experience that is less than 1 year. The authors asserted 
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that the internal auditors in the local government authorities have sufficient working 
experience. 
 
Akinteye, York and Qudrat-Ullah (2015), a study from the same domain of Badara and 
Saidin (2014)  investigating the IAF’s quality in the Nigerian listed firms using 
interview responses from 8 respondents (Head of IAFs) also affirmed that internal 
auditors in Nigeria are sufficiently experienced to enable the IAFs in the country to 
operate effectively as a corporate governance’s mechanism. The study specifically 
revealed that 20% of the responding heads of the IAFs has 7 years of working 
experience, 40% has 14years experience, 20% has 15-year experience, while 20% has 
22 years cumulative experience. The working experience however includes experience 
in internal audit, external audit or in accounting functions generally. 
 
The significance of working experience on the internal auditors’ level of proficiency 
therefore cannot be overemphasised. Hence, the 13th proposition as stated below:  
 
P13: Possession of reasonable length of years of experience by the internal auditors 
of the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the individual internal 
auditors’ competence and the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen 
corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
4.5.4     Internal auditors’ regular training 
Regular training of internal auditors is another way the competence level of the internal 
auditors can be enhanced. Internal auditing profession is constantly evolving. Therefore, 
the IIA takes the issue of training of the practitioners of internal auditing very serious. 
The IIA standards 1230 require internal auditors to enhance their knowledge, skills, and 
other competencies through continuing professional development. It is through regular 
trainings in form of conferences, seminars, on-the-job training, and formal trainings that 
internal auditors can be exposed to international best practices and frequent changes 
thereon from time to time. Specifically, CIAs are required to obtain at least 40hours of 
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training annually to meet the institute’s continuing professional education (CPE) 
requirements for maintaining certification. 
 
Lenz, Sarens and D’Silva (2014) also used frequency of training of the internal auditors 
as a factor that distinguishes one IAF from another. The referenced study observes the 
inadequacy of training for the German internal auditors that participated in the 
questionnaire survey. 
 
Arena and Azzone (2007), in their study of adoption and characteristics of internal audit 
departments in Italian companies revealed that training on the job is the most popular 
way of exposing internal auditors to international best practices in the field. This 
consists of developing workers’ competences in the field, for instance by introducing 
newly hired employees into a team of experienced employees. For the Italian CAEs that 
participated in the survey, those who indicated in-house training as the most important 
way of enhancing internal auditors’ level of competences constitute 88.82%. According 
to the survey the next commonest form of training is through outsourced courses. 
 
Akinteye, York and Qudrat-Ullah (2015) found the average mandatory CPE hours of 
Nigerian internal auditors as 36hours, which is 4hours short of the minimum 40hours 
recommended by the IIA for CIAs. However, the author established that 40% of the 
internal auditors involved in the study are Associate members of the ICAN, another 
40% as Fellow of the ICAN (FCA), while the remaining 20% are associate members of 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants in India (ACAI). Therefore, if none of the 
respondents is CIA, the basis of the analysis of the mandatory CPE hours is confusing 
except ICAN has same requirements on the CPE with the IIA. In summary, internal 
auditors in Nigeria though can be said to be exposed to adequate training, the issue 
however is that internal auditing community in the country seems unaware of enormous 
knowledge sharing and acquisition available from the IIA chapter in the country. 
Therefore, the 14th proposition is formulated as below:  
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P14: Regular training of internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector is 
positively associated with the individual internal auditors’ competence and the 
ability of the internal audit function to strengthen corporate governance in the 
Nigerian financial sector. 
 
4.5.5    Membership of internal auditors with the IIA 
Burnaby and Hass (2011)’s study earlier discussed indicates that Latin America had the 
largest number of respondents (80%) that had been a member of the IIA for 5 years or 
less, and the lowest number (4.6%) that had been members for 11 or more years. For the 
US respondents, 56.1% of the respondents had been members for 5 years or less, and 
23.7% had been a member for 11 or more years. In the case of Canadian respondents, 
58.5% had been a member for 5 years or less, and 19.5% had been a member for 11 or 
more years. The highest number of respondents from USA that had become members of 
the IIA for 11 years or more might not be unconnected with the USA’s long history of 
internal auditing, particularly, been the pioneer country in the history of internal 
auditing as a profession worldwide. 
 
Arena and Azzone (2009), a study on organisational drivers of internal audit 
effectiveness used 153 responses of Italian companies’ CAEs to gather insights from the 
CAEs on the various factors that can promote the effectiveness of internal audit. One of 
the three factors identified by the authors, as capable of influencing internal auditors’ 
competence is the membership of the CAE with the IIA. As revealed by the study, while 
64.71% (i.e. 99 CAEs) indicated their membership with the IIA, only 54CAEs (i.e. 
35.29%) are not members. The higher percentage of CAEs who are members of the IIA 
is considered remarkable and as such is expected to have positive impact on the CAEs’ 
level of competence or training activities. As anticipated, the study established that 
internal audit effectiveness increases when the CAEs is affiliated to the IIA. 
 
With a view to investigating the level of the membership of the internal auditors in the 
NFS with the IIA, and implication of such membership on their level of competence and 
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ability to impact on the corporate governance in the sector, the last proposition (i.e. P15) 
of the study is formulated as:  
  
P15: Membership of internal auditors of the Nigerian financial sector with the 
Institute of internal auditors is positively associated with the individual internal 
auditors’ competence and the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen 
corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. 
 
Finally, by relying on the institutional theory discussed in the preceding chapter, the 
fourth hypothesis under the study is formulated as : 
H4: Internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector are not to a greater extent 
competent in fulfilling their expected roles. 
  
4.6                Chapter summary 
This chapter focused mainly the review of extant literature on the key concepts through 
which answers can be provided to the four research questions of the study. At the end, 
fifteen propositions were made on the four key concepts (IAF’s independence, IAF’s 
auditing methodology, Internal auditors’ objectivity and internal auditors’ competence) 
shaping the study’s focus. Using the three theories (i.e. Agency, TCE and Institutional), 
four hypotheses were formulated for testing. The next chapter provides details of the 
methodology adopted in carrying out the study, including a brief overview of the 
study’s analytical methods. 
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           Chapter 5: Research Methodology 
5.0 Chapter overview  
Having come up with four hypotheses to be tested, and fifteen propositions to be 
verified, under the study in the previous chapter, this chapter presents the approach 
adopted in gathering the necessary data, as well as the methods used in analyzing the 
data. This is done through six different sections covering the philosophical foundation 
of the methodology, development and piloting of the research instruments, data 
collection, data analysis, limitations of the methodology as well as summary of the 
chapter. Specifically, the chapter is arranged as follows: Section 5.1 set the tone for the 
philosophical foundation of the research methodology. The study’s research strategy is 
presented in 5.2, and an overview of the development of the study’s research instrument 
is given in 5.3. Section 5.4 gives an overview of data collection and analysis method 
adopted in the study. Section 5.5 highlights the limitations of the methodology, and 
section 5.6 summarises the chapter.  
 
5.1. The Philosophical foundation of the methodology 
The philosophical foundation of any research is the fulcrum on which the methods and 
strategy adopted in carrying out a research rest. In research, two strands of viewpoints 
are commonly used to describe the strategy or pattern of research methods. These are 
referred to as ‘’epistemology’’ and ‘’ontology’’.  
 
Whereas epistemology can be seen in terms of ’’what constitutes valid knowledge and 
how it is obtained’’, ontology can be said to be concerned with ‘’what constitutes reality 
and how we can understand existence’’. For Rose et al., (2015), epistemology usually 
refers to questions of how we know what we claim to know, or alternatively by going 
along the Bryman and Bell (2011)’s school of thought, a question of whether or not the 
social world can and should be studied according to the same principles, and ethos as 
the natural sciences. Creating a domain of understanding ontology, Bryman and Bell 
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(2011, p. 20) elucidate that its central idea is the question of whether social entities can 
and should be considered objective entities that have a reality extraneous to social 
actors, or whether they can and should be considered social constructions built up from 
the perceptions and actions of social actors. These differing viewpoints are generally 
categorized as objectivism and constructionism.  From these brief descriptions 
therefore, epistemological and ontological perspectives can be construed as theory of 
knowledge and view of reality, shaping a study’s methodology. 
 
Generally, Positivism and Interpretivism otherwise called phenomenology (see 
Omoteso, 2006; Bryman, 2008; Bryman & Bell, 2011), perceived within the mindset of 
either objectivism or constructionism, are the two dominant and recognized 
philosophical foundations of research methodology (Omoteso, 2006; Yekini, 2012; 
Adelopo, 2010; Bryman & Bell, 2011). Giorgi (2009) stresses that the primary aim of 
phenomenological philosophy is to develop a greater understanding of individual’s 
experiences through the consciousness of the experience. This indicates that 
phenomenological research aims at greater understanding of social world by describing 
or interpreting human experience as lived by the experience in a way that can be used as 
a source of qualitative evidence (Mayor & Onwuegbuzie, 2015).  
 
Although research can be categorised as either theory-validating (deductive) or theory 
building i.e. inductive (Rose et al., 2015; Bryman & Bell, 2011), the epistemological 
orientation of the researchers themselves appears to be the most prominent way of 
describing a research approach or strategy. This understanding is further extended by 
Rose et al.,(2015) and Adelopo (2010) who affirm that researchers can essentially be 
categorized in terms of their epistemological inclination. The concentration in this 
section on the two paradigms of positivism and interpretivism along both the 
epistemological and ontological perspectives notwithstanding, other paradigms along 
this bimodal orientation commonly recognised and controversially debated (Yekini, 
2012; Trochim, 2006; Bryman, 2008; 2011; Saunders et al., 2009)  in literature include 
post-positivism also known as realism, relativism, hermeneutics, structuralism, post 
structuralism, deconstructivism, constructivism, and feminism (see Yekini, 2012. P. 95). 
  
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 174 
 
Aside recognizing these diverse philosophical ideologies, the focus of this study is 
mainly on the ones earlier espoused given their suitability and relevance to this study.  
 
Positivism refers to the orientation of using scientific approach to conduct research 
whether the subject focus is inanimate or animate, and researchers that follow this line 
of orientation are referred to as positivists. From ontological view point, this line of 
epistemology is said to be embedded in objectivity, i.e. ‘’facts are facts’’ (see Bryman 
& Bell, 2011). Interpretivism in contrast refers to the school of thought that rejects 
positivism by holding on to the position that pure scientific approach is unsuitable for 
social-science research. Interpretivists argue that there are fundamental differences 
between the objects of science (such as chemical and rocks) and the human being that 
social scientists study (Rose et al., 2015), and thus the scientific methods of positivism 
are inadequate if meaningful inferences are to be drawn from studies. 
 
Contrary to the notion of stability of features, interpretivism perspective recognizes that 
human reasoning is unstable, and that people actively interpret the world around them 
and do so within a specific socio-cultural context (Rose et al., 2015), ‘’people are 
people’’. It can possibly be argued that interpretivism is the epistemological perspective 
embedded in the quest for subjective knowledge. Thus indicating ‘’subjectivity’’ as the 
ontological standpoint of phenomenology (or interpretivism). The above clarifications 
indicate the interconnectivity of both epistemological and ontological orientations 
particularly when addressing the philosophical foundation of research in business or 
social science, where the focal point is usually organisation or human reasoning. 
 
Positivists and objectivists are expected to isolate themselves from the object of their 
research, given that the general tenet of the scientific approach of research methodology 
is that knowledge should be sought in a value-free manner, with the notion that objects 
are already embedded with meanings and meaningful realities, awaiting discovery 
without any interference. From their view point, only procedures through means such as 
data gathering and analysis similar to scientific approach used in natural science for 
hypothesis testing, and verification of causal relationship are ideal for such discovery. 
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Knowledge based on positivism standpoint is therefore assumed to be value-free, 
objective, and by corollary verifiable or replicable and thus generalisable. 
 
Contrarily, the interpretivists and constructionists are of the view point that rather than 
being detached from the object under study in social sciences, people use their intuition 
to interpret the social world being studied, and that knowledge is actually fluid and 
subjective. This implies that researchers cannot detach themselves from the object being 
studied, and therefore, totally objective or value-free research seems impossible. That is 
‘’the knower and the known’’ are considered as inseparable (Rocco, et al., 2003). 
 
From the above discussions and considering the study’s objectives and research 
questions indicated in chapter 1, the philosophical foundation of this study could be 
argued to be mainly grounded in the interpretivism epistemological foundation and 
constructionism ontological orientation. This is so given that for the four research 
questions raised in the study, certain class of actors (i.e. those who are saddled with the 
responsibility of corporate governance enhancement, particularly, the internal auditors 
and management) are the identified relevant group through which the phenomenon 
(internal auditing) being studied could be actualized. These are animate domain, whose 
perceptions may not be totally value-free, aside from the fact that the domain is not 
totally scientific like molecules or rock. Interpretivists seek to understand human 
behavior from their  daily interactions with the social world (Bryman, 2008). 
 
5.2.0 Selecting the research strategy: Quantitative, qualitative or mixed 
methods? 
Bryman and Bell (2011, p. 26) describe research strategy to mean a general orientation 
to the conduct of business research. Generally, the two main types of research strategies 
established in literature are: 
i. Quantitative, and 
ii. Qualitative 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), quantitative research on one hand can be said to 
be the research strategy that emphasizes quantification both in data gathering and 
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analysis. Qualitative research on the other hand usually emphasizes words instead of 
quantification in data collection and analysis. This indicates that quantitative researchers 
collect and analyse numeric data, while qualitative researchers use non-numeric data, 
which may also include images and video (Rose et al., 2015).Mayoh and Onwuegbuzie 
(2015, p. 96) maintain that qualitative researcher views data as the product of 
interaction between research and participant. 
 
Aside from the nature of data, other common attributes used to differentiate the two 
research strategy categories is the strategy perspective on, or relationship to theory.  
While quantitative approach is usually concerned with theory testing (i.e deductive), 
qualitative is usually linked with theory building (i.e. inductive). In line with the 
Bryman and Bell (2011)’s word of caution on this line of demarcation between the two 
approaches, Rose et al. (2015) affirm that the distinction between quantitative and 
qualitative research strategy is not so precise, as quantitative research can as well be 
adopted for inductive, just as qualitative can also be deductive in some situation.  
 
Two clear lines of distinction between the two approaches as indicated by Rose et al. 
(2015) are that: 
i. quantitative research is commonly characterized as having structured, 
predetermined and fixed research designs, whereas qualitative research is more 
flexible and evolving.  
ii. quantitative research is often characterized as ‘’variable-orientation’’ by 
operationalizing concept of interest as measurable attributes or variables and 
specifying the expected linkages between them.  
 
In addition, with a view to making a generalization from the totality of whatever is 
being investigated, a fractional portion of the aggregate can be drawn, investigated and 
findings there from used as a basis for generalization for the entire object through the 
process of statistical inference. Qualitative approach unlike quantitative however 
focuses on heterogeneity and peculiarity of individual cases, and thus a smaller group is 
the focus. Therefore facilitating an in-depth knowledge of a focused group. The table 
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below as adapted from Rose et al. (2015) gives a summary of the salient distinguishing 
features of the two approaches 
Table: 5.1: Qualitative vs Quantitative research (adapted from Rose et al., 2015) 
 
To differentiate between the two research approaches, Bryman and Bell (2011) applies 
the line of epistemology and ontological orientation as below: 
 
 Quantitative Qualitative 




Inductive (i.e. theory 
generation) 
Epistemological orientation Natural science 
(particularly positivism) 
Interpretivism  
Ontological orientation  Objectivism  Constructionism 
Table: 5.2: Qualitative vs Quantitative research (adapted from Bryman & Bell, 2011) 
 
Arising from the comparison of the two research approaches as summarized in the 
above tables is a question of whether it is possible to apply both paradigms in a singular 
research work so as to take complimentary advantages such a combination can avail. 
Johnson et al. (2007) indicate that debates about singular or universal truths or 
approaches to viewing the world versus multiple or relative truths versus balances or 
S/n Features  Quantitative Qualitative 




iii. Procedure Structured, pre-specified and 
fixed 
Emergent, and flexible 
iv. Focus Aggregate properties and 
statistical inference 
Concerned with focused and 
in-depth observation 
v. Interference No researcher interference in 
the process 
Researcher is closely 
involved.  
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combination of same dates back to ancient western philosophy.  As the debate continues 
so does it continue to affect how knowledge is viewed. ‘’This debate continues to affect 
how we view knowledge, what we look for, what we expect to find, and how we believe 
we are going to go about finding and justifying ‘’knowledge’’ (Johnson et al., 2007.p. 
113). 
     
In terms of relationship with theories, the approach adopted under this study is 
deductive (i.e. ‘’theory testing”). As established in chapter 3 of this study, three theories 
(Agency theory, TCE theory and Institutional theory) constitute the theoretical 
paradigm for the study. On the agency theory, the main assumption of the theory, that 
IAF is a contracting cost, jointly applicable to both the management (in his position as 
agent of the board), and to the board (as principal or nominee of the principal-the 
shareholders) are put to tests in this study.  Specifically, and in line with the extensive 
discussions made under the theoretical background of the study (chapter 3), the 
contracting cost is borne by the principal as monitoring costs, necessitated by the need 
to ensure alignment of actions on the part of the agent. To agent, the cost is predicted as 
bonding, a necessary cost to signal to the principal that they are carrying out their 
instructions in line with their envisioned objectives, and also to ensure retention of their 
agency status. The issue of IAF’s independence positioned as the key concern to be 
addressed under the study’s first research question - ‘’what is the level of independence 
enjoyed by IAF in the Nigerian financial sector’’? is addressed by testing the reliability 
of the fundamentals of agency theory put forward by Adams (1994) as a paradigm for 
the essence of IAF in organisations where principal-agency condition exists. Given the 
thin line of demarcation between IAF’s independence and individual IAs’ objectivity as 
discussed in chapter four however, the issue of IAs’ objectivity (the focus of research 
question 3) is also addressed using Agency theory. 
 
Similarly, research questions 2 (“To what extent are the internal audit functions in the 
Nigerian financial sector performing their roles in conformity with the IIA 
standards?’’) and 4 (“To what extent are internal auditors in the Nigerian financial 
sector competent in fulfilling their expected roles?’’) of the study are investigated by 
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applying the canons of Institutional theory. The TCE is however applied for IAF’s 
sourcing decision and its impact on IAF’s independence. 
 
Whereas deductive research stance established for the study in the above exposition 
may seem conflicting with its earlier epistemological and ontological direction of 
constructionism, and an indication towards mixed methods; the interwovenness of 
epistemological positions with research strategy domains is a rationalization. In 
addition, though the study substantially requires primary data gathered from a survey 
with the use of a well-piloted questionnaire administered on the sampled firms’ CAEs 
and some senior members of their teams, a face to face semi-structured interview also 
conducted for the selected firms’ CAEs, in the sector further indicates a combination of 
two data collection methods. The face-to-face interview eventually conducted with four 
CAEs borne out of the desire for in-depth insights implies a combination of numeric 
and non-numeric data sets for the study. This is what is referred to as data triangulation, 
an established form of triangulation according to Denzin (1978), and a pointer towards 
mixed method research (MRR). 
 
Mixing of methods may occur in a study if the researcher decides it will help make the 
data collection and analysis more accurate or the inferences more useful (Rocco et al., 
2003). Consideration of interview method to complement the questionnaire survey 
method of collecting data for the study arose from the researcher’s desire for precision 
and robustness of evidences for inferences. Quantitative or qualitative components may 
be used equally, or one may be more dominant (Rocco et al., 2003. P. 22). In this study 
however, quantitative component is dominant considering its tremendous application on 
the study’s research questions and the complementing application of qualitative method.  
The various benefits of MMR (which includes data integrity and widened research 
horizon) as highlighted in the next section are some of the justification for this strategy. 
 
5.2.1  Mixing methods or data triangulation? 
Whereas discussions in the prior sections either via epistemological or ontological 
ground attempt to delineate the various research strategies as deductive or inductive, 
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quantitative or qualitative (that is presenting research methodology as being mono-
method oriented), studies that revolve around the two established paradigms abound. 
This paradigm forms the foundation of ‘’mixed methods’’. Johnson et al. (2007) view 
mixed methods research (MMR) as an approach to knowledge in terms of theory and 
practice that attempts to consider multiple viewpoints, perspectives, positions, and 
standpoints of qualitative and quantitative research.  The author accordingly defines 
mixed methods research as ‘’the type of research in which a researcher or a team of 
researchers combines elements of qualitative and quantitative research approaches (e.g. 
use of qualitative and quantitative viewpoints, data collection, analysis, inference 
techniques) for the broad purposes of breadth and depth of understanding and 
corroboration’’. MMR can be seen as a response to the long-lasting, circular, and 
remarkably unproductive debates discussing the advantages and disadvantages of 
quantitative versus qualitative research, given the concern over their different 
paradigmatic foundations (Feilzer, 2010). The underlying assumption of MMR is that it 
engenders a fuller understanding of human phenomenon because research conducted 
with mixed methods is generally perceived to be stronger (Rocco, et al., 2003).  
 
Another terminology usually adopted for mixed method is triangulation. Triangulation 
is frequently synonymous with MMR (Archibald, 2015, p. 3). The adequacy of the term 
can be inferred from Denzin (1978)’s definition of triangulation as ‘’the combination of 
methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon’’. According to the author, 
triangulation can take the form of : 
 i)  data triangulation- use of a variety of data sources in a study. 
ii)  investigator triangulation-engagement of several different researchers. 
iii) theory triangulation – use of multiple perspectives and theories to  
 interpret the results of a study; and 
iv) methodological triangulation – use of multiple methods to study a  
 research problem. 
The above is seen as an extension of Easterby-Smith et al. (2002) in Omoteso (2006) 
where triangulation is only limited to data, methodology and theory (see Omoteso 2006, 
p. 110). 
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Whereas there are agitations in literature on the appropriateness of construing mixed 
method as triangulation (see Archibald 2015), given that triangulation is generally 
understood as a means of confirming and proving completeness of research findings 
(see Creswell & Plano, 2011), an overemphasis  on the restrictive benefits of 
confirmation and corroboration of triangulation may give a conflicting appreciation of 
triangulation and its relevance as a nomenclature or expression of MMR, particularly 
within social science research. Without making attempt to joining researchers pre-
occupied with the agenda of clarifying the adequacy or otherwise of triangulation as a 
synonym for MMR, points worth of acknowledging in the debate so far is that 
triangulation and MMR share same border line in terms of pluralism of methods, as well 
as confirmation and corroborative benefits.  To further compound the confusion about 
the interchangeability of the two terms, Greene (2007), and Hesse-Biber (2010) re-
affirm that triangulation can refer to a MMR design, the intent of which is often 
corroboration or confirmation. 
 
Looking further from the issue of taxonomy, the benefits of mixing methods in research 
include the following as supported in literature (see: Johnson et al., 2007; Rose et al., 
2015; Mayoh & Onwuegbuzie, 2015; Yekini, 2012; Omoteso, 2006): 
i. increases validity of data and minimization of bias. The bias inherent in 
any particular data source will be canceled out (Denzin, 1978), thus 
giving researchers more confidence about their research results.  
ii. enhances the strengths and minimizes the weakness of individual 
methods 
iii. promotes analysis of data from different perspectives, and thus uncovers 
contradictions 
iv. helps in the use of the results of one method to enhance another 
v. widens the scope of research.  
 
The popularity of MMR is increasing particularly in business research and in the social 
sciences more generally (Bryman & Bell, 2011), despite the unsettled controversy about 
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its philosophical domain. To some, the combination of quantitative with its positivisms 
epistemological orientation and qualitative methods with its interpretivism 
epistemology creates a confusion and difficulty of locating a suitable philosophical 
paradigm. Rocco et al. (2003) define paradigm as a ‘’worldview’’. For Creswell (1998), 
paradigm is a ‘’basic set of beliefs or assumptions that guide a researcher’s inquiry’’. 
Going by Johnson et al. (2007, p. 113) however, the philosophical foundation of MMR 
is pragmatism (Feilzer, 2010; and Mertens, 2012). 
 
Pragmatism according to Feilzer (2010) raises question on the dichotomy of positivism 
and constructivism and aims at a convergence of both paradigms, emphasizing the 
diverse layering of phenomenon, some objective, some subjective and some a mixture 
of the two (Dewey, 1925), and the need for a method that lends itself to the required 
flexibility to address the divergent layers or features of a phenomenon being studied. 
Thus, researchers do not have to be imprisoned under the paradigm of any particular 
methodological domain, even when the studied phenomenon suggests a need for reflex. 
The assumptions behind the adoption of pragmatic paradigm as a philosophical 
foundation for MMR is grounded in the notion that there is not one set of methods that 
is appropriate for studying a phenomenon, but rather any methods that best address 
research question should be adopted (Mertens 2012). Arising from the above 
discussions therefore, mixed method, combining positivism and constructivism 
paradigms is adopted for the study. A pointer towards pragmatism in line with Johnson 
et.al. (2007), Feilzer (2010) and Mertens (2012). 
  
5.3.0.   Development and piloting of the research instrument 
The development of the instrument used for this study is informed by the four research 
questions, and the four  hypotheses formulated to be tested under the study. Based on 
the theories underlying the study and the literature reviewed in Chapter four, relevant 
and specific questions are built into a questionnaire that was administered on the study’s 
samples. At the planning stage of the survey, the instrument was divided into five 
different sections (Sections A-E). Section A of the instrument contains six different 
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questions meant to elicit respondents’ bio-data. These include questions on areas such 
as gender, age, qualifications, etc. of respondents. 
 
Section B focused the main characteristics of corporate governance. This section 
contains six questions meant to test the conformity of the respondents’ firm’s corporate 
governance with the framework and concepts reviewed under chapter four. The third 
section contains thirty-five questions in all and was used to test the 2 hypotheses and 9 
propositions formulated on two research questions that address the issue of IAF’s 
independence and individual auditors’ objectivity. The significance of these two 
important concepts to the effectiveness of IAF, the crux of this study informed the 
volume of the hypotheses, the related propositions and the specific questions thereon. 
The other two sections (i.e. D and E) contain fourteen and seven specific questions 
respectively. These are meant to provide answers to the propositions and the two 
hypotheses formulated to answer the remaining two research questions.  
 
Summary of the initial lay-out of the research instrument containing in total sixty eight 
(68) questions with focus on different specific objectives of the study as highlighted 
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Table 5.3:  Relevance of questions used in the research instrument to the study’s 
research questions  
S/N Research questions Focus Question Nos.as 











What is the level of 
independence of the 
internal audit functions in 








How objective are the 
internal auditors in the 
Nigerian financial sector? 
Existence of internal audit charter C4-6   
IAF’s reporting obligation to 
management 
C9 
IAF’s reporting obligation to the audit 
committee 
B1-5 
C8, C10, C17 
IAF’S support from management C7 
C13-16 
C21-24, C28 




IAF’s sourcing arrangement C1-6, C9-32 
IAF ‘s use as a training ground  C11-12, C25-27 
IAF’s roles in risk management D8-14 
3. To what extent are the 
internal audit functions in 
the Nigerian financial 
sector performing their 
roles in conformity with 
the IIA standards? 
IAF’s compliance with the IIA standards A4-6 
4 To what extent are 
internal auditors in the 
Nigerian financial sector 
competent in fulfilling 
their expected roles? 
Internal auditor’s competence E1-7 
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5.3.1  Piloting of the Research instrument 
In order to evaluate the adequacy, capability and reliability of the research instrument, a 
pilot survey was carried out on nine (9) respondents selected through judgmental 
sampling. The sample selected for the pilot are a group of respondents considered not 
too divergent from the targeted respondents for the study. These include internal 
auditing professionals with professional certification (i.e. ‘’CIA’’- Certified Internal 
Auditor), auditing professionals with external audit firm, some internal auditors from 
the targeted population and an academic with tremendous wealth of experience in 
research design, as indicated below: 
S/N Category Nos. 
1 Professional internal auditors who are members of the IIA 
(Nigeria chapter) with CIA certification 
3 
2  Managing partners of external audit firms 2 
3 Internal auditors from Nigerian Financial sector 3 
4 Academic  1 
 Total 9 
Table 5.4: Details of the participants in the Pilot survey 
 
The above approach is similar to such adopted by Munro & Stewart (2011), Ebaid 
(2011) and Sarens, Abdolmohammadi, & Lenz (2012).As recommended by Rose, 
Spinks and Canhoto (2015), the professional internal auditors with CIA certification 
were included in the pilot as subject matter experts so that they can give more detailed 
insights required for adequacy of the questions themselves.  
 
According to Bryman and Bell (2011), piloting a research instrument is done to ensure 
coherence of questions, in the course of re-arrangement of questions to see how they 
flow, amendments in form of merging of questions, re wording of questions etc may 
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happen. This is with a view to improving the instrument to ensure that the survey 
questions operate well.   
 
Given the desired mode of carrying out the questionnaire survey thorough online, the 
questionnaire was piloted by e-mailing to the selected respondents whose e-mail 
addresses were earlier obtained, with a covering letter indicating the objectives of the 
study, and guideline on how to complete the questionnaire. In addition, the respondents 
were informed that the survey was a trial run of a main study to be conducted after the 
pilot and that the opinions of the respondents were being solicited on the following 
areas with a view to improving the suitability and workability of the instrument: 
i. clarity or simplicity of the questions. 
ii. aptness of the wordings and ordering of the questions. 
iii. appropriateness or otherwise of the response options provided for each question. 
iv. appropriateness of the layout and structure of the questionnaire. 
v. practicability of the time taken to complete the questionnaire bearing in mind the 
 targeted group. 
 
5.3.2  Outcome of the Pilot study 
The pilot survey which commenced on February 23, 2016 lasted about four weeks. At 
the end of the pilot, eight (8) out of the nine (9) respondents returned their responses 
with their various observations and comments on the suitability of the instrument. 
Whereas, it took all the respondents less than the maximum period of two (2) weeks 
given for them to return the completed questionnaire with their comments, the required 
amendments on the instrument however took about two weeks to be concluded. The 
significance of the pilot survey is in form of invaluable feedbacks obtained from the 
participants which led to a major review of the questionnaire particularly in terms of re-
arrangement (mainly for the essence of coherence), re-wording of the questions, for 
more clarity and avoidance of ambiguity; and scaling down of the number of the 
questions to achieve minimal time of completion. 
 
  
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 187 
 
Overall, the initial sixty-eight (68) questions were considered too many by the pilot 
survey participants considering the status of the targeted audience and the challenges of 
likely apathy due to the usual busy schedule of CAEs (the targeted audience). 
Consequently, the following specific amendments were carried out: 
i. reduction of the number of questions under Section A of the instrument. Two of 
the questions (gender and age of the respondents) were removed as they were 
eventually considered irrelevant to the research objectives. At the end, the initial 
six (6) questions under this section were eventually reduced to four (4). Please 
see tables 5.5 and 5.6 below. 
ii. elimination of Section B focusing corporate governance’s characteristics. 
Initially, there were six different questions under this section covering areas 
such as existence, membership, and professional qualifications of members, of 
audit committee, as well as the frequency of meeting of the committee. Also 
included under this section initially were questions meant to evaluate issues 
bothering on external audit practice of companies in the sector under focus. 
These questions were eventually restructured and included under section B, that 
deals with independence of IAF and objectivity of internal auditors. All these 
questions with the exclusion of the one on “who handles the firm’s external 
audit” were considered part of the questions relevant to get insights on 
independence and objectivity of IAF and internal auditors respectively and were 
therefore restructured and classified as part of the questions under the new 
Section B. 
iii. re-arrangement and merger of some related questions particularly under Sections 
C-E. This revision is justified on the ground of similarity of focus between 
questions assessing objectivity of internal auditors and those evaluating the 
characteristics of internal auditors. 
At the end of the review, the five sections of the initial questionnaire (A-E) were 
reduced to four (A-D) and the sixty-eight (68) questions on the initial questionnaire 
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Table 5.5: Summary of the questionnaire before piloting 
 
S/n Section Focus of the questions Nos. of questions 
1 A Respondents’ Biodata 4 
2 B IAF’s independence and internal auditors’ 
objectivity 
20 
3 C Auditing methodology 6 
4 D Characteristics of Internal auditors 5 
 Total  35 
Table 5.6: Summary of the questionnaire after post-piloting amendments 
 
A copy of the research instrument is included as Appendix D to this thesis. 
 
The interview questions were prepared after the pilot survey. This was deliberate, and 
with a view to ensuring that the insights drawn from the trial survey was incorporated 
into the interview questions. The interview guide used for the interview was drawn with 
considerations to the outcomes of the pilot survey. Some scholars have argued that the 
progressive nature of interview is enough to enable researcher to improve on interview 
S/n 
 
Section Focus of the questions Nos. of questions  
1 A Respondents’ biodata 6 
2 B Corporate governance’s Characteristics 6 
3 C IAF’s independence and internal auditors’ 
objectivity 
35 
4 D Auditing methodology 14 
5 E Characteristics of Internal auditors 7 
 Total  68 
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schedules and questions. While this was actually the experience, the results of the pilot 
survey initially offered invaluable inputs into the interview protocol used for the 
interview. The interview guide is marked appendix E 
5.3.3  Target Population 
Though this study focuses internal audit practices in the NFS, the heads of the IAFs in 
the sector were however the target. Therefore, whereas the population of the study was 
all the internal auditors in the NFS, this study specifically focuses the heads of the IAF 
in the sector. As earlier indicated in chapter 2 of the thesis, the NFS comprises of bank 
and non-bank financial institutions which are regulated by the CBN, NDIC, SEC, 
NAICOM, PenCom, FMBN and the country’s Federal ministry of finance. Of all the 
companies identified in the sector as at the time of the survey, only sixty-eight (68) 
were found to be listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). These are as shown in 
the table below: 
Table 5.7 (a): Listed firms in the NFS as at 2016 
 
Going by the above table, and in tandem with Abiola (2012), where 10, 5, and 2 were 
used to estimate the average number of internal auditors/internal control staff of 
Nigerian banks, insurance companies and other FIs, the estimated total population size 






S/n  Number Percentage 
i. Commercial banks 20 29.41 
ii Mortgage banks 7 10.29 
iii Development banks 4 5.88 
iv Merchant banks 2 2.94 
v Microfinance banks 2 2.94 
vi Insurance companies 30 44.12 
vii Funds and Assets managers 3 4.41 
 Total 68 100 
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S/n  Number Average number of 
Internal audit/ 
internal control staff 





i. Commercial banks 20 10 200 
Ii Mortgage banks 7 2 14 
Iii Development banks 4 2 8 
Iv Merchant banks 2 2 4 
V Microfinance banks 2 2 4 
Vi Insurance companies 30 5 150 
Vii Funds and Assets managers 3 2 6 
 Total 68  386 
Table 5.7(b): Estimates of the study’s population using Abiola (2012) 
 
Given that only the head of the IAFs in the sector and their immediate subordinate are 
the subject of the survey however, the sample size of the study was thus one hundred 
and thirty six (136), representing 35.23% of the estimated total population. This is as 
shown below: 
Table 5.7 ( c) : The study’s sample size 
S/n  Number Percentage (%) 
i. Commercial banks 40 29.41 
Ii Mortgage banks 14 10.29 
Iii Development banks 8 5.88 
Iv Merchant banks 4 2.94 
V Microfinance banks 4 2.94 
Vi Insurance companies 60 44.12 
Vii Funds and Assets managers 6 4.41 
 Total 136 100 
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The sampling method used for the study was therefore proportionate stratified and 
purposive sampling.  
 
5.4.0 Overview of data collection and analysis method 
In line with the study’s focus and research questions, primary data was used for the 
research. The primary data were collected through questionnaire survey which was 
complemented by semi-structured interview carried out on four respondents that earlier 
participated in the questionnaire survey and voluntarily expressed their willingness to be 
interviewed further.  
 
 The questionnaire was administered electronically through a proprietary online survey 
tool known as ‘’Survey monkey’’. This is an online survey development cloud-based 
software that has become phenomenal in recent time particularly for academic surveys. 
The software basically leverages on the radical surge in the use of internet.  
Administering questionnaire survey online has the following invaluable benefits over 
the physical distribution of questionnaire to the targeted respondents: 
i.      it reduces the cost of questionnaire administration as the researcher is saved 
the hassles of making personal visits to the respondents’ locations. The task 
of distributing hard copies of questionnaire aside from the cost of 
stationeries required and follow-up visits could be more herculean 
particularly for respondents spread across geographical boundaries. 
Although certain fees are payable to subscribe for the use of the software for 
the desired time frame, this cost is however negligible when compared with 
the challenges associated with physical means of administration. 
ii.      online administration of questionnaire also has the advantage of ease of 
reaching out to respondents that ordinarily would be so difficult to reach 
either physically, or through telephone particularly respondents with 
extremely very busy schedules. As a matter of fact, when deciding the most 
appropriate means of administering the study’s questionnaire, this is one of 
the key factors that prompted the choice of the online medium. This is so due 
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to the peculiarly busy schedules of the CAEs who are the main focus of the 
study.  
iii.      it reduces the turnaround time owing to the speed of dispatch and ease of 
completion of the questionnaire on the part of the interested participants. The 
same consideration was noted in Christopher et.al (2009) where an e-mail-
based questionnaire was adopted to collect data from the CAEs in Australia 
in a study of independence of the Australian IAF. The usual likelihood of 
sending and resending of hard copy of questionnaire most importantly in 
case of misplacement by the respondents is eliminated. 
iv.      it eliminates error of data entry and coding usually inherent in manual entry 
of responses to questionnaire administered conventionally either by hand 
delivery or post. This is so given the capability of the software to 
automatically handle data processing through its user-friendly features. The 
online medium of administering the questionnaire eliminates manual process 
of data entry, and the usual associated human errors. 
 
As suggested by Rose, et al. (2015), the following factors were put into consideration 
before the decision to use online questionnaire administration for the survey was arrived 
at: 
a) the suitability of Survey monkey for the question formats 
Survey money is found to be very suitable for the format of the questions for the study’s 
questionnaire. The questions used in the questionnaire are both open-ended and close 
ended (with appropriate answer choices). The online survey software has the required 
capabilities that allow both question formats. 
b) the ease of use of the software design interface and availability of support in 
case of difficulty. 
One of the key endearing factors of the online survey tool is the availability of support 
services, and guides from the proprietors thus making the software user-friendly. The 
subscription paid for the access makes the software, a value for money package. 
c) The data security policy of the software and compatibility of same with the 
data protection policy guiding the research work 
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The software is data security-conscious, and the security offering on same is found to be 
compatible with the data protection policy applicable on the research, most importantly 
on the issue of respondents’ anonymity. 
d) Capability of the software to handle numbers of questions and size of the 
respondents 
The capability of the software in terms of number of questions and respondents it can 
handle is fabulous and categorized into different bouquets. So the researcher is given the 
choice of opting for premium options considered appropriate. 
e) The suitability and capability of the software for data export upon 
completion of the survey to facilitate data analysis. 
This is another critical area put into serious consideration before making the choice of 
Survey monkey for the questionnaire administration. The software is highly compatible 
with Microsoft Excel package that makes easy the exportation of the raw data. 
Possibility of exporting the raw data from the survey monkey software directly into 
excel format is considered a huge advantage of online questionnaire administration over 
the conventional hand delivery or telephone method. The compatibility of Survey 
monkey software with excel-readable file, through which the survey data can be 
electronically processed and analysed is considered the greatest advantage of online 
administration of questionnaire. 
 
5.4.1 Collection of data 
As earlier indicated, the study made use of primary data consisting of both quantitative 
and qualitative data collected with the aid of questionnaire survey and semi-structured 
interview. The study involved the internal auditors in NFS. Specifically, only the CAEs 
and their immediate subordinates were considered for the study. Going by table 5.7( c ) 
in section 5.3.3, the total targeted respondents making up the study’s sampling frame is 
one hundred and thirty six (136). Bearing in mind the online questionnaire 
administration method to be used for the study and with a view to ensuring good 
response rate, the strategy for reaching out to the targeted audience was clearly mapped 
out at the beginning of the survey. 
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First, the list of firms in the sector listed on the NSE was compiled through the personal 
contact made to the exchange (NSE). This was verified by the details contained on the 
NSE’s database maintained on the exchange website in January 2016 as detailed out in 
table 5.7(a). In the course of building up the contacts of the listed firms’ CAEs and 
their immediate subordinates, it came to the researcher’s discovery that the CAEs in the 
country’s banking sector subscribe to an association known as Association of Chief 
Audit Executives of Banks in Nigeria (ACAEBIN) with an office in Lagos, Nigerian 
commercial headquarter. The association, a not for-profit making body seeks to promote 
and foster interaction among CAEs of Banks in Nigeria, through promotion of 
competence, ethical standards and professional behavior amongst member 
organisations. 
 
In order to get detailed contacts of all the CAEs of listed banks that belong to the 
association, the researcher approached the association’s secretariat with a formal 
proposal (detailing out the research focus and the researcher’s intention to reach out to 
the association’s members through the secretariat). This was supported by two letters of 
reference, one from the researcher’s supervisory team, and the second from the IIA 
Nigeria chapter (copies of these letters are included as Appendix B and E respectively to 
the thesis). The university ‘s letter of introduction details out among other facts, 
confirmation of the researcher’s studentship with De Montfort University as a post-
graduate research student in Accounting, with the focus of the research work clearly 
stated. The IIA’s letter of support confirmed the researcher’s membership of the 
institute (IIA), and solicited for the support of the targeted respondents. These two 
letters were intentionally obtained to add credibility to the research activities and also to 
make necessary entreaty for support from the targeted respondents. 
 
The researcher’s interaction with the ACAEBIN’s secretariat and executives was quite 
helpful in building up a reliable database of the required contacts of the CAEs of the 
listed banks. Though this initially made the first contact more focused in terms of 
knowing the locations and the names of the CAEs to be contacted, contrary to the 
researcher’s expectation however, it was eventually realised that securing appointments 
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with the CAEs was not as easy as anticipated. First, most of the CAEs were 
uncooperative at the beginning, taking exceptions to the manner their names and 
telephone numbers were obtained from the Secretariat. It was later found out that the 
association’s secretariat actually did not give some of the members (whose details were 
obtained from the secretariat) prior hint about the research work and the researcher’s 
plan to approach them individually as promised. In addition to this, the usual busy 
schedules of the CAEs also added to the difficulty initially encountered by the 
researcher. 
 
In order to surmount this challenge, the researcher eventually formalize his approach by 
writing detailed proposal about the research work addressed specifically to each CAEs 
in the sector. From the prior and formal contact, the researcher was able to compile the 
list of the CAEs subordinates, telephone numbers and e-mail addresses, having 
confirmed the preference of the respondents for online survey questionnaire. The 
support of the researcher’s colleagues in the sector (both former colleagues while in the 
banking industry, and professional colleagues –i.e. members of both the IIA and the 
ICAN) also assisted greatly during the preliminary contacts on the targeted respondents. 
 
The significance of making initial contacts on targeted respondents particularly to 
enhance survey response is also emphasized by AL-Twaijry et al. (2003) in their study 
of the development of internal audit in Saudi Arabia using institutional theory. The 
authors indicated that their achievement of a response rate of 58% from the Directors of 
the internal audit departments was aided by the initial contact on the targeted 
respondents.  
 
The actual survey commenced in May 2016 and lasted for sixty (60) days. At the 
beginning of the survey, the questionnaire was sent to all the compiled e-mail addresses 
of the respondents through survey monkey platform. Considering the online prompt on 
each response, daily monitoring of the survey became seamless during the survey 
period. Throughout the period of the survey, the researcher kept making reminder calls 
on those who were yet to respond. At the end of the first thirty days, it was discovered 
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that only 40 responses had come in. This led to the researcher’s decision to extend the 
initial thirty days subscription to Survey monkey online tool for an additional thirty 
days. The thirty (30) days extension was complemented with aggressive follow up 
through telephone calls and e-mail reminders to the targeted respondents. Responses to 
the survey during the period of the extension were quite remarkable particularly during 
the first two weeks of the additional thirty days. It was observed that throughout the last 
two weeks of the survey, only two responses were obtained despite the follow up calls 
and e-mails. 
 
Overall, total responses obtained at the end of the 60 days survey was ninety one (91), 
representing 66.9% response rate. Of these 91 responses, it was discovered at the point 
of exporting the data into an excel-readable file, that there were three (3) incomplete 
responses, leaving only 88 usable responses (i.e. effective response rate of 64.7%). This 
response rate compares favourably with similar and related studies such as Lenz et.al. 
(2014)-34.3%; Adel and Maissa (2013)-67.6%; Zaman and Sarens (2013)-27.8%; Gras-
Gil et al. (2012)-65.3%; Sarens et al. (2011)-28.08%;Ebaid (2011)- 19.3%; Ahmad and 
Taylor (2009)-17.9%; Zain et al. (2006)-20.03%; Al-Twaijry et al. (2003)-58%; and  
Morrill and Morrill (2003) -46.4%. For ease of detailed comparison, details of the 
referenced studies showing how they compare with the current study in terms of the 
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i. Lenz et.al. (2014)- Probing the discriminatory power of 
characteristics of internal audit 
functions: Sorting wheat from the Chaff 
134 46 34.3 
ii. Adel and Maissa 
(2013) 
Interaction between audit committee 
and internal audit: evidence from 
Tunisia 
74 50 67.6 
iii. Zaman and Sarens 
(2013) 
Informal interactions between audit 
committees and internal audit functions 
672 220 32.7 
iv. Gras-Gil et.al 
(2012) 
Internal audit and financial reporting in 
the Spanish banking industry 
72 47 65.3 
v. Sarens et.al. (2011) Monitoring effects of the internal audit 
function: Agency theory versus other 
explanatory variables 
260 73 28.08 
vi. Ebaid (2011)  Internal audit function: an exploratory 
study from the Egyptian listed firms 
109 21 19.3 
vii. Ahmad and Taylor 
(2009) 
Commitment to independence by 
internal auditors: the effects of role 
ambiguity and role conflict 
565 101 17.9 
viii. Zain et.al. (2006) Internal auditors’ assessment of their 
contribution to financial statement 
audits: The relation with audit 
committee and internal audit function 
characteristics 
504 101 20.03 
ix. Al-Twaijry et. al 
(2003) 
The development of internal audit in 
Saudi Arabia: An institutional theory 
perspective 
135 78 58 
x Morrill and Morrill 
(2003) 
Internal auditors and the external audit: 
a transaction cost perspective 
330 153 46.4 
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5.4.2   Interview 
The face to face interview was conducted on four (4) CAEs who participated in the 
questionnaire survey and indicated their willingness to provide further insights through 
the interview. Whereas the initial plan was to conduct a focus group interview, or on at 
least 50% of the participants in the survey questionnaire, this however did not 
materialize given the general unwillingness on the part of the CAEs. Bryman and Bell 
(2011) indicate that focus group interview affords researcher the opportunity to study 
ways in which individuals collectively makes sense of a phenomenon and construct 
meaning around it. However, the issue of how to secure people’s agreement to 
participate remains one of the key challenges on focus group interview. In all, only four 
out of the ninety-one (inclusive of three respondents whose responses were unusable) 
that responded to the online questionnaire eventually agreed to take part in the 
interview. 
  
These four interviewees were therefore selected based on convenience sampling. 
Convenience sampling is a non-probability sampling technique where subjects are 
selected because of their convenient accessibility and proximity to the researcher. 
Whereas the advantages of convenience sampling method are mainly its promptness and 
cost-effectiveness, Rose et al. (2015) indicate that it can produce a biased and 
unrepresentative sample. Incidentally, the four participants represent four different 
industries in the sector. These are commercial banks, mortgage banks, micro-finance 
banks and insurance companies, all listed on the NSE, and spread across three different 
locations in the country. Two of these interviewees (commercial and insurance) were 
from Lagos, while the remaining two (Mortgage bank and microfinance banks) were 
from Abuja and Osogbo (Osun State) respectively.  This spread minimizes the 
tendencies of sample bias and non-representativeness. Another comfort on the 
application of convenience sampling for the interview is the fact that insights there from 
were meant to provide corroborative evidence for the feedback from the questionnaire 
survey of the 88CAEs. Acceptance of convenience sampling based on the links to be 
forged with existing findings is one of the justifications advocated by Bryman and Bell 
(2007) for the use of convenience sampling method.  
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Due to the different locations of the interviewees, and their different time of schedules, 
the interview was conducted over a period of one month, specifically between mid-
July2016 and mid-August 2016. All the interviews were conducted one-on-one in the 
offices of the participants, and each interview lasted for an average of 45minutes. To 
ensure concentration during the interview and facilitate transcription of the participants’ 
responses, the interviews were tape-recorded with prior consent of the interviewees. A 
carefully prepared interview guide was also used on the entire interview so as to avoid 
unnecessary deviations from the subject matter of the interview on the part of the 
interviewer. The interview guide therefore served mainly as the companion (see Bryma 
and Bell, 2011). As a back-up against incidence of poor recording or unanticipated 
malfunctioning of the audio recording device used for the interview however, notes 
were also taken of some insights considered critical during the interview. While 
transcribing the recorded data, the notes taken at the time of the interview were used as 
reference. 
 
5.4.3. Data Analytic procedure 
i. The quantitative data 
At the end of the sixty (60) days questionnaire survey period, all the responses obtained 
from the questionnaire administered online with the aid of Survey monkey were 
exported into an excel file. This was thoroughly reviewed for incidence of missing or 
incomplete data. Out of the ninety-one (91) responses obtained, 3 respondents were 
discovered to have given incomplete responses by not answering all the questions 
provided on the questionnaire. These 3 incomplete responses were eliminated from the 
data, thus leaving eighty eight (88) useful responses at the end. 
 
Given the nature of the dependent variable of the study (i.e. whether or not IAF is 
playing active roles in corporate governance), with dichotomous outcomes (either Yes 
or No), and extant studies on the concepts being studied, Binary Logistic regression 
analysis (BLRA) was adopted for the quantitative data. BLRA examines the influence 
of various explanatory or predictor variables (or factors) on a dichotomous (or 
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categorical) outcome by estimating the probability of the event's occurrence. BLRA is 
typically employed when the dependent variable is dichotomous and the independent 
variables are either continuous or categorical variables. According to Gujarati and 
Porter (2009), this analytical method is considered suitable where the dependent 
variable is qualitative in nature such as “Yes’’ or ‘’No’’, ‘’male’’ or ‘’female’’, ‘’alive’’ 
or ‘’dead’’ etc.  
 
Logistic regression is well suited for the study of categorical outcome variables (Peng, 
et al., 2002). Logistic regression is used to predict a categorical (usually dichotomous) 
variable from a set of predictor variables. Logistic regression is often used particularly 
where the predictor variables are a combination of both continuous and categorical 
variables and where the various assumptions of normality of distribution are violated, 
though in many cases, some features of linear regressions are still maintained.  
 
Contrary to Linear Regression Analysis that is based on Ordinary Least Square (OLS) 
method however, BLRA is based on Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE)., and the 
method is suitable for non-linear relationships between the dependent variables and the 
independent variables. Stone and Rasp (1991) noted that many issues of interest to 
researchers in the field of Accounting involves explanation or predictions of mutually 
exclusive, dichotomous choices such as qualify/do not qualify an audit opinion, 
capitalize or do not capitalize a cost etc. Peng et al. (2002) and Raghunandan et al. 
(2001) maintain that conventional OLS regression is appropriate when the dependent 
variable is continuous or can assume discrete values but becomes unsuitable for a 
dichotomous independent variable such as whether the audit committee provides private 
access to the CAE or not. The objective of this research, investigating whether IAFs of 
the NFS has the capability to add values to the corporate governance, as one of its key 
cornerstones, no doubts is another example like Raghunandan et al. (2001)’s illustration 
of a dichotomous dependent variable.  
 
Whereas under Linear regression analysis the dependent variable is continuous, and the 
independent variables are expected to be normally distributed, the dependent variable 
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under logistic regression analysis is categorical and normality of the independent 
variables is not a necessity. Generally, the following assumptions hold for any data on 
which binary logistic regression analysis (BLRA) is to be performed: 
i. linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables  
is not a necessity. 
ii. independent variables are not linear function of each other. 
iii. normal distribution is not necessary or assumed for the dependent variable. 
iv. normally distributed description of errors are not assumed. 
v. the independent variables need not be interval level  
 
As highlighted by Stoltzfus (2011), the basic conditions that need to be met under 
Logistic regression include: 
i.      independence of errors – this implies that all sample group outcomes are 
separate from each other(i.e. avoidance of duplicate responses) 
ii.      linearity in the logit for continuous variables –there should be a linear 
relationship between these variables and their respective logit-transformed 
outcomes. 
iii.      absence of multicollinearity among the predictor variables- multicollinearity 
is a situation of high level of interactions or associations among two or more 
predictor variables. As applicable under the linear regression function, 
multicollinearity usually leads to incidence of large standard errors for the 
estimated beta coefficients of the independent variables. In this situation, the 
coefficients estimates may change erratically in response to small changes in 
the model or the data. Thus indicating the unreliability of the regression 
model. 
iv.      lack of strongly influential outliers –where a sample member’s predicted 
outcome is vastly different from its outcome, and there are too many of such 
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5.4.4     Adequacy of number of events per independent variable 
Whereas in literature, little guidance is given on how large the sample size must be for 
logit parameter estimates to be unbiased (Stone and Rasp, 1991), Peng,et al. (2002) 
maintain that estimates for the regression coefficients become unstable for small 
samples. As a guide however, a rule of at least ten (10) observations per parameter or 
predictor variable is upheld. For a logistic regression, the predicted dependent variable 
is expressed as a function of the probability that a subject will be in one of the 
categories. Logistic regression assumes that the probability of the event is linked to a 
linear combination of the independent or predictor variables in the study by a logistic 
cumulative distribution function, which is a non-linear function (Ge and Whitmore, 
2010). For instance, under the current study, where the impact of IAF on corporate 
governance is being investigated using two categories of outcomes of corporate 
governance (Yes/No), i.e. whether the IAF is impacting on corporate governance or not, 
logistic regression is employed to model the relationship between corporate governance 
and IAF as a probability that IAF will impact on corporate governance or not. As 
indicated by Ge and Whitmore (2010), for a binary dependent variable y, with a vector 
of k predictor variables X (i.e. x1, x2, …xk), the linear relationship can be expressed as 
Xβ =β0 +β1x1+β2x2+…+βkxk, where β=(β0,β1,…,βk) is a vector of regression 
coefficients to be estimated. 
 
Statistically, probability (p) is the expected value of random variable y, conditional on 
the values of the independent variables x1, x2, …xk. 
i.e. p = E(y/X) or E(y/xβ). Recognizing the error or deviance term ε, (i.e. the arithmetic 
difference between the outcome y and its expected value p), the additive error model for 
the binary response becomes y=p+ ε 
The logistic regression function has two common representations: 
P= E(y/xβ) ={1+exp(-xβ)} ̅1                                 …equation (1) 
Logit (p)=ln(p/1-p)= xβ    …equation (2) 
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While the first equation is the logistic form of the relationship between probability p 
and the linear combination xβ, the second representation re-expresses the probability 
using a logit transformation which is simply by taking the logarithm of the odds of 
event H happening. Ge and Whitmore (2010) maintain the two representations are 
correct and mathematically equivalent. Peng, Lee and Ingersoll (2002) reiterate the 
mathematical concept that underlies logistic regression as the natural logarithm (logit) 
of an odds ratio. 
 
Analogous to the primary concerns under OLS regression analysis involving linear 
model such as below: 
Y= a+ β1xi +β2x2+ β3x3+ …βnxn+u  
Where: 
Y = the dependent variable, 
X1, x2, …xn = the independent variables, 
a = constant 
β= Regression coefficients, and 
u= error term (i.e. error of prediction of the model) 
the focus of logistic regression analysis is also to estimate the regression coefficients 
(βs) and in addition test the goodness of fit of the model. Under Logistic regression 
analysis however unlike multiple regression that employs OLS method for estimation of 
the constants, and the regression coefficients, estimation is based on the Maximum 
likelihood principle, through the process of iteration, simplified by the use of Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS). 
 
 
5.4.5  Evaluations of the Logistic Regression model 
Similar to OLS regression model, to assess the soundness of a logistic regression model, 
the following areas are looked into as emphasized by Stoltzfus (2011), Peng et.al 
(2002): 
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(a) overall model evaluation – a logistic model is adjudged to provide a better fit to 
the data if it demonstrates an improvement over the intercept–only model(also 
called the null model). An intercept-only model serves as a good baseline given 
that it contains no predictor. An improvement over this base line is assessed 
using three inferential statistical tests –the likelihood ratio, score test and Wald 
test. 
(b) statistical test of individual predictors – statistical test of individual predictors 
involves testing the statistical significance of individual regression co-efficients 
(i.e.βs). This is done by examining the Wald chi-square statistics and the p value 
of the coefficients. The effect of the predictor in the model is significant only if 
its p-value is less than 0.05. (i.e. P<0.05). 
(c) goodness–of-fit statistics–the two prominent statistics for assessing goodness-of-
fit of logistic regression model are the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) test and the R² 
indices (as defined by Cox and Snell (1989) and Nagelkerke(1991). These two 
R² indices are variations of the R² concept as applicable for OLS regression 
model. Whereas in linear regression, R² is defined as the variation in the 
dependent variable that can be explained by predictors in the model, for logistic 
regression however, the two R² do not connote (by definition) exactly R² as it is 
defined in OLS. They are therefore taken as supplementary to other more useful 
evaluative indices, such as the overall evaluation of the model, test of individual 
regression coefficients. 
(d) validation of predicted probabilities–This is typically presented in terms of 
percentages of correct classifications. 
To analyse the research data using SPSS, the survey data was first coded in a manner 
suitable for exporting into the package (i.e. SPSS). To be precise, the data collected was 
analysed with the use of SPSS version 22. Both descriptive and inferential statistics 
obtained from the analysis were employed to test the study’s hypotheses 
 
5.4.6       The Qualitative data - Interviews 
To make meaningful inferences relating to the research questions from the data obtained 
from the interview, thematic analysis was performed on the data. This was done after 
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transcribing the recorded interview responses from the audible form into written texts. 
Thereafter, coding of the transcribed data in hierarchy was done based on their 
significance and relevance to the key themes of the study. 
 
According to Rose et al. (2015), coding in qualitative data analysis involves looking at 
the data, identifying relevant themes and marking them. The essence of coding therefore 
is to facilitate distillation of a mass of raw data obtained in form of answers to 
interview. Clarke and Braun (2017) elucidate that thematic analysis is a method for 
identifying, analyzing, and interpreting patterns of meaning (‘themes’) within 
qualitative data. Thematic analysis, as adopted in this study, and in tandem with 
Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006) aims at establishing how the overarching themes are 
backed by excerpts from the raw data obtained from the interview with a view to 
ensuring that data interpretation is made without linkages with participants ‘views, 
opinions or expressions. 
 
5.4.7.0   The Research variables and their measurement 
The various variables formulated under the study and how they are measured are 
discussed below. 
 
5.4.7.1  The variables 
As applicable in most studies, where researchers desire to establish a relationship 
between two sets of variables (dependent and independent), this study (as can be seen in 
the introductory chapter), also seeks to find the relationship between IAF and Corporate 
governance in the NFS, by looking at how well IAF is impacting corporate governance 
as one of its key cornerstones. Whereas the dependent variable refers to output or 
outcome whose variation is being studied, the independent variables represent the 
potential reason for variations, i.e. the input inspiring the variations. In this study, 
Corporate governance is the dependent variable, variation of which, in relation to the 
predictor (independent) variables - IAF is being studied.  
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Though, IAF has been established in literature to be one of the key mechanisms of 
corporate governance, this study attempts to empirically establish the impact of IAF on 
firms’ corporate governance specifically in the NFS. From the review of literature 
carried out in chapter 4 of the thesis, the impact of IAF on firms’ corporate governance 
is to be explored using the following key predictor variables: 
1. Independence of IAF, 
2. IAF’s Auditing methodology, 
3. Objectivity of internal auditors, and  
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The above four key explanatory variables, based on the conceptual framework, and the 
hypotheses of the study are assessed from the chosen sector in Nigeria using four 
models comprising of the various predictor variables shown in the table below: 
Table 5.9 (a): Research variables definition 
 
Whereas the overall relational model of the study’s objectives is: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE = f(IAF’s Independence, Internal auditor’s 
Objectivity, IAF’s Auditing methodology, Internal auditors’ Competence),  
i.e. CORPGOV = f(IAFIND, IAFAUMET, IAsOBJ, IAsCOMP) 













i CAE hierarchy( ) 
 
Regular Private Contacts 




Compliance with IIA 
standards ( ) 
 
Educational qualification of 
IAs ( ) 
ii IAF Sourcing arrangement (SAR) IAF’s unrestricted access 




Membership of the IIA 
( ) 
 
iii Audit Committee meeting attendance 
frequency( ) 
Use of IAF as a training 
ground( ) 
 Internal auditors professional  
professional qualification 
( ) 
iv CAE appointment and dismissal( ) Engagement  of internal 
auditors in consulting 
activities( ) 
 Internal auditors length of years 
of experience ( ) 
v Reporting line of the IAF ( )   Regularity of training for the 
internal auditors ( ) 
vi AC existence (ACE)    
vii AC membership adequacy (ACMAD)    
vii
i 
AC meeting frequency (ACMF)    
ix Existence of IA charter (IACE)    
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The following four models are formulated from the above predictor variables to 
investigate the impact of the key variables on corporate governance as below: 
 
5.4.7.2                  Model Specification  
Model I: (Independence of the IAF) 
CORPGOV_IAFIND=βo+β1(REP)+β2(CAEH)+β3(SAR)+β4(ATT)+β5(APDI)+μ 
Where: 
CORPGOV_IAFIND is effect in Corporate Governance influenced by IAF’s 
independence) 
 - reporting line of the IAF 
 - CAE’s hierarchy  
SAR- IAF sourcing arrangement 
- CAE’s attendance of the audit committee meeting 
 - Appointment and dismissal of the CAE 
 
 
Model II: (IAF’s compliance with the IIA’s standards) 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET = βo+β1(ADP)+β2(QAIP)+μ 
Where: 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET = Effect in Corporate Governance influenced by IAF’s 
auditing methodology 
 = IAF’s adoption of the IIA standards for its engagements 
  = IAF’s performance of Quality assessment and improvement program 
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Model III: (Internal auditors’ objectivity 
CORPGOV_IAsOBJ= βo+β1(TRAIN)+β2(CONS)+β3(CONT)+β4(ACCESS)+μ 
Where: 
CORPGOV_IASOBJ is effect in Corporate Governance influenced by Internal 
auditors’ objectivity 
 = use of IAF as a training ground 
  = internal auditors role in consulting 
 = CAEs’ regular private contact with the audit committee chairperson 
 = Unrestricted access to records and information by the internal auditors 
 




CORPGOV_IAsCOMP is Effect in Corporate Governance influenced by Internal 
auditors’ competence 
 - Educational qualification of the internal auditors 
 - professional qualifications of the internal auditors 
 - Length of years of experience by the internal auditors 
 - Internal auditors’ regular training  
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5.4.7.3.  Variables Measurements 
Variables: 
(a) Independent 
   CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Measurement/Coding 
  
Yes =1, No= 0 
(b)  Independent   
 Above management =1 
Below management level =0 
SAR Outsource =1 
In-house or Co-sourced =0 
 4 times per year =1 
3 times or less per year =0 
 AC =1 
Management =0 
 AC=1; CEO/CFO/Management =0 
ACE Yes =1; No =0 
ACMAD Agreed =1; Disagreed =0 
ACMF 4 times =1; 3 times or less =0 
IACE Yes =1; No=0 
 Agreed =1; Disagreed =0 
 Always =1; Barely =0 
TRAIN Barely =1; Always =0 
 Rarely =1; Always =0 
 Always =1; Rarely =0 
QAIP Yes=1; No=0 
EDUQ HND=1, B.Sc=2; MSc/MA/MBA =3; PhD=4; Others =5 
MEM Yes=1; No=0 
PROQ 0-24%=1; 25-49% =2; 50-74=3; 75 and above =4 
YEAR Less than 5 years =1; 
 5-10years =2; 
 Greater than 10 years =3 
 Once =1; twice =2;  
three times =3; Four times =4; 
More than 4 times =5 
Table 5.9(b): Model variables’ measurement 
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5.5  Limitations of the Methodology 
Whereas the researcher is mindful of various alternative methodologies that could have 
been applied for the study, from the research design to analysis stage, the selected 
methodology is considered the most appropriate under the circumstances surrounding 
the current study as discussed below. 
 
To start with, the researcher chooses cross sectional research design due to its suitability 
and applicability to the study in terms of timing and financial requirements. 
Experimental design could not have been a better option considering its peculiarity of 
the need to manipulate the independent variables to assess the impact of such variations 
on the dependent variables. Under the current study, such manipulations on the various 
independent variables involving firms in the sector or the individual internal auditors 
under focus is not achievable and thus is not contemplated. 
 
While it could be argued that the issue being studied lends itself to time-effect, and 
could have been better handled using longitudinal design, issues of sample attrition, cost 
implication and time requirement are the challenges envisaged against the adoption of 
longitudinal design for the study. Bryman and Bell (2011) highlight that longitudinal 
research design consumes time and money. The other available options of case study 
and comparative design are also considered unsuitable on the ground of timing and 
financial requirements. The need for timely completion of the study is one of the key 
factors considered in the choice of the selected research design. 
 
On the method of data collection, instead of administering the study’s questionnaire 
online, the questionnaire could have been administered in hard copy form possibly 
through postal method or by the researcher approaching the targeted respondents 
physically himself. Neither the postal or direct means of distributing the questionnaire 
could have been as effective as the online platform (survey monkey) used for the study 
given the cost implications and the likelihood of low response which the online option 
attempts to improve upon. Physical distribution of the questionnaire was also 
considered inappropriate given the envisaged difficulties of securing physical contacts 
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with all the respondents. This is in addition to the burden of the cost of traveling up and 
down necessary for making contacts with the numerous respondents as well as for 
follow up and pick-up of the completed questionnaire. It is also worth stating that the 
postal service in Nigeria is currently terribly poor and unreliable, and as such online 
platform is considered most suitable.  
   
It could as well be contested that the limited number of the interviewees under the study 
could have been more manageable under focus group interview setting. The interview 
was however conducted on one by one basis as a result of some challenges associated 
with access. Although, focus group interview was initially conceived while planning the 
data collection for the study due to the formalised grouping of the CAEs in Nigeria 
particularly those in the banking industry of the sector, under the aegis  of the 
ACAEBIN, it was however later discovered that it would be practically and extremely 
difficult to get all the CAEs to assemble at a particular location for the group interview 
as a result of the members’ heterogeneous schedules, and geographical issues relating to 
respondents’ locations. For instance, inviting the CAEs from Abuja to Lagos or vice 
versa for the group interview might be too daunting. Hence, the rationale for the 
individual interview for the few ones that were eventually persuaded. 
 
Whereas some existing and relevant studies suggest the use of Linear regression method 
for data analysis, BLRA is however considered appropriate and adopted for the data 
analysis in consonance with the various assumptions or criteria for adopting same as 
discussed in section 5.4.3. The dichotomous nature of the dependent variable above all, 
and the non-suitability of OLS regression for non-linear relationship (Peng et.al, 2002) 
form the major rationale for BLRA. Extant and relevant studies that apply BLRA from 
which this study takes clue include Carey, et al. (2006); Abdolmohammadi (2009); 
Sarens, Abdolmohammadi, and Lenz (2012);Zaman and Sarens (2012); Raghunandan, 
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5.6  Chapter summary 
This chapter has established the methodology adopted for the study and also finds a 
suitable philosophy to rationalise the methodology. A combination of positivism and 
interpretivism paradigms popularly known as MMR shapes the study. Though till date, 
debates on the philosophical foundation of MRR are continuous, however pragmatism 
seems to be the currently accepted philosophy of the chosen method.  
 
Further to establishing the study’s methodology, an overview of the sampling 
techniques for the study is given, while description of the research instrument of the 
study, as well as BLRA carried out on the quantitative data, and thematic analysis 
adopted on the qualitative data is also made. Finally, a critique of the methodology of 
the research was made by considering other alternatives available. 
 
The next two chapters shall be used to present the empirical results with respect to the 
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                     Data Analysis I (Internal audit function’s characteristics) 
6.0:  Chapter Overview  
The next two chapters of this thesis deal with the analysis of the primary data collected 
through both the questionnaire administered on eighty eight (88) CAEs and their 
immediate subordinates, as well as the one-on-one in-depth interview (fully discussed in 
chapter 5) conducted for the four CAEs.  In carrying out the analysis, the following four 
cardinal research questions (addressed through the four hypotheses) remain the focus: 
 
i.      What is the level of independence enjoyed by the internal audit functions in 
the Nigerian financial sector? 
ii.      To what extent are the internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector 
performing their roles in conformity with the IIA standards? 
iii.      How objective are the internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector? 
iv.      To what extent are internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector 
competent in fulfilling their expected roles?. 
The research data analysis in this chapter and the next is patterned in line with the 
study’s empirical literature review agenda adopted in chapter four of the thesis. As 
indicated in chapter 4, the research agenda and review of relevant literature thereon is 
looked into through the following two perspectives:  
 
i. IAF’s characteristics: 
(a)  Independence of the Internal audit function; and 
(b)  Conformity of the internal audit function’s methodology with the IIA 
standards 
ii. Individual internal auditor’s characteristics: 
(a)  Objectivity of the internal auditors; and 
(b)  Internal auditors’ competence  
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Consequently, the analysis of the research hypotheses is carried out through two 
chapters (i.e. Chapters 6 and 7).  The first chapter of the analysis deals with the 
hypotheses and propositions on the IAF’s characteristics while the second chapter of the 
data analysis focuses hypotheses and propositions on individual internal auditors’ 
characteristics. 
 
To begin with, the summary of the respondents’ responses to questions A1-5 focusing 
the bio-data of  the respondents (specifically, the respondents' line of business, 
educational qualifications, professional qualifications, positions in organisations, and 
their perceptions about IAF’s role on corporate governance) are generally, firstly 
presented in form of descriptive statistics. This is followed by analysis of the descriptive 
statistics of the variables incorporated into the formulated models. The descriptive 
analyses of quantitative data are elaborated with the various insights from the qualitative 
data (using thematic analysis). Thereafter, the BLRA results are presented and analysed 
to test the validity or otherwise of the study’s hypotheses and propositions. 
 




   
   
 
 
Figure 6.1: Sequence of the mixed methods for the study’s Data analysis 
 
In line with the above therefore, the current chapter deals with analysis of data relating 
to the research questions 1 (i.e. whether IAF in the NFS is independent and impact 
positively on the sector’s corporate governance) and 2 (whether  IAFs in the NFS 
do adopt IIA standards for their engagements and therefore impact positively on 
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6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The Descriptive statistics of the respondents to the field survey are presented with a 
view to providing detailed information on them. 











Table 6.1: Table showing Respondents’ line of business (Source: Survey 2016) 
Of the 88 CAEs eventually considered for this analysis, 46.6% of them are from 
insurance industry, while CAEs from Commercial banking constitutes 28.4%.This is 
followed by the respondents from Mortgage banking and development banking that 
constitutes 13.6% and 8% respectively. Respondents from other categories such as 
microfinance banks etc. classified as "others" constitute only 3.4% of the survey’s 
participants.  
 
The respondents’ distribution presented in the above table is a reflection of the 
companies in the NFS (listed on the country’s stock exchange as at the time of this 
study). Following the various past recapitalisation exercises of the country’s banking 
industry, particularly the last recapitalisation exercise of the industry in the year 2009, 
the number of commercial banks in the country (hitherto over 80) was significantly 
reduced to 24, out of which only 20 are listed on the country’s stock exchange at the 
time of this study. The low level of required capitalisation of insurance industry, and the 






Commercial banking 25 28.4 28.4 
Mortgage Banking 12 13.6 42.0 
Development Banking 7 8.0 50.0 
Insurance 41 46.6 96.6 
Others 3 3.4 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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larger number of insurance companies in the country, explains the higher number of 
insurance companies represented in the survey. Whereas the capital requirement of 
banks in Nigeria since 2005 is =N=25billion (i.e. about £45.5million), only 
=N=2billion(i.e £3.6million),=N=3billion (i.e £5.5million) and =N=5billion (i.e. 
£9.1million) is required for life, non-life and composite insurance company in the 
country. 
 
6.1.2. Educational Qualifications 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 HND 25 28.4 28.4 
B.Sc 27 30.7 59.1 
M.Sc/MA/MBA 36 40.9 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.2: Respondents’ educational qualifications (Source: Survey 2016) 
Looking at the educational background of the respondents, the above table indicates that 
majority of the CAEs and their subordinates are holders of first degree (either Higher 
National Diploma or B.Sc degree) and none with PhD degree. While 59.1% of the 
CAEs that participated in the survey are holders of first degree, CAEs with Master 
degree (either MA/M.Sc or MBA) are 40.9%.  
6.1.3.    Professional Qualifications 
Table 6.3: Respondents’ Professional qualifications (Source: Survey 2016) 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 
None 7 8.0 8.0 
ACA/FCA 53 60.2 68.2 
ACCA 15 17.0 85.2 
ACIB/FCIB 3 3.4 88.6 
CIA 9 10.2 98.9 
Others 1 1.1 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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Of all the respondents, 7 representing 8% of the total respondents indicate that they do 
not belong to any professional body.  Of the remaining, 77.2% (68) are members of 
either the ICAN or ACCA, the global Accounting body founded in 1904. Respondents 
who are members of Chartered Institute of Bankers (either as Associate members or 
Fellows of the institute) and the IIA are 3.4% and 10.2% respectively. The higher 
number of members of the ICAN above other professional bodies explains further the 
general impression among practitioners of internal audit in the country about the 
supremacy of Accounting over internal auditing as a profession. 
  
6.1.4.   Respondents’ positions in organisations 




CAE 58 65.9 65.9 
CAE’S SUBORDINATES 30 34.1 100.0 
 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.4: Respondents positions in organisations (Source: Survey 2016) 
 
Out of the 88 respondents, 58 representing 65.9% are CAEs while the remaining (i.e. 
30), representing 34.1% are the subordinates of the CAEs. This distribution is in 
alignment with the pattern of the skewedness of the population of the respondents in 
favour of the CAEs whose insights on the subject matter of the study are considered 
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6.1.5. CAE’s perceptions about IAF’s role on Corporate governance 
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
NO 23 26.1 26.1 
YES 65 73.9 100.0 
 
Total 
88 100.0  
Table 6.5: CAE’s perceptions about IAF’s role on Corporate governance (Source: 
Survey 2016) 
 
The above table indicates that while 73.9% of the respondents indicate that their IAF 
plays significant and positive role on their organisation’s corporate governance, 26.1% 
are of the contrary view. Whereas IAF has been established as one of the key 
cornerstones of corporate governance, the authenticity of this position particularly from 
developing countries remains the crux of this study, and its verification, the essence of 
the analysis in the current and next chapter of the thesis. 
  
6.2.0. IAF’s Independence and corporate governance 
As discussed fully in Chapter 4 of the thesis, the independence of IAF remains its main 
attribute when it comes to the value it can add to organizations’ corporate governance. 
In order to examine how independent the IAF of the NFS is, the first  hypothesis and 
five propositions (indicated below) are subjected to empirical verifications. 
Triangulation of data analysis method involving both quantitative and qualitative data 
(with the aid of both BLRA and thematic analysis) is employed for the empirical 
verifications. In finding answers to the various propositions, summary of the 
respondents' responses on the explanatory variables are first presented in tabular form 
prior to the BLRA and the thematic analysis on same. The sequence of the empirical 
verifications is as indicated in figure 6.1. 
 
HI: Internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector are not independent of 
their organisation’s management. 
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The related propositions are: 
i. Internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector reporting 
to Audit committee is positively associated with the Internal audit function’s 
independence and ability to impact positively on corporate governance 
ii. Maintaining the hierarchy of the Chief Audit Executive of 
Internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector at par with management is 
positively associated with the function’s independence and ability to strengthen 
corporate governance. 
iii. Outsourcing of internal audit function of the Nigerian financial 
sector is positively associated with internal audit function’s independence and its 
ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
iv. Chief Audit Executive’s regular attendance of Audit 
committee’s meeting in the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated 
with Internal audit function’s  independence and ability to strengthen corporate 
governance  
v. Chief Audit Executive’s appointment and dismissal by the Audit 
committee in the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the 









CEO/CFO/Management 5 5.7 6.8 
Audit committee 83 94.3 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.6: IAF’s Functional reporting line (Source: Survey 2016) 
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The above table shows that 94.3% of the respondents (i.e. 83respondents) indicated that 
their IAFs report to their companies' audit committees, while only 5.7% (5 respondents) 
disclosed that they report to their management. The very strict regulatory framework 
and mandatory oversight saddled on audit committees in the NFS by the sector’s 
regulators (such as the CBN, NDIC, and SEC) might be a motivating factor for the 
observed high level of compliance. 
 
Leveraging on the TA carried out on the qualitative data of the research, and in support 
of the above, all the CAEs interviewed indicated that they maintain administrative 
reporting line with their MDs and functional reporting line with their boards. 
 
‘’We report to the MD administratively, but with hard line reporting line to the board 
Audit committee. So to that extent nobody influences what we do or how we do it’’.-
CAE1 
 
For the CAE4, the issue of functional and administrative reporting line is emphasised in 
his response. 
 
‘’my report actually goes to the audit committee. My department maintains functional 
reporting line to the audit committee and the administrative reporting line to the 
management’’-CAE4 
 
Stressing the benefits of maintaining functional reporting line to the board, one of the 
CAEs interviewed (CAE1) indicated that functional reporting line to the board ensures 
there is no undue influence from the management. This amplifies the significance of 
CAE ‘s reporting line on the independence of IAF. 
 
‘’…to that extent nobody influences what we do or how we do it’’.-CAE1 
The above comment from the CAE1 interviewed indicates the significance of 
appropriate reporting line on the independence of IAF. Any IAF that reports 
functionally to the audit committee is free from undue influences and interferences from 
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the management and thus has unimpeded independence. What the above implies is that 
majority of the IAFs of the NFS report functionally to their audit committees and 
therefore can be said to be independent of management. Only a few reports functionally 
to their management and therefore may not be independent.  
 
Overall, the finding on the reporting line of IAFs of the NFS aligns perfectly with 
Akinteye, et al. (2015) whose study discovered that 80% of the heads of the IAFs of 
listed companies in Nigeria report to their BoDs. This level of diffusion of international 
best practice is an indication of positive development in Nigeria. The finding shows an 
improvement over the manner of IAFs reporting lines from some developing countries 
like Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan as indicated in Christopher, et al., 2009; 
Al-Twaijry et al. (2003); Ebaid (2011); and Al-Hroot (2012). The percentages of IAF 
that maintain functional reporting line with their audit committees are reported as 38%, 
none, 48%, and 53.7% respectively by the referenced studies. With the enhanced 
reporting line of the IAFs to audit committees in the NFS, one anticipates high level of 
independence of IAFs in the NFS. 
 
6.2.2: CAE's hierarchy  
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Below Executive Management 
level 
55 62.5 62.5 
Parallel to the Executive 
Management/Above 
Management level 
33 37.5 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.7: CAE’s hierarchy (Source: survey 2016) 
 
Most (62.5%) of the internal auditors that took part in the field survey indicated that 
they have their CAE’s hierarchy maintained below their organisation’s management 
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level while 37.5% (i.e. 33IAs) have their CAE’s hierarchy maintained parallel or above 
management level. As argued in literature, this connotes negative implication on the 
independence of the IAF in the Nigerian financial sector. It is discovered that whereas 
in terms of organisational structure, the CAEs are meant to be at par with management, 
however, in reality and based on the interview conducted, some of the CAEs are placed 
on positions that do not actually reflect they are part of their organisations’ management 
cadre.  Certainly, this would have negative implications on the way the CAE as well as 
the entire IAF are perceived by the staff of the organisation, particularly in connection 
with their status and ultimately their independence. Surprisingly, but in corroboration 
with the above results from the questionnaire survey, of the four CAEs that took part in 
the interview, only one (CAE1) was sure of his actual stature in his organisation’s 
organogram.  
 
‘’Am also part of the executive committee of the bank, so am senior enough in the 
system, nobody pushes me around. Of course, the bank’s audit committee have input 
into my appraisal. Not just management appraisal, audit committee also does my 
appraisal. So the way we stand today, nobody can fire me unless they (Audit committee) 
support it. So to that extent am reasonably protected’’.-CAE1 
 
From the above emphasis from the CAE1, particularly on the involvement of the bank’s 
audit committee in his periodic appraisal, it is quite clear that the implications of 
appropriate positioning of the CAE in the firm’s organogram are very clear and 
unambiguous to him. The remaining three CAEs (CAE 2, CAE3 and CAE 4) however 
seem unsure of their status. It was noted that where they are positioned on management 
cadre, in reality, they are not treated at par with management; they are subservient to 
other management staff. To them, the issue of CAE’s hierarchy is just a matter of 
expectation based on operational standard and official appellation but without any true 
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 ‘’I am but not fully, because by standard, I think by now I should be on management 
grade but meanwhile, I am management by grade’’.- CAE 4. 
 
The result of this study on the CAE’s hierarchy therefore is at variance with Christopher 
et al.(2009), Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003), that indicate that 100% and over 67% of 
CAEs in  Malaysia have their positions maintained at their companies’ corporate level. 
It is documented in the literature that where the CAE is inappropriately positioned in the 
organisational organogram, issues such as his appointment, appraisal and dismissal 
might be compromised and therefore the entire IAF’s independence utterly threatened. 
Going by Peursem (2004), without having certainty of their authority or if they do not 
enjoy a clear level of authority (as suggested by the comments of CAE4 above), internal 
auditors may not be in a position to counter management’s pressure. 
 
 
6.2.3:  Sourcing of the IAF  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 In-house 86 97.7 97.7 
Outsourced 2 2.3 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.8: Sourcing of the IAF (source: Survey 2016) 
 
86 out of the eighty eight 88 respondents that participated in the survey, representing 
97.7% indicate that their IAFs are maintained in-house, while only 2 respondents 
(representing 2.3%) disclosed that their IAFs are outsourced. This implies that unlike 
other non-core activities in the sector (such as security, tellering and marketing) the 
practice of outsourcing of IAF might just be evolving in the sector and possibly in the 
country as a whole. The non-popularity of the practice of outsourcing of IAF in the NFS 
notionally has negative impact on the level of independence enjoyed by the function 
(i.e. IAF).  
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Corroborating the result of the survey as shown above, the thematic analysis carried out 
on the qualitative data also reveals that all the interviewed CAEs indicated that their 
IAFs are maintained in-house. This further lends support to the fact that both 
outsourcing and co-sourcing of IAF is not common in the country’s financial sector. As 
one of the CAEs interviewed puts it, no bank in the country currently practices 
outsourcing. 
 
“In Nigeria I don’t think that there is anybody that outsourced his IAF. It doesn’t make 
sense to do that”. ‘’ I have not seen any bank that outsource. You can do co-sourcing 
which means you give part of it out … and retain certain aspect, I don’t think there is 
any bank that outsources its internal audit, but some may outsource their internal 
control……….’’ –CAE 1 
 
The above comment supports the initial findings from the quantitative data where 
97.7% of the survey’s respondents indicated that their IAFs are maintained in-house. 
The unpopularity of the practice of outsourcing in the country’s financial sector might 
be due to the fact that risk management is considered the core business of the sector, 
and the need for greater commitment on the part of the IAF is also held very crucial in 
the sector. The issue of commitment as one of the rationale for maintaining IAF fully 
in-house in the NFS is emphatically emphasised by a CAE of one of the mortgage banks 
in the country. 
 
‘’Organisation wants commitment. In outsourcing, you can’t get enough commitment 
because the outsource company will only be driven by their profit motive, …by what 
they are going to make, but if you have somebody who is resident, you will be assured of 
his commitments in terms of time and resources’’.-CAE 2 
 
The significance of loyalty or commitment of IAF certainly cannot be trivialised 
whenever a decision on IAF’s sourcing comes up for discussion. While independence 
remains the key thrust for outsourcing of IAF, consideration for commitment is a factor 
at the other side of the sourcing decision (Barry and Chang, 1993). Ordinarily, it is 
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expected that internal auditors of an in-house IAF who see their career and future 
hinged on the success of their organisation would want to go extra mile in their audit 
engagements so as to improve their organisation’s operational efficiency than 
outsourced internal auditors. The issue of commitments emphasised by the CAE2 above 
notwithstanding, the practice of in-house IAF in the NFS may be viewed as a great 
threat on the function’s independence. This is so given the general argument that an in-
house IAF is usually easy to manipulate by management. This argument is part of the 
basis for the low esteem usually accorded IAF maintained in-house by the external 
auditors, particularly in a situation where their work is being assessed with a view to 
leveraging on same for their engagements.  
 
It has been documented in literature that internal audit source (whether in-house or 
outsourced) affects the external auditors’ reliance decision (see Desai, Gerard and 
Triparthy, 2011). Glover et. al (2008) indicate that external auditor  has the tendency to 
rely more on the work of outsourced IAF particularly when inherent risk is high in a 
financial statement audit. This position was also corroborated by Gramling and 
Vandervelde (2006).  In addition, Carey, et.al (2006) indicate that size matters in IAF 
sourcing decision, i.e. the larger the organisation the greater the propensity to outsource. 
In terms of capitalisation, the key determinants of sector’s size, the NFS certainly is one 
of the biggest sectors in the country yet does not embrace IAF’s outsourcing as the 
result of the survey and the interview had revealed. This therefore raises curiosity on the 
applicability of the referenced study’s results to the NFS’s context.  
 
As indicated under the study’s theoretical underpinnings in chapter 3, Firms operating 
in high risky domain require specialized knowledge particularly to appreciate the 
various inherent risks and peculiarities of vulnerabilities. Therefore, the fundamentals of 
human assets specificity of TCE theory might be argued the key rationality for 
prevalence of in-house IAF in the NFS. In general therefore, where highly specialized 
knowledge, or skills is required, and the industry or sector contains relatively few firms, 
internalizing the IAF may be cost effective irrespective of its size. This is so given that 
investment in the required skill acquisition may be less likely to be readily transferable 
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to other clients in the sector due to fierce competition that may abound (see Speckle’ et 
al., 2007) 
 
The non-popularity of outsourcing or co-sourcing in the NFS revealed by this study is 
similar to what obtains in Egyptian IAFs as discovered by Ebaid(2011). The author 
established that 100% of the Egyptian firms that participated in a study involving 
combination of questionnaire survey and interview, exploring IAFs of Egyptian listed 
firms indicate that their IAFs are maintained in-house. Also, Papageorgiou et al. (2012) 
indicate similar phenomenon among majority of the South African IAFs. Therefore, the 
finding of the non-popularity of outsourcing and or co-sourcing of the IAF in NFS 
might be extended to most developing countries. Generally, the infancy stage of internal 
auditing profession in majority of the developing countries might be the key 
explanation. Contrarily, developed countries have good account of the practice of 
outsourcing, and co-sourcing of IAF (see Dickings and O’Relly, 2009; Carey, et 
al.,2006; Subramaniam, 2005; Goodwin, 2004; Martinov-Bennie, 2011; Arena  and 
Azzone, 2007). 
  







Table 6.9: Frequency of CAE’s attendance of audit committee’s meetings (Source: 
survey 2016) 
 
64 out of the respondents, representing 72.7% indicate that their invitation to, and 
attendance of the audit committee’s meetings is not regular while only 24 respondents 
(representing 27.3%) disclosed that they do always attend their audit committee’s 
meetings. Existing studies had established that regular attendance of audit committee’s 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Barely or Never 64 72.7 72.7 
Always 24 27.3 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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meetings by the CAEs strengthens IAF’s independence. The opportunities such 
meetings do avail CAEs include development of mutual and enduring relationships with 
the members of the audit committee. Another benefit of such meetings to the CAEs are 
in the areas of getting them updated about their work while also creating avenues to 
provide further clarifications on their audit reports (and other matters affecting the 
organization) before the audit committee. 
 
Contrary to the above results however, all the interviewed CAEs disclosed that they do 
attend board (audit committee)’s meetings, where they present their reports and make 
necessary clarifications where required.  Attendance of audit committee meeting by the 
CAE though perceived more of compliance issue, serves dual purposes of strengthening 
the IAF’s independence and helping the audit committee members to strengthen their 
capacity by having deep understanding of issues relating to internal audit. The feedback 
obtained from the CAE2 on the matter further indicates that the audit committee 
members avail themselves greater opportunity to deepen their understanding of the 
internal audit issues by seeking direct clarifications from the CAE at the meeting rather 
than reading only their formal reports.  
‘’…Probably because they believe that there will be something that internal auditor will 
have to put them through on. Like the report may not be able to speak the whole mind of 
the internal auditor, but when the internal auditor is present, the committee members 
can actually understand the issues raised in the reports by asking questions and 
clarifications and by still getting from the internal auditors things that are not 
incorporated into the reports’’.- CAE2 
 
The inconsistency in the results obtained from the internal auditors through the 
questionnaire survey and the in-depth interview of the CAEs gives some concerns. 
Given that only the heads of IAFs participated in the in-depth interview unlike under the 
questionnaire survey however, the result of the in-depth interview is given pre-
eminence. Also, the opportunity the interview availed the researcher to validate the 
interviewees’ responses by their gesture (i.e. their body language) is another basis for 
the ascendancy of the insights from the interview over the feedback from the 
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questionnaire survey. Omoteso (2006, page 237-238) indicates that where there is an 
area of divergence between findings from questionnaire survey and interview, such area 
of discrepancy is better resolved based on logical rationality and underlying contexts of 
the responses such as respondents’ status and experience, as well as the nature of the 
organisation they work for.  
The above notwithstanding, the mixed results especially the unfavourable finding from 
the questionnaire survey suggest the need to critically re-focus this area or concept in 
possible future survey. From the literature review made in chapter 4, whereas CAEs 
from most developed countries do regularly attend audit committee’s meeting, the 
studies of Al-Twaijry (2003) evaluating the development of internal audit in Saudi 
Arabia, and Al-Hroot (2012) evidence from Jordan indicate mixed results about the 
regularity of CAE’s attendance of audit committee’s meetings. It is however troubling 
that the practice of CAE’s regular attendance of audit committee’s meetings is yet to be 
fully fashionable in developing countries in spite of various codes of corporate 
governance  that stipulates such international best practice. 
 
In developed countries however, attendance of audit committee’s meeting by CAEs 
seems obligatory. For instance, Paape, Scheffe, and Snoep (2003) indicate that out of 
the 105 CAEs in EU countries that participated in their study, 90% disclosed that they 
do attend all the meetings of their audit committees; and that 70% of CAEs from France 
and Greece do attend their audit committee’s meetings. Also, Christopher, Sarens and 
Leung (2008) reported that all CAEs that took part in their study with the exception of 
only one case indicate that they are regularly invited to audit committee’s meetings.   
 
6.2.5: CAE’s appointment and dismissal  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Management/Others 18 20.5 20.5 
Audit Committee 70 79.5 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.10: CAE’s appointment and dismissal (Source: Survey 2016) 
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79.5% of the respondents indicated that their CAE’s appointment and or dismissal are 
handled by their audit committees while only 20.5% indicated that such responsibilities 
are handled by their management. A situation whereby the CAE cannot be fired at will 
by the management indicates high level of independence of the IAF. The significance of 
this audit committee’s oversight function was re-emphasised by Bariff (2003) who 
maintains that the independence of the IAF is at risk if an auditee (management) is 
responsible for hiring and firing the CAE. 
 
Contrary to the above results, the responses obtained from the interview suggests, that 
the expected board’s influence on the matters of appointment, appraisal and dismissal of 
the CAEs is yet to be in place in the NFS.  While some of the CAEs indicate that their 
appointment, appraisal and discipline are handled by the board, one of the CAEs 
(CAE3) disclosed that more (particularly in the area of CAE’s appraisal) is still 
expected from the board in this regard. 
 
‘’The appraisal issue, to be frank with you, we are not there yet!. The appraisal is being 
done by the MD sometimes when I told the board the MD is not meant to appraise me, 
they say No’’ –CAE3 
 
For one of the CAEs (CAE1) however, the board also has input in his appraisal. 
 
‘’Of course, they have input into my appraisal. Not just management appraisal. They 
also do my appraisal. So the way we stand today, nobody can fire me unless they 
support it. So to that extent am reasonably protected’’ –CAE 1 
 
Overall, it appears boards of firms in the NFS are yet to fully appreciate the extent of 
their oversight functions in the areas of appointment and dismissal of their CAEs. This 
gap could be due to less awareness on their parts. The negative impact of this deficiency 
on IAF’s independence can therefore be imagined. According to Christopher et al. 
(2009), where senior management can determine the career of a CAE, ordinarily, one 
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would expect the CAE to be biased towards management and avoid raising 
unfavourable audit reports about them. 
 
The above finding from the NFS compares reasonably with studies from other 
developing countries (such as Al-Twaijry, 2003; Al-Hroot, 2012; and Ebaid, 2011) as 
espoused in chapter 4, and also with the study of IAFs of Nigerian listed firms by 
Akinteye, et al. (2015). All the referenced studies, coming from developing countries 
indicate that more positive shifts are necessary on the matter of audit committee’s 
involvement on matters affecting appointment and dismissal of CAEs. Doing this is 
necessary to further strengthen CAEs’ stature and consequently enhance the IAF’s 
independence in this environment. 
 
6.2.6  The Control variables 
The other variables on which responses were obtained but which are not directly related 
to any of the hypotheses being tested are classified as control variables. These include: 
(i) existence of audit committee; (ii) adequacy of audit committee members based on 
governance codes from the CBN, SEC, and other relevant regulatory codes; (iii) 
frequency of audit committee’s annual meetings; and (iv) existence of IAC.  
 
Whereas, these variables are not directly linked with any of the study’s propositions or 
hypotheses, for further insights however, responses thereon are also presented as 
summarised in the tables below:   
 
i. Existence of Audit committee  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 84 95.5 95.5 
No 4 4.5 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.11: Existence of audit committee in the NFS (Source: survey 2016) 
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Though, the operating codes of corporate governance applicable to firms in the NFS 
(particularly, the SEC codes, and the CBN codes), as well as the Nigerian codes of 
corporate governance mandate all listed firms to have functional audit committee. The 
result of the survey (shown in the table above) indicates that 4.5% of the respondents 
disclosed that their organisations do not have audit committee while the majority 95.5% 
of the respondents indicates that their organisations have functional audit committees.  
 
As expected however, all the four CAEs that participated in the in-depth face to face 
interview disclosed that they have functional audit committee as required by both the 
CBN and the SEC. Therefore, the feedback from those few internal auditors that 
maintain that they do not have audit committees in place is quite strange as this suggests 
an exception to the regulators’ rules in the sector. 
 
ii. Adequacy of Audit committee’s membership  
Table 6.12: Adequacy of audit committee’s membership in the NFS (Source: survey 
2016) 
 
On adequacy of members of the audit committees in line with provisions of governance 
codes from the CBN, SEC, (and other relevant regulatory codes) in total, 76.1% of the 
respondents expressed their agreements (both agree and strongly agree) that their audit 
committees’ members are considered adequate. 23.9% however rated members of their 
audit committees as inadequate based on the provisions of the governance codes of the 
sector’s regulators. This is suggestive of the need for more monitoring on the part of the 
concerned regulators in the sector. The complementing roles of audit committee to IAF 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Strongly agree 15 17.0 17.0 
Agree 52 59.1 76.1 
Disagree 17 19.3 95.4 
Strongly disagree 4 4.6 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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in firms cannot be overemphasised and only well-constituted audit committees are in 
the position to add values to both their IAFs and their organisation’s corporate 
governance ultimately. Adequacy of members of the audit committees are assessed in 
terms of size of such committee, its composition in terms of diversity of experience, etc. 
 
iii. Frequency of Audit committee’s annual meetings  
Table 6.13: Frequency of Audit committee’s annual meetings in the NFS (Source: 
survey 2016) 
 
Both the CBN’s and the SEC’s codes of corporate governance require firms in the NFS 
to meet compulsorily not less than 4 times in a year, and that the head of the IAF (i.e. 
the CAE) must also be in attendance in all such meetings to make formal presentation of 
his reports to the board. The above table indicates that 96.6% of the respondents 
confirm that their audit committees actually do meet 4 times and more in a year in 
conformity with the statutory requirements. 3.4% of the respondents however indicated 
that their audit committees do meet less than the required four times in a year. In 
admittance of the audit committee’s meeting not less than 4 times in a year as being 
mandatory, CAE4 emphasised as below: 
 
‘’the audit committee statutorily meets four times in a year’’-CAE4. 
 
As a result, indication of audit committee’s meeting of less than 4 years annually by 
3.4% of the respondents is clearly a case of deviation from the regulations. This is a 
clear indication that some companies listed on the NFS still circumvent the regulators’ 
requirement on the frequency of audit committee’s annual meeting.  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Once 1 1.1 1.1 
2 times 0 0 1.1 
3 times 2 2.3 3.4 
4 times 62 70.5 73.9 
More than 4 times 23 26.1 100 
Total 88 100.0  
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iv. Existence of internal audit charter 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
Yes 71 80.7 80.7 
No 17 19.3 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
    Table 6.14: Existence of IAC in the NFS (Source: survey 2016) 
 
As discussed extensively in chapter 4 of the thesis, the IAC is a fundamental document 
to any IAF. The power and responsibilities of internal audit department are encoded in 
the document. Therefore the expectation is that no IAF exists without having a charter 
backing its existence. It is however observed from the survey (as can be seen from the 
above table) that 19.3% of the respondents’ CAEs and their subordinates in the NFS 
disclosed that their IAFs operate without such charter. Only 71 respondents out the 88 
that participated in the questionnaire survey indicated that they operate with IAC. This 
revelation certainly has implication for both the internal auditing professional body in 
the country as well as the regulators of the NFS. It is unthinkable that an IAF will exist 
without the ‘’essence’’ of its existence.   Incidentally, similar revelations were made by 
Al-Twaijry, Brierly and Gwilliam (2003), a study on development of Saudi Arabian 
internal audit, and Lenz, Sarens and D’Silva (2014), a study probing the discriminatory 
power of characteristics of German IAF, both indicate that 23% and 54% of their IAFs 
seem to be operating without IAC. This speaks volume on development of internal 
auditing in developing nations and the need for the IIA’s increased advocacy and 
attention in this environment. 
 
As expected however, all the four CAEs that participated in the in-depth interview 
indicated that they have IAC. The CAEs appreciate the essence of IAC as they all 
emphasised same as a must for all IAFs. The comments made by both CAE1 and CAE4 
below clearly depict the significance of the documents to the CAEs and their full 
appreciation of its importance 
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‘’internal audit charter is about .. is a documents that  shows the relationship between 
the department and the organisation’’-CAE1 
 
‘’If you don’t have a charter, there is an issue because charter tells you what to do’’-
CAE4. 
 
Existence of IAC and its completeness on critical matters such as the mandates of the 
IAF, its relationship with other corporate governance’s mechanisms etc. therefore 
remain the starting point of evaluating how effective the department is as a cornerstone 
of corporate governance. 
 
6.3.0             Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 1 
In order to carry out BLRA on the first hypothesis on which five different propositions 




CORPGOV_IAFIND is effect in Corporate Governance influenced by IAF’s 
independence) 
 - reporting line of the IAF 
 - CAE’s hierarchy  
SAR- IAF sourcing arrangement 
- CAE’s attendance of the audit committee meeting 
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As indicated earlier, BLRA is conducted to test hypotheses 1, and the related 5 
propositions indicated earlier: 
. 
6.3.1.  Test of Multicollinearity 
In order to avoid occurrence of Type II error, where a null hypothesis that is untrue is 
not rejected, test of multicollinearity was first carried out on all the predictor variables. 
This is with a view to ensuring that predictor variables that are linearly related in the 
model are eliminated prior to estimating the correlation coefficients.  Gujarati and 
Porter (2009) indicate that whereas the term “Multicollinearity” originally means the 
existence of a perfect, or exact, linear relationship among some or all explanatory 
variables of a regression model, today, the term is however extended to situation of 
imperfect linear relationship among the predictor variables. Whether the collinearity is 
perfect or not, it impacts on the coefficient estimates. As indicated further by Gujarati 
and Porter (2009), the impact is indeterminate regression coefficient with infinite 
standard errors in the case of a perfect linear relationship among the explanatory 
variables. Where the explanatory variables are not perfectly related, the regression 
coefficients though determinate, possess large standard errors. Thus, implying that the 
regression coefficients cannot be estimated with high level of accuracy. 
 
Although the predictive power of a model is not affected by the problem of 
muticollinearity, it however affects calculations pertaining to each individual predictor 
variables. This means that valid results about each individual predictor may not be 
obtained. The clarifications above emphasise the need for test of multicollinearity prior 
to estimating the regression coefficients. 
 
As indicated by Gujarati and Porter (2009), possible causes of multicollinearity problem 
are: 1. data collection method employed – e.g. sampling over a limited range of the 
values taken by the regressors in the population 2. constraints in the model or in the population being sampled 3. inappropriate model specification  
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4. over-determined model. A model is said to be over determined when it has more 
explanatory variables than the number of observations. 
Whereas a quick check of the data and the model for incidence of the above indicates no 
likelihood of any of the above defects, the data was subjected to scientific test of 
multicollinearity using Variance Inflating Factor (VIF) test.  
 
VIF shows the level of inflation of the variance of the correlation coefficients as a result 
of the problem of multicollinearity. VIF is measured and interpreted using a band of 1 
to 10. While a VIF of 1 implies no multicollinearity, a VIF of 10 indicates high level of 
multicollinearity and requires detailed investigation. A VIF value between 1 and 5 is 
considered moderate and acceptable as indicated below. The benchmark of tolerable 
level of muticollinearity is as shown in the table below: 
 
VIF Status of predictors 
1 Not correlated 
1 < VIF < 5 Moderately correlated 
VIF > 5 to 10 Highly correlated 
Table 6.15 : VIF indicator 
 
 
The VIFs obtained from the test of multicollinearity conducted on the data are all below 
2. The lowest VIF is 1.020 (obtained for the predictor SAR against ATT) and highest of 
1.625 (obtained for the predictor REP against SAR) as indicated above. These factors 
(between 0 and 2) imply the existence of a moderate collinearity between the predictors. 
 
6.3.2 Results of the BLRA 
The results of the BLRA in form of the coefficients of the individual predictor variables 
(βs), Wald statistics (Wald), Odd Ratio and significance (Sig) as well as summary of the 
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Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 3.107 5 .683 
Block 3.107 5 .683 
Model 3.107 5 .683 









1 98.001a .035 .051 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 





Correct No Yes 
Step 1 CORPGO
V 
No 0 23 .0 
Yes 0 65 100.0 
Overall Percentage   73.9 
a. The cut value is .500 






t SAR ATT APDI CAEH REP 
Step 1 Constant 1.000 -.430 -.104 -.244 -.775 -.348 
SAR  1.000 .143 .015 .112 -.101 
ATT   1.000 -.011 .056 -.145 
APDI    1.000 .126 -.577 
CAEH     1.000 .172 
REP      1.000 
Table 6:19: Correlation Matrix 
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Variables in the Equation 






SAR -.165 .308 .286 1 .593 .848 .464 1.551 
ATT .673 .637 1.117 1 .291 1.961 .563 6.834 
APDI -.029 .774 .001 1 .970 .971 .213 4.426 
CAEH -.344 .309 1.242 1 .265 .709 .387 1.298 
REP -.319 .860 .138 1 .710 .727 .135 3.918 
Constant 2.108 1.158 3.312 1 .069 8.235   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: SAR, ATT, APDI, CAEH, REP. 
Table 6:20: BLRA result 
 
From the above results, none of the predictor variables is significant at 5% level of 
significance. This implies there is no enough evidence from the data to warrant the 
rejection of the null hypothesis. In addition, of all the five explanatory variables of the 
model, SAR, APDI, CAEH, and REP have negative regression coefficients of -0.165, -
0.029, -0.344, and -0.319 respectively, while ATT have a positive regression 
coefficient of 0.673. 
 
The Nagelkerke  of  in the Model Summary indicates that the model is fair. 
Cox & Snell shows that there is 3.5% probability of variation in the predictors that 
are explained by the logistic model. The next table is the classification results, with 
73.9% correct classification predicted, this indicates that the model slightly improves 
when the predictors entered.  
 
Concerning the hypothesis, the model does not have enough evidence to rejects the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, Hypotheses 1 (Internal audit functions in the Nigerian 
financial sector are not independent of their organisation’s management) is 
confirmed. 
 
For propositions 1-5 applicable under the hypothesis, the following results are inferred: 
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i.      There is an inverse relationship between IAF’s sourcing arrangement and 
IAF’s independence in the NFS. This indicates that outsourcing is positively 
associated with IAF’s independence and ability to impact on corporate 
governance, whereas maintaining IAF in-house or co-sourcing it negatively 
impacts IAF in the NFS. This result reflects the positions of Glover et al. 
(2008) and Gramling and Vandervelde (2006).  
ii.      The frequency of attendance of the CAE in the AC’s meetings is positively 
associated with the independence of IAF of the NFS and its ability to impact 
on corporate governance. This suggests that the more frequent the CAE 
attends audit committee’s meetings, the more independent the IAF becomes 
and the more likely it impacts on corporate governance in the sector.  
iii.      Adequate positioning of the CAE within the organisation’s hierarchy in the 
NFS is negatively associated with IAF‘s independence and its ability to 
impact on corporate governance. This implies that the more appropriate the 
CAE is positioned in an organisation, the less independent the IAF becomes 
and the less their ability to impact corporate governance. This result appears 
strange. 
iv.       The negative regression coefficients of APDI indicates that involvement   
 of the AC in the appointment and dismissal of CAE in the NFS has  
  negative association with the function’s independence and ability to 
  impact on corporate governance in the NFS. 
v. The negative regression coefficient obtained for REP suggests that there 
is a negative relationship between the reporting line of the CAE and the 
IAF’s independence where the CAE reports functionally to the audit 
committee and vice versa where CAE reports functionally to the 
management. This finding implies that the more the CAE reports 
functionally to the audit committee, the less independent the function 
becomes.  This finding is unusual and contradicts the existing paradigm 
that CAE’s functional reporting line to the audit committee enhances 
IAF’s independence and ability to strengthen organisation’s corporate 
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governance. This warrants further investigation and has consequently 
been identified as potential area of future studies.   
Going by the above regression coefficients of the predictors as shown in table 6.21, the 





6.3.3  Discussion of findings 
Based on the defined parameters set to assess the level of independence enjoyed by the 
IAFs in the NFS, the various findings above indicate that the IAFs of the NFS cannot be 
said to be totally independent from the influence of management. Therefore, the current 
level of independence of the IAFs in the NFS warrants tremendous improvement so as 
to bring it in line with the international best practices as being championed by the 
internal auditing professional body (i.e. the IIA).  
 
Of the five variables set to evaluate the current level of IAF’s independence in the 
sector (i.e. sourcing arrangement, the frequency of Audit committee’s meeting 
attendance by the CAEs, CAE’s stature within organisational hierarchy, the 
manner of appointment and dismissal of the CAE, and the reporting line of the 
IAF), the results only indicate satisfactory reporting line and sourcing arrangement for 
the IAFs in the NFS. These positions are also corroborated by the results of the TA of 
the qualitative data. 
 
The general finding indicates that the IAFs in the NFS truly reports functionally to their 
audit committees, and administratively to their management. This is considered to be in 
accordance with the international best practice of internal auditing, regardless of the 
strange negative relationship between IAF’s functional reporting line (to auditing 
committee). Attribute standard 1110 of the IIA (organisational independence) states that 
‘’The Chief audit executive must report to a level within the organisation that allows the 
internal audit (function) to fulfill its responsibilities …and confirms to the board, at 
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least annually, the organisational independence of the internal audit (function).’’ In the 
same vein, standard 1111 of the IIA standard requires the CAE to ‘’communicate and 
interact directly with the board’’. These areas of the standards amplify the essence of 
reporting line on organisational independence of any IAF and also support the assertion 
and conclusion in the preceding paragraph.  
 
In addition, it is established from this study that the practice of outsourcing is not 
prevalent among IAFs in the NFS. IAFs in the sector predominantly maintain their 
internal audit departments in-house. The practice of co-sourcing is also found to be 
practically alien in the sector. Though, guidance from the IIA does not recommend any 
single sourcing arrangement as being preferable to the others (Desai et al., 2011), yet 
studies and contemporary discussions seem to ascribe higher level of independence to 
IAAs sourced from outsider  firm.  The general impression is that outsourced IAF will 
be more difficult for management of organisations to manipulate than in-house IAF. 
However, the peculiarity of the sector under consideration when viewed from asset 
specificity perspective as earlier discussed makes the practice of in-house IAF 
fashionable in the NFS and the credibility of the sourcing arrangement derived from the 
commitment, familiarity with the idiosyncrasy of the sector and economic rationale its 
continuous motivation.  
 
As a departure from the above, the IAFs in the sector appear to be deficient in the 
remaining three areas (i.e. appointment and dismissal of CAEs, the stature of CAEs 
within the organisational structure, and regularity of attendance of the CAEs in 
their audit committees’ meetings). Incidentally, these three areas are usually 
considered very critical whenever independence of IAF is being assessed and discussed 
in literature and of course in practice. The results of this study suggest that the audit 
committees of organisations in the NFS play very minimal role in the appointment and 
dismissal of CAEs in the sector. Thus, leaving the heads of the IAFs in the sector to be 
subjected to the whims and caprices of their management. It is therefore not surprising 
to see most of the CAEs in the sector being placed below management level within their 
companies’ organisational structures. The extent to which an IAF can be independent 
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depends on the relative status of the function within the organisations (Reding et al. 
2013). As indicated by Reding et al. (2013), inappropriate positioning of the IAF 
increases the risk of conflicts of interest that impair the function’s ability to proffer 
objective assessments and advice.  
 
The last area of weakness of the NFS’s IAFs revealed in this study is the irregularity of 
attendance of audit committee’s meetings by the heads of IAFs in the sector. Regular 
attendance of audit committee’s meetings by the heads of the IAF creates values to both 
the audit committee and the IAF itself in terms of timely and value-adding information 
exchange and insights proposition. A CAE that is not given the opportunity of attending 
audit committee’s meetings is denied the opportunity of being apprised of strategic and 
operational developments in his organisation. In turn, the audit committee members are 
likewise deprived of timely foresights on business risks and control issues from their 
supposed internal consultants. Irregularity of invitation to audit committee’s meetings 
signals that organisations’ board  are yet to see IAFs in the sector as capable of adding 
any further value than their assurance roles.  
  
As also indicated in chapter 7 under discussion of findings on the objectivity of internal 
auditors, majority of the IAFs in the sector do not engage in consulting activities for 
their organisations. Consequently, the general impression will be that hindsight is the 
best return from IAFs and therefore, audit committees in the sector may not see any 
justification for creating ‘’a seat at the table’’ for their CAEs. In support of Chambers 
(2014), audit committee (Board)’s table is not a training ground. Therefore, CAE will 
only be invited to such meeting when the audit committee is convinced that the CAE is 
knowledgeable.   
 
Therefore, from the summary of the analysis and the above exposition thereon, there is 
no enough evidence to indicate that the IAFs of the NFS are independent of 
management. Unfortunately, the IIA standards provide no guidelines that can be 
applied to address the specific areas of defects on IAF’s independence. To be more 
elaborate, there is no standard that dictates who should appoint and dismiss the head of 
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IAF (i.e. the CAE). The guidance offered in the IIA standards only encourages the 
audit committee to be involved in the matter. Also, the Institute’s standard is 
considered ambiguous in its recommendation on the level where the IAF or its head 
should be positioned in the organisation. The Institute’s attribute standard 1100 only 
requires that the CAE must report to a level within the organisation that allows the IAF 
to fulfill its responsibilities. A more precise position in this direction would be helpful 
and therefore desirable.  The same is also applicable to standards and guidance on 
invitation of the CAEs to audit committee’s meetings.  
 
6.4.0     Auditing methodology and Corporate governance 
As discussed extensively in chapter 4 of the thesis, the auditing methodology adopted 
by the IAF of a firm to a large extent impacts on its corporate governance.  Whereas the 
various issues relating to internal audit’s methodology are addressed through questions 
C25-30, for ease of analysis and focus however, issue of internal auditing methodology 
is addressed by looking at the conformity of the IAFs in the NFS with the various 
standards issued by the IIA, and performance of QAIP in particular. Therefore, the 
proposition below (postulated in chapter 4), is put forward to investigate the impact of 
the IAF’s auditing methodology on its ability to enhance corporate governance:  
 
P6: Internal audit function’s adoption of the IIAs’ standards and performance of 
Quality assessment and improvement program (QAIP) is positively associated with 
the function’s compliance with the IIA’s international standards and ability to 
strengthen corporate governance. 
 
In order to evaluate the above proposition, the second hypothesis re-stated below shall 
be tested 
 
H2: Internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector do not perform their 
roles in full conformity with the institute of internal auditors’ standards.  
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In order to test the above hypotheses, reference is made to model 2 as indicated in 
chapter 5 of the thesis. i.e. 
 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET = βo+β1(ADP)+β2(QAIP)+μ 
 
6.4.1      IAF’s adoption of the IIA standards for its engagements  
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Rarely 45 51.1 51.7 
Always 42 47.7 100.0 
Total 87 98.9  
Missing System 1 1.1  
Total 88 100.0  
   Table 6.21 Conduct of Internal Audit in accordance with international standards 
(Source: Survey 2016) 
   
The above table shows that 51.1% of the respondents to the survey indicated that their 
IAFs rarely adopt IIA standards for their engagements. This implies that less than half 
of the internal auditors that participated in the survey do take cognisance of the IIA 
standards for their internal audit engagements. This result is far below the 70% of the 
IAF in the UK that fully conforms to the IIA standards as reported by Zaman and 
Sarens (2013), and also far less than 86.5% of those internal auditors that comply with 
the IIA standards in the Anglo-culture countries as reported by Abdolmohammadi 
(2009).  Burnaby et.al (2009), A comprehensive cross-countries survey of the usage of 
IIA standards by companies in the United States and select European countries shows 
the percentage of IAs that use IIA standards as 87.1%, 84%, 72.1%, 79.9%, and 84.4% 
for Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, UK and Ireland, and USA  respectively.  
 
On probing further, the major reasons adduced for non-adoption of the IIA standards by 
some of the internal auditors that participated in the survey include: 
i. non-familiarity with the standards 
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ii. the standards are seen as too time-consuming 
 
The in-depth interview with the CAEs also indicates that the internal auditors in the 
NFS do not seem to be well-informed about the IIA standards. Out of the four CAEs 
interviewed, only one of them (CAE1) seems to have limited knowledge about the IIA 
standards.  
 
“There is IIA standards by the Institute of Internal auditors which from time to time we 
try to comply with’’.-CAE 1 
 
However, when interrogated if his IAF’s level of compliance with the IIA is full or not, 
his response shows the limited level of the depth of his appreciation of the IIA 
standards. As far as he is concerned, he does not see any strong reason for full adoption 
of the standards for their engagements. He insists there will always be gaps in the 
standards adoption due to environmental issues. 
 
‘’What do you mean by is not fully?, …what do you mean by not fully?. There will 
always be gaps because the environments are not the same’’.-CAE 1 
 
For the other CAEs, the issue of IIA standards seem strange to them as revealed by their 
responses.  
 
‘’There is one …okay, we look at this one being used by the financial institutions, we 
adopt, we now marry it with the one by the professional body which is ICAN in 
Nigeria’’.-CAE2 
’I used to google it, … is not that that we are actually following a particular standard 
because if we are writing our reports, we based it on IIA standards’’.-CAE3 
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 ‘’Yes we have, we….even one of my staff sent something to me this morning on review.  
We have a checklist because in modern day audit… even in our bank we are fortunate 
to have international partners. They come here from time to time and we have learnt a 
lot from them. So because as an auditor we don’t have everything here. So what you 
need is a checklist. If for instance, you are going to audit a branch now, I have a 
checklist on what to look out for. If am in cash area, I know what to look out for, 
customer service I know what to look out for, credit I know what to look out for, in fund 
transfer, I know what to look out for. So, there is a standard checklist’’-CAE3 
 
From the above accounts therefore, it seems the CAEs in the NFS are generally not 
conversant with the IIA standards guiding internal audit activities and therefore, do not 
conduct their internal audit engagements in compliance with the IIA standards.  Non-
compliance of the sector’s IAFs with standards particularly the IIA standards implies 
non-uniformity of approach on engagements in the NFS’ internal audit community.  
 
The above further implies that most of the internal auditors in the NFS are totally 
ignorant of the IIA standards, and for those few who are aware that standards actually 
exist for internal audit engagements, such standards are perceived as time consuming. 
This is an indication of the likelihood of less value-addition from the IAFs to their 
companies’ businesses in the sector. Burnaby et al. (2009) hinted that the value 
contributed by the IAF to the organisation’s success may be compromised or 
diminished if the IIA standards are not followed. 
 
According to Abdolmohammadi (2009), the length of IIA membership and internal 
auditing certification are positively related to use of standards. As can be seen from 
chapter 7, only 14.8% of the internal auditors in the NFS indicate that they are members 
of the IIA, and out of these few IIA members, 69.2% of them became members of the 
institute within the last three years. This finding is clearly in agreement with the 
positions established in Abdolmohammadi (2009).  Aside from membership with the 
IIA, another area that may influence adoption of the IIA standards by the internal 
auditors in the NFS might also be the level of knowledge and expertise of the CAEs 
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(Abdolmohammadi, 2009). A situation where the IIA standards are being interpreted as 
‘’checklist’’ by a CAE indicates the shallowness of knowledge on the part of the head 
of IAF.   
The observation of low membership of internal auditors with the IIA and lack of depth 
of knowledge on one of the CAEs interviewed warrants an urgent attention and 
certainly suggests the need for increased advocacy on the part of the IIA in the country. 
This is a gap that also requires definite position and remedial actions by both the 
concerned regulators and policy makers in the NFS.  
 
6.4.2.  IAF’s performance of QAIP. 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 No 47 53.4 54.0 
Yes 40 45.5 100.0 
Total 87 98.9  
 Missing System 1 1.1  
Total 88 100.0  
Table 6.22 : IAF’s performance of QAIP (Source: Survey 2016) 
 
The above table indicates that majority of the IAFs (53.4%) in the NFS do not perform 
QAIP as recommended by the IIA standard 1310.  Performance of internal and external 
assessments of the IAF, covering all aspects of the internal audit (such as engagement 
planning and supervision, standard working practices, working paper procedures and 
sign off’ report reviews, and identifying and addressing weaknesses and areas in need of 
improvement) is with a view to determining their conformance with the definition of 
internal auditing, the Code of Ethics, or the standards (Reding et al., 2013). Whereas the 
internal assessment includes on-going monitoring of the performance of the IAF, and 
periodic self-assessment, or assessment by other persons within the organisations with 
sufficient knowledge of internal audit practices, external assessment by a qualified, 
independent assessor or assessment team from outside the organisation  is required to be 
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conducted at least once every five years. The issue of “who audits the internal 
auditors?” has always been in the fore front of discussions on internal audit globally.  
 
A similar study by Zaman and Sarens (2013), involving the CAEs in the UK indicates 
that up to 63.6% have been subjected to QAIP.  A cross country study by Burnaby 
(2009) also indicates the proportion of internal auditors that indicate that their IAFs had 
never had any QAIP  as 52.1%, 72.9%, 56.3%, 31.5% and 42.3% for Belgium, Italy, 
The Netherlands, UK and Ireland and USA respectively. Also, Burnaby and Hass 
(2011) indicating a total 84.4% of the USA, 85%of Canadians and 58.1% of Latin 
American respondents confirmed that their IAAs were or intended to be in full 
compliance of conduct of QAIP by their IAFs.  
 
As indicated by CAE 1, it appears where QAIP engagements are being conducted,  they 
are handled by the major external audit firms in the country. This is considered 
appropriate given the level of expertise, and resources at the disposal of such major 
external auditors. 
 
 ‘’As explained to you, we just finished an exercise with Ernst and Young who reviewed 
our processes as a department. We are awaiting our final report. That also speaks to 
the question of who audits the auditors?. So they have come to look at our processes 
and the standards we are following and all that to see areas of improvement and 
whether we are complying’’-CAE1. 
 
For the CAE3, 
‘’This type of external assessment is backed by our external auditor because they will 
come, they will appraise the internal audit as well and report to the board about the 
effectiveness of the internal audit’’-CAE3. 
 
Non-conduct or irregular conduct of QAIP is firstly an indication of non-compliance 
with the IIA standards and a pointer to poor internal audit practices in the NFS. QAIP is 
to ensure quality control of IAF activities and engagements and therefore non-
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compliance with the IIA standards on QAIP certainly has implications on corporate 
governance in the sector. From the literature reviewed in chapter 4 and the finding from 
the NFS reported above, it appears conduct of QAIP and conformance with the IIA 
standards on internal audit engagements has a direct association with maturity of the 
internal audit. 
 
 6.5       Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of Hypothesis 2 
In carrying out the BLRA on the 2nd hypothesis, the 2nd model (indicated in chapter 5) 
is the focus. i.e.  
 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET = βo+β1(ADP)+β2(QAIP)+μ –model (2) 
 
Where: 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET = Effect in Corporate Governance influenced by IAF’s 
auditing methodology 
 = IAF’s adoption of the IIA standards for its engagements 




6.6 Test of Multicollinearity 
In order to establish the possibility of any association between the two explanatory 
variables (  and ) established under the model formulated to investigate the 
second hypothesis, incidence of multicollinearity was first investigated by computing 
the VIF of the variables.  
The result of the test implies non-existence of collinearity of the two variables and 
therefore portends no challenge to the BLRA.  The VIFs of the two variables are 1, 
which is a standard threshold for no collinearity as discussed in section 6.3.1. 
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6.7.0      The results of the BLRA 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.434 2 .488 
Block 1.434 2 .488 
Model 1.434 2 .488 










1 99.064a .016 .024 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 






Correct No Yes 
Step 1 CORPGO
V 
No 0 23 .0 
Yes 0 64 100.0 
Overall Percentage   73.6 
a. The cut value is .500 
Table 6:25: Model classification table 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant ADP QAIP 
Step 1 Constant 1.000 -.370 -.456 
ADP  1.000 -.369 
QAIP   1.000 
Table 6:26: Correlation Matrix 
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Variables in the Equation 






ADP .622 .534 1.359 1 .244 1.863 .655 5.305 
QAIP -.325 .528 .378 1 .539 .723 .257 2.035 
Constant .893 .363 6.061 1 .014 2.442   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: ADP, QAIP. 
Table 6:27: BLRA result 
 
The above results indicate that at 5% level of significance, none of the two variables is 
found to be statistically significant to warrant rejection of the hypothesis being tested.  
However, of the two independent variables, QAIP is found to have a negative 
regression coefficient of (-0.325) contrary to its apriori positive regression coefficient. 
For the second variable (i.e.ADP), the result of the analysis indicates a positive 
regression coefficient. 
 
Table 6.24 includes the Chi-square goodness of fit test with the null hypothesis that 
intercept and all coefficients are zero. The Nagelkerke  of  in the model 
summary indicates that the model is fair. This level of precision is certainly low and a 
reflection of the limited number of explanatory variables identified in the study to 
explain the dependent variables. This is suggestive of the need to include more variables 
if this model is to be adopted for further research in future. The problem of limitation of 
number of explanatory variables and the need to refine same for future study is part of 
the study’s limitations highlighted in chapter 8 of the thesis. 
 Cox & Snell shows that there is 1.6% probability of variation in the predictors are 
explained by the logistic model. The next table is the classification results, with 73.6% 
correct classification predicted, it means that the model slightly improves when the 
predictors entered.  
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Overall, the model does not have enough evidence to rejects the null hypothesis that 
Internal audit functions in the Nigerian financial sector do not perform their roles in 
full conformity with the institute of internal auditors’ standards.  
 
Therefore, with reference to the proposition 6, the following findings are established:   
i. IAF’s adoption of the IIA standards for its engagements is 
positively associated with IAF’s auditing methodology, and the function’s 
ability to strengthen corporate governance 
ii. IAF’s regular performance of QAIP is negatively associated 
with IAF’s auditing methodology, and the function’s ability to strengthen 
corporate governance. This is a strange result and warrants further validation in 
future studies. The results contradicts findings of Sarens, Abdolmohammadi and 
Lenz(2012), where a positive association is found between IAF having QAIP 
and IAF having active role in corporate governance. The strange negative 
association between IAF’s regular performance of QAIP and IAF’s auditing 
methodology and ability to strengthen corporate governance might however be 
due to the low level of awareness of internal auditors in the sector about the IIA 
standards. 
 
Deriving from the above results of the regression coefficients of the explanatory 
variables –QAIP andADP, model 2 thus becomes as below: 
 
CORPGOV_IAFAUMET   = 0.893+0.622(ADP)-0.325(QAIP)+μ            
 
6.8             Discussion of findings 
Generally, the study showed that the auditing methodology of the IAFs in the NFS’ is 
not in tandem with the new order of internal audit practice. This revelation is not 
surprising and is a reflection of multiple factors. Firstly, and as would be seen in the 
next chapter, where matters relating to the characteristics of the individual internal 
auditors in the sector are investigated, most internal auditors in the NFS are not 
conversant of the various, and continuous developments in the field of internal auditing 
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globally. As far as they are concerned, old order could be said to be guiding their 
engagements. For instance, internal auditing is yet to be embraced as a stand-alone 
profession in the country and till date majority of the internal auditors still sees Internal 
auditing as a mere offshoot of Accounting, the practice of which is construed to be 
under the oversight of the ICAN.  
 
Whereas Internal auditing profession like any other profession is constantly evolving, 
and requires an internal auditor to keep himself abreast of the continuous shifts through 
regular update of knowledge and skills, the internal auditors in the NFS are yet to 
appreciate this need. They currently seem entrenched in the psychology that their 
trainings and knowledge in the field of accounting is enough to acquaint them to all the 
proficiencies and capabilities required to practice internal auditing in the current time. 
Internal auditors in the NFS consequently, are yet to take the many advantages of 
knowledge sharing particularly as available under the IIA’s training and educational 
offerings (in form of interactions through seminars, conferences and most importantly 
necessary certifications in the field). As the study revealed, this is indeed the major 
factor behind the perceived level of ignorance in this regard and as a result, their 
insensibility to various standards guiding the practice of internal auditing globally.  
 
To tackle the above problem, internal auditors need to stay informed about 
improvements and current developments in internal audit standards, procedures, and 
techniques. The IIA chapter in the country therefore, needs to increase their efforts on 
advocacy so as to further make itself more visible and relevant to the internal audit 
professionals. Various strategies recommended to achieve this are fully discussed in 
chapter 7, as also listed in chapter 8 (under the implication of the study’s findings on the 
Internal auditing profession). Extensive educational offerings make it easy for internal 
audit practitioners to cope with the rapid changes in the field, and thus able to meet the 
value expectations and exceed performance standards. 
 
Emanating from the issue of knowledge gap discussed above, is the potentials that 
abound for various external audit firms to begin to explore the huge opportunities that 
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abound in the area of external QAIP to firms in the country, particularly to those 
companies that are mandatorily expected to have IAF. Certainly, there is limitation to 
how much the IIA-Nigeria chapter can achieve in this direction if the identified 
knowledge gap is to be bridged in good time. 
 
6.9:  Chapter summary 
This chapter begins the data analysis by concentrating on the research questions relating 
to IAF’s independence and the auditing techniques being adopted by the function in the 
NFS. Both the quantitative and qualitative data collected on the study were analysed 
and in all, the two hypotheses related to the two concepts (i.e. H1 and H2) were tested 
using BLRA.  In addition, insights from the thematic analysis carried out were also used 
as corroborating evidences particularly on the six propositions.  
 
Overall, evidences were found to suggest that the IAF in the NFS does not appear to be 
independent and the approaches of carrying out internal audit engagements by the 
function are not in tune with the international best practice as being championed by the 
IIA. Following the evidences derived from the analysis, areas that need to be improved 
upon include audit committee’s involvement in the appointment and dismissal of the 
CAEs, regularity of attendance of audit committee’s meetings by the CAEs. In addition, 
the low level of awareness about the IIA activities on the part of the internal audit 
practitioners in the country also needs to be addressed. 
The next chapter focuses analysis of data required to test the hypotheses 3 and 4 
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Chapter 7 
Data Analysis II (Internal auditors’ objectivity and competence) 
 
7.0: Chapter Overview 
In continuation of the data analysis that commenced in the previous chapter, this chapter 
focuses issues relating to the characteristics of the individual internal auditors in the 
NFS. The characteristics of the internal auditors are examined through two lenses.  
First, by looking at the objectivity of the individual internal auditors and second, by 
considering the level of competence of individual internal auditors in the IAF.  The 
analyses here are aimed at providing answers to the following two research questions: 
 
i. How objective are the internal auditors of the Nigerian financial sector?. 
ii. To what extent are internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector competent in 
fulfilling their expected roles?. 
 
Similar to the structure of the previous chapter, first, summary of the descriptive 
statistics of the relevant explanatory variables of the formulated models are presented. 
This forms the preliminary quantitative data analysis. Findings from the preliminary 
quantitative data analysis are then elaborated by the various insights drawn (through 
thematic analysis) from the in-depth interview with the CAEs.  This is followed by the 
BLRA of the quantitative data that was adopted to evaluate the related propositions and 
test the two hypotheses put forward to find answers to the above two research questions.  
 
7.1.0 Internal auditors’ Objectivity 
In order to investigate empirically how objective the individual internal auditors in the 
NFS are, and the impact of such level of objectivity on the sector’s corporate 
governance, the following four propositions (P7-10) earlier postulated in chapter 4 of 
the thesis are subjected to analysis: 
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i. Using internal audit function of the Nigerian financial sector as a 
training ground is negatively associated with the internal auditors’ objectivity 
and with the function’s ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
ii. Consulting role of internal audit function of the Nigerian 
financial sector is negatively associated with internal auditors’ objectivity and 
the function’s ability to strengthen corporate governance. 
iii. Chief audit executive’s regular private contact with the Audit 
committee’s chairperson is positively associated with the internal auditors’ 
objectivity and the ability of the IAF of the Nigerian financial sector to 
strengthen corporate governance.. 
iv. Unrestricted access to records and information by the internal 
audit function in the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with 
internal auditors’ objectivity, and the function’s ability to strengthen corporate 
governance. 
 
7.1.1   Using IAF as a training ground 
Table 7.1: IAF as a training ground (Source: Survey 2016) 
 
Analysing the quantitative data collected on the study, the above table indicates that 
only 18.2% of the respondents disclosed that their IAFs are being used as training 
ground for employees of other departments in their organisations. The practice of using 
IAFs as training ground is usually through habitual rotational transfers of employees 
from other departments within their organisations to the IAF for some time (say two to 
three years). Alternatively, IAF is often used as the first duty post for new hires with the 
intention of exposing them to all departments in the organisations. The rationale is 
usually to enable them to have a better view and understanding of the entire 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Always 16 18.2 18.2 
Barely 72 81.8 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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organisation before been given permanent posting therein. 81.8% of the respondents 
indicated that such practice is very rare in their organisations.  This clearly suggests that 
the use of IAF as a training ground is very rare in the NFS. This finding is corroborated 
by the feedback from all the CAEs interviewed.  
 
‘’You can take in people from other departments but I have not had cause to send 
internal auditor to other departments except management directs that people should 
move out’’. –CAE1 
 
Generally, it appears the practice of transferring internal auditors from IAF to other 
department in the NFS is very rare. The comments of one of the CAEs on the issue 
suggest that the usual practice in the NFS is to take in staff of other departments into the 
IAF and not vice versa. Going by the insights from the interview, this practice is 
premised on the general expectation that internal auditors are expected to have gathered 
wide-ranging experiences in other departments before they can perform well in the IAF 
of the sector.  
 
‘’…before you can come to the department, you must have touched all the departments 
so that you know at least what is being done. If you say you want to add value to your   
organisation as internal auditor, you must actually know what is going on in other 
departments. This is to enable you to identify, the risks and make suggestions to  
mitigate risks’’.-CAE3 
 
‘’Is like you must have known… at least have idea of what is available in other 
departments  before you can come to internal audit function because if you don’t have 
idea, how do you want to add value’’?-CAE3 
 
Going by the above, it appears the issue of using IAF as a training ground seems 
inapplicable in the country’s financial sector as most of the CAEs interviewed indicate 
that they do not post their staff to other departments but rather do take in staff of other 
departments but do not practice rotational transfer.  The general view of the CAEs is 
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that any potential staff of the IAF ought to have gathered experience in other 
departments within the business before they can be a value-adding internal auditor.  So, 
rather than serving as a training ground for other departments, the IAF of NFS expects 
that a would-be valuable internal auditor is the one that has gathered experience in other 
departments of the organisation before joining the IAF.  Retention of internal audit staff 
ordinarily is expected to contribute to the career potential of internal audit professionals 
and therefore expected to boost the esteem of IAF as a specialised area where people are 
groomed as internal audit professionals.  
 
The practice of using IAF as a training ground in organisation has been established in 
literature to have the tendency of impacting negatively on the internal auditors’ 
objectivity and ultimately affecting the function’s ability to strengthen corporate 
governance (see Lenz and Hahn, 2015; Christopher, et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2013; 
Messier, et al., 2011).  Messier et al. (2011) contend that over 50% of all the companies 
that have an IAF specifically hire internal auditors with the aim of rotating them into 
management positions (or cycle current employees into the IAF for a short stint before 
promoting them into management positions).  
 
As discussed extensively in chapter two of the thesis, the usual short term tenor of 
internal audit staff in organisation’s IAF arising from rotational transfers (in-and-out) of 
staffs of IAF and the impression that the department is in most cases the organisational 
‘’incubation centre’’ for potential line managers are some of the issues brought forward 
by O’Regan (2001) to argue against the professionalization of internal auditing.  
In addition, Messrs et al.(2011) established that internal auditors of IAF used as 
management training ground are usually perceived by external auditors as less 
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Table 7.2: IAF and its consulting role 
 
Whereas, modern day internal audit involves both assurance and consulting, however, 
as can be seen from the above table, most internal auditors in the NFS indicated that 
they are rarely engaged by their management for consulting activities.  While only 3.4% 
of the respondents disclosed that they are always being requested to perform consulting 
activities for their organisations, 96.6% of the respondents maintained that they are 
rarely required to carry out consulting activity in their various organisations. This 
finding might be interpreted to indicate that the issue of objectivity of the internal 
auditors of the NFS being affected as a result of engagement in consulting activities is 
very remote. This position notwithstanding, the finding may also be interpreted to mean 
that majority of organisations in the NFS are yet to tap fully into the potentials of the 
IAF when it comes to its value addition in the area of insights. Abiola (2012) in his 
study on the relevance of internal auditors in corporate governance of Nigerian banking 
sector anticipates that internal auditors in the sector would be more engaged in 
consulting activities for their organisations. The current study however shows that this 
expectation is yet to materialise. Relying on the IAF for assurance only might be taken 
as a signal that the new paradigm of IAF as ‘’assurer’’ and ‘’consultant’’ is yet to be 
fully explored in the NFS.  
 
Ordinarily, one could have argued that the usual perception of likelihood of conflict of 
interest might be responsible for the non-popularity of consulting activities among the 
IAFs in the NFS, the feedback from the CAEs interviewed however ruled out this 
thought. When asked whether there could be incidence of conflict of interest if an IAF 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Always 3 3.4 3.4 
Rarely 85 96.6 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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engages in both the traditional function of assurance and the additional function of 
consulting as reasoned in the literature, the CAEs interviewed are of the opinion that 
they do not see any area where combination of the two roles can lead to conflict of 
interest.  
 
‘’Conflict?, I don’t see any conflict there. If you are an auditor you are expected to 
know it all because you will be advising an institution to improve performance and what 
is your basic job as an auditor?,… if not to give assurance to management that 
everything is going according to plan, policies are strong enough to protect the 
institutions. So, consultancy is for the auditor to be on top of his game, knowing what is 
happening in the environments’’.-CAE1 
 
If internal auditors are aware that venturing into consulting will make them to be on top 
of their game, can we then say management of organisations do not have much interest 
in engaging internal auditors for consulting role?. Can it be assumed that management 
do not see them having such proficiency that will enable them add additional value 
through consulting?. Or could it be that the management themselves are not fully 
tapping into the potentials of their IAFs due to their unconsciousness of the huge 
potential from IAF’s consulting activities?. The present study going by its focus 
certainly cannot address these posers and therefore these areas of uncertainty, 
particularly the motivation for firm’s engagement of IAF for consulting, are highlighted 
as potential areas of future research.  
 
Whereas the general impression is that the two roles of assurance and consulting are 
mutually exclusive, it seems internal auditors in the NFS view the two roles as 
complimentary and inseparable. 
 
‘’Honestly assurance cannot be done without consulting; and consulting cannot even be 
done without assurance. They are embedded. Assurance is embedded in internal audit 
and consulting is also embedded in internal audit. There is no way you can do auditing 
without consulting and there is no way you can do it without assurance’’. CAE4 
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For one of the CAEs interviewed, consulting activity is seen as old as assurance. 
‘’It has been a long time combination of activities. So it is just a change of 
nomenclature’’.-CAE3 
 
For all the CAEs interviewed, the general opinion is that internal audit cannot be 
complete without recommendations, and that internal audit has always been a 
combination of both assurance and consulting. According to them, consulting is 
embedded in assurance and the CAEs do not envisage any likelihood of conflict of 
interest in the dual roles. This position aligns with the view of the internal auditors in 
Malaysia as reported in Ahmad and Taylor (2009), a study conducted to test the effects 
of role theory on internal auditors’ commitment to independence through a survey of 
101Malaysian internal auditors. The referenced study indicates that Malaysian auditors 
also do not perceive any conflict between their dual roles of oversight (assurance) and 
advisory (consulting). 
 
The issue of desirability of consulting activities within the context of internal auditors’ 
objectivity is yet to be laid to rest in literature (see Arena et al., 2006; Allegrini et al., 
2006; Allegrini and D’Onza, 2003; Paape et al., 2003; and Selim et al., 2009). 
Therefore future research that will focus organisations’ executives and audit committees 
in Nigeria, most especially along industry line, for their insights on this concept is being 
contemplated by the researcher. Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) also hint that there 
could be industry differences on perceptions and experiences on the matter. In addition, 
identification of factors that might mitigate any potential threats of bias when internal 
auditors engage in the dual roles of consulting and assurance also forms part of the 
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Table 7.3: Regularity of CAE’s private contact with the Audit committee’s 
Chairperson 
 
The above table shows that majority of the internal auditors that participated in the 
survey indicated that their CAEs do not enjoy the privilege of having private contacts 
with the chairperson of the audit committees of their organisations. Whereas 26.1% of 
the respondents confirmed that their CAEs do enjoy regular private contacts with the 
chairpersons of their audit committees, 73.9% indicated that such opportunity currently 
eludes their CAEs. It has been strongly contested that the objectivity of the staffs of the 
IAF is enhanced through regular private contacts between the CAE and the audit 
committee’s chairperson. It is anticipated that such regular private contacts will enable 
the CAE to discuss in details issues that are considered germane to the success of the 
organisation without any interference from the management. Adel and Maissa (2013) 
also indicate that such informal interactions enable the IAFs to communicate their 
findings honestly and objectively. 
 
The above finding suggests the absence of robust relationship between the CAEs and 
the Chairpersons of audit committees in the NFS. Extant studies particularly from 
developed economies produced contradicting results. For instance, Zaman and Sarens 
(2013) revealed that majority (88.1%) of the CAEs in UK indicated that they enjoyed 
informal interactions with the audit committee’s chair and/or audit committee’s 
members. Also, Christopher et.al (2009) showed that 68% of the responding CAEs had 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 Disagreed 65 73.9 73.9 
Agreed 23 26.1 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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regular private contacts with the audit committee’s chair or individual audit committee’s 
members.  
 
Drawing insights from the interview, it appears the issue of CAE’s having private 
contacts with the chairperson of audit committee is truly not too popular and considered 
highly necessary among the IAFs in the NFS. Only one out of the four CAEs that took 
part in the in-depth interview acknowledged the significance of such un-official contacts 
with the audit committee’s chairperson.     
 
“Certainly I do. Aside from the formal meeting, I normally catch up with him to discuss 
any issue requiring his attention. Occasionally the chairman of the audit committee 
personally invites me to his office where we discuss and rub mind together on issue 
pertaining to the organization” –CAE4. 
 
Zaman and Sarens (2013) study that focuses informal interactions between audit 
committees and IAFs indicate that the proportion of the independent audit committee’s 
members and particularly the background of the audit committee’s chairperson are 
factors that promote positive association with the existence of informal interactions 
between audit committee and IAFs. Also, Raghunandan et al. (2001), investigating 
Audit committee’s composition, ‘’Gray directors’’ and interaction with internal auditing 
among the Chief Internal Auditors in the US manufacturing companies, found evidence 
for positive relationship between the audit committee with independent members, and 
with at least one member having an accounting or finance background and informal 
meetings between the IAF and audit committees. 
 
If the finding of the referenced study is taken as reported, then it might be desirable to 
investigate further the number of independent audit committee members in the NFS as 
well as the antecedents of the people occupying the position of the audit committees’ 
chair in the sector. The question included in the study’s questionnaire however appears 
inadequate to generate detailed insights on the specific attributes of the audit 
committee’s members in the sector. Therefore, the respondents’ views on adequacy of 
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audit committee’s membership in section 6.2.6 might be subjective and inadequate to 
verify the positions in both Zaman and Sarens (2013) and Raghunandan et al. (2001). 
Although, UK is known to have a long history of existence of audit committee as well 
as matured IAF, nonetheless, the result obtained from the questionnaire survey as 
reported above, suggests that these areas present an opportunity for future research.  
 
 






Table 7.4: IAFs access to records and information 
 
From the table above, 77.3% of the respondents indicated that they do always have 
unrestricted access to records and information. Only 22.7% of the respondents indicate 
they barely have such unrestricted access to records and information in the NFS. Having 
unrestricted access to records and information by the internal auditors is indeed one way 
the objectivity of internal auditors can be assured. Stewart and Subramaniam (2010) 
contend that restriction of access to records and information constitutes impairment to 
objectivity.  
 
Considering the feedback gathered from the interview, the CAEs of the NFS do not 
seem to have any issue on their access to records from the business units. This might be 
a product of enhanced relationship management between them and the various business 
units, and appreciation of the continuous paradigm shift as far as internal auditing is 
concerned. Internal auditors are now moving away from the usual posture of  
‘’corporate detectives’’ to corporate partner. Whereas the IIA standards maintain that 
internal auditors should be objective, only the CAE that cultivates good relationship 
with line managers and other personnel of the organisation will be able to easily break 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Barely 20 22.7 22.7 
Always 68 77.3 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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barriers of access to information and documents.  From the above table and insights 
from the in-depth interview therefore, it is apparent that the CAEs in the NFS seem to 
have robust interpersonal relationships with the auditees in the NFS and consequently 
break barriers of restrictions particularly barrier of access to their organisation’s records 
and useful information. This is considered good as it indicates that the required 
objectivity of the internal auditors in the sector does not seem to be in doubt. To 
maintain a balance between objectivity and rapport with the auditees requires good 
interpersonal relationship. An internal auditor with good interpersonal relationship 
profile will certainly get approval of the staff of his organisation and consequently has 
no difficulty in performing his roles objectively. 
 
7.2.0          Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of  Hypothesis 3 
In order to carry out the BLRA on the 3rd hypothesis, and the associated four 
propositions (P7-10) listed in 7.1.0, the quantitative data collected is analysed following 





CORPGOV_IAsOBJ is effect in Corporate Governance influenced by Internal 
auditors’ objectivity 
 = use of IAF as a training ground 
  = internal auditors role in consulting 
 = CAEs’ regular private contact with the audit committee chairperson 
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7.2.1. Test of Multicollinearity 
As done in chapter 6, possible interrelationships between the explanatory variables were 
first examined by testing for their multicollinearity using VIF indicator as shown below. 
   Table 7.5: Collinearity Statistics 
The VIFs of the independent variables computed as reported in the table above indicate 
that all the VIFs of the variables are between 1.068 and 1.09. This implies a moderate 
level of correlation of the variables with one another which is acceptable in line with the 
table of threshold of VIF in chapter 6 as repeated below. 
VIF Status of predictors 
1 Not correlated 
1 < VIF < 5 Moderately correlated 
VIF > 5 to 10 Highly correlated 












Predictor Variables VIF 
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7.2.2  Results of the BLRA 
In tandem with the approach adopted for the analysis carried out in chapter 6, the results 
of the BLRA are presented below.   
 
Variables in the Equation 
 Β S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(β) 
Step 1a ACCESS .653 .584 1.247 1 .264 1.921 
TRAIN .650 .646 1.011 1 .315 1.915 
CONS 2.123 1.384 2.353 1 .125 8.353 
CONT .847 .692 1.497 1 .221 2.332 
Constant -2.191 1.511 2.102 1 .147 .112 
Table 7.7: Variables in the Equation 
 
 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 94.747a .070 .102 
Table 7.8:  Model summary 
 
From the analysis above, at 5% level of significance, none of the predictor variables is 
found to be statistically significant to warrant rejection of hypothesis 3. In addition, all 
the four explanatory variables (CONT, ACCESS, TRAIN, CONS) have positive 
coefficients of regression. Of the four independent variables however, both TRAIN, 
and CONS failed to meet the a-priori negative signs of their regression coefficients.   
The above results are also interpreted in terms of the relationships of the variables to 
internal auditors’ objectivity as follows:  
i. CAE’s regular private contact with the audit committee’s chair 
is positively associated with individual internal auditors’ objectivity. This 
implies that the more regular the private contacts made by the CAE with the 
audit committee’s chairperson in the NFS, the more the individual internal 
auditors are objective and the more the IAF is able to strengthen the sector’s 
corporate governance. This aligns with extant studies such as Zaman and Sarens 
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(2013). The referenced study, a questionnaire survey of CAEs in UK provided 
evidence of positive association between CAE’s informal interactions with the 
audit committee and internal auditors’ objectivity.  
ii. IAF having unrestricted access to records and information in the 
NFS is positively associated with individual internal auditors’ objectivity, and 
the IAF’s ability to strengthen corporate governance in the NFS. The direction 
of this association suggests that unrestricted access to information and records of 
organisations by the internal auditors enhances the objectivity of the individual 
internal auditors, and in turn increases the IAF’s ability to strengthen the 
organisation’s corporate governance in the sector.  
iii. Using IAF of the NFS as a training ground in the NFS is 
positively associated with internal auditors’ objectivity and the IAF’s ability to 
strengthen corporate governance in the NFS. The practice of interdepartmental 
transfer of internal auditors, though not prominent in the NFS, interestingly 
turned out to have positive relationship with the internal auditors’ objectivity in 
the NFS. This indicates that the more frequent internal auditors are rotated 
across departments in organisations in the NFS, the more the individual internal 
auditors become objective, and the more the likelihood of IAF’s ability to 
strengthen corporate governance in the sector. This finding is however not in 
tune with the general notion that the use of IAF as a training ground affects 
internal auditor’s objectivity.   
iv. Consulting role of IAF of the NFS is positively associated with 
the individual IAs’ objectivity and the likelihood of the IAF’s ability to strengthen 
corporate governance. Whereas it is established through the survey data (presented in 
table 7.2 and discussed in section 7.1.2 of the thesis) that the IAF of the NFS is yet to 
fully embrace consulting activity.  Consulting (One of the two components of modern 
day IAAs) is however found to have positive relationship with the objectivity of the 
individual internal auditors.  
The predictive power of the model of 10.2% indicates that only 10.2% of the variations 
of internal auditors’ objectivity are explained by the four variables in the model.  
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7.2.3 Discussion of findings 
Objectivity as defined by Chambers (2014) is ‘’an unbiased mental attitude that allows 
internal auditors to perform engagements in such a manner that they believe in the work 
product, and accept no compromises in the product’s quality’’. Going by the descriptive 
statistics presented in section 7.1.1 to 7.1.4 of this chapter, the discussions thereon, the 
results of the BLRA presented in the previous section, it is evident that that the internal 
auditors in the NFS cannot be said to be objective. It is believed that the current level of 
objectivity of the internal auditors in the sector can be enhanced particularly by 
addressing the issue of irregularity of private contacts between the CAEs and the audit 
committee or audit committee’s chairpersons. 
 
As discussed earlier, the non-popularity of seeing and using the IAFs in the sector as 
training ground for potential executives or managers in the sector is seen as one of the 
key parameters that is currently contributing to the impartiality or neutrality of internal 
auditors in the sector in the discharge of their duties. The internal auditors are therefore 
not imprisoned by their conscience in expressing their minds on matters affecting their 
assessment of effectiveness of their organisations’ governance, internal control, and risk 
management. The non-popularity of the use of the IAF as training grounds in effect has 
reduced the threat of conflict of interest or appearance thereof on the part of the internal 
auditors and consequently promotes the credibility of the internal auditors in the sector.  
According to Reding (2014), the following events are parts of circumstances that can 
lead to potential conflict of interest: 
 
i. a senior manager from another area of the organisation is asked 
to be the CAE 
ii. an employee moves into the IAF from another area of the 
organisation or rotates through the IAF as part of his or her training regimen 
iii. an internal auditor with specialised accounting expertise is asked 
to assume a temporary accounting position 
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iv. an internal auditor with management experience is asked to fill a 
vacant management position while the organisation searches for a suitable 
replacement. 
 
It is very important that the concerned stakeholders see the internal auditors as having 
the courage to review any area of the organisation without being biased themselves or 
been compromised by others. Although another strand of argument support the use of 
IAF as training ground, claiming such practice will enhance the outlook of the function, 
the negative impacts such practice connote on the function’s objectivity has been 
established to outweigh its benefits. 
 
Also, unhindered access to records and information; and less engagement of the internal 
auditors in consulting role in the sector are good indicators of cooperation from the 
auditees and avoidance of conflict of interest on the part of the internal auditors. 
Auditees’ enthusiasm about IAF’s roles in the organisation is a sign of shared mission 
on the part of the line managers, and possibly a reflection of appropriate tone from 
above on the beneficial roles of IAF. Such positive development, combined with 
internal auditors’  unprejudiced mind are very vital to stimulate internal auditor’s 
objectivity in the sector.  
 
Whereas, the BLRA indicates a positive association between CAE’s regular private 
contacts with the audit committee’s chairperson and individual internal auditors’ 
objectivity, yet the study indicates that the CAEs in the country’s financial sector are yet 
to appreciate the benefits associated with their private contacts with the audit 
committee’s chairperson. Absence of regular private contacts between the CAEs and 
their audit committee’s chairpersons implies that the entire IAF might not have the 
privilege of gaining the full support of the audit committee. If there is any relationship a 
CAE should be desirous of fostering to ensure his ability to make impartial or unbiased 
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7.3.0 Internal Auditors’ competence 
As indicated in chapter 6, competence is the second characteristics of internal auditors, 
and the analysis under this section is meant to provide answers to the fourth research 
questions (i.e. to what extent are internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector 
competent in fulfilling their expected roles?). The five propositions to be evaluated here 
are as presented below: 
  
i.      Educational qualification of internal auditors of the Nigerian financial sector 
is positively associated with the individual internal auditors’ competence and 
the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen corporate governance 
in the Nigerian financial sector. 
ii.      Possession of relevant professional qualifications by the internal auditors in 
the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the individual 
internal auditors’ competence and the ability of the internal audit function to 
strengthen corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. 
iii.      Possession of reasonable length of years of experience by the internal 
auditors of the Nigerian financial sector is positively associated with the 
individual internal auditor’s competence and the ability of the internal audit 
function to strengthen corporate governance in the Nigerian financial sector. 
iv.      Regular training of internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector is 
positively associated with the individual internal auditors’ competence and 
the ability of the internal audit function to strengthen corporate governance 
in the Nigerian financial sector. 
v.      Membership of internal auditors of the Nigerian financial sector with the 
Institute of internal auditors is positively associated with the individual 
internal auditors’ competence and the ability of the internal audit function to 
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Table 7.9: Educational qualification of the internal auditors of the NFS  
 
The analysis of the respondents according to their level of educational qualifications 
shows that majority (59.1%) of the internal auditors in the NFS  possess only first 
degree (i.e. either HND or B.Sc.). Substantial proportions of them (40.9%) however 
 possess post-graduate degrees (i.e. Master degree). This is anticipated given the 
 category of the respondents and the focus of the research. Higher level of educational 
 qualification is actually expected of anybody that occupies the position of CAE (and/or 
 their subordinates) of organisations in the sector. 
7.3.2(a)        Professional qualifications of the internal auditors in the NFS 
Table 7.10: Professional qualifications of the internal auditors in the NFS 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 HND 25 28.4 28.4 
BSc 27 30.7 59.1 
MSc/MA/M
BA 
36 40.9 100.0 
Total  88 100.0  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 None 7 8.0 8.0 
ACA/FCA 53 60.2 68.2 
ACCA 15 17.0 85.2 
ACIB 3 3.4 88.6 
CIA 9 10.2 98.9 
Others 1 1.1 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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Whereas only 7 internal auditors representing 8.0% of all the respondents indicated that 
they do not possess any professional qualifications, those respondents that are members 
of professional bodies considered highly relevant to the profession of internal auditing 
(i.e. the IIA, ICAN, and ACCA) constitute 95.1% of those that belong to one 
professional bodies or the other. Of these people, those that are members of the ICAN 
as either associate member (with professional appellation ‘’ACA’’) or Fellows 
(‘’FCA’’) account for 68.8% while those with CIA qualifications are just 11.7%.  This 
indicates that majority of the internal auditors in the NFS are members of ICAN, 
whereas CIA, the premier certification sponsored by the IIA, remains the only globally 
accepted certification for internal auditors (Reding et al., 2013).  Akinteye, York and 
Ullah (2015) also documented that majority of the internal auditors of firms listed on 
the Nigerian Stock Exchange hold professional accounting qualifications. 
 
The above finding is also established to be in tandem with the results from the in-depth 
interview. As the interview revealed, all the interviewed CAEs are members of the 
ICAN. In addition, the interviewees indicated that most of their team members are 
members of ICAN.  
 
‘’I can tell you that at least 80% of my staff are qualified accountants”.-CAE1 
 
When interrogated on the possible explanation for this skewedness of professional 
membership highly in favour of the ICAN, the general opinion is that membership of 
the ICAN is enough to practice as internal auditor.  
 
‘’No. I am not a member.… I think once you have ICAN I don’t think IIA is a strong… 
They are just new. They are trying to get membership; they are trying to penetrate the 
market’’.-CAE1 
 
‘’Am not a member’’ –CAE2. 
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‘’Am not even a member of IIA……..and I don’t think any of my staff are members. Am 
a member of the Institute of Chartered Accountant of Nigeria’’ –CAE4 
 
It is observed that internal audit professionals in the sector are yet to appreciate the 
invaluable and numerous benefits that can be derived from their membership of the IIA. 
Rather, they all see the IIA as a foreign and new professional body that is just trying to 
penetrate Nigeria given their limited membership.  
 
‘’Yes, IIA is not that strong. Their membership is not that strong’’-CAE1 
This impression perhaps explains both the shallow understanding about internal audit 
profession and the position of the internal audit professionals in the country on the 
relevance of the IIA to the internal auditing profession. The general impression in the 
country is that internal auditing is an offshoot of accounting and not a separate 
profession. 
‘’Yes, IIA is not that strong. Membership is not that strong. We have not gotten to that 
level where we will say if you are not an IIA member you cannot be an auditor’’.-CAE1 
 
7.3.2(b): Percentage of team members with relevant professional qualification 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 0-24% 5 5.7 6.0 
25-49% 17 19.3 26.2 
50-74% 32 36.4 64.3 
75% and 
above 
30 34.1 100.0 
Total 84 95.5  
Missing System 4 4.5  
Total 88 100.0  
Table 7.11 Percentage of team members with relevant professional qualification
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The above table shows that majority (36.4%) of the IAF in the NFS confirmed that 
between 50-74% of their team members (staff) possess one relevant professional 
qualification or the other.  Under the study, professional qualifications considered 
relevant include ACA, ACCA, ACIB, CIA,CRMA,CISA,CCSA,CRISC,CFSA etc. In 
addition, 34.1% of the IAF in the NFS indicated that 75% and above of their team 
members are members of relevant professional bodies.   
 
The result of the in-depth interview conducted also corroborated the above findings. 
One of the CAEs interviewed emphatically stressed that being a member of one 
professional body or the other is considered critical for his team members: 
 
‘’I can tell you that at least 80% of my staff are qualified accountants.  In the IT audit, 
they have to be certified.  CISA-qualified and with IT background’’-CAE1  
 
As also indicated by Akinteye et al. (2015), where 100% of the internal auditors that 
participated in a survey investigating the IAF’s quality in Nigerian listed firms possess 
one accounting professional qualification or the other, it appears internal audit 
practitioners in the NFS considered possession of relevant professional qualification 
very important. This is considered inspiring.  
    
7.3.3  Length of years of experience of the internal auditors  of the 
  NFS  
 Table 7.12: Length of years of experience of the internal auditors of the NFS  
 
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Less than 5 years 11 12.5 12.5 
5-10 years 65 73.9 86.4 
Greater than 10 
years 
12 13.6 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
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On the issue of length of year of experience, 73.9% of the respondents have between 5 
to 10 years of experience in internal audit while 13.6% indicate that their length of years 
of experience in the practice of internal audit is more than 10 years. Corroborating the 
above findings, all the interviewed CAEs were of the opinion that their team members 
have reasonable length of years of experience.  
 
‘’By experience, all my staffs are well-experienced; that I can assure you of’’-CAE4. 
 
The issue of experience through on-the-job training is emphasised by the CAE2.  
 
‘’By experience, it is believed that one learns on the job as well but they are taught 
some operational areas too at least to a manageable extent, they are okay’’.-CAE2 
 
Truly, internal auditing like any other profession is expected to be learned more 
primarily by doing, after all, nobody is an expert upon graduating from college. 
 
7.3.4(a)  Internal auditors’ membership with the IIA 
 Table 7.13: Internal auditors’ membership with the IIA 
 
The above table shows the number of respondents who are, and who are not members of 
the IIA in the sector. Only 13 of the internal auditors representing 14.8% are members 
of the IIA. The disparity of this number with those that have CIA qualification (as 
indicated in table 7.12), is due to the opportunity extended by the IIA to prospective or 
 Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
 No 72 81.8 84.7 
Yes 13 14.8 100.0 
Total 85 96.6  
Missing System 3 3.4  
Total 88 100.0  
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practicing internal auditors to become member of the institute prior to writing of any of 
the institute’s professional and qualifying examinations for certifications . Such 
qualifying examinations include Certified Internal Auditor (CIA), Certified 
Government Auditing Professional (CGAP), Certified Financial Services Auditor 
(CFSA), Certification in Control Self-Assessment (CCSA), and Certification in Risk 
Management Assurance (CRMA)). When probed further, it was discovered that 9 out of 
the 13 IIA members (i.e. 69.2%) actually became members of the institute (IIA) within 
the last three years while the remaining 4 members joined the institute more than 3years 
ago as shown below: 
 
7.3.4(b)  Length of years of internal auditors’ membership with the IIA 
Table 7.14: Length of years of internal auditors’ membership with the IIA 
The above finding however is not unexpected considering the state of infancy of the 
institute in the country, the non-popularity of the IIA as a professional body in Nigeria 










 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 since a year ago 2 15.38 15.38 
since 2years ago 2 15.38 30.76 
since 3years ago 5 38.46 69.22 
More than 3years ago 4 38.46 100 
Total 13 100.0  
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7.3.5 Regularity of training of internal auditors in the NFS  
 Frequency Percent Cumulative Percent 
 Once 26 29.5 29.5 
Twice 43 48.9 78.4 
Thrice 13 14.8 93.2 
Four times 3 3.4 96.6 
More than 
four times 
3 3.4 100.0 
Total 88 100.0  
Table: 7.15 Regularity of training of internal auditors in the NFS  
 
Frequency of training of the internal auditors in the NFS is shown by the above table. 
Majority of the respondents (48.9%) indicated that they had attended formal training 
two times over the last 24months. 26 respondents representing 29.5% of the respondents 
disclosed that they attended just one training over the last 24months. This implies that 
majority of the internal auditors in the NFS do attend training once in a year on the 
average.  Those who indicated that they attended training up to four times or more over 
the last 24 months are just 6, representing 6.8%. These findings suggest that attendance 
of training by the internal auditors in the NFS is not as regular as expected, and 
contradicts the positions of the CAEs interviewed as reflected in the response below.  
 
‘’Yes, there is always training and re-training and according to this organization 
policy, it is compulsory for each staff to attend at least one training per year’’- CAE4. 
 
According to the CAEs that participated in the semi-structured interview, internal 
auditors do attend training regularly to enrich their knowledge particularly in the areas 
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7.4           Binary Logistic Regression Analysis of hypothesis 4 
The five propositions (i.e. P11-15) related to the fourth hypothesis made on the study as 
listed in 7.3 were analysed using BLRA. To do this, reference was made to model 4 
formulated and discussed in chapter 5. 
 
 
Model IV: Internal auditors’ competence 
CORPGOV_IAsCOMP=βo+β1(EDUQ)+β2(PROQ)+β3(YEAR)+β4(REGT) 
                     +β5(MEM)+μ 
Where: 
CORPGOV_IAsCOMP is Effect in Corporate Governance influenced by internal 
auditors’ competence 
 - Educational qualification of the internal auditors 
 - Professional qualifications of the internal auditors 
 - Length of years of experience of the internal auditors 
 - Internal auditors’ regular training  




7.4.1. Test of Multicollinearity 
As launched in chapter 6, possible interrelationships between the explanatory variables 
were first examined by computing their multicollinearity using VIF indicator. The VIF 
for the variables ranges from 1.007 to 1.117. This implies that the level of relationship 
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7.4.2   Results of the BLRA 
Presented below is the result of the BLRA carried out on the data using model 4. The 
table shows the coefficients of the individual predictor variables (βs), Wald statistics, 
and the significance of the variables.  In addition, the summary of the model indicating 
the level of precision of the model is also presented. 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% C.I.for 
EXP(B) 
       Lower Upper 
Step 1a EDUQ -.024 .317 .006 1 .939 .976 .524 1.817 
  PROQ -.108 .228 .226 1 .635 .897 .575 1.402 
 MEM .200 .731 .075 1 .784 1.222 .291 5.122 
 YEAR -.412 .516 .637 1 .425 .663 .241 1.821 
 REGT -.099 .265 .139 1 .709 .906 .538 1.524 
 Constant 2.281 1.346 2.869 1 .090 9.782   
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: EDUQ, PROQ, MEM, YEAR, REGT. 
Table 7:16: BLRA result 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square Df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1.152 5 .949 
Block 1.152 5 .949 
Model 1.152 5 .949 










1 96.058a .013 .020 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 4 
because parameter estimates changed by less than 
.001. 
Table 7.18: Model summary 
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Correct No Yes 
Step 1 CORPGOV No 0 22 .0 
Yes 0 63 100.0 
Overall Percentage   74.1 
a. The cut value is .500 
Table 7:19: Model classification table 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant EDUQ PROQ MEM YEAR REGT 
Step 1 Constant 1.000 -.400 -.203 -.065 -.759 -.265 
EDUQ  1.000 -.277 -.013 .031 -.127 
PROQ   1.000 -.094 .011 .189 
MEM    1.000 .117 -.180 
YEAR     1.000 -.144 
REGT      1.000 
Table 7.20: Correlation Matrix 
 
The above results validates hypothesis 4. This is so because none of the predictor 
variables is significant enough at 5% level of significance to warrant rejection of the 
hypothesis. Looking at the direction of relationship of the predictor variables in relation 
to the dependent variable (IAsCOMP) however, the regression coefficients of the 
variables indicate that only MEM is positive. The remaining four variables (EDUQ, 
YEAR, PROQ and REGT) turned out to be negative contrary to their apriori 
expectation of being positive.  
 
The Nagelkerke   of  in the Model Summary indicates that the model is fair, 
Cox & Snell shows that there is 1.3% probability of variation in the predictors are 
explained by the logistic model.  
 
  
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 283 
 
The implications of the reported direction of relationship of the independent variables 
with the dependent variable on the five propositions (P11-15) are as below: 
i. Membership of the internal auditors of the Nigerian financial 
sector with the IIA is positively associated with individual internal auditors’ 
level of competence. This implies that internal auditors’ membership with the 
IIA enhances their level of competence. 
ii. Possession of relevant professional qualifications by the internal 
auditors is negatively associated with the level of competence of individual 
internal auditors. There seems to be no significant relationship between 
professional qualification and internal auditor’s level of competence in the 
Nigerian financial sector according to the analysis. 
iii. Educational qualification of the internal auditors is negatively 
associated with the internal auditors’ competence.  
iv. Average length of years of experience of the individual internal 
auditors is negatively associated with the level of competence of the internal 
auditors in the sector.  
v. There is a negative relationship between the number of formal 
training attended annually by internal auditors and their level of competence.  
 
 The direction of the relationship of the variables PROQ, EDUQ, YEAR and REGT 
established in the above analysis contradicts the expectation and deviates from the 
results documented in literature and consequently creates avenue for further detailed 
study. 
 
In addition, the predictive power of the model appears very low. If variation of about 
98.7% in internal auditors’ level of competence cannot be explained by the five 
independent variables considered in the current study, it means other variables might 
need to be developed and included in the model so that its predictive power can be 
improved upon. The possible imperfection of all the models formulated under the study 
is acknowledged and highlighted in chapter 8 of the thesis (under the limitation of the 
study).  Therefore, improvement of the models in future studies is anticipated. 
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7.4.3       Discussion of findings 
According to the IIA standard 1200 (proficiency and due professional care), internal 
audit engagements must be performed with proficiency and due professional care. To 
elaborate this requirement, the IIA standard 1210 requires that internal auditors must 
possess the knowledge, skills and other competencies needed to perform their individual 
responsibilities. Knowledge, skills and other competencies is a collective term 
interpreted to mean the professional proficiency required of internal auditors to 
effectively carry out their professional responsibilities. Internal auditors by these 
standards are encouraged to pursue their proficiency by obtaining appropriate 
professional certifications and qualifications (Reding et al., 2014). Under this study, 
proficiency or competency is conceptualised to revolve around the following five 
attributes: 
i. internal auditors’ educational qualification 
ii. internal auditors’ professional qualifications 
iii. internal auditors’ length of years of experience 
iv. Regularity of internal auditors’ training; and 
v. internal auditors’ affiliation with the IIA 
 
As the descriptive statistics and the thematic analysis in this chapter revealed, internal 
auditors in the NFS have appropriate level of education and professional qualifications. 
For instance, the minimum educational qualification of the internal auditors in the sector 
was discovered to be first degree. As a matter of fact, 40.9% of the internal auditors 
possess postgraduate degree, and only 8% of them do not possess any relevant 
professional qualification. This is considered appropriate though those with CIA 
certification (10.2%) is considered low and an evidence of disposition of internal 
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auditors to the ICAN as a professional body, considered to be the most recognised 
accounting professional body in Nigeria.  
 
In terms of years of experience of the internal auditors in the practice of internal audit, 
over 70% of them have been in the practice for a period of between 5-10years while 
only 12.5% have been in the practice for less than five years.    
 
The two areas of serious concern arising from the study’s findings are irregularity of 
annual training for the internal auditors and the low level of their membership with the 
IIA. These are key areas that warrant attention and immediate remedial actions 
particularly on the part of the internal auditing community in the sector and in Nigeria 
generally. It is considered that increased interest of the internal auditors in the IIA 
membership may further create the consciousness of regular training in the minds of the 
internal audit professionals in the sector. The low level of CIA certification of the 
internal auditors in the sector revealed by the study can also be improved upon by 
increased membership of the institute (i.e. the IIA). The rare opportunity of becoming a 
member of the IIA prior to any of the institute’s certification is a good strategy of 
promoting interest in the professional body. It is however uncertain if internal auditors 
in the country are aware of this very rare opportunity. 
 
7.5  Chapter summary 
This chapter being the concluding chapter of the analysis of the research data, focused 
the research questions related to the characteristics of the internal auditors. These are 
internal auditors’ objectivity and competence. The two hypotheses (H3 and H4) 
formulated to provide clues on the two research questions related to internal auditors’ 
objectivity and competence were tested through the comprehensive analysis of both the 
quantitative and qualitative data obtained from the questionnaire survey and the semi-
structured interview. The overall finding here is that the study provides no evidence to 
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The results of the analyses indicate irregularity of private contacts between CAEs and 
the audit committee’s chairperson. In addition, the study provides evidence of low level 
of awareness of developments in the field of internal auditing on the part of the internal 
auditors in the NFS. This is revealed by the low level of the IIA membership of the 
internal auditors in the sector. The above findings therefore indicate the need for 
improvement on internal auditors’ objectivity and their level of competence. 
Specifically, the issue of irregularity of private contacts between CAEs and the AC’s 
chairperson on one hand, and the low membership of the internal auditors with the IIA 
on the other hand require prompt attention. 
 
 The next chapter which is the final chapter of the thesis summarises the whole research 
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 Chapter  8 
              Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
8.0 Chapter Overview 
This is the concluding part of the Thesis. This chapter summarises the whole research 
work and also highlights areas opened up for future research endeavours discovered in 
the course of the study. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 8.1 details an 
overview of the work done under the study; section 8.2 summarises the major findings 
of the study in line with the study’s focus and within the conceptual and theoretical 
frameworks set out in chapters 2 and 3 of the thesis. The potential implications of the 
study’s findings for both academic and the profession of the IA in Nigeria and generally 
in the world are discussed in section 8.3. While Section 8.4 highlights the limitations 
and challenges encountered on the study, section 8.5 presents future research 
opportunities uncovered during the study. Finally, section 8.6 reflects on the study’s 
objectives as set out at the beginning of the research with a view to demonstrating how 
the study’s objectives have been met at the end. 
 
8.1.0 General overview of the research work  
This research work sets out to find empirical evidence from the NFS, of the contributory 
power of the IAF as one of the four cornerstones of corporate governance. Whereas 
studies investigating the relationship between IAF and corporate governance abound, 
such studies, aside from concentrating on developed nations with matured internal 
auditing history, also produced tenuous results.  In addition, financial sectors of such 
economies are usually excluded. The curiosity of extending such findings to the 
developing countries with special focus on financial sector which hitherto suffered 
attention spurs this study. In addition, the study also aims at establishing the ideal 
profile of any IAF that desires to add value to organisational corporate governance. 
 
With a view to addressing the study’s objectives in an organised manner, this thesis is 
divided into three main parts. The first part is covered in chapters 1-4 of the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 introduces the main focus of the research work and lays out the background 
to the identified problem which the study attempts to provide solution to. This is done 
by setting out the research objectives and the research questions to be answered by the 
study in chapter 1. These are restated below: 
i. to investigate the level of independence of the IAF from management in 
the Nigerian financial sector. 
ii. to establish the level of adoption of the IIA international standards by 
IAFs for their engagements in the Nigerian financial sector 
iii. to establish the level of objectivity of the individual internal auditors in 
the Nigerian financial sector. 
iv. to establish if the internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector 
possess the required level of proficiency to fulfill their expected roles. 
 
In addition, the chapter also discusses the originality and the main result of the study. 
 
Chapter 2 of the thesis presents the background for the concern about internal auditing 
as a corporate governance in the NFS. This is with a view to appreciating the need to 
include financial sector whenever IAF and corporate governance issues are to be 
discussed. The chapter establishes the study’s conceptual framework. As part of the first 
section of the thesis, chapter 3 focuses the study’s theoretical underpinnings.  In 
establishing the study’s theoretical framework, a combination of three theories (namely 
Agency, TCE, and Institutional theory) was adopted (see Figure 8.2 on page 297).  
 
Extant studies on the study’s subject matter were reviewed in chapter 4. The chapter 
consequently shows the gaps to be filled by this study. Overall, 4 hypotheses were 
formulated for the study. In formulating the hypotheses, the study’s conceptual 
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Figure 8.1 Summary of the study’s theories and concepts 
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competence are examined and discussed based on only institutional theory, while 
agency theory guides the discussions on internal auditors’ objectivity. 
 
The second part of the study, a chapter (chapter 5) deals with discussion of the study’s 
methodology. In addition to discussing the study’s philosophical view point, the choice 
of mixed method involving both quantitative and qualitative methods was justified. 
Also, justification and discussions of both the data collection and analysis method was 
made. The rationale for the researcher’s use of both questionnaire survey and interview 
methods for data collection, and  BLRA and thematic analysis for data analyses instead 
of other available methods of data collection (such as case study and focus group) and 
analysis (e.g. OLS) , are detailed out.  In general, the researcher was able to appreciate 
the fact that the choice of research methodology for any study depends on the focus of 
the study, the type of data required, as well as the antecedents of extant studies. 
 
The third part of the thesis (consisting of chapters 6 and 7) deals with the analysis of the 
research data and discussion of the results of the analyses.  The study’s empirical 
analyses in chapters 6 and 7 employed both descriptive and statistical analyses methods. 
This involves both BLRA and thematic analysis, and the results of the two analyses are 
compared and eventually integrated to make inferences on the 4 hypotheses formulated 
in relation to the research questions. 
 
8.2.0 Findings and conclusion 
 
8.2.1 Main findings  
Following the discussions in chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis, and considering the study’s 
objectives (as stated in chapter 1, and restated in section 8.1.0 of this chapter) the main 
findings of this research work are summarised below: 
 
First, the study provided strong evidence to indicate that the IAFs of the NFS cannot be 
said to be totally independent from the influence of management. The results of both the 
thematic analysis and BLRA of the qualitative and quantitative data showed that the 
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current level of independence of the IAFs in the NFS  warrants significant improvement 
so as to align with the international best practices as being championed by the internal 
audit professional body (i.e. the IIA).  
 
Of the five indicators set to evaluate the current level of IAF’s independence in the 
sector, the study showed that the IAFs in the NFS are only satisfactory in their reporting 
lines and the manner they are sourced, maintained or operating. Evidences from the 
study show that the IAFs in the NFS are deficient in the remaining three areas (i.e. 
appointment and dismissal of CAEs, the status accorded the CAEs within their 
organisational structure, and the frequency of their attendance of audit committee’ 
meetings). Evidences from the study suggest that the audit committees of companies in 
the NFS play very little role in the appointment and dismissal of CAEs in the sector. 
This has the potential of undermining the independence of the IAFs in the sector.  This 
anomaly is also reflected in the inappropriate positioning of the CAEs in the 
organisational’s hierarchy in the sector.  In addition, the study provided evidence of  
irregular attendance of audit committee’ meetings by the heads of IAFs in the sector.   
 
Second, the study has established that the AM of the IAFs of the NFS is not in tune with 
the new order of IA practice (i.e. IIA standards). It is revealed in the study that some 
CAEs and their team members are not conversant at all with the IIA standards let alone 
adopting them for their engagements. 
 
Third, whereas, the study provided no evidence to contest that the internal auditors in 
the NFS are objective, no evidence of using the IAFs in the sector as MTGs for 
potential executives or managers in the sector was however found. In addition, the IAFs 
in the sector were found to have uncensored access to records and information and 
presently do not render consulting services for their organisations. It was however 
discovered that the CAEs of the IAFs in the sector are yet to appreciate the benefits of 
maintaining unofficial private contacts with the chairpersons of their audit committees. 
The study indicates that such private rapport is not prevalent in the NFS. 
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Finally, evidence from the study is not strong enough to conclude that internal auditors 
in the NFS are proficient. Irregularity of training on the part of the internal auditors and 
their low membership with the IIA are the two critical areas of concern established in 
the study.  
 
8.2.2 Situating the Findings within the Context of Applicable Theories: 
(i)  IAF’s independence and Objectivity of the internal auditors 
As discussed in chapter 4, the major theories underpinning this study are Agency 
theory, TCE theory and Institutional theory. 
 
As shown by figure 8.1, both Agency and TCE theories are employed to test hypothesis 
1 and 3 formulated under the first and third objectives (i.e. to establish the level of 
independence of the IAF from management, and to establish the level of objectivity of 
the individual internal auditors in the NFS) of the study. Whereas only Agency theory 
ordinarily would have been employed to address the various issues raised on the IAF’s 
independence and internal auditor’s objectivity, TCE is however, also employed to 
complement agency theory in addressing IAF’s independence. This is simply due to the 
issue of IAF sourcing arrangement that was included as part of the factors determining 
IAF’s independence.  As the overall results about IAF’s level of independence and 
internal auditors’ objectivity in the sector indicate, the non-independence of the IAF 
from the management is an affirmation of the agency theory on the essence of internal 
auditing. According to Agency theory,  IAF is the instrument of bonding initiated by the 
agent (i.e. management) to signal to the owners of the business (i.e. the principal) that 
they are doing their biddings. Drent (2002) contends that most management team still 
perceives IAF as management’s instrument.  The theory indicates that internal audit is 
instituted by the management as one of the bonding costs to demonstrate their 
continuing allegiance to the principal so as to retain their confidence and bonding 
(Adams, 1994). With this argument, one would ordinarily expect that such an 
instrument of bonding instituted by the agent should be under the control and influence 
of the agent (management), and thus should be reliant on its initiator.   
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Argued in another way, internal audit unlike external audit that is part of the principal’s 
instrument of maintaining balance in the principal-agent’s contract is theoretically 
initiated by management to moderate the principal’s cynicism about their loyalty. If this 
position is tenable, then the expectation of independence of IAF from management as 
well as the objectivity of internal auditors truly do not seem logical, and might therefore 
be argued as unfounded. After all, whoever pays the piper, they say is expected to 
dictate the tune.  
 
Arising from the above position on the relevance and adequacy of Agency theory on the 
justification of the essence of internal auditing is a concern on the IIA’s continuous 
standpoint that internal auditing is an independent activity. Agency theory has indeed 
justified the reason the umbilical cord between IAF and management remains ever 
strong and un-detachable. If indeed internal auditing is independent, the question would 
then be ‘’independent of who’’?, definitely not of management as this study has proved. 
In the same vein, can an IAF whose independence is in doubt guarantee objectivity for 
its staff?.  
   
Therefore, further reflections on the IIA’s stance of IAF’s independence and internal 
auditors’ objectivity within the context of Agency theory are warranted. Else, the issue 
of IAF’s independence might forever remain a myth. Except such an allegory is 
demystified, the rationale behind the IIA’s avowal of internal audit as an independent 
activity, and the foundation of internal auditing as a profession would remain vulnerable 
to unending disparagement. Consequently, the results of the study particularly the 
confirmation of lack of independence of IAF from management and the established 
doubts about internal auditors’ objectivity had clearly validate the assumptions of 
agency theory.   
 
As applicable to this study, TCE theory remains the only viable theoretical platform on 
which the issue of IAF’s sourcing can be analysed. As shown in chapter 7 of the thesis, 
cost economy, and asset specificity remain the key consideration in decision relating to 
IAF’s sourcing in the NFS.  The prevalence of in-house IAF in the NFS has its 
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justification in the fundamentals of human assets specificity of TCE theory fully 
discussed in chapter 3. Where highly specialized knowledge or skills is required, and 
the industry or sector contains relatively few firms, internalizing the IAF has been found 
to be cost-effective irrespective of its size. This is so given that investment in the 
required skill acquisition may be less likely to be readily transferable to other clients in 
the sector due to fierce competition that may abound (see Speckle’ et al., 2007).   
 
Overall, combination of both agency theory and the TCE theory applied to shape the 
evaluation of the study’s first and third research questions turned out to be appropriate 
and the findings from the study had also confirmed the validity of the various 
assumptions of the two theories. In addition, the study has demonstrated the suitability 
of multi-theories in addressing issues relating to IAF’s independence  and objectivity of 
internal auditors.  
 
(ii) IAF and Auditing standards 
Till date, IIA remains the only global professional body that is in charge of regulation of 
the practice of internal audit worldwide. This is achieved primarily through 
standardisation of the various activities of the practice. The IIA provides regular 
guidelines on the practice of internal audit. Members of the institute are provided with 
an International Professional Practice Framework (IPPF) to guide their professional 
practice and ensure the highest–quality internal audit results in widely diverse 
environments. The IIA standards are principles-based mandatory guidance. 
 
The standards are meant to achieve the following: 
i. delineate basic principles that represent the practice of IA. 
ii. provide a framework for performing and promoting a broad 
  range of value-added internal auditing 
iii. establish the basis for the evaluation of internal audit 
  performance 
iv. foster improved organisational processes and operations 
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As discussed in chapter 3, Institutional theory provides insights on how regulatory 
requirements, diffusion of practices among organisations and the impact of professions 
generate isomorphic pressures on organisations (Mihret et al. 2012). Similar to other 
professions, most of the guidelines codified as standards are sometimes in response to 
certain incidences and developments affecting the profession. Promulgations from 
security and exchange Commissions (SECs), industry regulators etc, are part of the 
critical factors shaping the internal auditing profession worldwide. The isomorphic 
behaviour of organisations facing similar conditions remains the reference point under 
Institutional theory.  According to DiMaggio and Powell (1983) the three mechanisms 
through which organisational isomorphism occur are: coercive, mimetic and normative. 
These can be interpreted to mean standardisation by ways of legislation, voluntary 
imitation of successful peers and influence from enviable professional bodies 
respectively.   
 
The efforts of the IIA in providing guidelines for the practice of internal audit 
worldwide is a clear example of normative isomorphism, and  has definitely gone a long 
way in legitimising internal auditing as a profession worldwide, and in stimulating 
international best practice among internal auditors globally. The current low level of 
diffusion of the IIA’s guidelines on the practice of internal audit in Nigeria, particularly 
as demonstrated by the low level of internal auditors’ membership of the IIA is 
identified as the major factor for the internal auditors’ low regards for, and adoption of 
the IIA standards for internal audit engagements in Nigeria. Efforts aimed at addressing 
this defect definitely can be fashioned out based on Institutional theory.  
 
The various transformational developments in the field of IAF can be explained using 
this theoretical lens. In addition, the theory actually offers itself a good platform for the 
various recommendations in this chapter. 
(iii) Internal auditors’ competence 
Internal auditors are by the IIA standards 1210 encouraged to demonstrate their 
competence by obtaining appropriate professional certifications and qualifications 
(Reding et al, 2014). Continuous educational offerings of the IIA in form of 
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conferences, seminars, workshops etc. (aimed at unceasing knowledge sharing on 
international best practices of internal auditing), and the various certifications programs 
of the institute are part of the institutional endeavours of the IIA to raise the standard of 
internal auditing profession globally. This is similar to efforts of notable accounting 
professional bodies such as ACCA, and ICAEW.  Therefore, past, present and future 
efforts in these regards can best be explained using institutional theory. 
 
The intertwining of the Agency, TCE and Institutional (‘’ATI’’) theories in the study of 
IAF’s contributions to corporate governance as applied to the study is as shown in the 
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Figure 8.2:‘’ATI’’- the intertwining theories of internal auditing. 
 
 
TCE THEORY (T): 
*IAF’S INDEPENDENCE 
(IAF’s sourcing) 
         
 
          AGENCY THEORY (A): 
• IAF’S INDEPENDENCE 
(Organisational status, 





   IAF 
INSTITUTIONAL 
THEORY (I):  
* IAF’S AUDITING STANDARD 
(standards adoption, and QAIP 
conduct) 
* INTERNAL AUDITORS’ 
OBJECTIVITY (IAF as a Training 
ground, IAF’s dual roles, CAE’s 
private contacts with the AC’s 
chair, IAF’s unrestricted access to 
records and information) 
* INTERNAL AUDITORS’ 
COMPETENCE (educational 
qualifications, Professional 
qualifications,  length of years of 
e experience, regularity of 




The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 298 
 
In general, the above expositions had demonstrated the suitability of multi-theory 
approach of the study and also affirmed the complementary roles of the ‘’ATI’’ theories 
adopted for the study. In summary therefore, this study has proven the need for multiple 
theories in internal auditing research.  
 
8.2.3 Conclusions 
The conclusions to be drawn from the above findings are in two folds. One fold relates 
to the set objectives of the study while the other strand has to do with improvement in 
the theoretical underpinnings of studies on IAF and its relevance in the corporate 
governance’s mosaic. Evidences drawn from the study indicate that the IAFs of the NFS 
are not independent, and the activities of the functions in the sector are not carried out in 
conformity with the IIA standards. Also, the individual internal auditors in the sector are 
also not found to be objective and fully competent.  
 
In addition, a key contribution of this study is the new paradigm of theory integration 
adopted.  The multi-theory framework (‘’ATI’’) espoused is considered an enhanced 
platform through which further research activities in this context can be explored.    
 
Also worth of mentioning as a contribution to knowledge is the development of an 
elaborate conceptual framework and the originality involved in developing workable 
models based on the expansive concept for accessing both the quality of IAF and profile 
of internal auditors of IAF desirous of playing its expected roles as a corporate 
governance mechanism in the contemporary era.  
 
8.3.0 Implications of the study’s findings 
No doubts, the findings in this research work have some consequences for the internal 
auditing community (i.e. both the academic researchers and the professionals of internal 
auditing), as well as for the policy makers of the NFS and financial sector of any 
developing country. This section is therefore aimed at presenting to the readers of the 
thesis the implications of the study’s findings to the mentioned stakeholders.  
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8.3.1 Implications for researchers in internal auditing 
To start with, the framework developed by the researcher in chapter four of the thesis 
and adopted for the study has opened up a new research agenda in internal auditing 
studies. This new paradigm revolves around IAF’s characteristics and the characteristics 

















Figure 8.3: Conceptual framework for studies on IAF and Corporate governance 
 
The espoused research conceptual framework is a response to calls in academics to turn 
new leaf in internal auditing research (see Sarens, 2009). The expansive conceptual 
framework which offers a fresh idea in internal auditing research articulates the various 
viewpoints aimed at advancing internal auditing research in this contemporary period. 
The framework no doubts brings together the various disjointed thoughts and 
approaches offered by scholars pre-occupied with the objectives of shaping research 
works in response to the extended vista of internal auditing being championed by the 
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Furthermore, the three–layered theoretical model –ATI espoused in this study (see 
figure 8.2) offers a more robust theoretical underpinning for future research in internal 
auditing. This study while proving the relevance of Agency, TCE, and Institutional 
theories to studies on internal auditing, has reasonably demonstrated the inadequacy of a 
singular theoretical lens to evaluate the relevance of IAF in the corporate governance’s 
mosaic. This study attempts to be the first to investigate the relevance of IAF to 
corporate governance using a conflation of theories on one hand, and the first study to 
concentrate only on financial sector which hitherto suffered neglect from researchers, on 
the other hand.  It is therefore anticipated that both the conceptual framework and the 
new ‘’ATI’’ tripod theoretical framework will shape the directions of future research 
activities in the field. Application of the multi-theory model is expected to bring 
tremendous improvements in future studies in internal auditing over the extant studies 
with singular theoretical perspectives and tenuous findings.  
 
In addition, the four models developed under the study and applied to test the study’s 
hypotheses empirically while awaiting rigorous scrutiny and possible refinement, is 
considered a modest attempt to open a new path for future studies on internal auditing. 
The anticipated improvement of the models in future study will no doubt push further 
the agenda initiated under this study.  
 
8.3.2 Implications for the Internal auditing profession 
For the internal auditing community in Nigeria, this study has shown serious concerns 
on the acceptance of the legitimacy of the internal auditing profession even amongst the 
internal audit practitioners in the country. The issue of low membership of internal 
auditors with the IIA, justifies the general perception of internal auditing as an offshoot 
of accounting in the country. To begin with, contrary to what obtains in some developed 
countries with matured profile of internal auditing as a profession (e.g. USA) where 
internal auditing is offered as a discipline, till date, internal auditing as broad as it is, 
continues to be offered as a sub-topic in ‘’Auditing ‘’. This is commonly at intermediate 
level in our tertiary institutions. Same phenomenon plays out at graduate level for those 
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pursuing post-graduate degree in Accounting. Institutionalisation of internal auditing as 
a full-fledge course in curriculum of the country’s educational institutions (particularly 
universities) possibly at both the graduate and postgraduate level is strongly 
recommended. As part of her advocacy towards sensitising internal audit professionals 
in the country, on the full fledge professional status of internal auditing, this 
recommendation can be championed by the IIA Nigeria chapter. A case of reference is 
inclusion of Corporate Governance as a topic in ‘’Business policy’’, a mandatory course 
at intermediate level in most universities and Polytechnics in the country. This is with 
the aim of preparing the minds of the young undergraduates on what obtains in the 
corporate world as they prepare to end their undergraduate trainings. The consciousness 
this stint of corporate world image do create in the minds of potential business 
executives cannot be overemphasised.  
 
In addition, with a view to fostering her advocacy of the legitimisation of the internal 
auditing as a discipline, increased advocacy on the part of the IIA (Nigeria chapter) may 
take the form of strategic partnership with one or two reputable tertiary institutions in 
the country with very high status in research activities. To make the task achievable in 
good time, the Nigeria chapter of the IIA may want to consider a strategic coalition with 
relevant stakeholders in the field. For instance the institute may form strategic alliance 
with ACAEBIN, The Institute of Directors (IoD), and Audit Committee Institute of 
Nigeria (ACIN) to float an enduring endowment or Research Chair in internal auditing 
in any of the reputable universities in the country. The recommended strategic alliance 
could then be used towards advancement of research activities specifically in internal 
auditing. This expectedly will deepen interests of scholars and researchers in research 
endeavours that can break new grounds in the field and consequently boost the  image 
of the profession in the country. Similar successful efforts in this regards is the recent 
strategic alliance between  Lagos State Internal revenue services (LIRS) and University 
of Lagos in instituting a research chair known as ‘’Lagos State Professorial chair of Tax 
and Fiscal matters’’. This is aimed at stirring interests in research activities capable of 
enhancing the revenue generation potential of LIRS. Mimicking such initiatives is also 
expected to be helpful. 
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8.3.3 Implications for the regulators  
First, whereas existence of well-constituted and functional audit committees  is usually 
taken  for granted in the NFS  (just like any other country) given its very strict 
regulations from time to time from different regulators, insights from the study about 
the CAEs’ limited interactions with either the committee or its chairperson however 
suggests a need for policy enhancement. The argument here is  of what benefits would 
the existence of audit committee and the functional reporting line of the CAEs to the 
committee be if the required access to such committee through formal and informal 
means are not guaranteed?. As a way out therefore, the various regulators of the sector, 
particularly the CBN, NAICOM and the FRCN might want to come out with specific 
measures capable of promoting unfettered access between the heads of IAFs and their 
organisation’s audit committees, or at least the chairpersons of such committees.  
 
Arising from the internal auditors’ unconsciousness about the significance of the IIA’s 
efforts in regulation of the practice of internal auditing globally is the need for 
standardisation of the practice in the country. Activities of the Financial reporting 
council of Nigeria –FRCN (an agency of Federal government of Nigeria established by 
FRCN Act no.6, of 2011, operating under the supervision of the Federal ministry of 
Industry, Trade and Investment) is an example of antecedents in this direction. FRCN is 
saddled with the responsibility of developing and publishing accounting and financial 
reporting standards to be observed in the preparation of financial statements of public 
entities in Nigeria. Regulators of the NFS and other key stakeholders may want to push 
for a sustainable platform to pursue the recommended standardisation of the practice of 
internal audit in the country. It is not impossible that the identified defects in this 
sector’s IAF may also be inherent in other sectors of the nation’s economy. After all, the 
issue of corporate disorders that pervaded the nation and led to revision of most of the 
governance codes in the country was not peculiar to only the financial sector. No 
doubts, regulators, such as the SEC, CAC, CBN etc. have critical roles to play in 
instituting good corporate governance practices (Adegbite, 2012). Therefore, prompt 
regulatory policy responses are anticipated in this regard.  
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Synergetic alliance needs to be fostered between the IIA, Nigeria chapter and the 
concerned various regulatory bodies. The need for collaboration between accounting 
and auditing professional bodies, and regulators in the country’s financial sector to 
ensure corporate order is part of the recommendations of Adegbite (2012).  
 
Another important area of policy direction is the need for NFS’ regulators particularly 
the CBN to get involved in the appointment (or ratification of appointment) of CAEs for 
firms in the sector. This suggestion is borne out of the identified ambiguity in the IIA 
guidance and provisions of the various corporate governance codes on appointment of 
CAE. The recommendation here is similar to the CBN’s current position on 
appointment of executives, and Chairmen of BoDs of banks in the country. This is to 
further enhance the status of CAEs in the sector and prevent them from antics or 
inimical acts from management capable of compromising their objectivity.  
 
8.4 Limitations of the study 
All research has limitations (Margerison, 2015), and as expected, there are a number of 
limitations of this study as well which should be borne in mind. These are as discussed 
below. 
 
First, the sample size of 88 for the study’s quantitative data is relatively small. This is 
however so given that the study only concentrated on the CAEs and their immediate 
subordinates in the NFS, who in the researcher’s view, are in the best position to 
provide meaningful perceptions on the issue in focus. This limitation definitely poses 
the challenge of generalisation of the study’s findings. Inclusion of other players 
particularly from the remaining three key mechanisms of corporate governance in the 
sector (i.e. audit committee members, external auditors, and management) aside from 
giving future researchers opportunity of improving on the sample size, may also 
produce reinforced evidence for generalisation of findings. A larger spectrum (inclusive 
of other participants in the corporate governance’s domain) was initially contemplated 
for the study but the idea was later jettisoned due to constraint of time and finance. The 
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response rate of 64.7% to the study’s questionnaire survey is however considered a 
compensating factor. 
 
Associating with the above drawback is the concern on the non-randomness of the 
sampling method for the respondents that participated in the questionnaire survey and 
the semi-interview. Participants in the questionnaire survey and semi-structured 
interview were selected based on judgmental and convenience non-probability sampling 
methods. As much as random sampling is known for its high level of statistical 
precision, the targeted respondents for the questionnaire survey are known in advance 
and as such their selection required no scientific method. Likewise, the CAEs that 
participated in the survey were selected based on their willingness to give further 
insights after the questionnaire survey. 
 
Third, the views of the four CAEs that participated in the semi-structured interview 
meant to generate qualitative data required for corroborating the results of the 
questionnaire survey is considered scant. Future study may adopt focus group instead. 
As indicated in chapter 5, focus group option was initially contemplated by the 
researcher due to the formalised grouping of the CAEs in Nigeria particularly those in 
the banking industry of the sector, under the aegis of the ACAEBIN. It however became 
obvious in the course of the data collection that the busy schedule of the targeted 
interviewees may not make focus group feasible particularly within the time frame 
budgeted for data collection on the study. Getting all the targeted CAEs to assemble at a 
particular location for the group interview was impracticable under the situation 
considering the CAE’s heterogeneous schedules, and geographical issues relating to 
respondents’ locations. It is however worth noting that the semi-structured interview is 
to generate corroborating evidence for the study’s quantitative data. Nevertheless, more 
robust corroborative evidence is envisaged from focus group interview.  
 
Fourth, all the explanatory variables and the formulated models adopted for the study 
were defined, and originally formulated by the researcher. As indicated by the 
predictive powers (i.e. NagelkerkeRsquare) of the models, all the four formulated 
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models can be improved upon significantly either by inclusion of additional explanatory 
variables, or refinement of the definitions of the current variables.  
 
8.5 Future research opportunities 
Whereas this study investigates the contributory roles of the IAF in the corporate 
governance’s domain of a developing country-Nigeria, using a conflation of theories 
(ATI) and through four different models, application of this theoretical and conceptual 
framework for future research (particularly in developed countries) will be helpful in 
validating or improving the formulated models, as well as the ‘’ATI’’ theoretical 
framework espoused in this study.  
 
Till date, the only notable study of interrelationship of IAF and corporate governance 
from developing countries remains Barac and van Standen (2009) a study conducted in 
South Africa, which raises doubts about internal auditing’s role as a corporate 
governance mechanism. The outcome of this study with the contradicting position 
necessitates further examination of the contributions of the IAF to corporate governance 
in developing nations. The fact that the data collected under this study is exclusively 
limited to the NFS, further amplifies the need for a cross-cultural (particularly within 
developing countries) approach to the study so as to determine the applicability of the 
study’s results in other developing nations. 
 
Also, similar study but with focus on other sectors aside from the financial sector are 
anticipated in Nigeria. Findings from such study may be used to prove the outcome of 
this research work. Alternatively, as earlier suggested, instead of relying on the 
feedback from the CAEs and their immediate subordinates on the various attributes 
used to assess the IAF’s contributions to corporate governance in the study, other 
corporate governance’s mechanisms (both internal and external) such as external 
auditors, audit committee members and management can be approached for their 
insights on the concepts investigated in the current study. Doing this may produce a 
divergent outcome capable of further deepening existing understanding of the 
contributory power of IAF to corporate governance. 
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Furthermore, this study revealed internal auditors’ very low interest in affiliating with 
the IIA. This observed low level of association with the internal auditing’s global 
professional body was linked with the CAE’s dearth of knowledge of the IIA standards. 
Contrarily, majority of the internal auditors in the sector are members of the ICAN, the 
accounting professional body in the country. It is therefore desirable to investigate 
empirically, the main reason for the low membership of the IIA among the internal 
auditors in the country. The result of such studies will certainly be of immense 
contributions to the Nigeria chapter of the IIA. In the same vein, a study that 
investigates the perception of management about the use of the IIA standards for their 
internal audit engagements will be an interesting endeavour and will throw more light 
on the motivation for embrace of international best practices of internal auditing by 
IAFs in the country. 
 
Another important potential area of study uncovered under this study relates to the level 
of coordination between the IAF and audit committee. Specifically, association of 
Existence of audit committee (and adequacy of the committee’s membership) with 
IAF’s independence require further investigation. The basis of the negative relationships 
observed between audit committee’s existence and IAF’s independence, between 
adequacy of audit committee’s membership and IAF’s independence needs further 
verification. These areas need to be explored further particularly bearing in mind the 
limited formal and informal access of the CAEs to audit committee or audit committee’s 
Chairperson in the sector. 
 
Finally, part of the findings of this study is that IAF of the NFS do not engage in 
consulting activity for their organisation. It would be interesting to know whether 
management of firms in the sector are yet to appreciate the benefits their organisations 
can get from such consulting activities from their IAF, or the internal auditors 
themselves do not possess the required skills for this seeming new role, or they do but 
are not marketing their consulting competency to management possibly because of the 
potential threats of conflict of interest that may arise. Also, it is not impossible that the 
  
The Internal Audit Function as a Corporate Governance Mechanism in a Developing 
Economy: An Empirical Study of the Nigerian Financial Sector. Page 307 
 
IAF’s non-engagement in consulting activity do contribute to internal auditors’ level of 
objectivity. The situation might be different if the IAFs in the sector do engage in 
consulting activities for management. A study of internal auditors’ objectivity, focusing 
specifically on IAFs that carry out consultancy for their management (say in other 
sector) is also desirable to clear this doubt.   
 
8.6 Reflections on the research objectives 
As indicated in chapter 1 of the thesis, the research work was embarked upon to achieve 
four main objectives: first to investigate the level of independence of the IAF from 
management in the NFS, and second to establish the level of adoption of the IIA 
international standards by IAFs for their engagements in the NFS. These two research 
objectives have been met. In chapter 6 of the thesis, the researcher employed a 
combination of Agency, TCE and Institutional framework (acronymed ‘’ATI’’) 
theories, in conjunction with the models 1 and 2 formulated by the researcher in chapter 
5 to discuss the results of both the quantitative and qualitative data analyses in testing 
the 2 hypotheses on the objectives.  The findings of the investigation indicate that the 
IAFs of the NFS could not be said to be independent, and the engagements of the 
functions are also not in alignment with the IIA international standards. 
 
The third and fourth objectives of the study were to establish the level of objectivity of 
the individual internal auditors in the Nigerian financial sector, and to establish if the 
internal auditors in the NFS possess the required level of proficiency to fulfill their 
expected roles. These objectives were pursued vigorously in chapter 7 of the thesis 
through the 2 hypotheses formulated thereon. Here, only the Agency and Institutional 
theories provided the required guidance. At the end, it was established that internal 
auditors in the NFS are not objective and also do not possess the required level of 
proficiency. 
 
The eventual conflation of theories adopted for the study has greatly enhanced the initial 
understanding about internal auditing theorisation. In addition, the study, by carefully 
leaning on Sarens (2009) on the ideal paradigm through which the contributory power 
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of IAF as a corporate governance’s mechanism can be studied, has resulted in a more 
concise conceptual framework that revolves around IAF’s characteristics and the 
characteristics of the individual internal auditors. Thus,  paving way for meaningful and 
focused approach to studies on IAF in this present era when increased attention is 
directed towards internal audit as a mechanism of corporate governance. 
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APPENDIX D: THE RESEARCH INSTRUMENT 
QUESTIONNAIRE ON A RESEARCH ON ‘’THE INTERNAL AUDIT AND 
    CORPORATE GOVERNANCE’’. 
The questionnaire 
This questionnaire is categorised into four different sections (A,B,C,& D). Whereas 
section A is on respondent’s bio-data, the remaining sections focus on different areas of 
the research as indicated below.  
Section B. 
This section addresses the issue bothering on Independence of the Internal Audit 
Function (or department), hereafter referred to as “IAF” and Objectivity of 
individual Internal Auditors in Nigerian Financial sector. 
Section C 
Auditing methodology as recommended by the International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing hereafter referred to as “Standards” adopted 
by the Nigerian financial sector’s IAF is addressed under this section. 
Section D 
This section focuses the characteristics of individual internal auditors.  
SECTION A  
1. Organisation’s line of business:  
(a) Commercial Banking[ ] (b) Mortgage Banking [  ] (c) Development banking[ ]  




2. Respondents’ highest Educational Qualifications: (a) HND[    ] (b) B.Sc. [  ]  
(c) MSc/MA/MBA [      ] (d) Ph.D. [     ]   
 
3. Professional qualification: (a) None [    ]  (b) ACA/FCA [    ] (c) ACCA [  ] 




4. What is your position in the organisation? 
(a) Junior Officer         [        ]      
(b) Intermediate/Supervisor 
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(c) Manager      [        ]      
(d) Senior Manager   [        ]      
(e) Chief Audit Executives  [        ]      
 
5. Can you say your Internal Audit function is playing active roles in your 
organisation’s  Corporate governance? 
(a) Yes [     ]      (b) No [      ]  
 
SECTION B (Independence of IAF and Objectivity of internal auditors) 
 
6. How is your organisation’s Internal Audit Function structured? 
(a)  Fully in-house [  ] 
(b)  Fully outsourced [  ] 
(c) Co-sourced (i.e. partly in-housed, and partly outsourced) [     ] 
 
7. Does your company have a functional Audit committee? 
(a) Yes [     ] (b) No [      ]  
 
8. In your opinion, are the members of your company’s Audit committee suitably 
qualified based on the CBN or Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)’s 
Code of corporate governance? 
(a) Strongly agreed [  ]    (b)Agreed [  ]  (c) Disagree [  ]  (d) Strongly disagree [  ]           
 
9. How often does your Audit committee meet annually? 
(a) Once  [   ] (b) 2 times [   ]  (c) 3 times [   ] (d) 4 times [    ]  
(e ) more than 4 times [   ] 
 
10.  How often is your company’s CAE invited to Audit committee’s meetings? 
(a)Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]  (d) Rarely [  ]          
(e) Never [  ]    
   
11. In your opinion, do you think on annual basis, the audit committee of your 
company usually devote enough time to discuss internal audit issues/reports?  
(a) Strongly agreed [  ]    (b)Agreed [  ]  (c) Disagree [  ]  (d) Strongly disagree [  ]           
 
12. The CAE has regular private contacts with the audit committee (Chair/or 
individual members).  
(a) Strongly agreed [  ]    (b)Agreed [  ]  (c) Disagree [  ]  (d) Strongly disagree [  ]           
 
13. Who is mandated to appoint, dismiss and evaluate the head of your organisation’s 
internal audit function? 
          (a) Audit committee [       ]  (b) Management [       ] 
           (c ) Other (Please specify)………………………………………………………… 
 
14. Who approves the internal audit budget?  
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(a) The CEO [    ]  
(b) The CFO  [  ] 
(c) The Board  or Audit Committee      [     ] 
 
15. What is the hierarchical level of the Head of your Internal Audit Function? 
(a) Below Executive Management level [     ]  
(b) Parallel to the Executive Management level  [     ] 
(c) Above Management level   [     ] 
 
16. Does your organisation have Internal audit charter? 
(a) Yes [       ]    (b) No [      ] 
 
17. If your answer to question 16 above is “Yes”, is your Internal audit charter 
approved by the board (or audit committee) and annually represented? 
(a)Yes        [    ]      (b) No   [      ] 
 
18.  What is the staff strength of your internal audit function?  
      (a) less than 10 [     ] (b) between 10-20  [      ]  
      (c) between 21-40 [    ]    (d) Greater than 40 [       ] 
 
19. In your opinion, is there a separation between the CAE’s functional and 
administrative reporting in your organisation? 
(a)Yes        [    ]      (b) No   [      ] 
  
20. If your answer to question 19 is ‘’Yes’’, to whom does your organisation’s Internal 
Audit Function report functionally?  
(a) The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) [  ]  
(b) The Chief Finance Officer (CFO)   [  ] 
(c) The Head of Risk Management    [  ] 
(d) Audit Committee      [  ] 
 
21. Does your department have full and unrestricted access to records and information 
required in the course of carrying out your work? 
(a) Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]  (d) Rarely [  ]   
(e) Never [  ]    
 
 
22. Is it common for management to implement internal audit’s recommendations? 
(a)  Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]  (d) Rarely [  ]   
      (e) Never [  ]   
 
23. Is it common for internal auditors to be posted to other functions within your 
organisation?        (a)  Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]   
(d) Rarely [  ]  (e) Never [  ]    
 
24. Does your IAF engage in consulting activity for the management?       
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(a)Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]  (d) Rarely [  ]          
(e) Never [  ]    
 
 SECTION C (Auditing methodology)   
25. Who approves your annual audit plan? 
(a) Management [  ](b) Audit Committee  [  ] (c) The CEO   [  ] (d) The CFO [  ] 
26. Are your internal audit engagements conducted in accordance with the 
International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing ? 
(a)Always [  ]    (b) Most of the time [  ]  (c) Occasionally [  ]  (d) Rarely [  ]          
(e) Never [  ]    
 
27. If your answer to question 26 above is not “ALWAYS”, what is or are the 
reason(s) for not using IIA’s International standards for the Professional Practice 
of Internal Auditing  
(a) Not familiar with the standards [  ] 
(b) Standards or practice Advisories are too complex [  ] 
(c) The standards are too costly to comply with  [  ] 
(d) IIA’s standards are too time consuming  [  ] 
(e) Inadequate IAF staff  [   ] 







28. Have you performed a quality assurance on the Internal Audit Function in the past 
five years? 
(a) Yes [     ]     (b) No [   ] 
 
29. Does your organisation have a formalised enterprise wide risk assessment 
Framework? 
(a) Yes         [  ]  (b) No [     ] 
 
30. Does your organisation have a formal risk management department? 
(a) Yes    [  ]     (b) No [     ] 
 
 SECTION D (Internal Auditors’ Characteristics)  
31. Are you a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA)? 
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Yes  [  ] (b) No [  ] 
 
32. If you are a member of the IIA, how long have you been a member of the institute 
(IIA)? 
(a)  Since a year ago [  ]  (b) since 2 years ago [  ] 
( c ) Since 3 years ago [  ] (d) more than 3 years ago [  ] 
 
33. What percentage of your team has one or more relevant professional qualifications 





34. In your opinion, what is the average length of years of experience of your team? 
(a) Less than 5 years [     ] 
(b) 5-10years   [   ] 
(c) Greater than 10 years [     ] 
 
35. On average, how many formal training have you attended over the last 24months 
period or since you have been in the IAF if less than two years?.  
            (a) 1 time [  ]   (b) 2 times [  ] ( c ) 3 times [  ] (4) 4 times [  ]   
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APPENDIX E: THE INTERVIEW GUIDE 
   
INTERNAL AUDITING AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE NIGERIAN FINANCIAL SECTOR 
INTERVIEW GUIDE 
(A) INDEPENDENCE OF INTERNAL AUDIT FUNCTION 
1. Could you kindly describe the organisational structure of your internal 
audit function : 
i. If In-house, when was the department established, and why? 
ii. If Outsourced, why and what motivate the decision 
iii. If co-sourced (what areas of engagement are retained in-house and 
why?) 
2. What are the composition and professional background of your audit 
committee members (are there any documents that can show the 
information?) 
3. From your experience how is your Audit committee strengthening your 
internal audit function?. (AC’s input to your audit plan, regularity of private 
contacts between the CAE and the Audit committee Chair, involvement in 
appointment, evaluation  and dismissal of Chief Audit Executive) 
 
(B) OBJECTIVITY OF INTERNAL AUDITORS 
1. Could you please describe the career path of internal auditors in your bank 
(How frequent are your internal auditors transferred to other department within 
the bank) 
2. How is internal audit activities perceived in your bank? (Particularly on 
areas of Governance, Risk management and Control). 
3. What is your position on combination of assurance and consulting (do you 
envisage any conflict of interest arising from the dual role?) 
 
(C) AUDITING METHODOLOGY 
1. What standards do you apply in the conduct of your internal audit 
engagements? (If International Standards for the Professional Practice of 
Internal Auditing, to what extent do you comply with the standards?) 
2. What is the level of your Quality Assurance and Improvement Program 
(QAIP)? (How often do you conduct both internal and external assessment, 
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(D) CHARACTERISTICS OF INDIVIDUAL INTERNAL AUDITORS 
1. What are the composition and experience level of internal auditors in your 
bank? (adequacy of number of staff, team members years of experience, skills, 
qualifications, industry expertise of the team members) 
2. Overall, what is the level of your internal auditors that belong to the 
Institute of Internal Auditors? (In addition, how frequent do you send your 
staff for training, and what type of skills do you consider important for your 
staff) 
*What roles do you think your internal audit function is playing on your organisation’s 
Corporate governance, and how do you assess the contribution of your internal audit 
department to your organisation? 
**Is there anything else you think I should know about your internal audit function? 
 
 
